The negotiation track to end the war in Ukraine has now narrowed down to two main issues: territory and security guarantees.
The negotiation process around the war in Ukraine has entered a tough phase of bargaining. US President Donald Trump seeks to end the war by putting pressure on Russia, Ukraine and Europe at the same time. This was stated by US Vice President J.D. Vance: "In essence, we are trying, so to speak, to put pressure on both the Russians and the Ukrainians to try to bring them to the negotiating table and make a deal," he said.
According to US Vice President J.D. Vance, peace talks today have narrowed down to two key issues - territories and security guarantees. "I think we're at a point now where we've at least narrowed it down to a couple of basic issues. One of the issues is territorial. The Russians want about 6,000 square kilometers that they have not yet captured by military force. This is what the Russians want. The Ukrainians, on the other hand, want security guarantees – whether from the Europeans or someone else – because they want to be sure that if they make a deal, the Russians will not come back in a few months or years, demanding more," the vice president stressed.
According to him, Russia demands that Ukraine cede about 6,000 square kilometers of territory to end the war. Most likely, we are talking about the northwestern part of the Donetsk region, which remains under the control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. According to rough estimates, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have retained less than 7 thousand square kilometers in the region, with a total area of 26.5 thousand square kilometers in the region.
The main problem of the negotiations is that Washington, Kiev and European capitals have not yet been able to agree on a regime of security guarantees for Ukraine. And since this mechanism has not been developed, there is nothing to put on the table with Russian President Vladimir Putin in order to demand his consent or start bargaining for specific parameters of the agreement pressure on Moscow. This is what is reportedly extremely annoying to Donald Trump.
The sanctions game. US President Donald Trump has called on the European Union to impose 100% tariffs on China and India to stop their purchases of Russian oil and increase pressure on Moscow to end the war in Ukraine. He promised that in the event of such a decision, the United States would follow the example of Brussels.
US Energy Secretary Chris Wright said that the EU should replace purchases of Russian oil and gas with supplies from the United States. According to him, this step will not only weaken funding for the Russian military machine, but will also allow Brussels to fulfill the terms of the trade agreement, which provides for the purchase of American energy resources in the amount of $750 billion until 2028. Wright stressed that stopping Russian energy imports would be a signal that paves the way for tougher US sanctions against Moscow.
While the EU is trying to get Washington to increase sanctions pressure on Russia, D. Trump puts forward a tougher position: Europe must be consistent and, first of all, abandon the remaining channels of cooperation with Moscow. The logic is simple: Brussels wants the United States to take on the main burden of escalation, but at the same time continues to use Russian resources.
In fact, US President Donald Trump is shifting responsibility for further toughening of sanctions policy to Europe, while retaining room for maneuver. He demonstrates to his allies that he does not intend to be a "sponsor of the war" and is ready to participate only to the extent that meets the interests of the United States.
The scenarios for the development of the situation are twofold. If Europe refuses to comply with Trump's conditions, Washington will be able to blame Brussels for the failure of sanctions pressure and use this as an argument in favor of its conditions for ending the war. If the EU agrees, then the United States will also benefit: Europe will become more dependent on American energy resources, and Trump will be able to conduct tough bargaining with Moscow and Beijing.
However, the most likely option remains intermediate: Brussels will avoid sharp confrontation and continue to issue new sanctions packages (19th, 20th and beyond), trying to balance between US demands and the interests of its own trading partners. At the same time, the practical effect remains limited: Russia's share in energy supplies to Europe after 18 packages of sanctions decreased from 40% to 15%, but has not completely disappeared. Moreover, a significant part of the flows is redirected through bypass schemes - from Indian oil products to liquefied natural gas, which continues to flow to European ports.
So far, D. Trump continues to position himself as the main mediator of the negotiation process: he openly declares that President of Ukraine V. Zelensky and President of the Russian Federation V. Putin hate each other so much that only he can "take the conversation into his own hands." "I thought it would be easy for me to stop the war in Ukraine, but it turned out to be very difficult. The hatred between V. Zelensky and V. Putin is incomprehensible. I will have to conduct the whole conversation. We'll solve it one way or another. They hate each other so much that they can't breathe, so I'm going to have to intervene," Trump told reporters, referring to the trilateral meeting of the leaders of the United States, Ukraine and Russia, which he had previously called for.
