July 2–9, 2025
The current U.S. policy on Ukraine remains situational and tactical. President Donald Trump is demonstrating flexibility and a willingness to maneuver politically. His increasingly critical stance toward Russian President Vladimir Putin and the partial resumption of military aid to Ukraine (following a temporary pause introduced on July 1, 2025) appear to reflect a desire to maintain a minimal balance of power in the Russia-Ukraine war—preventing Ukraine’s military collapse while avoiding deep U.S. involvement in the conflict.
The true scale and long-term nature of American support will only become clear if, for example, new sanctions are imposed on Russia or if new aid packages are approved that are not tied to the commitments made by former President Joe Biden’s administration. Until then, all statements and deliveries should be seen as part of a tactical diplomatic strategy aimed at preserving U.S. influence in negotiations and preventing Russia from gaining unilateral advantage.
On July 1, 2025, the United States temporarily suspended deliveries of several critical types of weaponry to Ukraine. The official reason cited was the need for a logistical audit of Pentagon stockpiles following large-scale missile shipments to Israel's air defense systems amid Iranian attacks. The White House emphasized that this was a temporary and routine procedure to verify inventories. The affected arms were drawn from aid packages previously authorized under President Biden (most of which are now nearly depleted). About 10–15% of the total list of military supplies—approximately 7–12 out of 80 items—were suspended.
The pause impacted the following items from the U.S. aid package:
– 30 Patriot missiles (PAC-3 MSE) — critical for air defense;
– 142 Hellfire missiles (AGM-114) — for strike drones and armored vehicles;
– 252 GMLRS missiles for HIMARS;
– 25 Stinger missiles — MANPADS for defense against drones and aircraft;
– 8,496 rounds of 155mm artillery shells;
– 92 AIM-7 Sparrow missiles — short-range surface-to-air missiles;
– 125 AT-4 grenade launchers — lightweight anti-tank weapons. Only those shipments deemed essential to U.S. national security were suspended. At the same time, the U.S. continued to honor prior commitments, maintaining intelligence and analytical support, targeting assistance, and early missile warning systems.
The pause was not only a technical measure but also a political bargaining tool with Russia. The Trump administration likely expected it to soften the Kremlin’s position. However, the phone call between Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin on July 3 revealed Moscow’s unwillingness to make concessions—even minimal ones. The Kremlin took a hardline stance and intensified its shelling of Ukrainian territory, which sharply increased following the start of the aid pause.
On the night of July 4, 2025, Russian forces launched over 550 missile and drone strikes on Ukraine. Just a few days later, on the night of July 9, a new grim record was set with 728 drones launched against Ukraine. In June 2025 alone, Russia deployed a record-breaking 5,337 drones (some sources report 5,438), a 35% increase compared to the previous month.
This escalation disappointed the U.S. administration and was a key factor in the White House's decision to resume defensive arms deliveries to Ukraine after a brief pause.
During a dinner with Israeli Prime Minister B. Netanyahu on July 7, U.S. President D. Trump announced plans to provide Ukraine with more weapons: “We’ll send a bit more weaponry — we have to. They need to be able to defend themselves. They’re being hit very hard right now, and it’s going to get even worse. We must supply more weapons, primarily defensive, because the strikes are very intense. A lot of people are dying.” Trump also expressed personal frustration with Putin’s actions, stating, “I’m disappointed that Vladimir Putin hasn’t stopped. I’m not happy with Putin at all!”
At a U.S. Cabinet meeting on July 8, 2025, Trump confirmed the delivery of an additional 10 Patriot air defense system missiles to Ukraine. However, this number pales in comparison to the 30 missiles included in the paused aid package from the Biden administration, falling far short of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ needs to effectively counter Russia’s massive missile strikes.
Later, President Trump publicly reiterated his dissatisfaction with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s actions, condemning the scale of violence in the war against Ukraine. During the Cabinet meeting, he emphasized that Russia was “killing too many people” and reaffirmed the decision to send additional defensive weaponry to Ukraine, despite the Pentagon’s earlier pause in supplies.
