UN General Assembly: Shift in Donald Trump’s Rhetoric Toward Moscow The 80th session of the UN General Assembly, which concluded on September 29, 2025, in New York, was notable for Ukraine due to a significant shift in U.S. President Donald Trump’s rhetoric regarding Russia. Unexpectedly, Trump publicly expressed confidence in Ukraine’s victory and its ability to reclaim all territories up to its 1991 borders. However, despite this tougher rhetoric, no concrete actions followed, and U.S. policy toward Russia remains unchanged: the U.S. maintains a stance of limited engagement, shifting the primary burden of support to Europe while benefiting economically from arms supplies.
In his UN speech, Trump highlighted several key points:
- U.S. Domestic Policy: He claimed the U.S. is experiencing a “golden age,” emphasizing the strength of the American economy and military, as well as what he described as the “best-ever” state of border security.
- United Nations: He sharply criticized the UN, accusing it of “inefficiency and empty words instead of real action.”
- International Initiatives: Trump condemned countries (the UK, Canada, Australia, Portugal, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Monaco, and Malta) that recognized Palestine the previous week, calling it a mistake. He also dismissed the climate agenda, labeling climate change the “greatest hoax.”
- Europe: He criticized the EU’s migration policies, stating that “Europe is heading toward disaster” due to “experiments with open borders.” He further accused UN agencies of allegedly aiding illegal migrants reaching the U.S. by providing “food, housing, transportation, and debit cards.”
Trump’s new stance on Russia was particularly significant. He noted that early in his presidency, he had hoped to “quickly” end the war in Ukraine, citing his “good relationship” with Vladimir Putin. However, he stated, “the war has been ongoing for four years, which makes Russia look bad.”
Trump also used harsh language toward China and India, calling them “main sponsors of the war” due to their purchases of Russian oil. He criticized Europe, stating that the U.S. would not increase economic pressure on Russia until the EU completely halts imports of Russian energy resources, which he called “shameful.”
Trump suggested the possibility of imposing tough tariffs on Moscow, promised to negotiate with Hungary to reduce Russian gas purchases, and stated that NATO allies could open fire on Russian aircraft violating Alliance airspace.
A notable post by Trump on Truth Social after his UN speech emphasized his belief that Ukraine, with EU support, could “fight and reclaim all of Ukraine as it originally was.” Calling Russia a “paper tiger” facing economic peril, he added that Ukraine could “reclaim its country in its original form and, who knows, maybe go even further!” He suggested that with “time, patience, and financial support from Europe, particularly NATO,” returning to the pre-war 1991 borders was feasible. Trump concluded, “Putin and Russia are in major economic trouble, and now is the time for Ukraine to act. In any case, I wish both countries the best. We will continue supplying NATO with weapons for NATO to do whatever it wants with them.”
The shift in Trump’s approach likely stems from several factors:
- Incidents involving Russian drones and military aircraft in NATO and EU airspace.
- Reports of growing Ukrainian military capabilities and Russia’s weakening position.
- Recognition that Moscow lacks the resources to impose significant conditions on Kyiv, such as retaining control over Donetsk Oblast.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin’s references to the “nuclear factor” and the need to renegotiate the START III treaty, which Washington likely perceived as an attempt to negotiate from a position of strength, prompting a negative political reaction and a reputational counterattack.
It’s also possible that Moscow was aware of Trump’s planned “verbal pivot” during his UN speech.
Trump’s frustration with Russia’s displays of strength and the failure of his hopes for a conciliatory Russian policy, built on personal ties with Putin, may have driven his current attacks on Moscow’s political position and reputation.
Ukraine leveraged the UN platform to mobilize international support in several key areas: military (new arms and aid supplies), political (promoting security guarantees and keeping issues like Crimea and Moldova on the agenda), sanctions (increasing pressure on Russia through expanded restrictions), and humanitarian (addressing the return of deported Ukrainian children).
Kyiv aimed to strengthen political pressure on Russia, secure safety guarantees, present them to the U.S., and use the forum for negotiations with global leaders.
Ukraine and Europe adopted a phased strategy: first, mitigate risks (countering Trump’s pressure on Zelenskyy); then, restore support (sanctions and aid); and, ideally, secure more decisive steps to shift the war’s trajectory.
Significant hopes were pinned on a meeting between Zelenskyy and Trump, with Kyiv’s primary goal being to improve relations with the U.S. and strengthen ties with the Trump administration.
During his UN speech, Zelenskyy emphasized that Russia would not stop at Ukraine and highlighted the inability of current international institutions to effectively prevent or stop wars. He stated, “No international organization today can effectively stop a war,” signaling the need to reform the collective security system and shift focus to a coalition of allies (EU, NATO, G7) already supporting Kyiv.