But in fact, the United States is no longer a full-fledged participant and ally in this war, but rather an observer and arbiter who maintains control over the "fuses" of the conflict. Donald Trump is gradually curtailing military and financial support for Ukraine. The announced $400 million is no longer assistance in the classical sense, but funding for the infrastructure necessary for the United States on the territory of Ukraine: reconnaissance systems, target designation, early warning. This infrastructure is critically important for deterring the Russian Federation, - assistance that ensures the American presence of reconnaissance, target designation, and early missile warning. Without this infrastructure, our cities can simply turn into places where it is impossible to live. That is, the United States retains control over the critical fuses of this war so that it develops under control. At the same time, there is a reduction in aid to the eastern NATO countries, the Baltic countries, Romania, and Poland. And this is also a kind of ultimatum to Europe. All this suggests that the United States has left the role of the main participant in this war, this confrontation.
Europe, in fact, is left alone with the problem of financing the war against the Russian Federation, and Ukraine receives only a minimal package that ensures the American presence.
And against the backdrop of all these disagreements, tensions are growing between the allies. In an interview with Sky News, President of Ukraine V. Zelensky contrasted with D. Trump's approach. He called on the United States to impose unilateral sanctions against Russia, despite Trump's insistence on coordinating actions with Europe. "I believe that the United States is strong enough to make its own decisions... I'm sure the U.S. can apply enough sanctions to hurt the Russian economy, plus Donald Trump has enough power to make Putin fear him. Europe has already imposed 18 sanctions packages against Russia. And all that is missing now is a strong sanctions package from the United States," Zelensky said.
He criticized the summit in Alaska for conceding too much to Putin. In addition, he called on Trump to take a "clear position" on security guarantees, warning that without US support, Europe would not budge. "Before we end the war, I really want all agreements to be concluded. I want to... have a document that is supported by the United States and all European partners. This is very important. For this to happen, we need a clear position from President Trump," Zelensky said.
These remarks exposed a growing line of rhetoric: Kyiv and its European partners on the one hand, Washington on the other. Ukraine understands that Donald Trump is committed to ending the war and that his views are increasingly converging with Russia's after the talks in Alaska. At that time, Putin allegedly offered Donald Trump a "compromise" plan: adjusted territorial demands and a ceasefire in exchange for the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Donbass (without mentioning the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions), as well as an agreement to certain security guarantees for Ukraine, but without the presence of NATO troops. Most sources claim that Trump has generally accepted this plan, but it does not quite suit Ukraine and Europe. Now Moscow expects Trump to put pressure on Kiev and Brussels to agree to the terms under discussion. For Ukraine and the EU, the minimum task now is to prevent such pressure, the maximum is to convince Trump to take a hard line against the Kremlin. At the same time, Ukraine understands that the mood in Washington is unstable. Therefore, the key strategy is to strengthen support from European leaders and direct contacts with Trump. At the Yalta European Strategy (YES) conference, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy explicitly acknowledged the existence of competing voices around the American President and emphasized Kyiv's efforts to ensure that "good votes" have a decisive influence.
The Government approved the draft State Budget for 2026.
On September 15, the Cabinet of Ministers presented the Draft Law No14000 on the State Budget of Ukraine for 2026. The Budget-2026 retains a military character, but at the same time strengthens the social and humanitarian blocks. At the same time, dependence on external financing is growing, which remains a key source of covering the deficit.
Ukraine's real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is projected to grow by 2.7% in 2025 with a slowdown to 2.4% in 2026. Recall that in 2024 (GDP) of Ukraine increased by 2.9% and amounted to UAH 7,658.7 billion or 190.74 billion US dollars. According to the official data of the World Bank, the share of Ukraine's GDP in the world economy is 0.18%.
The dollar exchange rate is predicted at an average level of 42.4 hryvnia per 1 dollar in 2025 and 45.7 hryvnia per 1 US dollar in 2026.
