SITUATION IN UKRAINE: February 27 – March 5, 2025

After the scandal that took place in the White House on February 28, 2025, Ukraine, with the support and guidance of its European allies, primarily the United Kingdom and France, is trying to restore relations with the United States. The statement by Ukrainian President V. Zelensky about his willingness to work under the leadership of U.S. President Donald Trump is an attempt to re-establish dialogue with the American side. The subsequent reaction of the White House and Trump’s acceptance of Zelensky’s apology became an important diplomatic moment for Ukraine, allowing tensions in bilateral relations with the U.S. to ease.

At the same time, there are signs that the U.S. received this statement from the Ukrainian President with caution. Despite Zelensky's appeal being received with restrained optimism in the U.S., it has not yet led to the resumption of American aid to Ukraine. All previously imposed restrictions on military aid supplies, USAID activities in Ukraine, and intelligence sharing remain in effect.

On the one hand, Trump, in his speech to Congress, used Zelensky’s words to demonstrate progress in restoring relations. The U.S. President presented the situation as a successful step toward negotiations, stating that both Ukraine and Russia were ready to return to a peaceful resolution. However, this may be an exaggeration.

On the other hand, Washington expects concrete steps from Ukraine: readiness to sign a ceasefire, conclude an expanded economic agreement with the U.S., and align its policy with American interests instead of those of the UK or France.

The further development of events will depend on both the actions of the Ukrainian leadership and the position of the new U.S. administration.

The issue of a deal on the use of natural resources remains unresolved. It is unclear whether Ukraine will sign the agreement, but it is evident that the U.S. intends to revise the terms in its favor by making them stricter. The previous version of the agreement was too vague and did not contain guarantees for the return of U.S. funds already spent.

Before the Ukrainian President visited the U.S., Ukrainian media published a framework agreement. Its text was largely general and declarative, while the details and conditions of the deal were not disclosed publicly.

At that time, the parties divided the agreement into two documents: first – The Framework Agreement – a declarative document, the text of which was published by Ukrainian media; second – The Investment Fund Agreement – which should outline the positions of the parties, profit distribution, investment volumes, timelines, and operational conditions. This part has not yet been developed.

The agreement covers not only mineral resources but also other natural resources, including oil, gas, water, and infrastructure. Broadly speaking, it could impact virtually any economic sector in Ukraine.

In particular, the governments of Ukraine and the United States had planned to create an Investment Fund for Reconstruction, in which the U.S. would have a 100% financial interest and which would have a commercial (not political) purpose. Ukraine and the United States would jointly manage the fund on an equal basis to develop Ukraine’s economic potential, including but not limited to mineral resources, oil, gas, infrastructure, and ports, until the fund was fully financed.

The fund’s investments should include revenues from the monetization of Ukraine’s natural resources, including minerals (oil, gas, coal, etc.). Ukraine is obligated to contribute 50% of its revenues from natural resources (except those already being extracted—meaning new deposits or expanded extraction in existing fields).

Management of the fund would be carried out jointly with the U.S. government, with opportunities to finance infrastructure and industrial projects. The agreement includes control mechanisms to prevent the circumvention of sanctions and other restrictions. The document is subject to ratification by the Ukrainian Parliament.

The fund’s revenues are planned to be reinvested in Ukraine’s security and economy.

At the same time, the agreement means that effective control over Ukraine’s strategic resources (minerals, infrastructure, energy) may pass to the U.S. through the fund’s mechanisms. The agreement does not include limitations on U.S. influence in fund management, which may lead to a situation where key economic decisions depend on the U.S.. Additionally, Ukraine’s obligation to transfer 50% of its revenues from resource extraction to the fund may limit the government’s ability to use these funds for the budget, social policies, and other priorities.

The agreement also does not contain mechanisms to prevent the privatization or transfer of controlling stakes of strategic enterprises to international corporations. The United States could influence asset monetization policies, securing favorable conditions for American companies.

