Perspective – Written by Ruslan Bortnik
The full analysis is available here.
Operation Eastern Sentry is not the result of a well-thought-out strategy but rather a knee-jerk response to a sudden security shock on NATO’s eastern flank, driven more by the need to “do something now” than by a shared long-term political vision. Spurred by Russian drone incursions into Poland and other allied territories, it pooled existing instruments, resources, and mandates into an improvised shield that provides informational reassurance, deterrence, and a symbolic demonstration of unity yet remains without a clear strategic or legal basis. However, what began as a hasty military operation, driven by NATO and EU efforts and growing security challenges in Eastern Europe, could eventually be transformed into a military mission, as some countries on NATO’s eastern flank hope. Perhaps this is why the operation was launched indefinitely and attracted significant political attention.
From Post-Cold War Complacency to a Permanent State of Risk
Europe has entered a period of heightened military and political turbulence marked by a sharp increase in security risks as cutting-edge military technologies coexist with elements of the old world order. In 2025, the cohesion of the NATO alliance was shaken. The new U.S. administration led by Donald Trump questioned NATO’s principle of collective defense (commitment to Article 5), tying collective defense to additional financial burdens and geopolitical conditions and pushing European allies to increase military spending to 4-5% of GDP. At the same time, in European countries, especially those along NATO’s eastern flank, there is a growing awareness that unconditional security is no longer guaranteed. The reduction in American aid to Ukraine and the scaling back of several U.S. support programs have demonstrated the limitations of external guarantees. The reduction in the American military presence and aid in some eastern NATO countries has in some cases sparked outright alarm.
A new challenge to NATO has been the periodic border incidents in recent months (including those involving drones), which are likely instruments of Russian pressure aimed at testing the readiness of NATO countries for a coordinated response. Europe has been forced to rethink the foundations of its defense strategy in order to maintain security and unity, from building up its own defense capabilities to increasing operational coordination on the eastern flank.
From Border Incident to Operation Eastern Sentry
On September 12, 2025, NATO announced the launch of Operation Eastern Sentry (OES), a large-scale mission to strengthen the defense of the alliance’s eastern flank from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The announcement was the result of an incident on Polish territory: On the night of September 10, approximately 19–20 Russian air drones violated Polish airspace, flying in from Belarus and Ukraine. Polish air defense forces and NATO Allies responded immediately, scrambling fighter jets from the Polish and Dutch air forces, an Italian airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, and a NATO multirole tanker. As a result, some of the drones were shot down—the first time during the war in Ukraine that Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were destroyed over the territory of a NATO member state. Warsaw called the incident an act of aggression and convened an emergency government meeting, after which it formally appealed to its allies, invoking Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This marked the eighth time in NATO’s history that Article 4, which provides for urgent consultations among Allies in the event of a security threat to one of them, has been invoked. The Allies unanimously expressed solidarity with Poland and condemned Moscow’s “reckless” behavior, although the situation did not reach the point of invoking Article 5.
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk called the drone incident the most serious threat to Poland’s security since World War II, noting that a significant number of the drones had flown directly from Belarus, rather than accidentally flying in from Ukrainian territory, as had happened previously. Moscow, for its part, denied any intention to attack: Russian officials claimed they were striking Ukraine that day, not targeting targets in Poland, and dismissed the drones’ flight deep into NATO territory as an “accident” and potentially even a provocation by Kyiv. Nevertheless, NATO views the event as part of a growing chain of incidents. Over the past few months, violations of allied airspace were recorded in other areas as well.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte publicly announced the launch of Operation Eastern Sentry to strengthen the alliance’s eastern borders and stated that the operation was defined as a measure of “additional surveillance and protection of Allies” following airspace violation incidents, rather than as a long-term defense program. Operation Eastern Sentry includes a complex strengthening of NATO’s eastern flank from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Its main efforts focus on creating multi-level systems protection through reinforced air patrols, modernization funds for anti-aircraft defense, and the integration of intelligence, logistics, and cyber components into a single net response.