Ukraine's public debt will amount to 101.6% of GDP , or UAH 10.47 trillion, at the end of 2026. The largest share will be external liabilities - 80.1%, while domestic debts will be only 19.9%.
Need for external financing:
UAH 2.079 trillion → approximately USD 50.7 billion.
Government borrowings:
A total of UAH 2.544 trillion → approximately USD 62.1 billion.
Of these:
• UAH 420 billion (USD ≈10.2 billion) – domestic;
• UAH 2.125 trillion (USD ≈51.8 billion) – external.
Budget deficit: 18.4% of GDP, down -3.9% compared to 2025. If we calculate tentatively (taking into account the expected GDP growth in 2025-26 and the figure in 2024 - 190.74 billion US dollars), then the budget deficit of Ukraine in 2026 will be about ≈ 37 billion US dollars.
An update of the minimum wage and the subsistence minimum is envisaged.
The draft budget for 2026 provides for the update of social standards - for the first time since 2024, no indexation was carried out in 2025.
The minimum wage will increase from UAH 8,000 to UAH 8,647 (an increase of 8%). This will be an important benchmark for the entire labor market, since the minimum wage directly affects the tax base and the amount of the unified social contribution.
The subsistence minimum will also be revised:
the total figure will increase from UAH 2,920 to UAH 3,209 (+9.9%);
for able-bodied persons — from UAH 3,028 to UAH 3,328 (+9.9%);
for persons who have lost their ability to work — from UAH 2,361 to UAH 2,595 (+9.9%).
The latter indicator is of key importance for the pension system, since it determines the minimum amount of the pension. Thus, from 2026, the minimum pension will be UAH 2,595, and the maximum pension will be UAH 25.95 thousand.
Total expenditures are expected to grow to UAH 4.8 trillion, which is +UAH 415 billion (≈+9.5%) more than in 2025 (taking into account changes).
Revenues of the general fund are planned at the level of UAH 2.826 trillion, which is +UAH 446.8 billion (≈+18.8%) higher than a year earlier. We are talking about revenues excluding grants and other international assistance, which emphasizes the fiscal burden on domestic resources.
Defense and security: total expenditures will amount to UAH 2.806 trillion (27.2% of GDP), which is +UAH 168.6 billion (+6.4%) more than in 2025.
Of these:
UAH 2.355 trillion – general fund;
UAH 220.4 billion – special fund (including UAH 125.3 billion from military personal income tax);
UAH 200 billion – reserve;
UAH 30 billion is state guarantees.
Particular attention is paid to the development of the military-industrial complex: UAH 44.3 billion (including UAH 36.7 billion due to military personal income tax) will be directed to the production of ammunition, missiles, air defense systems, aviation and armored vehicles.
Social protection: a total of UAH 467.1 billion is provided (+UAH 45 billion, ≈+10.7%).
Includes:
UAH 251.3 billion – transfer to the Pension Fund;
UAH 133.0 billion – payments to vulnerable categories;
UAH 42.3 billion – benefits and subsidies for housing and communal services (2.7 million households);
UAH 24.5 billion – new measures to support families (increase in "generic" payments to UAH 50 thousand, the new "eYasla" program, the "first-grader" package).
Education: total UAH 265.4 billion (+UAH 66.5 billion, ≈+33.5%).
Important innovations:
an increase in teachers' salaries by 50% during the year;
expanding school meals (reaching 4.4 million children);
doubling of academic scholarships;
investments in shelters, school buses and infrastructure of the "New Ukrainian School".
Science: UAH 19.9 billion (+UAH 5.4 billion, ≈+37.3%).
For the first time, there is an emphasis on defense research, grants for young scientists and centers of applied science in the interests of business.
Healthcare: UAH 258 billion (+UAH 38.2 billion, ≈+17.3%).
Main directions:
UAH 191.6 billion – Medical Guarantees Program;
UAH 15.1 billion – centralized procurement of drugs;
UAH 10 billion – preventive screenings for people 40+;
UAH 18.6 billion – investments in maternity, rehabilitation, and psychiatry centers.
Veteran policy: UAH 17.9 billion (+UAH 6.1 billion, ≈+51.7%).