The text of the agreement does not specify an exact mechanism for investment returns, but it hints that Ukraine might take on obligations related to future natural resource revenues. This creates a risk of debt dependence on the U.S. if Ukraine cannot meet its commitments.

The framework agreement does not mention any security guarantees for Ukraine. Washington believes that the presence of American businesses in Ukraine will serve as a deterrent to Russia and, therefore, military guarantees for Ukraine are unnecessary.

At the same time, the draft agreement does not include a requirement for Ukraine to contribute $500 billion to a U.S.-controlled fund. It also does not contain a demand for Ukraine to pay the U.S. double the amount of any future American aid—a requirement that V. Zelensky compared to imposing long-term debt on Ukraine.

Instead, the draft agreement states that Ukraine will contribute half of its future revenues from the monetization of natural resources, including critical minerals, oil, gas, ports, and other infrastructure. The United States will have the maximum financial interest allowed under American law, though not necessarily full ownership. The fund will be intended to reinvest part of its revenues in Ukraine, with the U.S. committing to support Ukraine’s future economic development.

The published agreement is an agreement developed by the Ukrainian side. It is not entirely clear how much it has been coordinated with the administration of D. Trump at present. As we recall, as a result of a verbal exchange between D. Trump and V. Zelensky, the deal fell through, and the parties did not even approach its discussion.

What goals will the U.S. achieve if this agreement is ultimately signed?

D. Trump may use it to demonstrate his effectiveness to American voters, contrasting himself with former President D. Biden and the Democrats. The U.S. also seeks to establish its influence in Ukraine. If this agreement is signed, it will essentially mean the establishment of U.S. control over key economic sectors of Ukraine (all recent versions of the agreement provide for U.S. control over Ukraine's energy system and trade logistics, including seaports). Control over the economy, in turn, means influence over Ukrainian politics. Thus, the U.S. may achieve full control over the country without official mutual obligations. The U.S. only promises to assist Ukraine in obtaining security guarantees but does not commit to providing them. According to the text of the agreement, a new round of economic and military aid to Ukraine is not envisaged. The U.S. does not assume such obligations, although the Ukrainian government may interpret the agreement differently, claiming prospects for new financing.

How can this agreement affect the negotiation process? It plays an important role as it allows the U.S. to control the situation and negotiate with Russia. The U.S. has secured its influence in Ukraine despite competition from the UK and other players. This may open the way for a new agreement with Russia, including in the field of mineral resources.

The Ukrainian leadership hopes that this agreement will bind the U.S. to Ukraine and draw it into further financing and protection of the country. The U.S., in turn, is interested in recovering previously spent funds and shifting the responsibility for Ukraine's defense onto Europe.

The Ukrainian public will most likely view the agreement with suspicion. However, since there is practically no opposition in the country, this document will not be a major irritant. At the same time, the agreement states that it must be ratified by Parliament, where a broad discussion may unfold around it. Nevertheless, the document is likely to be voted on.

In the future, this agreement may exclude other countries from economic processes in Ukraine. This strategy is directed not only against Russia but also against Europe, China, and Ukrainian political elites. The agreement states that countries that have taken a hostile stance toward Ukraine cannot have access to its resources, primarily Russia, but potentially also China. The agreement also stipulates that access to Ukrainian natural resources and infrastructure is possible only by mutual consent, which effectively gives the U.S. the ability to block any significant economic cooperation between Ukraine and, for example, Turkey, China, or other countries. Europe, China, and Turkey will be forced to coordinate their economic activities in Ukraine through the U.S. And any projects by other countries for Ukraine’s reconstruction may be blocked by the U.S. if they affect energy, logistics, and infrastructure. Essentially, the U.S. may obtain leverage over Ukraine’s economic and, consequently, political system by controlling the financing of Ukraine’s infrastructure, energy, and industry.

There is currently no indication that Ukrainian President V. Zelensky is ready to sign the natural resources agreement or take steps toward the immediate cessation of hostilities. There is also no clear signal of Ukraine’s willingness to make concrete concessions on the issue of a ceasefire.

