SITUATION IN UKRAINE: 11–1 July 7, 2024.

Personnel rotations in the Cabinet of Ministers are being prepared in Ukraine. There are most likely no plans to replace the total composition of the Government headed by Prime Minister D. Shmygal. Answering a question from journalists about the resignation of the Government, V. Zelensky admitted that there may be personnel changes in the Cabinet of Ministers with "some ministers." "We can't just talk about a change in the prime minister; this suggests that there may be changes in the government, and they probably can be. We are engaged in this process," said V. Zelensky. Let us recall that earlier, there were rumors that a complete replacement for the government was being prepared. The main goal of such a replacement was to "pin" on the current Prime Minister, D. Shmygal, and all the accumulated negativity against the authorities in society. This option was likely discussed in the Office of the President but still needs to be implemented.

New personnel changes in the government will mainly be related to the accumulated political negativity, ensuring progress in Ukraine's accession to the EU, and cost reduction (Government personnel may be reduced by 30%- 50%).

There are rumors about the likely dismissal of Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories Irina Vereshchuk and Minister of Education and Science Oksen Lisovoy. Former Minister of Finance and current Ambassador of Ukraine to the United States, Oksana Markarova, may be appointed first deputy prime minister (if she is not appointed prime minister). Instead, the embassy in the United States will be headed by Dmitry Kuleba, who today holds the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. In his place, they will put Andrei Sibiga, deputy head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is also possible to replace the Minister of Justice D. Malyuska and a whole list of regional leaders.

However, personnel decisions still need to be made. A meeting with the President of Ukraine is expected to discuss this issue in the coming days. The personnel decisions must be implemented over the next two weeks when the Parliament of Ukraine will be in plenary sessions.

At the front, Ukrainian troops have yet to be able to completely stop the Russian offensive, although its pace has slowed down somewhat thanks to the resumption of supplies of Western weapons. Thus, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were almost able to stop the advance of the Russian Federation in the Kharkiv region. But the heaviest fighting continues in the Donetsk direction. Russian troops are trying to advance from the south towards the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka highway from the village. Ocheretino towards the settlement. Vozdvizhenka (in this area, the distance to the highway is already less than 6 km). Russian troops advanced to the village. New York on the Toretsky direction. At the same time, attacks are underway from the east on the city of Toretsk itself. The advance of Russian troops in the town of Chasovoy Yar slowed down somewhat. The Russian Federation controls the city's eastern outskirts, and the front line runs along the Seversky Donets - Donbas canal. They also advanced toward Seversk in the Razdolovka area from Vesele. Fighting is also taking place along the Kupyansk-Svatovo-Kremennaya line, but there have yet to be any confirmed changes to the front line. On the Vremevsky salient (on the border of Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions), the Russian Federation declared a settlement—Urozhayne (was liberated during the counter-offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces last summer).

At the NATO summit, they announced that F-16 aircraft had begun to be transferred to Ukraine. However, the first batch will consist of only six aircraft, and by the end of the year, Ukraine will have received 20 F-16s. Such planes are incapable of radically changing the situation at the front in favor of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, even though the Russian Federation uses 300 aircraft against Ukraine every day. As President of Ukraine V. Zelensky stated, Ukraine needs 128 F-16 jets. He also demanded that the United States allow Ukraine to fire American long-range missiles at Russian airfields to destroy aircraft carrying bombs. However, the White House recently announced that it does not intend to lift restrictions on the use of its missiles.

People's Deputy M. Bezuglaya left the Servant of the People faction of her own free will. M. Bezuglaya explained her statement: "She does not have the moral strength to associate herself with the faction even formally." The deputy was elected to Parliament as a majoritarian, so she did not lose her mandate. M. Bezugla may have left the Servant of the People faction because she was often associated with the Office of the President and its head A. Ermak in the media. In particular, criticism from M. Bezugla of the military leadership becomes a harbinger of imminent resignation (as was the case with the ex-commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine V. Zaluzhny and Yu. Sodol). She acted for the OP as a tool or "tip of the spear" to criticize the guilty or objectionable generals. Whether the authorities removed M. Bezugla from themselves or "brought her into the shadows" will be seen by the presence or absence of actual criminal cases against her. In the future, M. Bezugla will likely continue publicly speaking out against some of the Ukrainian generals, especially since she now has a free hand. Currently, M. Bezuglaya actively criticizes the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, A. Syrsky (which is a negative signal for him). She claims that the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Syrsky, and his entourage favor a ceasefire with the Russian Federation and "do not believe in victory," which was allegedly reported to her by "several sources."