This marked the second time in 24 hours that Trump voiced this stance, highlighting his frustration with Putin’s unwillingness to pursue a ceasefire — an initiative supported by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. “He [Putin] is killing too many people, so we’re sending some defensive weapons to Ukraine, and I’ve approved it,” Trump told reporters.
In parallel, Trump noted that he is closely reviewing a Senate bill proposing tough sanctions against Russia and countries purchasing Russian oil, gas, or uranium. According to Trump, the bill is advisory and includes certain presidential exemptions, increasing its likelihood of passing both chambers of Congress.
Senator Lindsey Graham expressed confidence that the Senate will announce sanction measures this week. He noted that the new bill grants broader authority to the president and aligns with Trump’s position, increasing its likelihood of passage.
Pentagon Press Secretary Sean Parnell confirmed that defensive weapons will be sent to Ukraine to bolster its self-defense capabilities, despite an earlier temporary pause for reviewing U.S. weapons stockpiles.
The push for tough sanctions has garnered support from key Trump allies, notably former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, who emphasized that the bill sends a strong signal to the Kremlin.
President Donald Trump’s actions and statements indicate a partial shift in his rhetoric toward Russia and Vladimir Putin compared to earlier periods.
For the first time in a while, Trump has adopted a stance focused on intensifying sanctions and providing additional weapons to Ukraine. This approach appears pragmatic and reactive, driven by the need to address international criticism and pressure from Congress and his Republican Party allies.
The resumption of arms deliveries and support for the sanctions package reflect the Trump administration’s intent to project toughness and adaptability in response to Russia’s escalation. However, the emphasis on “additional defensive weapons” and flexibility in sanctions suggests that the White House remains reluctant to commit to large-scale, long-term aid packages for Ukraine, favoring targeted, limited measures instead.
In essence, the Trump administration continues to monitor and control the conflict, minimizing resource expenditure while awaiting shifts in the balance of power to potentially resume a role as an arbiter or mediator. Following an unsuccessful attempt to nudge Moscow toward concessions in peace talks, the White House has reverted to supplying weapons to Ukraine, balancing its "America First" rhetoric with the need to prevent Russia from swiftly gaining a unilateral advantage on the battlefield.
Nevertheless, the U.S. retains the prerogative to adjust the scope and terms of its support based on the evolving situation and diplomatic negotiations.
Against this backdrop, the Kremlin is deliberately displaying public calm and restraint in its assessments. Thus, Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov noted that "we heard a very important statement from Trump that resolving the Ukrainian conflict turned out to be much more complicated than he initially thought." "We are quite calm about this. Trump generally has a rather tough style," Peskov said. According to him, Moscow desires "the continuation of dialogue with Washington and the restoration of bilateral relations" and doubts that there are fundamental disagreements: "There is a desire to resolve the issue through political and diplomatic means... but the complexity of the issue does not allow for an immediate solution."
Overall, Moscow's reaction reflects a pragmatic approach, leaving room for further diplomatic maneuvering while maintaining the possibility of continuing the negotiation process with the U.S. and avoiding escalation. Peskov's statement indicates that the Kremlin views Trump's words more as an element of tactical play and bargaining rather than a serious threat. Moscow hopes that American statements will not yet translate into large-scale concrete actions (such as serious sanctions or new major military aid packages to Ukraine).
Military Operations in Ukraine
The pace of Russian troop advances remains high on the front lines. From July 2 to July 9, 2025, Russian forces captured an additional 172 km² of Ukrainian territory, now controlling a total of 113,888 km².
The most intense fighting is occurring on Ukraine’s eastern and southern fronts (Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia regions) as well as in the northern border areas (Sumy region).