Zelenskyy also announced the opening of Ukrainian weapons exports, positioning Ukraine as a “shield of Europe” contributing to collective security.
At the UN Security Council, Zelenskyy sought to hold China partly responsible for the war’s continuation, arguing that Beijing has sufficient influence to force Moscow to end its aggression but chooses to remain distant. He stated, “Without China, Putin’s Russia is nothing,” accusing Chinese leadership of tacitly endorsing the war. This move aimed to draw China into peace talks.
Zelenskyy also portrayed Ukraine as open to negotiations, contrasting it with Russia’s refusal, and signaled to Washington that Ukraine expects active U.S. pressure on the Kremlin, not just declarations.
Security guarantees were a key focus. Zelenskyy presented a model of security guarantees, coordinated with allies and previously shared with the U.S. via the UK Defense Minister. However, Trump stated it was premature to discuss such guarantees.
Despite rhetorical support for Ukraine and attacks on Russia, Trump effectively confirmed the U.S.’s withdrawal from the conflict—whether as an ally or mediator—shifting responsibility to Europe and Ukraine while retaining economic benefits from arms supplies. Ukrainian officials noted a lack of concrete military or economic support behind Trump’s statements, with some viewing his call for European financial backing as an attempt to distance the U.S. from resolving the conflict.
At the same time, Trump likely repeated a tactic previously used with Europe. When the EU demanded that the U.S. strengthen sanctions against Russia, it received an ultimatum: the U.S. required the EU to completely halt purchases of Russian energy resources and impose tariffs on India and China, conditions the EU could not meet. In response to Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s claims of advancing 360 square kilometers, encircling Russian forces, and potentially winning the war, Trump did not dispute this and allowed Ukraine to fight as long as it could—or to the end—without American resources or support, with full responsibility for the outcome resting on Ukraine itself. The U.S. maintains a stance of limited engagement, shifting the primary burden of support to Europe and Ukraine while retaining economic benefits from arms supplies. That is, if Ukraine declares its intention to liberate all its territories, it must fight to the end. But if it cannot, it means the Ukrainian leadership “overestimates its capabilities.”
In Ukraine, accordingly, no concrete military or economic support was seen behind the statements of the American leader. Some Ukrainian politicians believe that Trump’s words about financial support from Europe indicate an attempt by the U.S. to distance itself from involvement in resolving the conflict in Ukraine.
Separately, it is worth noting that Trump’s shift in rhetoric away from a “frozen conflict” scenario and his tacit approval of Ukraine’s fight for its “1991 borders” represents a tactical success for Kyiv and the EU. However, strategically, the situation remains uncertain: the U.S. maintains a position of limited engagement, shifting the primary burden of support to Europe while retaining economic benefits from arms supplies.
U.S. Pressure on Moscow
In an interview with Fox News, the U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, stated that Washington does not oppose Ukraine conducting long-range strikes on targets deep inside Russia and that the possibility of supplying Tomahawk cruise missiles is currently under consideration. When asked, “Is it the President’s position to allow Ukraine to conduct long-range strikes on Russia?” Kellogg responded, “I think if you read what he said, and what Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of State M. Rubio have said, the answer is yes.” On the question of supplying Tomahawks, he added, “No decision has been made yet. I know President Zelenskyy has requested them, as confirmed by a social media post from Vice President Vance. The decision rests with the President.” The range of Tomahawk cruise missiles, depending on the modification, can reach up to 5,500 kilometers, classifying them as strategic weapons. In comparison, the U.S.-supplied ATACMS missiles provided to Ukraine in 2024 have a range of approximately 300 kilometers and are intended for tactical use.
This signal from Washington should be viewed primarily in a diplomatic rather than military context. The U.S. is engaging in tough bargaining with Moscow: public discussions about the possibility of deep strikes and even the hypothetical transfer of Tomahawk missiles serve as a form of pressure on the Kremlin, aimed at pushing it toward negotiations on terms close to those proposed by Donald Trump. In effect, Washington is demonstrating that the stakes can be raised to the point where Russia loses its sense of security in its own hinterland.
For Ukraine, it is crucial to recognize the duality of the situation. On one hand, such signals strengthen Kyiv’s negotiating position, indicating U.S. readiness to increase support and raise the stakes. On the other hand, they push the conflict toward a more dangerous phase of escalation, for which Ukraine must be prepared—both militarily and diplomatically.
It should also be noted that even if a decision to supply Tomahawks is made, their delivery and integration would take significant time. They are not a “next-day” tool but rather an element of a long-term strategic game. It is unlikely that Ukraine would receive Tomahawks in sufficient quantities to gain an operational advantage. Ukraine’s experience in recent years shows that each new “wave” of weaponry—from HIMARS and ATACMS to Bayraktar and Leopard—has had a certain impact on the battlefield but has not been a decisive factor in fundamentally altering the course of the war.