The signing or non-signing of the U.S.-Ukraine Agreement on Access to Ukraine’s Mineral (Natural) Resources in the coming days may clarify the future prospects of the negotiations. This agreement may further highlight the U.S. interest in ending hostilities. If the deal ultimately collapses, the U.S. may simply withdraw from Ukraine.

Returning to the White House conflict, at the meeting between V. Zelensky and D. Trump, two key issues were actually being decided:

Ukrainian President V. Zelensky wanted to maintain Western support, while U.S. President D. Trump sought to preserve American influence in Ukraine.

U.S. President D. Trump tried to pressure V. Zelensky, swaying him to his side and distancing him from the influence of Europe’s and the U.S.’s liberal elites.

D. Trump also sought to force V. Zelensky to sign a ceasefire agreement and an end to hostilities, demanding that he issue an order to the Ukrainian armed forces to cease fire.

The main reason for the conflict was precisely the ceasefire, the first element of D. Trump’s strategic plan to end the war and form a new geopolitical model involving China and Russia.

V. Zelensky refused to sign a ceasefire without security guarantees, insisting on coordinating this issue with Ukraine’s European allies, primarily the UK and France.

After the negotiations, D. Trump realized that V. Zelensky remained under the influence of European leaders. This caused disappointment within the Trump administration. The Ukrainian president, after the negotiations, traveled to Europe, where he received support from French President E. Macron and British Prime Minister K. Starmer, further deepening the divide between the Trump administration and V. Zelensky’s team.

However, the summit in London, which was urgently convened after the White House scandal (initiated by British Prime Minister K. Starmer and French President E. Macron, key representatives of the Western "war party" in Europe), highlighted the main problem for Ukraine—Europe is not ready to support its war efforts without the U.S.

The main outcome of the meeting was the realization that without American assistance, Europe would not be able to continue military support for Ukraine at the previous level. Instead of promising expanded aid, European leaders focused on finding ways to influence Trump to reconsider his strategy and not insist on an immediate ceasefire.

France and the UK decided to offer the U.S. their own version of conflict resolution. E. Macron proposed the idea of a "phased" ceasefire. Instead of a complete cessation of hostilities (as Trump insists), E. Macron proposed a temporary halt to missile strikes, attacks on infrastructure, and naval operations for one month. Negotiations on a peace agreement should then begin, followed by the introduction of peacekeepers.

However, shortly after, the British side denied that this plan had been agreed upon and clarified that it was merely Macron’s initiative.

The main difference between Trump’s and the Europeans' plans lies in key conditions:

• Trump demands a full cessation of hostilities before negotiations begin.

• Macron proposes a limited ceasefire but does not include elections in Ukraine, which Trump insists upon.

E. Macron justified his position by stating that his approach would allow Europe to actively participate in the peace negotiation process and prevent the entire discussion from taking place between Trump and Putin without European and Ukrainian involvement.

The key point of disagreement is the issue of military guarantees. Europe wants the U.S. to continue military support for Ukraine and to ensure the protection of European peacekeeping contingents that may be deployed in Ukraine after the signing of a peace agreement. However, Trump has repeatedly stated that he does not intend to provide Europe with any military guarantees. Military guarantees for Europe contradict his strategy of rapprochement with Russia.

It remains unknown whether Trump will accept the moratorium plan proposed by V. Zelensky and French President E. Macron or reject it, insisting on a full and unconditional ceasefire. Most likely, Russia would not agree to such a scenario either.

Ukraine may ultimately face a choice: either agree to Trump’s plan and conditions for a complete ceasefire (likely without any security guarantees from the U.S.) or escalate confrontation with Washington.

The current situation in Ukraine is characterized by strategic risks associated with the cessation of U.S. military assistance. However, these risks are not critical in the short term. Ukraine confirms that arms supplies have stopped and that physical aid is no longer arriving. However, Ukraine continues to receive support established under the Biden administration, as well as from European countries.

