Ukrainian troops continue their offensive in the Kursk region on Russian territory. Even though the pace of advance of the Ukrainian Armed Forces has decreased over the week, Russian troops are not able to completely stabilize the situation in this region. The Ukrainian army is seeking to expand the combat zone, strengthen the flanks of the advancing group, and occupy the south of the Glushkovsky district. Ukrainian forces destroyed all three bridges over the Seim River, connecting the south of the Glushkovo region with the Kursk region. Also, they began to occupy this area from the west. The Russian Armed Forces withdrew to the location of the settlement. Tetkino on the eastern bank of the Seim River. The destruction of all bridges will disrupt the supply of Russian military personnel in the southern part of the Glushkovo region and may force them to leave this territory.
The pace of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' offensive has slowed compared to last week. Of the four critical settlements in the border area, only one was taken – the city of Sudzha.
In his report, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Alexander Syrsky at the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities under the President of Ukraine stated that during the period of the offensive on the territory of the Kursk region, the Armed Forces of Ukraine advanced 28-35 km deep into enemy defenses, captured 1,263 square kilometers of territory and took control of 93 settlements.
A. Syrsky showed a map of the territory in the Kursk region controlled by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. So, the Ukrainian forces advanced to the village Korenevka (under Russian control) in the west, north of the settlement. Sheptukhovka (already under Ukrainian control) and the settlement of Spalne in the east (also under Ukrainian control).
According to A. Syrsky, every day, the enemy spends up to 45 thousand ammunition shelling our positions in the east and south of Ukraine. Since the start of the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, the Russian army has fired 9,627 missiles of various types into Ukraine. Most often, the Russian Federation used S-300/S-400 missiles – 3008 units. The defense forces managed to shoot down more than 2,429 Russian missiles (25%). The missiles attacked 5,197 civilian targets and 1,998 military targets. In addition, the Russian Federation used 13,997 attack drones against Ukraine. Drones attacked 1,022 civilian targets and 3,697 military targets. At the same time, most of the UAVs (9272 units) were destroyed (66%). Since February 24, 2022, Russian missiles and drones have hit 11,879 targets in Ukraine, of which 6,203 are civilian and 5,676 are military.
It is worth noting that despite the fact that the average kill rate is about 25% of missiles and about 66% of drones, the dynamics of air defense operations have changed significantly for the better since the beginning of the war, and now this figure is much higher.
For Ukraine, the offensive in the Kursk region is a game-changer, a critical turning point, and an attempt to change the negative political and information trend. The Kursk region was attacked in order to raise morale within Ukraine, strengthen the position of President V. Zelensky's team, and fundamentally change the Western allies' views on the war. Ukrainian troops will strive to gain a foothold in the Kursk bridgehead before the American elections or even before the end of the active phase of hostilities. After the new administration of the US President comes to power, there will be a geopolitical reassessment of the situation in Ukraine. Therefore, both Russian and Ukrainian troops will strive to achieve maximum territorial success (Ukraine in the Kursk region and the Russian Federation in Donetsk) for a more advantageous position in negotiations with the new American president.
At the same time, the process of peaceful settlement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine has been paused for now. Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky said his country's attack on Russia's Kursk region showed the Kremlin's threats of retaliation were a bluff and called on Kyiv's allies to ease restrictions on the use of supplied weapons.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine's successes in the Kursk region contribute to K. Harris's election campaign since they can be presented as proof of the correctness of the democratic administration's policy of supporting Ukraine. The Ukrainian leadership needs to maintain the Kursk bridgehead until the elections in the United States.
Most likely, the Russian Federation will try to stabilize the Kursk ledge, preventing it from expanding and subjecting it to shelling, but without transferring large military forces, so as not to slow down the pace of the offensive in the Donbas. The liquidation of the bridgehead will likely be postponed, with a gradual build-up of the group in the Kursk region to avoid the withdrawal of significant forces from Donbas. Moscow is expected to increase the number of its troops in Ukraine to 800,000 by the end of the year, up from the current 600,000.
