Against the backdrop of the difficult situation at the front and the crisis mood in the country, the Office of the President continues to try to convince the allies to approve the main points of the "Victory Plan". President V. Zelensky held a meeting with the prime ministers of the Scandinavian countries in Iceland, and the head of the Office of President A. Yermak in the United States met with US President J. Biden's National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken.
Let us recall that the main point of V. Zelensky's "Victory Plan" is Ukraine's membership (invitation) to NATO and permission to hit strategic targets on the territory of the Russian Federation with Western long-range weapons. Foreign media report that in the secret part of the "Victory Plan," V. Zelensky requested Tomahawk missiles for Ukraine, capable of striking at a distance of 2,400 km deep into the Russian Federation.
In Europe, V. Zelensky convinced his partners that what Ukraine needs now is not NATO membership itself, but an invitation that would "give geopolitical clarity" and support the country. He also reported that North Korean soldiers are already participating in combat operations on Ukrainian territory, and that "deep negotiations" are underway between Iran and Russia on missile supplies.
Given that support for Ukraine in Western countries remains high (50-60%), there are attempts by V. Zelensky to publicly put pressure on the leadership of these countries. In particular, he points out that aid from allies is not being provided promptly and in insufficient quantities, thus indirectly shifting the blame for the difficult situation at the front to them. The President of Ukraine stated that the country has received only 10% of the aid package voted for by the US Congress in 2024 ($61 billion). The partners have also not provided all the promised air defense systems.
Thus, the President's team is trying to secure new support from allies by any means to avoid a scenario of forced peace negotiations with the Russian Federation (not on Ukrainian terms) since otherwise, V. Zelensky's power may lose its stability within Ukraine.
However, none of the allies officially supported the "Victory Plan". All this is happening against the backdrop of Western publications that at least 8 countries do not support Ukraine's invitation to NATO - the USA, Germany, Slovakia, Hungary, Belgium, Slovenia, Turkey, and Spain. Permission for long-range strikes against the Russian Federation was also rejected by the USA once again.
Within the country, government officials are trying to smooth over the not entirely successful presentation of the "Victory Plan" to the allies in the eyes of Ukrainian society, both politically and informationally. Thus, Ukrainian President V. Zelensky instructed government bodies to develop proposals for the so-called "Internal Action Plan" (within the framework of the Victory Plan), which would help the country withstand the war. Unlike the "Victory Plan", which relies on Western partners, the "Internal Action Plan" will provide for steps that Ukraine itself must take. The document will concern internal decisions in the areas of the military-industrial complex, frontline defense, economics, finance, social policy, information sphere, ensuring justice, regional work, and other strategic areas. This will be a political program for mobilizing all the country's resources for the needs of continuing the war. The Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Oleksandr Lytvynenko will be responsible for preparing the Internal Action Plan.
In a way, this is a signal to Western partners that Ukraine is concentrating all its internal resources on waging war, and therefore the allies must support the main points of the "Victory Plan".
Ukraine's allies are concerned that a possible victory for Republican Donald Trump in the US elections could force Ukraine to enter into a painful peace settlement with Russia and abandon NATO membership.
In particular, the Republican Party's candidate for US vice president, J.D. Vance on the News Nation TV channel made it clear that Ukraine would have to give up some of its territories to end the war with Russia. In his opinion, The role of the United States is to ask Russia and Ukraine what they need, and then "impose real diplomacy." "The Ukrainians will have to make this decision... They are already too exhausted... this cannot go on forever. They have no people, they have no weapons, they have no money," said D. Vance. Thus, the D. Trump camp most likely does not plan to continue military support for Ukraine in its current dynamics and will actively impose a cessation of hostilities along the current front line.
Even though Ukrainian President V. Zelenskyy declares that he will continue the war until all occupied territories are liberated, the Ukrainian military is very depleted and largely dependent on US aid.
