Situation in Ukraine August 27 – September 3, 2025

Outcomes of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit

          The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) continues to position itself as a key player in promoting a multipolar world. The SCO Summit in Tianjin (August 31 – September 1, 2025) was leveraged by Beijing to showcase its diplomatic influence and advance specific initiatives, including the establishment of an SCO Development Bank, the expansion of settlements in national currencies, and the introduction of the "Global Governance Initiative" and the concept of a "shared future for mankind." China aimed to strengthen its influence among Global South nations, presenting itself as an alternative center of global governance and a pillar of a multipolar world, in contrast to what it portrays as Washington’s pragmatic and self-serving policies characterized by tariffs and sanctions. The summit also highlighted the growing alignment among Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi amid increasing tensions with the United States. Notably, India, previously seen by the U.S. as a counterbalance to China, demonstrated a willingness to engage more closely with both Beijing and Moscow, emphasizing the independence of its foreign policy.

          The Tianjin SCO Summit brought together over 20 heads of state, including Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Discussions covered a wide range of topics, from regional security to economics and infrastructure. Beijing fully utilized the summit to bolster its image as a leader of a new global order, while U.S. President Donald Trump and other observers viewed the event as a signal of the formation of an anti-Western bloc.

          President Xi Jinping emphasized that the SCO has become a significant force for peace, security, and development across Eurasia. He highlighted its growing capacity to counter the "three evils" — terrorism, separatism, and extremism — which are traditionally seen as key threats to regional stability. The SCO encompasses 26 member states and partners, with practical cooperation spanning over 50 areas, including security, economics, and humanitarian ties. With a combined GDP approaching $30 trillion, the SCO is considered the world’s largest regional organization, comparable in scale to the EU and ASEAN. Xi called on member states to strengthen the "Shanghai Spirit" — principles of trust, equality, and mutually beneficial cooperation.

          The 2025 SCO Summit underscored the priority of a "multipolar" agenda and laid the groundwork for new measures to deepen integration in finance, technology, and military-political spheres. Financial initiatives were particularly prominent. President Xi proposed the creation of an SCO Development Bank to finance cross-border projects and support member states. Additionally, over 100 grant-based "small and impactful" projects worth 2 billion yuan were proposed, along with 10 billion yuan in loans through the SCO Interbank Consortium over three years. These steps mark the first move toward a new financial architecture as an alternative to the dollar-centric system. Russian President Vladimir Putin advocated for issuing joint bonds, expanding settlements in national currencies, and establishing an independent payment infrastructure. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko emphasized that such a bank should mitigate sanctions pressure and serve as a tool to protect joint projects. These initiatives represent a step toward forming an alternative to the dollar-dominated financial system, potentially reshaping the global financial balance.

          Ideologically, Xi Jinping reinforced the summit’s significance by presenting the "Global Governance Initiative" and the concept of a "shared future for mankind." In contrast to U.S. President Donald Trump’s focus on national self-interest, Beijing proposed a vision of a future based on fairness and equality.

          This rhetoric, backed by concrete steps in finance and infrastructure, positions the SCO as a platform for competing economic and value-based development models.

          The summit’s "diplomatic theater" was also significant: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi embraced Russian President Vladimir Putin and sat beside Xi Jinping, signaling a symbolic alignment of China, India, and Russia. This "geopolitical photograph" suggests a new challenge for the U.S., as India, previously considered a Western ally, is no longer a reliable counterweight to China. The summit effectively formalized a symbolic "axis" of China, India, and Russia.

          Prior to the summit, India viewed China primarily as a regional rival, with the U.S. as its strategic partner. However, Modi’s visit to Tianjin and his talks with Xi Jinping shifted the dynamics, with New Delhi showing openness to finding common ground with Beijing, despite lingering bilateral tensions.

          The topic of Ukraine was mentioned only in statements by individual leaders and was absent from the summit’s final declaration. Russian President Vladimir Putin used the SCO platform to criticize Western countries, accusing them of preparing a "regime change" in Kyiv and expanding NATO. He expressed gratitude to China, India, and other partners for supporting peaceful resolutions.