In Donetsk region, the fiercest battles continue around the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration south of Kostiantynivka, as well as in the cities of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk. Russian forces have also advanced toward the Dnipropetrovsk region border along the Komar-Fedorivka line and near the settlement of Piddubne.
In Kharkiv region in the east, Russian troops are engaged in fighting around the city of Kupiansk and have advanced toward Sviatohirsk.
In Sumy region in northern Ukraine, the advance of Russian forces has slowed somewhat, and as of July 9, 2025, they control 208 km², unchanged from the previous week. Last week, Ukrainian Armed Forces successfully repelled an attack attempt in the "gray zone" north of Sumy, near Yablunivka and Andriivka. Fighting continues for key highways used by the Ukrainian army for logistics, particularly the Sumy–Sudzha road. The distance to the city of Sumy has been reduced to approximately 20 km.
In Zaporizhzhia region, Russian forces have occupied new positions southeast of the settlement of Kamenske and along the banks of the Kakhovka Reservoir.
Map of military operations.
Donetsk region.
Sumy Region.
Possible Personnel Changes in the Ukrainian Government
After July 15, significant personnel reshuffles may occur in the Ukrainian government. The focus is on the potential resignation of Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal and a subsequent partial renewal of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. However, rumors circulating (including in Western media) about a large-scale restructuring of the Cabinet have not yet been definitively confirmed.
The legality of a complete government resignation during wartime remains a subject of political and legal debate. According to Article 10 of Ukraine's Law "On the Legal Regime of Martial Law," the termination of the government's powers is not permitted during martial law without corresponding legislative amendments. Some members of parliament have emphasized this, noting that any attempts to overhaul the Cabinet while bypassing this provision would be legally vulnerable and politically risky. According to sources in the Parliament, the likelihood of a full government resignation and the appointment of a new Cabinet is currently assessed as "50-50." Meanwhile, a more realistic scenario, with about a 60% probability, involves a partial reshuffle of the Cabinet while retaining Denys Shmyhal as Prime Minister. In this case, the changes could be presented as internal rotations within the existing government, allowing compliance with legal restrictions and avoiding the formal procedure of a government resignation.
Nevertheless, there are those who promote the idea of an imminent major personnel change in the government, including the Prime Minister, with some even suggesting possible new compositions of the Cabinet of Ministers:
- Denys Shmyhal may step down as Prime Minister without a new appointment.
- Yulia Svyrydenko may become the new Prime Minister.
- Oleksiy Kuleba could be appointed as First Deputy Prime Minister.
- Oleksiy Sobolev, First Deputy Minister of Economy, may take the position of Minister of Economy.
- Olha Stefanishyna will retain her position as Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration; her chances of being appointed as Ambassador to the U.S. are low. If the Ministry of Justice is taken from her, it will be headed by Iryna Mudra, Deputy Head of the Presidential Office.
- Mykhailo Fedorov will remain Deputy Prime Minister for Digital Transformation.
- Oleksiy Chernyshov will leave his position as Deputy Prime Minister for National Unity, and his ministry will be reorganized.
- Oleh Nemchynov will step down as Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers, with Kostiantyn Maryevych appointed as the new minister.
- Matviy Bidnyi will remain Minister of Youth and Sports.
- Herman Halushchenko (Ministry of Energy) and Svitlana Hrynchuk (Ministry of Ecology) will retain their positions.
- Daryna Marchak will replace Oksana Zholnovych as Minister of Social Policy.
- Nataliya Kalmykova will leave her position as Minister for Veterans’ Affairs, with the ministry’s future unclear.
- Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko may take the position of Deputy Prime Minister for Security and Defense.
- Vitaliy Koval (Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food) will retain his position provided he maintains support.
- Oksen Lisovyi and Viktor Lyashko will leave their posts as Ministers of Education and Healthcare, respectively; replacements are currently unknown.
- Finance Minister Serhiy Marchenko is likely to leave his position, with Denys Uliutin or Roksolana Pidlasa being considered as candidates.