President V. Zelensky has not yet expressed public agreement with the criticism of the Armed Forces commander-in-chief of Ukraine, A. Syrsky, for failures at the front. He said that he was not going to evaluate the work of A. Syrsky, yet, during his leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, there was a delay in the supply of weapons from the United States. In particular, Russian troops could have staged a breakthrough in the north of the Kharkiv region under any other commander-in-chief. However, in any case, the Office of the President looks forward to positive changes at the front, primarily intercepting the military initiative. As we wrote earlier, the country's political leadership believes it has done everything possible for the military (they mobilized, secured the allocation of Western aid, etc.), and now they demand appropriate results. A factor of pressure on the Ukrainian authorities here is the fact that the problematic situation at the front in Ukraine is causing concern on the part of the White House, where the presidential election campaign is underway, and where they also believe that they have done everything possible for Ukraine and expect positive changes at the front or, according to at least adequate protection of Ukrainian troops from Russian aggression. Suppose the situation at the front does not, at a minimum, stabilize before September 1 (when the election campaign in the United States enters the "hot phase"). In that case, the Armed Forces commander-in-chief of Ukraine, A. Syrsky, may lose his post.

It is noteworthy that politically, Commander-in-Chief A. Syrsky is actively defended by P. Poroshenko's team representatives. In particular, MP M. Bezuglaya was included in the database of the website "Peacemaker" (control over which is attributed to the ex-president's team) for criticizing the military leadership. It is indicated that the activities of M. Bezugla have "clear signs of an information campaign planned in the interests" of the Russian Federation and "an unidentified group of people"; she is accused of "discrediting the senior command staff and demoralizing the personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine."

During the presidential election campaign, the assassination attempt on the US Republican presidential candidate, D. Trump, increased the degree of tension and radicalized the confrontation between the two opposing camps – Republicans and Democrats. This incident significantly increases the chances of D. Trump winning. For Democrats, the pre-election situation has become even more complicated against J. Biden's disastrous debates and public calls for his replacement from some Democratic leaders (although J. Biden himself does not want to leave the race). In addition to this, Democrats will be accused of, at a minimum, creating an atmosphere of hatred towards D. Trump or even organizing the assassination attempt itself. At the same time, this assassination attempt (during which D. Trump miraculously remained alive, turning his head) is difficult to write off as staged.

 

Now, Democrats will not be able to conduct their campaign based on demonizing the image of D. Trump, as was the case before, for fear of accusations of inciting new incidents. In addition, there are disagreements in the Democratic camp regarding the nomination of J. Biden as a candidate from his party. All this only increases the Republicans' chances of winning. US President J. Biden is actively demonstrating that he will not leave the election race.

For Ukraine, the situation as a whole will mean a shift in the general vector of attention of its principal ally, the United States, from foreign policy affairs and the situation on the Ukrainian front to its internal situation.

The possible election of D. Trump as US President threatens global changes in the conduct of US foreign policy. After the assassination attempt, Donald Trump was officially announced as the US presidential candidate by the Republican Party. After that, he chose a potential vice president, Ohio Senator J.D. Vance. It is known that D. Vance opposes the supply of weapons to Ukraine and is a supporter of a speedy end to the war through negotiations. He also called for linking military and other assistance to Ukraine with an end to pressure on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC).

For Ukraine, the assassination attempt, as a factor increasing D. Trump's chances of winning, will gradually push representatives of the Ukrainian government to adapt to the general mainstream of the Republicans. This may concern the process of peace negotiations (and the willingness to compromise), reduction or complication of the provision of military and financial support, and change of partners and curators of Ukrainian-American interaction.

The negotiation process will largely depend on whether a political "puzzle" can be formed by the end of the year—the simultaneous Hungarian presidency of the EU Council and Donald Trump's victory in the US presidential elections. In this case, we expect maximum revival of the negotiation process from November to December. But if such negotiations fail, the war could last several years until 2027.