One of the priorities became the expansion of capabilities to detect and intercept UAVs, as well as the minimization of vulnerabilities that have emerged after a series of incidents with Russian drones in Poland and Romania. These efforts involved allied states’ fighters (including the French Rafale, German Eurofighter, and Danish F-16) and AWACS deployed in Poland, the Baltic states, and Romania. While there is still debate about who should lead the process—the EU, NATO, or national governments—one thing is clear: The technological race between offensive and defensive capabilities has intensified, and without investment in defense innovation, closing the skies to drones is impossible.
In addition to the air segment, the operation was aimed at strengthening land and sea infrastructure: the modernization of air bases and airfields, the development of transport corridors for fast transfers of troops, the reinforcement of logistics nodes, as well as increased air defense and communications systems capabilities. The initiative also included preparations for counteractions, hybrid threats—cyberattacks, disinformation operations, and other intelligence activities in strategic areas. Special attention was given to coordination among Allies and the development of united procedures for responding to airstrike incidents to prevent the duplication of solutions and speed up the process of consultations under Article 4. Strategically, Eastern Sentry forms the basis for a new stage of NATO, where traditional military tools are combined with technological, informational, and organizational means to achieve containment.
Operation Eastern Sentry covers NATO’s entire eastern border, from Finland and Estonia in the north to Romania and Bulgaria in the south. Eight countries have already joined Operation Eastern Sentry and handed over their resources to Supreme Allied Commander Europe Alexus Grinkevich. Other countries are expected to follow this example. According to official data, Denmark has deployed two F-16 fighter jets and an air defense frigate, France has deployed three Rafale fighter jets, Germany has deployed four Eurofighters, the UK has deployed a Eurofighter unit to patrol Polish airspace, and several other countries (Spain, Italy, Sweden, Finland, and the Baltic states) have expressed their readiness to join if necessary. The Czech Republic is deploying some special forces units to Poland and has sent three multirole helicopters there. There are no new American resources provided for Operation Eastern Sentry, however, although more than 10,000 American troops are stationed in Poland.
An Improvised Shield Instead of a Coherent Strategy
OES could be considered a consequence of an emerging trend: The war in Ukraine is increasingly spilling over and affecting neighboring countries. Russian drones, missiles, and aircraft have already violated the airspace of Moldova, Romania, Poland, as well as the Baltic and Scandinavian countries. For the first time in 34 years, Tallinn convened an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council in response to Russia’s violation of Estonian airspace after three MiG-31 fighter jets entered its airspace without permission over the Gulf of Finland near Vaindloo Island on September 19. Similarly, when European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s plane landed in Plovdiv, Bulgaria on August 31, GPS navigation problems were detected, raising suspicions of possible external interference by Russia, although these suspicions have not been definitively confirmed. These episodes heighten the threat perception in European countries and created a dangerous precedent of a “shadow war” on NATO’s doorstep, which requires a comprehensive response from the alliance.
After all, the possibility that the incident was a deliberate action on the part of the Russian Federation cannot be ruled out. The escalation could have been the Kremlin’s response to the developing debate in the West about post-war security guarantees for Ukraine. At the same time, Russia is also determining how prepared the West is to respond to this kind of pressure. It could be “probing” NATO with drones, sending the message, “You give weapons to Ukraine, and we’ll show you that we can reach you too,” amid ongoing aggressive rhetoric and the raising of the stakes in strategic arms control between the United States and Russia.