Even if the Democratic candidate Kamala Harris wins the US elections (and the election "pendulum" can unpredictably swing in either direction), Ukraine will probably have a hard time getting significant financial support through the US Congress, given the complexity of the procedure itself. At the same time, some American elites (mainly from the Republican camp) believe that the main burden of further financing of Ukraine should be shifted to the Europeans. For Ukraine, this would be a catastrophic scenario, given the shortage of resources in Europe itself.
Most likely, any decisions regarding further assistance to Ukraine will be discussed in more detail after the American elections, when Western partners will be able to more clearly determine the future direction of US foreign policy.
The same applies to processes, related to peace negotiations. It is noteworthy that the head of the Presidential Office Andriy Yermak said in an interview with Corriere Della Sera that Ukraine is ready for negotiations with the Russian Federation in the event of the Russian Federation retreating to the borders before a full-scale invasion (that is, to the borders of February 23, 2024, and not to the borders of 1991, as was the case before).
Given that Russian troops hold the military initiative at the front, the Russian Federation is not very keen to consider any compromises with Ukraine now. They even deny the existence of secret negotiations with Ukraine on stopping attacks on energy infrastructure, as the Western press writes. For now, in the best-case scenario, the Russian Federation will agree to negotiate a halt to military action along the front line. And that is if the Russian leadership is pressured by China and the countries of the Global South.
Recently, the situation on the front has acquired a negative dynamic for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Russian troops have accelerated their advance in the south of the Donetsk region. In some areas of the front, their pace reaches 50-79 sq. km per day. In particular, 250 sq. km of territory on the Donbas front have been lost in the last 10 days alone.
In the Pokrovsky direction, Russian troops have already captured the town of Selidovo, the settlement of Vishneve (to the west), and the town of Gornyak.
In the area of the city of Vuhledar, after the capture of the city, the entire defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was broken through, the Russian Armed Forces advanced north by 9 km, and the width of the front in this area reached 15 km.
Now the Russian army has captured the settlement of Shakhtyorskoye and is trying to advance further into the settlements of Yasna Polyana, Bogoyavlenka, and Novoukrainka. From this bridgehead, the Russian Federation can develop an offensive to the northeast towards the city of Kurakhovo. Further west, the city of Velyka Novoselovka may soon be half-encircled.
North of the Pokrovsk-Avdiivsky salient, fighting for the city of Toretsk continues. Most likely, the assault on the cities of Pokrovsk and Mirnograd will not begin until the Ukrainian Armed Forces are able to hold the city, due to fears of a blow from the north to the flank of the advancing Russian group.
In the northern section of the front (Kupyansk and Liman directions), there is a high probability of losing territory in the area of the settlement of Borovskoy on the left bank of the Oskil River, where a bridgehead could be formed for a further offensive on Sloviansk and Kramatorsk from the north.
Given the current dynamics on the front, Ukraine could lose the entire southwestern part of Donbas, from the settlement of Velyka Novosilka to the city of Kurakhove inclusive. And in the most negative scenario, the Pokrovsk agglomeration as well.
After this, the fighting may shift to the Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporizhia regions (in all likelihood, the Russian Federation is already preparing an offensive in this direction), as well as in the direction of the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk from the south, from the direction of Konstantynivka.
In the future, territories in the Kursk region may be lost (the Kursk salient has already shrunk by a third since the start of the operation), where Russian troops continue their counteroffensive, and the arrival of the first batch of North Korean fighters is expected.
It is known in advance that 5 thousand elite military personnel from the DPRK will be sent to the Kursk region (and then, possibly, to the territory of Ukraine). However, the North Korean soldiers who arrived in the Russian Federation for training and participation in combat operations are still poorly trained and will have difficulties with adaptation and mastering the new Russian equipment at first. Therefore, Ukraine will most likely be able to hold the Kursk bridgehead until the elections in the USA. But the Russian Federation will likely make every effort to dislodge the Ukrainian Armed Forces from here by the end of the year.
The acceleration of the offensive of Russian troops in Donbas may be a consequence of the operation in the Kursk region, where the most mobile and trained troops of the Ukrainian Armed Forces are involved.