Currently, Ukraine is indeed conducting long-range strikes on targets within Russia, primarily using its own drones rather than American systems. In his interview, Keith Kellogg did not clarify what exactly President Trump authorized—whether it was the continued use of Ukrainian drones for deep strikes into Russian territory or the potential use of American missiles for such purposes. This ambiguity is itself part of the signaling policy: public discussion of the issue creates additional pressure on Moscow without revealing the specific limits of U.S. willingness to escalate.
Against the backdrop of these declarations, the infrastructure war between Ukraine and the Russian Federation continues unabated.
On the night of September 28, Russia carried out yet another massive attack on Ukraine: according to Ukrainian Armed Forces data, 595 drones and 48 missiles were launched, of which air defenses intercepted 568 drones and 43 missiles. Five missiles and 31 strike drones struck 16 locations, with debris falling on 25 others. The assault affected Kyiv and several regions—Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Odesa, and Chernihiv oblasts—with reports of damage to buildings, infrastructure, and fires. In the capital, multi-story residential buildings, a medical facility, a cardiology center, and critical civilian infrastructure objects were damaged. As a result, at least four people were killed, including a 12-year-old girl, with dozens more injured across the affected areas. The barrage, one of the heaviest since the full-scale invasion began, lasted over 12 hours and prompted Poland to scramble fighter jets in response to threats near its border. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy condemned the strikes as "vile and cowardly terrorism," urging international allies to maintain pressure on Russia ahead of winter.
Simultaneously, Ukraine continues to deliver strikes on Russia's oil and gas infrastructure, inflicting tangible damage to the Russian economy—estimated at around $100 billion cumulatively. In particular, more than ten oil refineries and export terminals have been targeted, including the major Salavat petrochemical complex in Bashkortostan, which was hit multiple times in September (on September 18 and again on September 24), causing fires and operational disruptions at this key facility over 1,400 km from the front lines. Ukrainian forces also struck distribution facilities in Bryansk and Samara oblasts during this period.
These attacks have exacerbated fuel shortages across Russian regions, with gasoline production down by about 1 million tons in September, a 20% deficit, and halted operations at roughly 38% of refineries—leading to skyrocketing prices, export bans on gasoline (extended into October), and partial diesel export restrictions. Experts note that these strikes are "undermining Putin's war machine" by making the conflict's costs felt by ordinary Russians and straining Moscow's sanctioned supply chains for repairs. Recovery efforts could take months, further pressuring Russia's economy amid intensified Ukrainian drone campaigns targeting energy assets as legitimate military objectives funding the invasion.
Ukraine’s Budget Deficit: “Military Reality” and Prospects
Ukraine’s budget stability directly depends on international support and success in securing long-term financing. However, there is a growing risk that, with low economic growth rates, the country’s economy will not be able to sustain such a high debt burden without significant structural reforms.
Daniil Hetmantsev, head of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Finance, Tax, and Customs Policy, emphasized that the current state budget directly reflects a war economy. In 2025, the deficit is expected to reach nearly 1.9 trillion hryvnias, or 18.4% of GDP. This is an extremely high figure, but without this level of borrowing, it would be impossible to fund the military with defense expenditures exceeding 2.8 trillion hryvnias, as well as fulfill the state’s social obligations—such as increasing salaries, pensions, and the subsistence minimum, all of which have been devalued by inflation. According to Hetmantsev, based on European standards, the optimal deficit level for an EU candidate country should be within 3% of GDP, as required by the Maastricht criteria. Ukraine adhered to this range during 2015–2019 and plans to return to it in the future. Forecasts suggest the deficit should gradually decrease: to 5.1–5.2% of GDP in 2027, and to 3.8% of GDP in 2028. However, these figures are only achievable with accelerated economic growth (+5% in 2027 and +5.7% in 2028). In reality, the situation is much more complex: in 2026, the economy is expected to show minimal growth since 2023—only +2.4% (compared to +5.5% in 2023). A slowdown is already evident this year, with growth of +0.9% in Q1 and +0.8% in Q2.
Special attention is drawn to the defense budget deficit: in 2025, it increased from 300 billion hryvnias to 358 billion hryvnias, with a forecast rise to 400 billion hryvnias. For 2026–2027, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) convinced the Ukrainian government to revise its external financing needs estimate from the previous $38 billion to $65 billion. This agreed estimate has already been submitted to the European Commission.