          The presence of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, and Central Asian leaders — including Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, and Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov — reinforced the image of a "global majority" seeking new centers of influence amid trade wars and Western crises.

          The summit elevated the SCO’s role as a platform for advancing alternative global initiatives and fostering mutual trust among Eurasian nations. For China, it was an opportunity to position itself as an alternative center of global governance, contrasting with Trump’s pragmatic and self-interested policies, which have impacted both adversaries and nominal U.S. allies in the region through tariffs.

          On the sidelines of the summit, Russia and China signed 22 bilateral agreements covering energy integration, visa regime simplification, high-tech development, nuclear cooperation, security, and SCO institutional expansion. Key agreements include:

- Energy: A legally binding agreement for the construction of the "Power of Siberia 2" gas pipeline through Mongolia, with a capacity of up to 50 billion cubic meters per year, and an increase in deliveries through the existing "Power of Siberia" pipeline from 38 to 44 billion cubic meters annually.

- Visa Regime: Starting September 15, 2025, a one-year trial visa-free regime for Russian citizens staying in China for up to 30 days.

- Science and Technology: A memorandum between Rosatom and the China Atomic Energy Authority on peaceful nuclear energy use, and the "Lunar Dust Monitoring" project for China’s Chang’e 7 mission.

- Digital and Medical Sectors: Agreements on digital economy, biosecurity, investment protection, and cooperation in media and film industries.

- Regional Security and Anti-Drug Efforts: Establishment of an anti-narcotics center in Dushanbe and a universal threat response center under the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure in Tashkent.

- SCO Institutional Initiatives: Adoption of the Tianjin Declaration, the SCO Development Strategy until 2035, an energy cooperation roadmap until 2030, and an anti-extremism program for 2026–2030. Laos gained dialogue partner status, the SCO received observer status in the CIS, and the Kyrgyz city of Cholpon-Ata was named the SCO cultural capital for 2025–2026.

 

          Military Parade in China — 80th Anniversary of Japan’s Capitulation

          On September 3, China held its largest-ever military parade to commemorate the 80th anniversary of Japan’s capitulation and the end of World War II. The event in Beijing was not merely a tribute to history but a display of China’s military might and political influence. The parade showcased hypersonic missiles, unmanned systems, and advanced military technology, with President Xi Jinping emphasizing the choice between "peace or war" and China’s readiness to defend its national interests.

          The parade became an international event, underscoring China’s growing role as a center for the "global majority." Alongside Xi Jinping on the tribune were Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, joined by approximately 26 leaders and representatives from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and international organizations.

          The parade served multiple purposes: it demonstrated China’s technological progress and self-reliant defense industry, reinforced national unity and pride amid external pressures, sent a clear signal to the West and U.S. allies about China’s readiness for long-term confrontation, and warned Taiwan and regional actors of China’s resolve to assert its interests through force if necessary. It also highlighted a competition over historical narratives, with Beijing seeking to reframe itself as a key victor in Asia during World War II, sidelining the U.S.’s traditional claim to that role.

          U.S. President Donald Trump responded sarcastically, congratulating Xi and the Chinese people while noting the presence of Putin and Kim Jong Un, suggesting they were "plotting against the United States." He emphasized the U.S.’s role in defeating Japan, stating that American sacrifices liberated China and expressing hope that they would be duly honored. Trump downplayed the China-Russia alliance as a direct threat, asserting the unmatched strength of the U.S. military.

          The parade solidified Xi Jinping’s image as a leader uniting an "anti-Western club," with Putin and Kim’s presence as part of a broader geopolitical strategy. For the U.S., it posed a new challenge: China is not only showcasing military power but also crafting a historical narrative that diminishes Washington’s role in World War II.

 

          Stalled Peace Negotiations

          The past week saw a significant setback in the peace negotiation process. Following meetings in Anchorage (early August 2025) and Washington (late August 2025), there were signs of progress toward a comprehensive peace agreement rather than a mere ceasefire. Discussions included security guarantees for Ukraine, territorial compromises, and a potential meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and U.S. President Donald Trump.