Despite the intensification of behind-the-scenes negotiations regarding the end of the war, there is no rapprochement of the positions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation yet. Hungarian Prime Minister V. Orban called on Europe to launch a peace initiative. This is stated in a letter from V. Orban addressed to the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, and EU leaders after his trips to Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and China. V. Orban summarizes the negotiations' results and argues that Europe should launch a peace initiative without waiting for the United States. As reported in V. Orban's letter, Russian President V. Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping suggest that new peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine will occur before the year ends. Such an assumption on the part of the Russian Federation and China probably implies a significant defeat for Ukraine at the front (which, of course, is not what Ukraine is counting on). But, as V. Orban himself admits, after his "peace tour," he concluded that both Kyiv and Moscow "are very determined to fight, and without the intervention of external mediators, we, unfortunately, will see brutal destruction in the coming months."

Relevant today remains the difference in the already stated positions of both Ukraine (which continues to insist on the withdrawal of Russian troops from its entire territory) and the Russian Federation (a request to recognize five regions of Ukraine as Russian) and the absence of any points of contact between them.

At the same time, the parties fictitiously demonstrate openness to the negotiation process. In particular, Ukraine continues to prepare for the second peace summit despite the ultimatum statements of the Russian Federation. President of Ukraine V. Zelensky repeated that representatives of the Russian Federation should be at the 2nd peace summit. To do this, they plan to develop a final plan at three meetings: on energy in Qatar, the maritime corridor in Turkey, and humanitarian issues in Canada. The plan for implementing all the necessary points for the second Peace Summit will be ready in November (that is, by the time of the US presidential elections). However, the Russian Federation stated that they would not take part in the summit, where the peace plan of V. Zelensky (which, in essence, implies the surrender of the Russian Federation) will be considered a basis.

The situation for the Russian authorities is much better and more stable now than it was in the fall of 2022. Therefore, the Russian Federation aims to realize its demands through military means and is not inclined to seek compromises with Ukraine until the elections in the United States.

The NATO summit, which took place in Washington (July 9-11), recorded the absence of prospects for Ukraine to join the Alliance before the end of the war. The NATO summit communiqué said the Alliance would continue to support Ukraine "on its irreversible path towards full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership." NATO "will also be able to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when the allies agree and the conditions are met." Earlier, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that Ukraine would receive NATO membership, but this would happen when there was a consensus among the Alliance members. Moreover, this is only possible after the end of the war. "Ukraine is approaching NATO, but there is no talk of admission to the Alliance yet," said NATO Secretary General J. Stoltenberg.

The absence of significant progress in Ukraine's accession to NATO can also be perceived as a negotiating position for resuming dialogue with the Russian Federation.

At the same time, the function of managing the war and providing assistance to Ukraine from Ramstein has been transferred to NATO, which, if President Donald Trump is elected in the United States, will make it difficult for him to cancel this assistance since it would require the consensus of all member countries of the Alliance.

In exchange for the lack of a specific promise of membership, the allies provided Ukraine with a compensatory aid package (in essence, they bought Ukraine off). In particular, they promised to provide Ukraine with five more air defense systems – Patriot and SAMP-T (as soon as possible). Also, in the coming months, the United States and its partners intend to provide Ukraine with "dozens of tactical air defense systems, including NASAMS, HAWK, IRIS-T SLM, IRIS-T SLS, and Gepard systems." The US also promised Ukraine "hundreds" of additional interceptor missiles, but only "over the next year."

The NATO summit communiqué stated that NATO intends to provide Ukraine with at least 40 billion euros ($43.28 billion) in military assistance over the next year.

Mobilization process. The period for updating military registration data of Ukrainian citizens aged 18 to 60 ended on July 16, 2024. The state provides a fine of 17,000–25,000 UAH for untimely updating of data. Those who updated their data before the new mobilization law came into force but did not do so after May 18 will also face a fine. According to the Ministry of Defense, as of July 7, 2024, the number of updates of military registration data by citizens reached almost 3.2 million. Since the beginning of the Russian invasion, the TCC has drawn up more than 180 thousand administrative protocols on military registration violators and submitted more than 400 thousand reports on the search for draft evaders.