Ukraine has been forced to weaken its positions in the Donbas to focus on the battles in the Kursk region. In the Pokrovsky direction, the pace of the Russian offensive remains high. At the same time, activity in other areas has decreased somewhat, partly due to the transfer of Russian troops to the Kursk region. According to several sources, four settlements in the Pokrovsk direction were captured: Zavitne, Mykolaivka, Novozhelanne, and Svyrydonivka. It is mainly the southern flank of the offensive in the direction of Selidove.
The real target of the Russian Federation may not be the city of Pokrovsk but the southern part of Donetsk and northern Zaporizhzhia regions. Russian troops are advancing in the direction of the settlement. Novogrodivka, but not in the direction of the cities of Pokrovsk and Mirnograd, but to the southeast, in the direction of the Vremivskyi ledge. It may indicate that the Russian Federation is seeking to bypass large fortified areas of the Armed Forces of Ukraine west of the towns of Kurakhove and Krasnogorivka in the direction of Vugledar.
Due to the worsening situation in the Pokrovsky direction, the evacuation of Selidove, Pokrovsk, and Mirnograd residents is being prepared.
In the direction of Toretsk, reports appeared about the entry of a Russian armored group from the settlement of Severne inside the town. The Russians planted a flag over the dominant height—the local waste heap. Data also appeared that the Russians had completely taken control of the
settlement "Niu York."
A significant Russian Federation advance took place near the city of Vugledar. There, Russian troops blocked the highway to Konstantynivka, approaching Vodyane. Thus, the town of Vugledar is almost blocked from the northeast.
This week, Parliament's work was unblocked. After adopting the law on the UOC, several military PR laws are also expected. After that, MPs will resolve the issue of staff rotations in the Cabinet of Ministers.
It seems that under pressure from the team of ex-president P. Poroshenko and the neoliberal wing, oriented towards the Democratic Party in the USA and their allies in the UK, who blocked the work of Parliament for several weeks, at some point the Office of the President decided to adopt a law on the UOC. Thus, the government team decided to extract a “patriotic trump card” from P. Poroshenko, depriving him of the opportunity to promote himself on this topic.
It is believed that Law 8371, "On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on the Activities of Religious Organizations in Ukraine," now known as "On the Protection of the Constitutional System in the Sphere of Activities of Religious Organizations," opens the way to a ban on the activities of the UOC in Ukraine. However, the law does not contain a direct political prohibition on the UOC; it only offers an additional basis for going to court.
Law 8371 amends the Law of Ukraine "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" of 1991 (Law on Religion of 1991) and the Law of Ukraine "On State Registration of Legal Entities, Individual Entrepreneurs and Public Formations" of 2003 (Law on State Registration).
Article I.1.2 of Bill 8371 adds a new part to Article 16 of the 1991 Law on Religion: "In cases provided for by this law, the activities of a religious organization may be terminated in court at the request of the central executive body implementing state policy in the field of religion, or prosecutor. This provision gives the authority to the central executive body or the prosecutor to liquidate a religious organization only by going to court."
According to the proposed procedure, if suspicions arise regarding a religious organization, the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience conducts a “religious studies examination” to determine “subordination in canonical and organizational matters to the centers of influence of a religious organization (association)” associated with the aggressor country.
If violations are discovered during the examination, the organization is issued an order to eliminate them. Thus, religious organizations, with respect to establishing a connection with the Russian Orthodox Church, will be given about ten months (9 voluntary + 1 after the conclusions) so that they can take several actions indicating that they no longer have such connections. Suppose the conditions are not met after this period. In that case, the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience may apply to the court to terminate the religious organization's activities.
Amendments have been made to the law that allows the termination of the activities of a religious organization by a court decision if authorized persons of this organization are convicted of crimes against the national security of Ukraine or for offenses specified in articles 161, 258–258-6, 436–438, 442, 447 Criminal Code of Ukraine. These articles relate to violations of the equality of citizens (including religious beliefs), fraud, legalization of illegally obtained property, terrorist attacks, war propaganda, denial of Russian aggression, genocide, and being mercenaries.
A ban on a church's activities can be declared only after a court decision and confirmation in an appeal.