          However, on September 3, 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared in an interview with Indonesia’s Kompas that resolving the conflict requires addressing its "root causes" — namely, ensuring Ukraine’s neutral, non-aligned, and non-nuclear status, and recognizing the "new territorial realities" of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Sevastopol, the so-called "DNR" and "LNR," and the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions.

          These demands echo ultimatums issued by Putin in summer 2024, effectively closing the door to compromise. Neither Ukraine nor its European partners are willing to discuss territorial concessions, even regarding Donbas, returning the negotiation process to square one.

          It is possible that the negotiation process is being complicated by the U.S.-Russia-China triangle. The timing of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement is significant, coming immediately after the SCO Summit in Tianjin (August 31 – September 1, 2025) and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing for the military parade (September 3, 2025). This suggests that Moscow may have secured informal support from Chinese President Xi Jinping and received political signals of solidarity from other leaders, such as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. In this context, Lavrov’s statement can be interpreted as a kind of "message" to U.S. President Donald Trump.

          For Trump, this shift in Russia’s position significantly hinders his negotiation efforts: instead of the anticipated "grand deal," Moscow has outlined a plan that is inherently unfeasible and unacceptable to both Kyiv and the West.

          On Tuesday, Trump expressed that he was "very disappointed" with Putin, adding, without elaborating, that the White House plans to take steps to reduce casualties in Russia’s war against Ukraine. "I am very disappointed with President Putin, I can say that, and we will do something to help people live," Trump stated. He also reiterated threats to impose additional sanctions on Russia if progress in peaceful resolution is not achieved. Previously, on August 22, Trump had threatened "large-scale sanctions or tariffs" if progress on Ukraine was not made within two weeks, a deadline that led to talks in Anchorage and Washington.

          Following those meetings, Trump announced expectations for a bilateral meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Putin, followed by a trilateral meeting including himself. Zelenskyy stated that Russia is doing everything possible to prevent his meeting with Putin, while the Kremlin claimed that the agenda for such a meeting was not yet prepared. Trump had earlier suggested that "territorial exchanges" and changes to territorial borders would be "decisive for any settlement." Ukraine categorically opposes legally recognizing any Ukrainian territory as Russian, though it has acknowledged that it will likely have to accept some de facto territorial losses.

          Trump’s peace efforts—numerous visits by Special Envoy S. Whitkoff to Moscow, along with talks in Anchorage and Washington—have now reverted to the starting point of negotiations. For the U.S. domestic audience, this situation appears as a "stalemate in negotiations"; externally, it signals a loss of leverage to compel progress.

          It is clear that, despite maintaining formal contacts between Russian and Ukrainian delegations, substantive negotiations are unlikely in the near future. Moscow has effectively indicated a preference for a military solution, signaling a new escalation, increased intensity of hostilities, and further strikes on each other’s critical infrastructure.

 

          Russian-Ukrainian war escalated into a full-scale infrastructure war.

          The Russia-Ukraine conflict has increasingly taken on the character of a systematic struggle targeting energy infrastructure. Following a series of Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries and an attack on the Druzhba pipeline, Moscow sharply intensified its retaliatory strikes on Ukraine’s energy system.

          From August 27 to September 3, massive drone and missile attacks targeted facilities in Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk regions. A notable strike in Kyiv destroyed a residential building, killing approximately 23 people and injuring dozens. Official data indicates that on the night of August 31, Russia launched over 140 Shahed drones, most of which were intercepted, but power lines and substations were damaged, leaving about 160,000 people without electricity in several regions. In Poltava, fires engulfed a gas transportation hub and a compressor station critical for transit. Since March 2025, Ukraine’s energy system has endured over 2,900 attacks.

          In response, Ukraine continues targeted attacks on Russia’s oil infrastructure. Since late August, facilities in Krasnodar Krai, Syzran, and the Urals have been hit, affecting at least 10 oil refineries and disabling about 17% of Russia’s refining capacity. Additionally, a petrochemical tanker, Excellion, was damaged in the Black Sea, and strikes on oil depots in Krasnodar Krai caused major fires.