International financial organizations are also revising their forecasts downward. For example, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) lowered its GDP growth forecast for Ukraine in 2025 to 2.5%, citing the war’s consequences, destruction of energy infrastructure, falling exports, and labor shortages due to mobilization and migration. The EBRD estimates the budget deficit in 2025 could approach 22% of GDP.
Amid this backdrop, the European Union is considering providing Ukraine with a so-called “reparations loan” of up to €130 billion. The final amount will be determined after the IMF assesses Ukraine’s needs for 2026–2027. The uniqueness of this mechanism lies in the fact that the loan will only be repayable after Russia pays reparations as part of a potential peace agreement.
Combat Operations
In the week from September 24 to October 1, 2025, Russian forces captured approximately 64 km² of Ukrainian territory and now control about 114,948 km².
In September, the pace of Russian occupation noticeably slowed: over the month, Russian troops managed to seize only 259 km² of Ukrainian territory—almost half the area taken in August (464 km²), and the lowest figure since May 2025. Thus, last month’s increase in occupied territory shrank by 44% compared to August, amounting to just 0.04% of Ukraine’s total area. As a result, around 19.04% of the country’s territory remains under Russian control.
In the Donetsk region, intense fighting continues near Pokrovsk. The situation for Ukrainian forces is worsening on the Konstantynivka front, where Russian troops captured the settlement of Poltavka. Currently, the city of Konstantynivka is effectively encircled from three sides; the distance to the front line has reduced to 6–9 km.
On the Dobropillia front, there are no significant advances yet in the Ukrainian counteroffensive; heavy fighting continues with an undecided outcome.
On the Dnipro-Zaporizhzhia front, Russian forces are advancing in the areas of Beryozove and Kalynivske and have consolidated their positions in the western part of Verbove, which may be lost entirely. The village of Stepove in Dnipropetrovsk region has been captured. Additionally, advances were noted in the areas of Olhovske and Novoivanivka in the northeast of Zaporizhzhia region.
On the Luhansk front, Russian troops have advanced in the Serebrianske Forestry, almost fully taking control.
On the Lyman sector, the situation is worsening: over the past week, Russia claimed the capture of the villages Shandryholove, Derylove, and Zarechne, as well as advances near Yampil. This poses a threat of a breakthrough in the defense line before Lyman.
On the Kharkiv front, the situation in Kupiansk remains critical. Russian forces have entrenched themselves in the city center and are gradually expanding the gray zone. The city is closed to civilians and volunteers, and evacuation has been halted. The potential loss of Kupiansk could have irreversible consequences — the front line may retreat to the Oskil River, significantly complicating defense in the northeast sector.
Battle Map
Donetsk Region
Moldova Elections
On September 28, 2025, the Republic of Moldova held its 12th parliamentary elections, which resulted in five parties entering parliament. The victory went to the pro-Western Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) of President Maia Sandu, which received 50.20% of the vote and 55 seats (a loss of 8 seats compared to the previous convocation). Second place was taken by the Patriotic Electoral Bloc, led by former President Igor Dodon, which received 24.17% of the vote and 26 seats (a loss of 6).
A new political project, “the Alternative” Bloc, entered parliament with 7.96% of the vote and 8 seats. Additionally, the “Our Party” led by the mayor of Bălți, Renato Usatîi, gained 6.20% and 6 seats (+6), and the “Home Democracy” party, founded by activist Vasily Kostiuk, gained 5.62% and 6 seats (+6).
Thus, the new parliament is represented by five forces, ranging from the pro-Western PAS to Dodon’s pro-Russian bloc, reflecting the persistent political polarization in the country.
PAS’s success was largely ensured by the diaspora, while the margin inside the country was minimal, limiting maneuvering space. Opposition forces may attempt to exploit protests, destabilization, and even provocations for a comeback.
The Moldovan parliament has 101 seats. PAS secured a majority with 55 seats but fell short of the constitutional majority of 67 seats, making its victory fragile: the parliament remains divided, and the opposition needs only to unite efforts or sway a few deputies to shift the balance of power. Opposition forces may also try to use protests, destabilization, and provocations to seek revenge.
Despite this, Maia Sandu’s victory is critically important for Ukraine amid the war. The continuation of a pro-Western government in Chișinău opens opportunities for regional cooperation in security and a potential resolution of the Transnistrian issue.
The election result allows Kyiv to count on a stable rear on the southwestern front near Odesa. By avoiding “Georgianization”—a sharp turn toward Moscow—Moldova has maintained its pro-Western course. In the future, once the government in Chișinău stabilizes, pressure on Transnistria may increase; this region remains a vulnerable point for Russia, which is incapable of fully protecting it. Losing the enclave would entail serious military, resource, and reputational costs.
Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovskaya, Andriy Tymchenko
for the Ukrainian Institute of Politics