A key feature of Operation Eastern Sentry is its open-ended nature. Unlike many other exercises and local operations, it is not limited to a specific timeframe and can continue until its objectives are achieved. It nevertheless builds existing NATO mechanisms. The alliance’s history includes several similar missions and operations for rapidly reinforcing vulnerable areas and responding to crises without resorting to Article 5. In 2003, when Türkiye first triggered Article 4 in response to threats from Iraq, NATO carried out Operation Display Deterrence. Airborne early warning aircraft (AWACS) were deployed, and air defense forces were reinforced to cover Turkish territory. During the war in Syria in 2012, Ankara again turned to its allies under Article 4, and batteries were deployed on its southern border as part of Operation Active Fence to strengthen Turkey’s missile defense. NATO has also had a permanent Air Policing mission over the Baltics since 2004. Allies take turns sending fighter jets to protect the skies over Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO also resorted to extraordinary measures to strengthen its eastern borders. The alliance established the Enhanced Forward Presence program, deploying multinational battalion groups on a rotational basis in the Baltic countries and Poland. At the same time, the Air Policing mission was strengthened with additional squadrons. Similarly, after the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, eight Eastern European allies simultaneously initiated consultations on Article 4, and NATO responded by activating the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) for the first time and deploying new multinational battalions in Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Hungary. Eastern Sentry thus builds on NATO’s proven tools and mechanisms.
Still, NATO’s response to the incident in Poland demonstrated important shifts in the alliance’s approach to collective defense. Just a few years ago, isolated violations of allied borders were dealt with by national air defenses or as part of NATO’s routine Air Policing mission. Now, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO is returning to the fundamental task of collective defense and actively strengthening its forward positions. In essence, Operation Eastern Sentry marked the first time that Allies collectively and preemptively deployed forces to protect their eastern flank from a specific emerging threat—in this case, a drone swarm. While previous responses to such incidents were largely national or ad hoc, Operation Eastern Sentry introduces a unified, coordinated air defense policy on NATO’s eastern borders. In effect, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has been given additional authority and tools to deploy air defense forces and assets along the eastern flank as needed, enhancing the alliance’s ability to respond to crises in real time.
The formation of Operation Eastern Sentry was a landmark event for NATO and the entire European security system. For the first time since the Cold War, the alliance faced a situation in which its territory was being repeatedly and deliberately violated by a potential adversary’s military technology—and was forced to respond not only with diplomatic notes but also with concrete military measures to strengthen its defenses. However, Eastern Sentry is more of a stabilizing effort within the alliance than the development of a new defense concept. Moreover, since the operation does not have its own strategic or legal mandate, its launch was not accompanied by the approval of a separate document or budget at the North Atlantic Council level.
Drones: Cheap Tools, Expensive Answers
But the current rise in tensions on the eastern flank is directly linked not only to the Russian invasion of Ukraine but also to the development of military technology and its availability. Unmanned aerial vehicles have become one of the symbols of modern warfare and, at the same time, a complex “gray zone” between war and peace. The widespread use of relatively inexpensive drones in Ukraine has demonstrated their ability to perform missions ranging from reconnaissance to strike against rear areas, while their loss is less consequential than that of manned aircraft. For Russia, drones have become a convenient tool for probing NATO defenses: They are stealthy, can fly at extremely low altitudes, and evade radar detection, and if they crash or are shot down, Moscow can easily claim operator error or a technical malfunction.
New technologies present NATO with a complex security dilemma: how to protect Europe’s vast airspace from swarms of small targets without wasting disproportionate resources and creating a constant threat of false alarms for civilian infrastructure. The cost of intercepting inexpensive Russian drones, estimated to cost around $10,000 each, could be many times higher than the cost of the drones themselves—the use of fighter jets and expensive missiles increases the cost tenfold.
Even if rogue drones don’t cause direct damage, their mere presence in airspace disrupts normal infrastructure operations and sows disorder. In September 2025, unknown drones disrupted operations at Copenhagen Airport, and similar incidents temporarily closed major airports in Germany. In several cases, unidentified UAVs have appeared over military installations—for example, in Belgium, drones were spotted near an F-35 fighter base, and in Germany, over training grounds and barracks. These actions don’t cause widespread destruction, but they seriously destabilize the situation, demonstrating that the skies over Europe are full of holes, and the boundary between the front and the rear has effectively disappeared.