Representatives of the Ukrainian command name three main reasons for the negative situation on the front.
1. Lack of ammunition and weapons.
2. There is no necessary replenishment and rotation of personnel.
3. Management imbalance.
Overall, there is a factor of general material exhaustion of the Ukrainian forces. Along with air superiority, Russia retains a significant advantage in ammunition. And its personnel outnumbers Ukraine by 3 to 1, probably recruiting about 30,000 new soldiers per month.
In Ukraine, martial law and general mobilization have been extended for another 90 days, until February 7, 2025. On October 29, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the relevant bills - No. 12151 and No. 12152. This is already the 13th extension of martial law and mobilization from February 24, 2022.
In general, there is a general increase in the feeling of crisis in society in Ukraine. The number of supporters of negotiations with the Russian Federation in one form or another in Ukraine continues to grow. 35% of Ukrainian citizens believe that negotiations with the Russian Federation should be conducted now, without any conditions, in September 2023 only 21% thought so (According to a study by the Razumkov Center). At the same time, about 50% continued to insist on negotiations after the liberation of all territories, a year ago 60% thought so. The majority of citizens continue to support the country's course towards joining the European Union (74%) and NATO (72%).
According to the Sociological Group, Rating, Ukrainians themselves mostly believe that Ukraine is not quite ready to join the EU. Thus, only 20% believe that Ukraine is already completely ready to join the EU. 57% believe that the country needs further reforms for this. 22% that Ukraine is not at all ready to join the EU. The share of those who see the need for further reforms has increased by 14% over the past year.
The number of those who believe in rapid accession to the EU is decreasing dynamically (the number of those who believe that EU membership is possible within 1–2 years has decreased from 66% in 2022 to 15% in 2024).
43% agree with the statement that Ukraine should join the EU. 48% of respondents are more inclined to believe that Ukraine may not join the EU, but should strengthen economic ties with it. 7% believe that Ukraine does not need to integrate into the EU at all.
68% believe that Ukraine should defend its interests and not agree to some of the EU's demands. 28% believe that all demands should be agreed to. 48% believe that the EU is interested in Ukraine's accession. 50% have the opposite point of view.
Main sources of information: Telegram is the most popular source of information for 47%. Next comes YouTube (26%), "Unified News Marathon" (21%), eyewitness accounts/acquaintances, and official government sources (19%).
The Verkhovna Rada dismissed Prosecutor General of Ukraine Andriy Kostin, the reason for this was the scandal with fake disabilities of prosecutors. Regional prosecutors actively issued certificates of disability: in the Khmelnytsky region alone, 49 people received a disability from the 2nd group. President V. Zelensky, commenting on the mass registration of disability among prosecutors, noted the political responsibility of the Prosecutor General for the situation in the prosecutor's office of Ukraine. A. Kostin acknowledged the presence of corruption in the system and supported the President's proposal to cancel illegal decisions on assigning disability and paying pensions. The declarations indicate pension amounts of more than 54 million hryvnias, and some payments have been issued since 2016. However, real punishment for regional prosecutors is unlikely, since many of them are people with large financial and social resources.
The supposed successors of A. Kostin is the prosecutor, head of the Kyiv regional military administration R. Kravchenko, who is considered close to the Office of the President, or the head of the Odesa regional state administration O. Kiper, whose candidacy is actively criticized by pro-Western activists.
It is worth noting that rumors about the dismissal of the Prosecutor General have been circulating for a long time. A. Kostin often attended foreign events, was actively involved in public activities, and established good contacts with European representatives of justice, but lost control over the situation in his Office. The so-called "deep prosecutors" - an internal lobby in the Prosecutor General's Office - played a significant role in his possible resignation.
The scandal surrounding the “disability” of prosecutors also served as a reason for the reorganization of medical and social expert commissions (MSEC) throughout the country.
Today, the Verkhovna Rada begins considering the Draft Budget for 2025 in the first reading. Discussion is currently underway. After the vote "on the basis" of the budget conclusions takes place and the vote collects 226+ votes, the deputies will move on to consider amendments to the budget. There are many of them, so the procedure may last until the night.