The Cabinet of Ministers has prohibited mobilizing employees of organizations that receive foreign grants. Against the backdrop of the risk of shutting down several important city-forming and public utility enterprises due to mobilization processes in the information environment, a published copy (the primary source was journalists from the Judicial-Legal Gazette portal) of the order of the Secretary of State of the Cabinet of Ministers dated June 21, 2024 No. 75 caused a wave of anger. On June 21, 2024, No. 75, amendments are made to the order of the Secretary of the Cabinet of Ministers dated February 16, 2023, No. 16 on some issues of the implementation of government resolution No. 76, dated January 27, 2023. The resolution describes the procedure for booking companies, organizations, and institutions whose activities are essential for Ukraine.

According to Order No. 75, dated June 21, 2024, 133 non-governmental organizations are recognized as "critically important for the functioning of the economy and ensuring the livelihoods of the population during a special period" and are allocated funds by international institutions. Employees of these companies are now protected from mobilization.

Many of these organizations deal with policy formation in Ukraine, public opinion research, polls, analysis of electoral processes, etc. In addition to organizations that are direct representatives of donor institutions from the USA, Germany, Great Britain, etc., this list includes several domestic non-governmental civil society organizations, limited liability companies, and an educational institution.

The situation with electricity in Ukraine remains difficult. During heatwaves in some regions, power outages exceed schedules, causing significant social discontent. The maximum period without light in the different areas ranges from 6 hours in a row to 18 hours a day (not on all days of the week). The fairness of the power outage schedules by region is planned to be checked. The leader in the number of complaints is the Dnipropetrovsk region. A check will begin with it, affecting another 5-6 areas.

Representatives of Ukrenergo report that the situation with energy supply will improve in late July – early August, as generating units will go out of repair and weather conditions will change, which will soften the blackout schedules accordingly. Of course, the deficit will remain, but it will no longer be as significant. Since May 2024, controlled emergency power outages have been introduced in all regions of Ukraine due to a substantial electricity shortage. Then Ukrenergo stated that all large thermal and hydroelectric power plants in Ukraine were damaged due to Russian shelling. Prime Minister Denis Shmygal said that Russia has destroyed 50% of Ukraine's electricity generation capacity, and 73% of large thermal power plants are not operating due to severe damage and destruction. Damage to energy infrastructure is estimated at US$1 billion.

During the period from March 22, 2024, the Russian Federation carried out eight missile and drone attacks on the Ukrainian energy system, while these attacks were on a smaller scale than they were at the end of 2022 – the beginning of 2023. As the authorities admit, the situation in the energy sector is now worse than at that time. Of course, there is also a cumulative effect when the power generation system does not have time to recover. However, the main reason for the current situation with electricity in the country is that the work to restore power-generating installations was planned without considering weather conditions and abnormal heat.

In June 2024, Ukraine imported more electricity than in 2023, reports the DiXi Group analytical center, citing Energy Map data. In June 2024, Ukraine imported 858.4 thousand MWh of electricity, 6% more than what was purchased for 2023 (806.4 thousand MWh). This is the highest monthly import volume in the last ten years. Compared to May 2024 (448.2 thousand MWh), imports increased almost two times, and from June 2023 (43.7 thousand MWh) - increased nearly 20 times. It is reported that electricity exports were utterly absent in June. Based on the results of June 2024, the most significant volume of electricity was imported from Hungary – 357.1 thousand MWh or 42%. Another 297 thousand MWh came from Slovakia and Romania (17% each), 138.1 thousand MWh (16%) - from Poland, and Moldova – 66.2 thousand MWh or 8%.

Public opinion research in Ukraine demonstrates that despite growing war fatigue, society is not yet ready to make any compromises with the Russian Federation to end hostilities. According to a sociological study by the Razumkov Center commissioned by ZN.UA, Ukrainians are prepared for negotiations (44%) but not ready to concede anything to the Russian Federation (61%). The minimum necessary condition for concluding a peace agreement with the Russian Federation is the liberation of Ukraine from Russian troops within the 1991 borders (51%). At the same time, 46% of Ukrainians believe that there is nothing shameful about being a draft dodger. If the government agrees to a peace agreement with the Russian Federation with borders along the front line, 49% predict civil resistance.

In general, paradoxical phenomena can be observed in the mood of Ukrainian society. The majority does not believe that being a draft dodger is shameful, but they want to return all territories within the 1991 borders. The majority are ready to negotiate with the Russian Federation but still decide whether to concede anything.

Interestingly, similar sentiments are observed in Russian society. According to Russian Field, the % of those supporting negotiations in the Russian Federation is 49%. But at the same time, there are very few supporters of real compromises. For example, only 1% are ready to return to Ukraine's territories within the 1991 borders.