In response to these challenges, both NATO and the EU have discussed creating a “drone wall” or “European shield,” a comprehensive air defense system against drones and cruise missiles. However, the wall metaphor can be misleading. It implies not a static line of defense, but a multi-layered, dynamic, and “smart” network of sensors and interceptors. The project’s estimated implementation could cost approximately €3–7 billion. However, European countries have so far been unable to agree on its implementation due to its differing importance for Eastern and Western European countries, the unresolved funding issue, and the risk of military conflict with Russia.
But still, certain steps were taken. The announced OES explicitly states that, in addition to deploying forces, NATO’s Joint Operations Command is collaborating with Allied Command Transformation to accelerate the testing and implementation of new technologies, including drone detection and destruction systems, at an alliance-wide level. This means that lessons learned from Ukraine’s combat experience are being directly integrated into NATO plans. Kyiv, as experts note, has become a true drone warfare laboratory, and Ukrainian engineers and military personnel have accumulated unique experience in countering massive UAV attacks. The implementation of Ukrainian know-how—from homemade jammers to drone swarm tactics—will help the alliance adapt more quickly to the new threat. Furthermore, European countries are launching initiatives for joint procurement of short-range air defense systems and establishing counter-drone test centers. Germany, Poland, and the Baltic states are actively lobbying for the accelerated formation of a pan-European “counter-drone program.” While there is still debate about who should lead the process—the EU, NATO, or national governments—one thing is clear: The technological race between offensive and defensive capabilities has intensified, and without investment in defense innovation, it is impossible to close the skies to drones.
Deterrence Without Escalation: NATO’s Balancing Act
A rapid defense buildup, however, carries risks of escalation. A classic security dilemma arises: how to demonstrate resolve to repel any Russian aggression without provoking a direct confrontation. NATO has made it clear that it will use all necessary military and non-military means to defend its allies and that its commitment to Article 5 remains unwavering. At the same time, the alliance has deliberately limited its response to defensive measures on its own territory, so as not to cross the Kremlin’s red lines. In Europe, the prevailing view is that even an unintentional incident involving a drone or aircraft could quickly escalate into a direct conflict between nuclear powers if care is not taken.
For example, although several Polish and Baltic politicians called for considering “closing the skies” over western Ukraine or shooting down Russian drones before they even reach the border, NATO deemed such proposals too dangerous. Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev threatened that “implementing the provocative idea… to shoot down our UAVs will only mean one thing—a war between Russia and NATO.” He bluntly stated that Russia would perceive any attempt to establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine or to destroy Russian drones by NATO forces as an unacceptable escalation of hostilities.
NATO is trying to maintain this delicate balance. Invoking Article 4 instead of Article 5 is a way to demonstrate the Allies’ solidarity and readiness to act without triggering an automatic military response. However, using it too frequently can undermine its effectiveness: For example, when, a week after the Polish drone incident, Estonia invoked the same Article 4 following the brief incursion of three Russian MiG-31s, it came as a bit of a surprise to several NATO capitals. After all, Tallinn had reacted more cautiously to dozens of previous violations. Norway even reported after the fact that it had recorded three more Russian aircraft incursions in the far north in 2025, and it did not convene NATO meetings following any of these violations of its airspace. Such inconsistency in response thresholds demonstrates the difficulty of maintaining a uniform line of deterrence.
Warsaw, which directly borders the war zone, is prepared to open fire on any intruder. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has explicitly warned that all unidentified objects will henceforth be immediately shot down. In countries further from the war zone, however, the response may be more cautious.