Tomorrow there will be a vote on the amendments "for confirmation" and a vote on the budget conclusions as a whole, which is a vote for the Budget in the first reading. Then the conclusions are sent to the Government, and they await the return of the Budget text so that it can be voted on for the final time before November 20.
We examined the Government’s proposals for the Draft State Budget for 2025 in more detail in the issue from September 12–18, 2024.
From October 22 to 24, Kazan hosted the XVI BRICS summit. This year, Russia is chairing BRICS for the fourth time in the 20-year history of the organization. Delegations from 36 countries participated in the summit. Among them were the leader of China Xi Jinping and the Prime Minister of India N. Modi. As well as the leaders of the Republic of South Africa, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, the head of the Palestinian Authority, etc. The President of Brazil and the Prince of Saudi Arabia refused to travel to Russia.
The BRICS summit was attended by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. The latter's visit to Russia caused great indignation in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry pointed out that A. Guterres had previously declined an invitation to the Peace Summit in Switzerland.
By hosting the BRICS summit, Russian leaders sought to demonstrate that Russia is not isolated, despite growing pressure from the United States and its allies over Russia's aggression against Ukraine.
Following the summit, the BRICS participants adopted a declaration, which contains 134 points on 43 pages. Among the main topics are the further development of the association, the position on various global problems, sanctions, the settlement of regional crises, including in Ukraine and the Middle East, about plans to create a new international payment system, as well as insurance. The day before, Russia announced that the BRICS summit would return attention to the Friends of Peace platform created by China and Brazil and agree on common points on the war in Ukraine, which will be included in the final declaration. The Russian Federation stated that considers the Chinese-Brazilian initiative on Ukraine to be useful (which does not mean full agreement with it).
But Ukraine is mentioned in the declaration once, in paragraph 36. It says the following: "We recall the national positions on the situation in and around Ukraine, expressed in relevant fora, including the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly. We emphasize that all states should act by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter in their entirety and interrelatedness. We note with satisfaction the relevant offers of mediation and good offices aimed at ensuring a peaceful settlement of the conflict through dialogue and diplomacy." Thus, within the BRICS format, there remains a general vague uncertainty regarding the war in Ukraine. No specific decisions or provisions regarding Ukraine have been recorded in writing. In particular, the declaration does not mention anywhere the Chinese-Brazilian peace initiatives or the Friends of Peace platform (which were discussed orally at the summit).
As for the references and references to the UN Charter, it can be interpreted differently by different parties, both Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Here it is necessary to understand that it is not only about territorial integrity but also about security. Thus, the Russian Federation can interpret this point from its position: that it committed aggression against Ukraine to overcome the violation of the security principle of the UN Charter, which Ukraine and its allies allegedly committed. Another reason for referring to the UN Charter was the visit to the BRICS summit of UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, who raised its status with his presence.
In general, the BRICS countries are limited in their ability to make joint decisions by a mass of contradictions. The struggle continues regarding the entry of certain countries into BRICS. For example, India and Brazil were skeptical about the desire to expand the bloc (for example, at the expense of Turkey), considering this an implicit attempt to weaken their influence.
There is also a struggle between two approaches: the Russian Federation would like BRICS to transform into a full-fledged military-political bloc in the future – a kind of “Anti-NATO”. At the same time, China and other countries are only in favor of expanding economic cooperation, following the example of the initial stage of development of the European Union.
BRICS is still not a fully-fledged organization and is struggling to find structure. The BRICS countries differ in their principles and approaches to pressing global issues, such as the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and do not fully agree on some of the broader issues put forward by the bloc's leaders, including weaning international trade of the U.S. dollar and mitigating the threat posed by U.S. sanctions.
Therefore, for now, BRICS is more of a semi-formal, weakly organized structure, tacitly opposing the G7 to a greater extent, which can only potentially turn into a new union following the example of the EU or even into a military-political bloc in the very distant future. This is also evidenced by the wide geopolitical set of issues considered in the Summit Declaration - from space to ecology and artificial intelligence, the situation in Syria and Gaza to international trade, sanctions, and sports competitions.