The entire procedure for a ban on the UOC will begin in May-June 2025, when all electoral processes in the United States will be completed. After this, it will become apparent to the government team in Ukraine how positive or negative the new White House Administration will be regarding the issue of the UOC. Depending on this, banning it can either be accelerated or suspended. Let us recall that potential Republican Vice President James Vance has repeatedly publicly condemned the pressure on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and even called for limiting military assistance to Ukraine because of this.
Adopting the law on the UOC will result in part of the former OPL [Opposition Platform "For Life"] (where the UOC is considered its main electoral base) breaking away from the informal parliamentary pro-government coalition. In this case, the Servants of the People must form a new alliance with European Solidarity. Thus, P. Poroshenko's figure will begin to gain political weight, first in Parliament within the country and then, possibly, at the international level.
Russian gas continues to be supplied through Ukraine in the approved volume through the Sudzha station in the Kursk region. Currently, Gazprom does not control the Sudzha gas measuring station. The situation is sufficient grounds for declaring force majeure and stopping gas transit to Europe. However, according to Gazprom, the gas supply to the Sudzha station continues, and company employees can perform standard equipment maintenance.
If Gazprom stops gas transit, it will not only lose revenue but also face multi-billion dollar lawsuits from European buyers. In addition, Gazprom needs to maintain gas supplies to Hungary and Slovakia to maintain their support. After the news about the Ukrainian Armed Forces' breakthrough into the Kursk region, gas prices in Europe rose to a maximum for this year. Benchmark gas futures rose 4.8% to 38.45 euros per megawatt-hour.
Russia could pressure Ukraine with Belarus's help, which could lead to a crisis on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border. Russian authorities suspect that there may have been a conspiracy between Belarus and Ukraine since Ukrainian troops removed from the Belarusian border participated in the Kursk operation. President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko said in an interview that the Belarusian people should be ready for his departure from office, which may indicate pressure from Russia. If Russia does not achieve its goals, A. Lukashenko may be removed from power.
A. Lukashenko also proposed resuming peace negotiations on Ukraine based on the agreements reached in Istanbul. He noted that an escalation of the conflict on the part of Ukraine could force Russia to take asymmetric measures, including the use of nuclear weapons. In addition, there is a possibility of Western troops entering Ukrainian territory. Ukraine has more than 120 thousand troops near the Belarusian-Ukrainian border, and the border is carefully mined. The defense of the western border of Belarus has been worked out jointly with Moscow, and if necessary, the plan can be changed to the offensive.
President of Ukraine Vladimir Zelensky introduced to Parliament a bill on ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which will allow Ukraine to become a full member of this court. The bill also aims to bring Ukrainian legislation into line with the Rome Statute and ensure criminal prosecution of serious international crimes such as genocide, aggression, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
Ratification of the Rome Statute will allow Ukraine to participate in the work of the Assembly of States Parties and submit candidates for the election of judges and prosecutors of the ISS. As of 2024, 137 states have signed the treaty, and 124 countries have ratified it. The ISS has already issued six arrest warrants for Russian aggression, including warrants against Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian officials. However, Russia does not recognize the ISS warrant and is not a party to the Rome Statute, like China, India, the USA, Israel, and other large countries.
Ukraine signed the Rome Statute in 2000 but has not yet ratified it, fearing that the ISS might launch investigations against Ukraine. Although Ukraine has already given the ISS the right to investigate crimes committed on its territory, there is a 7-year grace period for serving warrants and prosecuting Ukrainian citizens. In war conditions, ratification of the Rome Statute creates certain risks for the Ukrainian military since Russia may bring charges, and the ISS will be obliged to consider them.
War maps.
The situation in Ukraine.
Parliament resumed its work and adopted a law on the UOC.
This week, Parliament's work was unblocked. After adopting the law on the UOC, several military PR laws are also expected. After that, MPs will begin to resolve the issue of personnel rotations in the Cabinet of Ministers.
It seems that under pressure from the team of ex-president P. Poroshenko and the neoliberal wing, oriented towards the Democratic Party in the USA and their allies in the UK, who blocked the work of Parliament for several weeks, at some point the Office of the President decided to adopt a law on the UOC. Thus, the government team decided to extract a “patriotic trump card” from P. Poroshenko, depriving him of the opportunity to promote himself on this topic.