The situation also exposed some contradictions within the alliance itself, primarily transatlantic differences. The sharp differences in the approaches of Warsaw and Washington are apparent: While Poland and the Baltic states have demanded a tough response to the Russian provocation, the White House initially suggested that the drone strikes could have been a mistake, even hinting at Europe’s culpability. President Trump publicly suggested that Russia had unintentionally violated NATO borders. Warsaw rejected this explanation unusually strongly, stating that there had been no mistake and that the United States should demonstrate solidarity with its ally. For the Polish leadership to openly contradict the U.S. president is an unprecedented step. Ultimately, Washington adjusted its position: The United States joined the Allies’ collective statement condemning the violations and pledging to defend “every inch of NATO territory.” However, a bitter aftertaste remains: Europeans are concerned that transatlantic unity could fray under the current Trump administration. They note a lack of synchronicity in sanctions policy, despite new U.S. sanctions against Russian energy companies and the EU’s nineteenth round of sanctions. For NATO to be credible, it is important to respond to such violations quickly, consistently and—most importantly—repeatedly and in a measured manner across political, military, and economic dimensions.
Eastern Sentry as a Stress Test for NATO and the EU
Overall, the launch of OES has demonstrated that NATO is responding to threats, redistributing the burden on European allies, and containing pressure from Eastern European members demanding a tough response to Russian danger. All this took place against the backdrop of the Trump administration’s statements about revising allied obligations and linking U.S. assistance to defense spending—NATO faced the need to demonstrate its legal capacity to act without American participation. Eastern Sentry became a compromise between Eastern European states requiring tough measures and Western European capitals that fear direct confrontation with Russia. Thus, the operation is primarily intended to maintain balance and symbolism unity inside the block, not offer a new strategic approach to defense or a mechanism for long-term containment.
Because the operation does not have its own strategic or legal mandate, its launch was not accompanied by a separate document or budget at the NATO level. In public statements by Secretary General Mark Rutte, Eastern Sentry was presented as an additional security measure after air space violations, not a long-term defense program. The financial side of the operation also confirms its limited character: There is no allocated budget, and the forces involved are forces that were already deployed by participating countries but have been temporarily reoriented to the eastern flank. The absence of dedicated management structures and centralized financing makes Eastern Sentry a redistribution of existing capacities, not a new defense architecture. The operation can be interpreted as a signaling exercise—a “test of the pen”—in response to growing calls for the implementation of collective defense on NATO’s and the EU’s eastern flank.
Eastern Sentry has demonstrated that NATO is capable of coordinating relatively quickly in the face new tactics and responding in a way that simultaneously strengthens defense and avoids direct confrontation. But the level of this coordination is inadequate in the face of increasing threats, and the events of recent months have highlighted vulnerabilities. NATO faces the challenge of eliminating differences of opinion among members when it comes to response measures. Only consistency and a united front will be able to preserve security. In addition, the large-scale modernization of defense is needed, from integrated air defense and missile defense systems to compatible counter-drone technologies. European allies will probably have to increase defense spending and more closely coordinate their efforts to be completely independent from the United States in similar crises. The disagreements with Washington over the assessment of the Polish incident shows that transatlantic relations require constant attention and strengthening, especially as political changes unfold in the United States itself. Nevertheless, Operation Eastern Sentry must show that fundamental NATO commitments remain unshakable, even in the face of new non-traditional threats.
For now, with the launch of Operation Eastern Sentry, the alliance has attempted to demonstrate its willingness to back up the treaty’s provisions with practical steps: the redeployment of equipment, the strengthening of air patrols, and the integration of national air defense systems into a single network. In this way, NATO is attempting to plug gaps in its defensive shield by demonstrating flexibility and proactivity.
Geopolitical Implications: European Security and Transatlantic Relations
Escalating tensions on NATO’s eastern flank inevitably impact overall stability in Europe and the dynamics of relations within the alliance itself. The drone incident in Poland was a wake-up call for European security: It turns out that the flames of war in Ukraine can easily spread across borders, even in the form of drone debris or errant shells. “Europe is no longer at peace with Russia,” said German Chancellor Friedrich Merz following the events in Poland. His words reflect a new reality: The confrontation with Moscow has returned to Europe an atmosphere reminiscent of the darkest days of the Cold War, when military incidents could escalate into open conflict at any moment. The situation is further exacerbated by the harsh, confrontational rhetoric of some leaders and the lack of dialogue between Europe and Russia. After the start of Trump’s presidential term and large-scale negotiations between the United States and Russia, it is Europe that Russia calls its main enemy, and the United States often views it as a barrier to a peaceful settlement between Ukraine and Russia.