The BRICS countries have agreed to simplify trade procedures between states and are trying to create a parallel financial system, but have so far abandoned the idea of a common currency.
The Russian Federation is also promoting the creation of a new financial system to circumvent the dominance of the dollar and sanctions. Bilateral relations between Russia and the BRICS countries are quite complex. And complicated primarily by sanctions and secondary sanctions. These countries comply with the sanctions regime in the financial sector. Therefore, the idea of a digital platform "BRICS Bridge" arose in the Russian Federation, which can only be created by not involving large banks of the BRICS countries, since they do not want to fall under sanctions. The Kremlin is developing the idea of creating small banks in different countries that form a network. However, the Russian Federation notes that The BRICS investment platform proposed by V. Putin will not become an alternative to the SWIFT payment system in the future.
The BRICS declaration outlines plans to create a new international payments and insurance system and states that BRICS countries will promote the use of national currencies in financial transactions between BRICS countries and their trading partners.
Maps of military operations.
Donetsk region.
Sociology.
According to the Razumkov Center research (conducted from September 20 to 26, 2024)
The attitude of Ukrainian citizens towards joining the European Union and NATO
81% of respondents would take part in the referendum on Ukraine's accession to the EU.
Would vote for joining the EU -73.7% (-5%) versus 13% (+6%) of all respondents. In March 2023, the ratio was -78.6% versus 7%.
Of those who would take part in the referendum - 88% (-4%) versus 7.6% (+3.7%), respectively. In March 2023, the ratio was - 91.8% versus 3.9%.
82% of respondents would take part in the referendum on Ukraine's accession to NATO.
Would vote for joining NATO -72% (-2%) versus 14.8% (+6.3%) of all respondents. In March 2023, the ratio was -74% versus 8.5%.
Of those who would take part in the referendum - 86% (-1.5%) versus 9.7% (+5%), respectively. In March 2023, the ratio was - 87.5% versus 4.7%.
Attitude towards foreign countries.
Ukrainians have a predominantly positive attitude towards: Latvia (87%), Lithuania (87%), Germany (87%), Great Britain (86.5%), France (86%), the USA (84%), Canada (84%), the Netherlands (84%), the Czech Republic (83%), Estonia (82%), Poland (78%), Moldova (74%), Japan (72%), Slovakia (68%), Romania (65%), Georgia (65%), Israel (58%), Turkey (55%), Armenia (52%).
The share of positive sentiments exceeds negative ones: Azerbaijan (46% and 26% respectively), South Korea (44% and 30% respectively), and Brazil (41% and 28% respectively).
Regarding Kazakhstan, opinions were almost divided (40% and 39.5% respectively).
The majority of respondents have a negative attitude towards: Russia (94%), Iran (85%), Belarus (84%), North Korea (76%), China (73%), and Hungary (59.5%).
The proportion of those with a negative attitude exceeds the proportion of those with a positive attitude: India (45.5% and 32%, respectively), and South Africa (36% and 28%, respectively).
96.3% of Ukrainian citizens have a negative attitude towards the Russian President. This figure has remained almost unchanged since March 2023.
After Ukraine's victory, support for a complete severance of all relations with the Russian Federation is 78.5% versus 13.3%.
They believe that Belarus is a party to the war against Ukraine - 78% versus 11%. In March 2023, 80% thought so versus 7.5%.
After Ukraine's victory, 68% supported a complete severance of all relations with Belarus against 19%
Regarding negotiations with the Russian Federation.
The number of supporters of negotiations with the Russian Federation in one form or another in Ukraine continues to grow.