Funds for housing, psychological adaptation, veteran spaces, rehabilitation.
Economy and agriculture: support for the economy – UAH 41.5 billion:
Entrepreneurship Development Fund – UAH 18 billion;
eOselia (mortgage) – UAH 15.8 billion;
grant and investment programs – UAH 4.8 billion.
Support for the agricultural sector – UAH 13.1 billion (+UAH 3.5 billion, ≈+36%).
Subsidies, land reclamation, crop insurance – UAH 9.5 billion;
assistance to farmers – UAH 2.6 billion;
humanitarian demining of lands – UAH 1 billion.
Regional support: total UAH 871.9 billion (+UAH 162.3 billion, ≈+22.8%).
The main emphasis is on interbudgetary transfers (UAH 289.3 billion), support for frontline territories and a balanced policy for compulsory medical insurance.
The draft budget of Ukraine for 2026 does not provide for the cost of holding elections. However, the very nature of the document may indicate that the authorities are indirectly laying the foundation for possible electoral processes. It is noteworthy that for 2026, the draft provides for an increase in social spending, an increase in wages and pensions, as well as significant funding for state media tools, including a telethon (UAH 1.5 billion). Such a set of priorities testifies to the Government's attempt to record the social loyalty of the population and create a positive background on the eve of possible electoral processes.
In general, it can be noted that the deficit of the state budget of Ukraine remains significant and exerts serious pressure on the European Union (EU), which is expected to fill the financial gap.
At the recent Yalta European Strategy (YES) conference, which traditionally brings together leading politicians and economists to discuss strategic issues, financial experts expressed serious concern about the impending financing gap. According to estimates by international financial institutions, Ukraine will require $40 to $50 billion in external financing annually to cover its basic budget needs in 2026-2027. At the same time, a significant part of the cost of purchasing weapons and military equipment remains outside the state budget, which further increases the burden on partners and donors.
The government officially recognizes the defense budget deficit in 2026 at the level of about UAH 300 billion. And according to the statements of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine Denys Shmyhal, in 2026 the country will need at least 120 billion US dollars for defense spending in order to get closer to parity with the Russian Federation in the military sphere.
For European allies, this challenge is especially acute against the backdrop of the end of the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) – the seven-year budget of the Union, within which funds are distributed among countries and programs. At the same time, the United States of America (USA), remaining a key partner of Ukraine, expects that it is Europe that will take on most of the financial burden.
This comes as the G7's ERA loan package is in its early stages, as a result of which the EU must identify additional sources to support Ukraine.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) believes that Ukraine is underestimating the amount of necessary external resources for the next two years by about $20 billion.
The disagreement manifested itself during the talks in Kiev last week.
According to government forecasts, the country will need up to $37.5 billion in 2026-2027. However, the IMF calls this estimate insufficient, pointing out that the actual need may be $10-20 billion higher.
A separate topic of discussion was the categories of budget expenditures. The Fund expressed concern about the practice of payments to the military, noting that not all servicemen have a legal right to maximum accruals.
For the government of Ukraine, the task is complicated by the fact that military spending is the largest and at the same time the least predictable part of the budget. Their volume must be kept at a high level during the war, but it is almost impossible to predict the dynamics of such costs.
At the same time, Ukraine refuses to increase the tax burden on the population, despite the recommendations of the IMF. For the authorities, this is a politically sensitive issue: increased tax pressure may cause social discontent. In return, the IMF intends to increase pressure in the other direction – demanding a reduction in the volume of the shadow economy, which, according to the Cabinet of Ministers, exceeds 30% of GDP.
The final agreement on the amount of funding is expected next week. After that, the government, together with international partners, will begin to look for ways to close the identified gap, which creates the prerequisites for new negotiations with the EU and the United States on the distribution of the financial burden. The IMF is currently developing a new program, and the conditions for reforms and the fight against corruption are expected to be even tougher, especially in light of tensions between NABU and the SBU.
Continuation of the confrontation between law enforcement and anti-corruption agencies.