For Ukraine, the events surrounding the Eastern Sentry also have a dual significance. On the one hand, NATO has made it clear that it will continue to avoid direct intervention in the war. On the other hand, the Allies have nevertheless attempted to rally behind Ukraine: The NATO Council statement emphasized that no Russian provocations will force the West to abandon its assistance to Ukraine, as “Ukraine’s security is an investment in our own security.” The incident in Poland highlights Ukraine’s urgent and growing need for air defense, which the Ukrainian leadership has been able to reinforce by highlighting the Russian threat.
In general, the Ukrainian leadership is using the situation as a pretext to once again emphasize Russia’s escalatory behavior. Kyiv has long maintained that “Russian weapons will not stop in Ukraine” and that the aggressor would easily cross the borders of other states if left unchecked. Now, there’s clear confirmation of these claims. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in a special address, declared that the Kremlin’s drones know no borders: “If today they fly over our Lviv region or Polish towns, tomorrow they could appear over the heads of every European.” He emphasized that “a Russian attack on Polish skies is an attack on Europe’s collective security.” According to the president, the only path to lasting peace is to “stop Russia’s military machine as much as possible” by increasing sanctions and military pressure.
The Ukrainian authorities are using this case to reinforce several key messages. First, they are emphasizing that it is urgent to increase aid to Ukraine, especially air defense assets, to shield the skies from Russian attack drones and missiles. “Russian drones are flying to Europe through Ukrainian skies—give us more air defense systems, and we will protect not only ourselves, but you as well,” is the leitmotif of statements from Kyiv. The Office of the President of Ukraine announced that it will seek additional supplies of Western air defense systems and counter-drone systems, including coverage for Ukraine’s western regions, to prevent a repeat of incidents on NATO territory.
The topic of a no-fly zone over Ukraine—at least over its western part—has also resurfaced in Ukrainian discourse. As a reminder, in the first weeks of the full-scale war, Zelenskyy persistently called on NATO to close the skies over Ukraine, but the Allies refused due to the risk of direct conflict with Russia. Now, after the Polish incident, Kyiv is reviving the discussion. Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to the Head of the Office of the President, has said that “if NATO starts shooting down Russian drones even as they approach the borders of the Union—over Ukrainian territory—this will be a powerful deterrent for the Kremlin.” A delegation of national security advisers from the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy also visited Kyiv, where security guarantees for Ukraine were discussed, as well as the deployment of foreign instructors within the framework of the “coalition of the willing,” among other things.
In the future, a complete no-fly zone over western Ukraine will no longer be feasible. Mechanisms are being discussed as part of a future architecture of security guarantees for Kyiv. A realistic format for Europe is not a “total NFZ,” but a stepped “NFZ lite” model—for example, one limited geographically to the Lviv–Transcarpathia corridor, governed by clearly defined rules of engagement (intercepting only UAVs and missiles, without NATO aircraft entering Ukraine’s interior), and supported by a layered air defense system based in Poland, Slovakia, and Romania. Such an “anti-Shaheddin dome” could simultaneously achieve several objectives: It reduces the risk of war spilling over into NATO territory, protects Ukraine’s critical logistical supply hubs, and sends a deterrent signal to Moscow without NATO formally entering the war. For the Ukrainian leadership and individual European partners, incidents on Europe’s eastern borders are becoming an additional pretext for pressuring both the Trump administration and dissenting European countries to return them to supporting Ukraine—both through continued supplies of weapons and air defense systems and through increased sanctions pressure on the Russian Federation. But for now, it is clear that Eastern Sentry will only be carried out on the territory of NATO countries.