- Andriy Sybiha will remain Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- Herman Smetanin (Ministry of Strategic Industries) has a 50% chance of retaining his position.
- Mykola Tochytskyi will leave his post as Minister of Culture and Information Policy, likely transitioning to diplomatic work.
- Rustem Umerov will remain Minister of Defense.
The most likely candidate to replace Denys Shmyhal as Prime Minister, should he resign, is First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy Yulia Svyrydenko. Svyrydenko is considered close to the Head of the Presidential Office, Andriy Yermak, which strengthens her position as Shmyhal’s potential successor and could facilitate improved relations with the new U.S. administration. Yulia Svyrydenko was involved in signing a subsoil agreement with the U.S. on behalf of Ukraine.
Discussions are also underway regarding the replacement of Ukraine’s Ambassador to the United States, Oksana Markarova. Potential candidates for this role include Denys Shmyhal, Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Olha Stefanishyna, Minister of Defense Rustem Umerov, and Minister of Energy Herman Halushchenko.
The primary motivations behind these potential changes include the Presidential Office’s desire to strengthen its vertical power structure, enhance government manageability, and prepare for negotiations with Western partners. A significant factor driving these possible reshuffles is the low trust rating of the Cabinet of Ministers. According to a Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) survey from early 2025, only 20% of citizens trust the government (down from 26% in December 2023), while distrust has risen to 53%. This negative trust balance threatens the image of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself.
Recently, rumors have emerged about the possible resignation of Kyrylo Budanov, Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense. Currently, there are no direct public indications of preparations for such a decision. However, it is worth noting that such rumors have surfaced in the information space multiple times before. Kyrylo Budanov is one of Ukraine’s most prominent political figures and consistently ranks among the top three Ukrainian leaders in public trust, alongside former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Valerii Zaluzhnyi and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. According to a SOCIS/Barometer/NV poll from June 26, 2025, Budanov ranked second with a trust rating of 55.3%. Per a “Rating” survey conducted on July 4-5, 2025, Budanov placed third with a trust rating of 56%. Such high public support and significant political capital may explain the recurring rumors about his potential rotation or attempts to pressure him.
In parallel, Western media has intensified criticism of Andriy Yermak, Head of the Presidential Office. Notably, The Economist and earlier *Politico* published articles highlighting his excessive influence and unpopularity in the U.S. Former Trump advisor Steve Cortes, writing for *Censor.NET*, commented on serious corruption allegations surrounding Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Chernyshov, stating that their dismissal was allegedly initiated by Yermak, further fueling a negative information environment toward him in Washington.
This may indicate a deliberate campaign (rumors suggest some publications could have been initiated by former Presidential Office Head Andriy Bohdan or other opposition figures) aimed at creating conditions for Yermak’s potential resignation in the future. While it cannot be entirely ruled out that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy might sacrifice Yermak to maintain support from Western allies, it appears that no such extreme measure has been demanded of him yet.
Sociology
According to a survey by the Sociological Group "Rating" conducted on July 4-5, 2025, the majority of Ukrainians maintain a degree of optimism regarding continued U.S. support for arms supplies, despite current political turbulence and ambiguous statements from U.S. President Donald Trump. Only 11% of Ukrainians expect the previous levels of aid to be fully maintained, while 53% anticipate partial support. About 25% believe aid will be minimal, and only 8% are convinced it will cease entirely.
Regarding efforts to achieve peace and end the war, Ukrainian society largely views President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s actions positively: 60% of respondents believe the head of state is doing "everything possible." Additionally, 19% think he is making some efforts, while 10% consider his actions insufficient, and 9% see no activity from the president in this regard. These figures have remained virtually unchanged since June 2025, fluctuating within the margin of error.
However, trust in Ukraine’s negotiation team has noticeably declined over the past month. In June 2025, 48% of citizens believed negotiators were doing "everything possible" to achieve peace, but by early July, this figure dropped to 36%. The number of those who consider the negotiators’ efforts insufficient also rose from 13% to 18%.