          Russia aims to paralyze Ukraine’s energy system, targeting not only production facilities but also transit hubs for gas from the U.S. and Azerbaijan via the Trans-Balkan Interconnector, particularly a compressor station near Novoselske in Odesa Oblast. Ukraine, conversely, focuses on inflicting economic damage to undermine Moscow’s export capabilities and push Slovakia and Hungary to reconsider their reliance on Russian imports. Unlike Russian targets, strikes on Ukraine result in significant civilian casualties, including the destruction of the Kyiv residential building (23 deaths) and widespread power and water outages in Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, and Odesa. These attacks directly hinder Ukraine’s preparations for winter, threatening civilian resilience.

 

          Military Operations

          From August 27 to September 3, 2025, Russian forces captured approximately 40 km² of Ukrainian territory, bringing their total control to 114,700 km², or 19% of Ukraine’s territory. In August, Russian advances slowed, with 464 km² captured compared to 564 km² in July, an 18% decrease.

          The fastest progress was on the Novopavlovsk direction toward Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

          The front line remains volatile, with Russia making slow advances on most fronts except Sumy and Kharkiv.

          The city of Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast is a focal point, with reports of Russian forces entering the city, though Ukraine has not confirmed this. Pokrovsk is key to Ukraine’s defensive "fortress belt" (Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Kostiantynivka), with Russia deploying up to 110,000 troops to break through.

          Ukrainian forces are attempting to liberate Udachne southwest of Pokrovsk.

          A counteroffensive near Dobropillia north of Pokrovsk temporarily eased pressure, but tactical breakthroughs remain possible elsewhere.

          Battles continue for Fedorivka south of Siversk.

          In Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Russian forces advanced near Maliivka toward Yanvarske and captured Voskresenka.

          In Kharkiv Oblast, Russian troops consolidated positions on the northern and northwestern approaches to Kupiansk, including Myrove, and are attempting to infiltrate the city.

          Russian offensives rely on small infantry units supported by artillery, drones, and aviation. Large-scale breakthroughs are unlikely due to the prevalence of drones, which make deep mechanized advances nearly impossible. Russia also faces a shortage of well-trained troops for sustained operational offensives.

 

Combat Map

Donetsk Oblast

 

 

Conflict Among Ukraine’s Anti-Corruption and Security Agencies

          A fierce rivalry persists between Ukraine’s key anti-corruption and security institutions— the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU), the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAP), and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU).

          This week, NABU and SAP charged SBU Brigadier General Ilya Vityuk, former head of the cybersecurity department, with illegal enrichment and false declarations. Investigations revealed that in December 2023, Vityuk purchased an apartment for 21.6 million UAH, though the official price was 12.8 million UAH. The transaction was allegedly facilitated through a family member who earned funds as a sole proprietor providing legal and consulting services, but these companies showed signs of being fictitious, with 8.8 million UAH unaccounted for.

          The SBU countered that the charges were retaliation for the recent arrests of NABU detectives Ruslan Magamedrasulov and Viktor Gusarov, accused of collaborating with Russia.

          In July 2025, Magamedrasulov was arrested for alleged business dealings in Russia and ties to a banned Opposition Platform — For Life deputy, Fedir Khrystenko. The SBU claimed he facilitated the sale of technical hemp to Russia and had contacts with Russian intelligence. NABU requested a public trial for Magamedrasulov.

          On September 4, the High Anti-Corruption Court considered a 42 million UAH bail for Vityuk.    The Center for Countering Corruption (CPC) refuted the SBU’s claim of retaliation, stating that the case against Vityuk stemmed from a 2024 journalistic investigation, with the apartment seized a year earlier.

          A high-profile case involves corruption in drone and electronic warfare equipment procurement. In August 2025, NABU and SAP uncovered a scheme inflating state contract prices, implicating MP Oleksiy Kuznetsov and former Luhansk Oblast Military Administration head Serhiy Haidai. Kuznetsov was released on an 8 million UAH bail. The investigation also involves a company linked to businessman Ihor Mindych, associated with President Zelenskyy’s circle, tied to drone and "Flamingo" missile procurement. NABU clarified that the "Flamingo" missile itself is not under investigation.