Option 1. They believe that this is an effective way to achieve peace, which should be used now - yes (35.2%); no (47.8%); found it difficult to answer (17%)
In September 2023, the ratio was as follows: yes (21%); no (63%); found it difficult to answer (16%)
Option 2. Negotiations with Russia should be conducted only after the liberation of Ukrainian territories as of February 23, 2022 - yes (37.2%); no (41.2%); found it difficult to answer (21.5%)
In September 2023, the ratio was as follows: yes (25%); no (61%); found it difficult to answer (13.8%)
Option 3. Negotiations with Russia should be conducted only after the liberation of the territories of Ukraine as of 1991 - yes (49.4%); no (29.2%); found it difficult to answer (21.4%)
In September 2023, the ratio was as follows: yes (60.8%); no (23.6%); found it difficult to answer (15.5%)
According to research data from the Sociological Group Rating.
Trust in law enforcement and the courts:
The National Guard of Ukraine enjoys the highest level of trust among law enforcement agencies: 86% of respondents expressed trust, compared to 72% in 2023.
Security Service of Ukraine - 73%, which is 14% more than last year.
State Border Service: 54% trust it, 42% do not trust it.
Other institutions are rather distrusted.
The National Police and the Ministry of Internal Affairs have 48% trust, while 51% and 38% of respondents do not trust them, respectively. In 2023, the share of those who trusted the National Police was 56%.
The State Bureau of Investigation is trusted by 45%, while 50% express no confidence.
The National Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Prosecutor General's Office, and the State Customs Service have approximately the same level of trust (about 33%), while more than 60% do not trust these institutions.
The lowest level of trust is in the judiciary: only 25% express confidence, while 72% express no confidence.
Attitude towards EU reforms and support.
74% of respondents consider the fight against corruption to be the most important reform.
Reforms in the areas of national security, defense, and the judicial system also received 36% support each.
Police and customs reforms are a priority for 10% of respondents.
The respondents rated the following the best:
Digital transformation reform: 66% of respondents are completely or somewhat satisfied with it; another 20% are dissatisfied, and 13% of respondents found it difficult to answer.
About 50% are satisfied with support for gender equality, about 30% are dissatisfied, and another 21% are undecided.
National security reform: 46% satisfied, 47% dissatisfied, 7% undecided.
57% of respondents are dissatisfied with the police reform, while 40% are satisfied.
56% are dissatisfied with the customs reform, 30% are satisfied, and 15% are undecided.
Judicial reform received the lowest rating: 73% were dissatisfied and only 21% were satisfied.
Anti-corruption efforts received the lowest support - 15% satisfied and 84% dissatisfied.
Sources of information.
Telegram is the most popular source of information for 47%. It is followed by YouTube (26%), "Unified News Marathon" (21%), eyewitness accounts/acquaintances, and official government sources (19%).
Ukraine's accession to the EU.
68% believe that Ukraine should defend its interests and not agree to some EU demands. 28% believe that it is necessary to agree to all demands.
48% believe that the EU is interested in Ukraine joining. 50% have the opposite point of view.
20% believe that Ukraine is already fully prepared to join the EU. 57% believe that the country needs further reforms for this. 22% believe that Ukraine is not at all ready to join the EU. The share of those who see the need for further reforms has increased by 14% over the past year.
Timeframe for Ukraine's accession to the EU.
The number of those who believe in rapid accession to the EU is decreasing dynamically (the number of those who believe that EU membership is possible within 1–2 years has decreased from 66% in 2022 to 15% in 2024).
43% agree with the statement that Ukraine should definitely join the EU. 48% of respondents are more inclined to believe that Ukraine may not join the EU, but should strengthen economic ties with it. 7% believe that Ukraine does not need to integrate into the EU at all.
Regarding support from the EU.
EU support in the de-occupied territories is considered the most effective - 48% of respondents assess it positively, and 38% of respondents consider support in the investigation of war crimes to be effective.
Expectations from joining the EU.
Most often they expect the fight against corruption (41%), cooperation in the sphere of security and defense (36%), and security guarantees (35%). Economic cooperation (27%), financial support (26%), reform of the judicial and law enforcement system (21%), observance of rights and freedoms, improvement of the economic situation (19% each).
Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovskaya, Andrey Timchenko
for the Ukrainian Institute of Politics