As for overall public trust in politicians, former Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Valerii Zaluzhnyi remains the leader in public opinion, with 73% trust (18% distrust). President Volodymyr Zelenskyy ranks second with a trust rating of 67% against 29% distrust. Notably, since the beginning of 2025, trust in Zelenskyy has increased by 10%, while distrust has decreased by the same percentage.
The level of trust in Kyrylo Budanov, Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, remains consistently high, placing him third among Ukrainian politicians in terms of popularity (56% trust versus 22% distrust). However, about 18% of respondents know nothing about him.
In fourth place by trust level is Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces, with 41% trust, consistent with the beginning of the year. However, his distrust level remains notably high at 37%.
Against the backdrop of overall trust ratings for politicians, Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stands out, with distrust rising to 48%, while only 25% of citizens trust him. This indicator has remained virtually unchanged since August 2024.
Thus, despite instability and contradictory foreign policy signals, Ukrainians continue to expect sustained international support. There is notably high trust in President Zelenskyy personally regarding peace negotiations. However, the significant decline in trust toward the negotiation team may indicate a need for improved communication and transparency in the negotiation process with the public.
Economic Situation in Ukraine
In the first six months of 2025, Ukraine attracted $22 billion in external financing out of an annual plan of $39.3 billion. The majority of these funds came through collective mechanisms of the G7 and EU (ERA), as well as individual tranches from Japan, the IMF, and the World Bank. Specifically, $17.6 billion was provided through G7 and EU mechanisms (from frozen Russian assets), $3.8 billion through the EU’s Ukraine Facility program (concessional loans and grants), $0.4 billion from the IMF, $0.19 billion from Japan, and $0.05 billion from the World Bank. Since the start of the full-scale war, the total volume of external aid to Ukraine has exceeded $137 billion.
As of July 1, 2025, Ukraine’s international reserves reached $45.07 billion, a 1.2% increase compared to May, with a growth of approximately $0.52 billion. This increase is attributed to significant inflows from international partners, which offset both the National Bank’s net currency sales and payments on foreign currency debt. In June, under the G7 ERA initiative, $4.0873 billion was transferred to government accounts at the National Bank, including $1.6896 billion from Canada, $1.2470 billion from the World Bank, and $1.1507 billion from the European Union. A total of $524 million was allocated to servicing and repaying foreign currency state debt.
The key difference this year is the absence of direct bilateral financing from the United States: since the beginning of 2025, U.S. budgetary support has not been provided due to a policy shift in the White House following Donald Trump’s victory. The U.S. now participates solely in multilateral G7 initiatives, without providing independent grants or loans. Previously, U.S. support was primarily in the form of grants, which significantly reduced the debt burden on Ukraine’s budget, and was also implemented through separate large-scale military aid packages funded outside the main budget framework.
The shift in the structure of external aid is creating new strategic risks for Ukraine. The key risks are related to dependence on collective decisions and the political will of European partners, the need for each tranche to go through complex and multi-stage approval processes, and high sensitivity to internal political dynamics in EU countries. As a result, Ukraine is becoming increasingly reliant not only on the volume of international support but also on the conditions and mechanisms of its provision. Unlike previous years, when a significant portion of U.S. aid was provided as grants, the current architecture of external financing is predominantly based on multilateral instruments, with the EU, G7, IMF, and other international organizations playing a leading role.
The sustainability of Ukraine’s macroeconomic system is increasingly determined not only by the government’s internal decisions but also by the willingness of international donors to continue financing on their terms. Access to international resources is now closely tied to meeting a range of structural, macroeconomic, and institutional requirements—from managing budget deficits and implementing fiscal reforms to advancing anti-corruption policies and increasing governance transparency.
Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovska, Andrii Timchenko
For the Ukrainian Institute of Politics