          Denmark’s Ministry of Defense announced that Fire Point, the "Flamingo" missile producer, will establish fuel production for long-range missiles near the Skidstrup airbase, home to F-16 fighters. Meanwhile, NABU continues investigating the company’s drone procurement activities.

          The situation in recent weeks demonstrates that anti-corruption bodies and security agencies in Ukraine continue to operate in an environment of mutual competition and mistrust. Every high-profile case becomes not only a legal process but also a battle for control over the information space and political influence. This confrontation undermines trust in law enforcement agencies and weakens Ukraine’s political-legal system during wartime, creating risks of new scandals and a governance crisis.

          The escalation of rivalry between the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU), the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAP), and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) indicates that the balance within Ukraine’s anti-corruption architecture remains unstable. It is noteworthy that the reinstatement of NABU and SAP powers on July 31, 2025, was not the result of a stable agreement with Western partners but rather a consequence of direct pressure on the authorities. Meanwhile, mistrust and disagreements on this issue among key players—anti-corruption bodies (now predominantly influenced by European partners), security agencies, Parliament, and the Presidential Administration—persist. As a result, the confrontation continues, taking new forms and remaining a destabilizing factor in Ukraine’s political system.

 

          Sociology

          According to a survey by the Rating Sociological Group (August 21–23, 2025):

- 59% support halting hostilities and seeking a negotiated compromise (up from 12% in February 2023).

- 13% advocate fighting until territories held as of February 23, 2022, are liberated (11% in February 2023).

- 20% support continuing the war until Donbas and Crimea are fully recovered (down from 73% in February 2023).

- 62% believe the war’s resolution should involve negotiations with other countries.

- 20% favor direct compromise with Russia.

- 11% oppose negotiations and support fighting until all territories are liberated.

- 75% believe a ceasefire is acceptable only with U.S. and EU security guarantees.

- 19% oppose any agreement.

- 3% are willing to agree without conditions.

Preferred Security Guarantees:

- 52% prioritize army funding and weapons supplies.

- 48% want partner commitments to intervene in case of renewed Russian aggression.

- 44% support control over air and sea space.

- 39% favor a multilateral treaty.

- 35% support foreign troop deployment in Ukraine.

- 12% consider a bilateral treaty with Russia viable.

Priorities:

- 58% prioritize guaranteed funding and weapons supplies.

- 31% prioritize territorial liberation.

Trust in Politicians:

- Former Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi: 74% trust, 18% distrust.

- President Volodymyr Zelenskyy: 68% trust, 30% distrust.

- Intelligence Chief Kyrylo Budanov: 59% trust, 19% distrust.

Presidential Election Preferences (August 2025):

- Zelenskyy: 35.2%

- Zaluzhnyi: 25.3%

- Petro Poroshenko: 5.3%

- Budanov: 4.5%

- Yulia Tymoshenko: 3.4%

(In July 2025, Zaluzhnyi led with 29% to Zelenskyy’s 25.5%.)

Parliamentary Election Preferences:

- Zaluzhnyi’s party: 23.7%

- Zelenskyy’s party: 19.7%

- European Solidarity: 7.4%

- Budanov’s party: 6.4%

- Azov party: 5.9%

(In July 2025, Zelenskyy’s and Zaluzhnyi’s parties were nearly tied at ~22%.)

          Ukrainian society shows a strong demand for ending the war, primarily to halt active combat rather than endorse specific compromises with Moscow. The shift from a maximalist "fight to victory" stance (73% in 2023) to a pragmatic "ceasefire and compromise" view (59% in August 2025) reflects a significant transformation. Negotiations are seen as inevitable, but their legitimacy hinges on robust international security guarantees.

          Following the Anchorage summit, Ukrainian society rallied around Zelenskyy, with his trust rating and presidential lead rising, marking a shift from earlier turbulence caused by anti-corruption protests and declining trust in state institutions.

 

          Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovskaya, Andrii Timchenko 

          For the Ukrainian Institute of Politics