From One-Off Operation to Potential Standing Mission
If Operation Eastern Sentry can stem the wave of violations on the eastern borders without escalating into open confrontation with Russia, this will strengthen the alliance’s reputation and stabilize the situation in Eastern Europe. At the same time, setting a precedent of NATO countries using weapons against Russia (even for their own defense) creates the risk of all of NATO being drawn into a military confrontation with Russia. In this case, the non-subjective format of OES, which does not require consensus for implementation, could work against the interests of most NATO countries, once again highlighting the cost of collective defense at the expense of national sovereignty. A formally non-subjective operation has thus transformed into an object of geopolitics and security debate, and, over time, it could evolve into a “structure within a structure” inside NATO and acquire additional political characteristics along the lines of the coalition of the willing.
The future success or failure of the OES depends on whether escalation continues. If it does continue, NATO could face an even more difficult choice: take more decisive action to defend its allies or risk a direct confrontation with Russia in the absence of U.S. support. This would test the very principle of NATO deterrence.
Incidents like the Polish one demonstrate that the NATO alliance is already directly experiencing the consequences of the war in Ukraine. Repeated drone attacks are increasing European pressure on the United States and hesitant European countries to toughen their policy toward Moscow. A clear and multi-variant strategy for responding to such crises has not yet been developed, but European capitals and Washington are demonstrating that they will not succumb to provocations aimed at drawing NATO into war.
For now, there is a tense balance on the eastern flank—the sides are sending signals of resolve but trying not to cross red lines. European NATO countries are balancing between the demands of domestic public opinion, harsh political and military rhetoric, and actual military capabilities, as well as the risks of being drawn into a confrontation with Russia, which Washington has loudly and repeatedly rejected. On the one hand, Eastern European NATO countries are hesitant. They appear bold and strong, but they also understand their strategic vulnerability in a situation of direct confrontation with the Russian Federation and the stated American “no” to the possibility of a direct confrontation with Moscow or, in such a case, support for European partners. This was most clearly demonstrated by NATO Secretary General Rutte’s recent statement that NATO’s strong position is not to shoot down drones: “It’s a proportionate response—we are much stronger than the Russians. If we were weaker, we could shoot them down immediately, but being stronger, our response is proportionate.”
Maintaining this delicate balance will be the focus of the international community in the coming months. European stability and transatlantic unity are being tested, and the outcome will determine whether the lessons of the Ukrainian conflict have been learned and whether NATO is prepared for new challenges. Clearly, a new political strategy for the EU and NATO could cast off the shackles of isolationism. Key components of this strategy could include broad participation in negotiation processes and the promotion of peaceful settlement ideas, as well as the integration and improvement of non-proliferation and arms control mechanisms on the continent.
Endnotes
“Defence Expenditures and NATO’s 5% Commitment,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 27, 2025, https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/defence-expendi….
“Eastern Sentry to Enhance NATO’s Presence Along Its Eastern Flank,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, September 12, 2025, https://shape.nato.int/news-releases/eastern-sentry-to-enhance-natos-pr….
Adam Easton and Jaroslav Lukiv, “Poland Says It Shot Down Russian Drones After Airspace Violation,” BBC, September 10, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c147065pzdzo.
Andrew Gray et al. “NATO to Beef Up Defence of Europe’s Eastern Flank After Poland Shot Down Drones,” Reuters, September 13, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/nato-beef-up-defence….
Leo Chiu, “EXPLAINED: How Many Times Has NATO Hit the Article 4 Button?” Kyiv Post, September 10, 2025, https://www.kyivpost.com/post/59823.
Andrius Sytas, “Latvia Urges NATO to Bolster Baltic Air Defence after Russian Incursions,” Reuters, September 27, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/latvia-urges-nato-bo….
Mark Rutte, “NATO Parliamentary Assembly 71st Annual Session in Ljubljana, 13 OCT 2025,” speech, October 13, 2025, posted by NATO News, YouTube, 1:31:08, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sqOcgRIubfA&t=4951s.