It is believed that Ukraine can sustain combat operations at the current level for 2–9 months without additional arms supplies. However, the long-term absence of U.S. assistance poses a strategic threat. It could significantly weaken the country and lead to territorial and human resource losses. Nevertheless, this scenario is not currently considered critical by Ukrainian political leadership, which remains confident in its position for the coming months but is undoubtedly concerned about the political future.

Within Ukrainian politics, certain signs of political autonomy and an alternative approach to relations with D. Trump are already emerging. Opposition figures such as D. Razumkov, Y. Tymoshenko, P. Poroshenko, and some parliamentary leaders demonstrate a desire to establish their own diplomatic channels with the U.S., bypassing the President's Office. However, they are acting cautiously, avoiding open confrontation with President V. Zelensky. Therefore, internal political confrontation has not yet reached a critical phase, as V. Zelensky retains strong positions and controls the security structures and key levers of power in the country.

Second Round of Russia-U.S. Negotiations in Istanbul

The second round of negotiations between Russia and the U.S. took place on February 27, primarily focused on unblocking embassy operations and normalizing diplomatic relations. Ukraine was not officially included in the agenda. The U.S. sought to determine Russia's conditions for ending the war. One of the key issues discussed was the deployment of peacekeepers. France and the United Kingdom are ready to send peacekeepers, but only with American guarantees and protection. U.S. President D. Trump supported the idea of a European peacekeeping mission after the war ends. However, the White House has not yet provided clear commitments regarding their protection.

However, Russia has stated that it does not consider the deployment of European peacekeepers in Ukraine. The Russian Federation also continues to publicly insist on full control over the occupied territories and does not agree to cease hostilities along the front line. At the same time, the Kremlin seeks to divide the "collective West" and reduce sanctions pressure.

D. Trump, on the other hand, proposes first declaring a ceasefire, holding elections in Ukraine, and then signing an agreement, but the parties have not yet agreed on this mechanism. For the U.S., achieving a ceasefire would already be a significant victory.

Ukraine also does not agree with this formula—President V. Zelensky refuses to declare a ceasefire without adequate security guarantees.

Several possible scenarios for further developments exist:

Compromise peace – D. Trump may persuade Ukraine and Russia to make concessions, leading to a temporary ceasefire but not a complete end to the war.

Escalation of sanctions – The U.S. may increase pressure on Russia if negotiations fail due to Russia's actions.

Forcing Ukraine into Russian conditions – A tough approach may be applied to pressure the Ukrainian leadership.

U.S. withdrawal from Ukraine – Trump may lose interest and stop assistance to Kyiv.

Situation on the Frontline

Overall, the pace of Russian troop advances has somewhat slowed over the past few months (according to the Ukrainian military source Deep State). In February, Russian forces captured 192 square kilometers of territory. By comparison, in January, it was 325 square kilometers, and in the previous autumn, figures reached 700 square kilometers per month. However, in February 2025, the pace still remains higher than in 2024 (118 square kilometers).

This slowdown is due to Ukraine deploying reserves for counterattacks in several directions—Kursk Oblast, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk (in Donetsk Oblast).

Currently, Russian forces are actively advancing only in the area of Velyka Novosilka, while in other directions, they are maintaining defensive tactics. In some areas, Ukrainian forces have managed to launch counterattacks. The most successful operations have been in Toretsk, where the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have regained control over approximately half of the city, as well as in the Pokrovsk area, where Ukrainian troops continue to resist Russian advances.

Battle Maps

Donetsk Oblast

​​​​​​​Kursk Oblast

 

The situation near Kursk has significantly worsened for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Severe territorial losses have been reported. According to military sources, there is a risk of complete loss of the Kursk salient by March-April. Russia has redeployed its most combat-ready units to the region, including elite reconnaissance groups, drone crews, and trained infantry, creating serious pressure on Ukrainian positions. Despite several counterattacks by Ukrainian forces southeast of the city of Sudzha, most of the territory that was under UAF control has now been retaken by Russian forces.