Combat map.

Internal situation in the country.

Economic situation.

The situation with electricity in Ukraine remains difficult. During heatwaves in some regions, power outages exceed schedules, causing significant social discontent. The maximum period without light in a row in the different areas ranges from 6 hours, in total, up to 18 hours a day (not on all days of the week). The fairness of the power outage schedules by region is planned to be checked. The leader in the number of complaints is the Dnipropetrovsk region. The check will begin with it and then affect another 5-6 areas.

Representatives of Ukrenergo report that the situation with energy supply will improve in late July and early August, as generating units will go out of repair and weather conditions will change, which will soften the blackout schedules. Of course, the deficit will remain, but it will no longer be as significant. From May 2024, controlled emergency blackouts were introduced in all regions of Ukraine due to a substantial electricity shortage. Then Ukrenergo stated that all large thermal and hydroelectric power plants in Ukraine were damaged due to Russian shelling. Prime Minister Denis Shmygal said that Russia has destroyed 50% of Ukraine's electricity generation capacity, and 73% of large thermal power plants are not operating due to severe damage and destruction. Damage to energy infrastructure is estimated at US$1 billion.

For the period from March 22, 2024, The Russian Federation carried out eight missile and drone attacks on the Ukrainian energy system, while these attacks were on a smaller scale than they were at the end of 2022 - the beginning of 2023. As the authorities admit, the situation in the energy sector is now worse than at that time. Of course, there is also a cumulative effect when the power generation system does not have time to recover. However, the main reason for the current situation with electricity in the country is that the work to restore power-generating installations was planned without considering weather conditions and abnormal heat.

In June 2024, Ukraine imported more electricity than it had in 2023, as reported by the DiXi Group analytical center, citing Energy Map data. In June 2024, Ukraine imported 858.4 thousand MWh of electricity, 6% more than was purchased for 2023 (806.4 thousand MWh). This is the highest monthly import volume in the last ten years.

Compared to May 2024 (448.2 thousand MWh), imports increased almost two times, from June 2023 (43.7 thousand MWh) - increased nearly 20 times.

It is reported that electricity exports were utterly absent in June.

According to June 2024 results, the largest volume of electricity was imported from Hungary—357.1 thousand MWh, or 42%.

Another 297 thousand MWh came from Slovakia and Romania (17% each)

138.1 thousand MWh (16%) - from Poland.

From Moldova - 66.2 thousand MWh or 8%

In June, Ukraine attracted emergency assistance from Romania, Slovakia, and Poland for five days.

It supplied excess electricity on June 2 and 22 due to the impossibility of supply to domestic consumers.

For eight days, Ukraine assisted Poland by urgently receiving surplus electricity, receiving more than eight thousand MWh.

Sociology.

According to a sociological study conducted by the Razumkov Center commissioned by ZN.UA.

Is it necessary to start negotiations with the Russian Federation?

44% believe that the time has come to start such talks.

35% - disagree

Undecided - 21%

Is a military victory for Ukraine possible?

66% believe that Russia can be defeated on the battlefield.

16% of Ukrainians no longer have this belief,

18% are undecided.

Regarding V. Putin's demands to end the war. Namely, Ukraine must withdraw its troops from the Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions and recognize these regions and Crimea as Russian.

6.1% of respondents agree to fulfill these requirements.

Do not agree to fulfill these requirements - 82.8%

Difficult to answer - 11.1%

Lift sanctions against the Russian Federation.

9% agree with this

Disagree with this - 76.9%

Difficult to answer - 14.1%

Neutral and non-bloc status of Ukraine

21.8% agree with this

Disagree with this - 58.5%

Difficult to answer - 19.7%

The minimum necessary condition for concluding a peace agreement with the Russian Federation.

51% - insist on the liberation of Ukraine from Russian troops within the 1991 borders.

26% - may agree to stop the war along the demarcation line in early 2022

9% are ready to recognize the border along the front line.

What concessions are Ukrainians ready to make during negotiations with Russia?

61.1% are not ready to sacrifice anything for peace with the Russian Federation.

14% of respondents can agree to abandon the pro-Western vector, and only

8% are ready to give up territories.

If the authorities agree to a peace agreement between the Russian Federation and the borders along the front line.