The confrontation between the key anti-corruption and law enforcement agencies of Ukraine (NABU and SAPO on the one hand and the SBU on the other) is taking on new forms and remains one of the factors in destabilizing the Ukrainian political system.
This week, the SBU released new details on the case of an employee of the NABU Central Office, detained in June on charges of working for Russia. According to the investigation, we are talking about Viktor Gusarov, an employee of the elite NABU unit "D-2". According to the SBU, he was recruited back in 2012, when he served in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and was part of a group of Russian agents in the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies under the supervision of FSB officer Igor Egorov. according to the special service, it also included Major General of the SBU Valery Shaitanov (detained in 2020), former deputy head of Viktor Yanukovych's security Dmitry Ivantsov (now in Crimea), as well as a soldier of the National Guard. The SBU claims that Gusarov transmitted data of Ukrainian security forces and other citizens to Russia through Ivantsov.
In the development of this story, the media recall the case of MP Khristenko, extradited by Ukraine to the United Arab Emirates and arrested by the SBU. According to sources, Khristenko may testify against NABU detective Ruslan Magamedrasulov, who is already in the SBU pre-trial detention center.
At the same time, the Security Service of Ukraine, the Prosecutor General's Office and the State Bureau of Investigation reported the detection of another corruption episode involving a senior NABU officer. According to the investigation, the deputy head of one of the Bureau's detective units did not declare an apartment in Uzhgorod worth about 100 thousand US dollars purchased by his family in December 2023. wife, the testimony of the seller and the notary confirmed the real transaction.
In addition, it was established that the parents of the defendant have Russian passports and live in the temporarily occupied territory. These data were not indicated in the documents for obtaining access to state secrets, which was a violation of the law and the basis for terminating the access.
The deepening confrontation between key security and anti-corruption institutions can be considered as one of the most alarming events of recent months. Expectations of de-escalation are now practically non-existent – on the contrary, everything points to further aggravation, which can further weaken Ukraine's resilience in the face of war.
Fighting.
In a week, Russian troops (from September 10 to September 17, 2025) captured about 57 km2 of Ukrainian territory and now control 114.816km2. Now the Russian Federation already controls 19% of Ukrainian territory.
Currently, the main hostilities are concentrated in the area of Pokrovsk, Konstantinovka (Donetsk region) and Kupyansk (Kharkiv region).
In the Pokrovsky direction: the advance of Russian troops to the Zverevo area (southwestern outskirts) is noted. Attempts to enter the industrial zone north of Udachny and approach the Pokrovskoye mine administration.
In the area of Konstantinovka (Donetsk region) The Russian Federation has entrenched itself in the area of Aleksandro-Shultino and in dacha areas, creating a bridgehead for further advancement towards the city.
Kupyansk (Kharkiv region). For the first time during the fighting, Russian troops entrenched themselves in the urban quarters of Kupyansk (northern part); new positions were taken in the Kondrashovka area.
Yampil — Lymansky district (North of Donetsk region). The Russian Federation has penetrated into Yampil, used camouflage with civilian clothes; street battles are underway, the enemy is entrenched in houses/basements. The situation with the capture of Yampil threatens the Russian Federation with access to the Lyman-Siversk line.
Dnipropetrovsk region - two sections. Main front: Novoselovka - Sosnovka - Berezovoye - Novonikolaevka line (length >16 km, depth of enemy penetration - up to 10 km). The second sector (~5 km) to the north: the Ivanovka - Filia line (near Novopavlovka).
The Zaporizhzhia region is the southern vector. Offensive along the Novoivanivka-Olgovskoye line; the total length of the line is up to 25 km. The purpose of the offensive is to move westward along the Donetsk-Zaporozhye highway with the threat of reaching the rear of the Ukrainian group and approaching Zaporozhye/Dnieper.
In the Sumy direction: the Armed Forces of Ukraine threw back the troops of the Russian Federation in the area of the settlement of Konstantinovka / Novokonstantinovka and in some places reached the Russian border.