Russian troops have advanced significantly in the north (near the settlement of Pogrebki) and southwest (in the area of Sverdlikovo) of the Kursk bridgehead. The settlement of Orlovka has returned to Russian control, and the settlement of Novaya Sorochina has transitioned from Ukrainian to a contested "gray zone." Additionally, Russian forces have taken control of Sverdlikovo on the western side of the Kursk salient, leading to increased fire control over the main Ukrainian supply route from Yunakivka to Sudzha to Martynovka. This road, a key logistical artery for the Ukrainian army, is now heavily targeted by Russian drones. Over two weeks, Ukraine has lost approximately 60 square kilometers in the region, reducing its controlled territory in Kursk Oblast from 416 to 356 square kilometers.

In the Borova direction of Kharkiv Oblast, Russian forces have made advances near the settlements of Zagryzovo and Nadezhda.

Near Pokrovsk, Ukrainian forces have managed to halt Russian advances in the southwest direction and reclaim several positions. However, no major breakthroughs have been achieved by the UAF in this area, as Russian forces continue to launch counterattacks. Russian troops also counterattacked near the settlement of Peschanoe.

In Toretsk, which was declared captured by Russian forces a month ago, heavy fighting continues. Ukrainian forces are carrying out counterattacks, and a significant part of the city remains under contested control. Some outskirts of Toretsk are still held by Ukrainian forces. Russian sources claim that Ukrainian troops are primarily operating in the "gray zone," an area not fully controlled by either side.

In the direction of Velyka Novosilka, near the settlement of Konstantynopil, an increase in Ukrainian reserves has slowed the Russian advance but has not completely stopped it.

Ultimately, the course of combat operations will depend on the balance of reserves on both sides. If either side launches an attack without sufficient reinforcements to achieve tactical success for political reasons, it could result in a strategic defeat in the long run.

 

On February 25, 2025, the Verkhovna Rada, on its second attempt, passed Statement No. 13041 "On Supporting Democracy in Ukraine in the Face of Russian Aggression" with 268 votes in favor. The previous day, February 24, 2025, the document had failed to pass, receiving only 218 votes. The failed vote occurred in the presence of foreign delegations visiting Kyiv for the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The initial version of the statement was registered as No. 13040, but after the failed vote, it was urgently re-registered as No. 13041 and brought to the floor again. Key points of the statement:

• Free, transparent, and democratic elections cannot be held in Ukraine due to the war.

• President Zelensky must remain in office until a new President takes office.

• The statement is a response to D. Trump, who demands elections after a ceasefire is established.

Washington is promoting the scheme of "ceasefire - lifting of martial law - elections in Ukraine - signing of a peace agreement." According to polls, if elections were held in the near future, V. Zelensky would lose.

The initial failure of the vote was due to minor sabotage and technical issues, but it once again highlighted the lack of discipline within the ruling party "Servant of the People." This became a reputational blow for the President's Office, which urgently corrected the situation to avoid undermining President V. Zelensky's position in the eyes of the international community amid foreign policy challenges

1. Reasons for the failed vote on February 24, 2025:

   1. Technical factors: Members of the ruling coalition were unorganized, and not all had arrived in the chamber in time since the session started earlier than expected.

   2. Lack of vote mobilization: The faction leader, Davyd Arakhamia, did not ensure full attendance and voting discipline.

   3. Possible intra-party intrigues: The head of the President’s Office, Andriy Yermak, may have used the situation against D. Arakhamia to turn the President against him.

   4. Internal sabotage: Some deputies may have intentionally abstained from voting, damaging the reputation of the President's Office amid visits from foreign delegations.

The failure of the vote in front of foreign guests raised doubts about internal unity around President V. Zelensky.

 

Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovskaya, Andriy Timchenko
For the Ukrainian Institute of Politics