49% predict civil resistance.

24.7% - does not expect radical developments

26.3% found it difficult to answer.

Under what conditions will Ukraine be able to defeat the Russian Federation?

82% of respondents believe that Ukraine can defeat Russia if Western partners provide enough weapons.

76% - if Ukraine builds its powerful defense complex and puts things in order with mobilization.

69% - if the West helps us with human resources.

Is it shameful to be a draft dodger during the war?

46% of Ukrainians believe that there is nothing shameful in being a draft dodger.

29% - have the opposite opinion

25% found it difficult to answer.

Thus, one can observe paradoxical phenomena in the mood of Ukrainian society. The majority does not believe that there is anything shameful in being a draft dodger, but they want to return all territories within the 1991 borders.

The majority are ready to negotiate with the Russian Federation but are not ready to concede anything.

Interestingly, similar sentiments are observed in Russian society. According to Russian Field data, 49% of Russians support negotiations in the Russian Federation. But at the same time, very few support real compromises. For example, only 1% are ready to return Ukraine's territory within the 1991 borders.

 

The situation around Ukraine.

The prospect of peace negotiations.

The negotiation process will largely depend on whether a political "puzzle" can be formed by the end of the year —the simultaneous Hungarian presidency of the EU Council and Donald Trump's victory in the US Presidential elections. In this case, we should expect maximum revival of the negotiation process from November to December of this year. But if such negotiations fail, the war could last several years until 2027.

Despite the intensification of behind-the-scenes negotiations regarding the end of the war, there is no rapprochement of the positions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation yet. Hungarian Prime Minister V. Orbán called on Europe to launch a peace initiative. This is stated in a letter from V. Orban addressed to the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, and EU leaders after his trips to Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and China. V. Orban summarizes the negotiations' results and argues that Europe should launch a peace initiative without waiting for the United States. As reported in V. Orban's letter, Russian President V. Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping suggest that new peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine will occur before the year ends. Such an assumption on the part of the Russian Federation and China probably implies a significant defeat for Ukraine at the front (which, of course, is not what Ukraine is counting on).

But as V. Orban himself admits, after his "peace tour," he concluded that both Kyiv and Moscow "are very determined to fight, and without the intervention of external mediators, we, unfortunately, will see brutal destruction in the coming month."

What remains relevant today is the difference in the already stated positions of both Ukraine (continues to insist on the withdrawal of Russian troops from its entire territory) and the Russian Federation (a request to recognize five regions of Ukraine as Russian) and the absence of any points of contact between them.

At the same time, the parties fictitiously demonstrate openness to the negotiation process. In particular, Ukraine continues to prepare for the second peace summit despite the ultimatum statements of the Russian Federation. President of Ukraine V. Zelensky repeated that representatives of the Russian Federation should be at the 2nd peace summit. To do this, they plan to develop a final plan at three meetings: on energy in Qatar, the maritime corridor in Turkey, and humanitarian issues in Canada. The plan for implementing all the necessary points for the second Peace Summit will be ready in November (that is, by the time of the US Presidential elections). However, the Russian Federation stated that they would not take part in the summit, where V. Zelensky's peace plan (which, in essence, implies the surrender of the Russian Federation) would be considered the basis.

The situation for the Russian authorities is much better and more stable now than it was in the fall of 2022. Therefore, the Russian Federation is aimed at realizing its demands through military means and is not inclined to seek compromises with Ukraine, at least until the elections in the United States.

Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Mikhail Galuzin said that Russia would not participate in the second Peace Summit and called V. Zelensky's "peace formula" "a dead end and ultimatum" and complained about the deliberate "ignoring of other initiatives" to end the war in Ukraine. "This is yet another manifestation of fraud. We do not accept such ultimatums and will not participate in such summits," said the Deputy Head of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

For his part, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev said that after the negotiations, the war will not end and called for preparations for the complete capture of Ukraine. "Even having signed the papers and accepted defeat, the remaining part of the radicals, after regrouping forces, will sooner or later return to power, inspired by Russia's Western enemies. And then the time will come to crush the reptile finally. Drive a long steel nail into the coffin. Destroy the remnants of his bloody legacy and return the rest of land into the bosom of the Russian land," said D. Medvedev.

 

Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovskaya, Andrey Timchenko

for the Ukrainian Institute of Politics