On the Ukrainian side, there are urgent problems that continue to determine its military posture. These are human resources – a shortage of mobilized and trained fighters; a high level of desertion and delays in training, according to some sources – up to 50% before the start of training. Ammunition and logistics - depletion of warehouses, vulnerability of supply routes, stretched rear line. Financing – high dependence on external aid; risk of lack of funds for a long-term mobilization economy. Air defense and missile defense are limited reserves of air defense systems against massive drone and missile strikes. Command and control - difficulties of coordination on a stretched front, vulnerability of communications (command - control).
An infrastructure war continues between the Russian Federation and Ukraine.
In particular, Ukrainian drones regularly carry out attacks on the territory of the Russian Federation. Since August 2025, Ukraine has affected at least 17% of the capacity (equivalent to about 1.1-1.2 million barrels of oil per day) of the Russian energy complex - about 18 oil refineries (Lukoil in Volgograd, Rosneft in Ryazan, as well as refineries in the Rostov, Samara, Saratov and Krasnodar regions, etc.)Some refineries burned for several days (for example, the large Novoshakhtinsky refinery in the Rostov region), and strikes on the Druzhba oil trunk pipeline led to fires at the Unecha oil pumping station in the Bryansk region and a halt in oil supplies to Europe. . They affect the formation of a recession, the degradation of the Russian economy and complicate the supply of the front. Russia's losses from Ukrainian attacks can be estimated at $50 billion.
For its part, the Russian Federation is carrying out record-breaking air strikes on Ukrainian logistics, infrastructure, energy companies and, even, for the first time in the years of war, on the building of the Ukrainian government.
The beginning of the "exercise season" in Belarus, with the dominant participation of the Russian army, as well as the invasion of attack drones into Polish airspace, demonstrates the potential for scaling up the conflict
In early September 2025, Russia struck a new blow at the Trypilska thermal power plant near Kyiv. This plant was already attacked in early 2024, after which it was restored and gradually returned power to the power system.
On September 7, one of the railway bridges across the Dnieper near Kremenchuk (Kryukovsky) was attacked. Damage to this junction increases the risk of a temporary halt in railway logistics across the river, which will entail consequences for military supplies. Dozens of passenger trains move across the Kryukiv bridge every day, as well as a flow of freight trains with grain (the Kremenchuk hub is the center of agricultural logistics). Every day, up to 40-50 pairs of trains (passenger + freight) and about 20-25 thousand cars (including freight transport) pass through the bridge Donbass direction: it is through it that trains from central and western Ukraine with ammunition, fuel and equipment go. By attacking the bridge, Russia was trying to buy situational time.
Recent Russian attacks have also effectively disabled the Kremenchuk refinery after several rounds of strikes over the past three and a half years. However, energy experts are less concerned about the coming winter. Compared to 2023, Ukraine has accumulated enough spare parts and equipment to maintain the integrity of the electrical system.
Against the backdrop of narrowing the negotiation track to the issue of "land and security guarantees" and approaching the point of making radical decisions, there is a large-scale political and military escalation between Ukraine and Russia, and their allies involved.
Russia has intensified strikes on symbolically significant targets. These include intimidating strikes near the EU Delegation and the British Council building in Kyiv, an attack on the Danish Refugee Council near Chernihiv, a strike on the main building of the Government of Ukraine and a drone attack on Polish territory.
This escalation appears to be the Kremlin's response to the evolving debate in the West about post-war security guarantees for Ukraine, while at the same time clarifying the extent to which the West is willing to respond to such provocations. It also highlights Ukraine's urgent and growing air defense needs, which the Ukrainian leadership has been able to amplify by pointing to the Russian threat.
Incident with Russian drones in Poland.
The very fact of the mass penetration of drones deep into Polish airspace gives the situation the character of demonstrative pressure.
The events around Poland are superimposed on the general crisis of the negotiation process: Moscow has again returned to the previous ultimatum demands - the consolidation of 4 occupied regions. At the same time, Donald Trump, suggesting that Europe abandon Russian energy carriers as a condition for strengthening sanctions, is in fact seeking to distance itself from the Ukrainian war, focusing on the confrontation with China.
The incident with Russian drones in Polish airspace at this stage is unlikely to lead to tough retaliatory actions. NATO deliberately avoids interpreting the incident as an armed attack, demonstrating a desire to prevent direct escalation and involvement in a war with the Russian Federation. Therefore, if such incidents are not systemic, they are unlikely to cause serious consequences in the short term.