It is believed that Law 8371, "On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on the Activities of Religious Organizations in Ukraine," now known as "On the Protection of the Constitutional System in the Sphere of Activities of Religious Organizations," opens the way to a ban on the activities of the UOC in Ukraine. However, the law does not contain a direct political prohibition on the UOC; it only offers an additional basis for going to court.
Law 8371 amends the Law of Ukraine "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" of 1991 (Law on Religion of 1991) and the Law of Ukraine "On State Registration of Legal Entities, Individual Entrepreneurs and Public Formations" of 2003 (Law on State Registration).
Article I.1.2 of Bill 8371 adds a new part to Article 16 of the 1991 Law on Religion: "In cases provided for by this law, the activities of a religious organization may be terminated in court at the request of the central executive body implementing state policy in the field of religion, or prosecutor. This provision provides the authority to the central executive body or the prosecutor to liquidate a religious organization only by going to court."
According to the proposed procedure, if suspicions arise regarding a religious organization, the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience conducts a “religious studies examination” to determine “subordination in canonical and organizational matters to the centers of influence of a religious organization (association)” associated with the aggressor country.
If violations are discovered during the examination, the organization is issued an order to eliminate them. Thus, religious organizations, with respect to establishing a connection with the Russian Orthodox Church, will be given about ten months (9 voluntary + 1 after the conclusions) to take several actions indicating that they no longer have such connections. Suppose the conditions are not met after this period. In that case, the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience may apply to the court to terminate the religious organization's activities.
Amendments have been made to the law that allows the termination of the activities of a religious organization by a court decision if authorized persons of this organization are convicted of crimes against the national security of Ukraine or for crimes specified in articles 161, 258–258-6, 436–438, 442, 447 Criminal Code of Ukraine. These articles concern violations of the equality of citizens (including religious beliefs), fraud, legalization of illegally obtained property, terrorist attacks, war propaganda, denial of Russian aggression, genocide, and being mercenaries.
A ban on a church's activities can be declared only after a court decision and confirmation in an appeal.
The entire procedure for a ban on the UOC will begin in May-June 2025, when all electoral processes in the United States will be completed. After this, it will become apparent to the government team in Ukraine how positive or negative the new White House Administration will be regarding the issue of the UOC. Depending on this, banning it can either be accelerated or suspended. Let us recall that potential Republican Vice President James Vance has repeatedly publicly condemned the pressure on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and even called for limiting military assistance to Ukraine because of this.
As a result of the adoption of the law on the UOC, part of the former OPL (where the UOC is considered its main electoral base) will break away from the informal parliamentary pro-government coalition. In this case, the Servants of the People must form a new alliance with European Solidarity. Thus, P. Poroshenko's figure will begin to gain political weight, first in Parliament within the country and then, possibly, at the international level.
Fitch Ratings downgraded Ukraine's rating from "C" (meaning imminent default) to "RD" (restricted default). In July, Fitch already lowered Ukraine's long-term rating to "C" from the previous level of "CC" (high probability of default). Now, the agency has also lowered the rating of Ukraine's Eurobonds for 2026 to "D" (default) and confirmed the rating of other bonds at the level of "C."
At the same time, Fitch maintained the rating of Ukrainian debt in national currency at the "CCC-" level, as it expects domestic debt to be excluded from the restructuring with external creditors. Fitch downgraded Ukraine's rating due to an agreement between the Ukrainian government and some Eurobond holders to restructure debt and a law allowing Ukraine to suspend payments on its external debt, which the agency regards as signs of default.
The downgrade to "RD" indicates that Ukraine failed to make timely payments on the 2026 Eurobonds, which fell due on August 1, 2024, after the 10-day grace period.
On July 31, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky signed a law allowing the government to suspend payments on the national debt until October if necessary. On July 22, Ukraine agreed with creditors to restructure part of its external debt in the amount of $23.4 billion, which includes writing off 37% of the Eurobond debt and postponing the first payments to 2029. Thus, considering this agreement and the new law, Fitch Ratings recognized a limited default in Ukraine.
Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovskaya, Andrey Timchenko
for the Ukrainian Institute of Politics