It is also impossible to completely exclude the factor of deliberate action on the part of the Russian Federation and even indirect influence on the overall escalation of the situation by the PRC. For example, the Kremlin's return to tough ultimatum rhetoric following Putin's visit to China may indicate a possible coordination of positions.
At the same time, for the Ukrainian leadership and European partners, this becomes an additional reason to put pressure on the Trump administration to return it to the track of supporting Ukraine - both through the continued supply of weapons and air defense systems, and through increasing sanctions pressure on the Russian Federation.
Drone attacks, if repeated, will help mobilize Polish and European society to increase pressure on Trump to impose new sanctions on Russia and to abandon any compromises that reward Russia to some extent for starting the war. Such consequences are quite possible today.
Map of hostilities.
Donetsk region.
Sociology.
According to a study by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), conducted from September 2 to September 14, 2025:
Actions when U.S. support ends. 76% of Ukrainians believe that even without U.S. help, the country should continue to fight alongside the European Union (82% in March 2025). 14% believe that if U.S. support ends, Ukraine should agree to any demands from Russia (8% in March 2025).
Expectations of the end of the war and readiness to endure. 18% of Ukrainians expect the war to end by the end of 2025, 27% name 2026, 32% - 2027 and later years. 23% found it difficult to answer. 62% of respondents say they are ready to endure the war as long as necessary (the figure remains unchanged since June 2025). Another 4% are ready to endure for about a year.
Readiness to defend the country. Among the citizens of Ukraine (men and women 18+ who are not undergoing military service), 54% answer that they are ready to join the defense forces with weapons in their hands. 38% are rather not ready. For comparison: in Poland, 45% of citizens are ready to fight for their country, in the United States – 41%, in the UK – 33%, in Germany – 23%, in the EU as a whole – 32% (Gallup data, 2023).
Faith in victory. 76% of Ukrainians believe in the possibility of victory, subject to sanctions pressure on Russia and a sufficient amount of military and financial assistance. 15% consider victory impossible even under such conditions. 9% found it difficult to answer. In September 2024, 81% of respondents believed in victory, 14% denied its possibility.
Perception of conditional peace plans. 75% consider the Russian plan unacceptable, 17% are ready to support it. 74% of Ukrainians, albeit without enthusiasm, admit the approval of the conditional plan of Europe and Ukraine, 15% categorically reject it.
If the Russian plan were implemented, 65% would regard it as a failure of Ukraine, 19% as a compromise "in half", and only 7% as a success. Among those who are ready to accept the Russian plan, only 22% would see it as a success, 36% - a compromise, 39% - a defeat. At the same time, 69% are convinced that in the event of such a peace, Russia will undertake a new aggression; Only 7% believe that there will be no more attacks.
In the case of the plan of Europe and Ukraine, 30% would perceive it as a success, 44% as an intermediate version of "50-50", 18% as a failure. Even in this scenario, 56% believe that Russia will try to attack again in the future, 28% estimate the probability as "50-50", 10% believe that there will be no attack. Thus, the European plan, although it has a chance for public approval, is perceived with restraint, not as a final victory, but also not as a defeat.
A conditional plan for Europe and Ukraine: the provision of reliable security guarantees from Europe and the United States, a steady supply of weapons and money, the closure of the sky from Russian attacks, the freezing of the current front line, the non-recognition of the occupied territories, but keeping them under Russian control, the movement of Ukraine into the EU, the preservation of sanctions against the Russian Federation until a sustainable peace is established.
Russia's conditional plan: the lifting of all sanctions against the Russian Federation; granting the Russian language official status; reducing the Ukrainian army and limiting weapons; the final refusal to join NATO and the cessation of Western arms supplies; Russia's participation as a guarantor of Ukraine's security; the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Kramatorsk, Sloviansk and other cities of the Donetsk region; the recognition of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk regions as part of Russia; the preservation of Russian control over the occupied territories of the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions.
Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovskaya, Andrey Timchenko
for the Ukrainian Institute of Politics
