Perspective – Written by Ruslan Bortnik
The full analysis is available here.
The New START Treaty (officially the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms) is the last remaining pillar of the arms control architecture that began to take shape during the Cold War but continued to evolve well after its end. New START was the seventh and last treaty in a series of bilateral treaties between the United States and the USSR/Russia on the limitation of strategic nuclear forces signed after 1972 that fixed the number of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles for each side at the level at that time. As its expiration in February 2026 approaches, Russia has proposed extending New START limits on strategic nuclear forces. Could New START serve as a springboard for resuming U.S.–Russia talks on strategic stability? What are the possible future scenarios and their implications, including the risk of a new nuclear arms race? And ultimately, could these talks serve as a starting point for a broader normalization of relations between Russia and the United States?
New START and the Erosion of the Arms Control Architecture
New START was signed in April 2010 and became the successor to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) at a time when both sides sought to reset relations and continue decades-long efforts to limit their nuclear arsenals. It entered into force in February 2011 and capped the number of nuclear warheads in both the United States and Russia at their lowest levels since the 1960s. Under the terms of New START, each country is limited to no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed strategic missiles and bombers, with a total limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers. These limits took full effect in 2018 and are verified through an extensive regime of data exchange, notifications, and on-site inspections.
New START did not exist in isolation. It was part of a broader framework of strategic stability. However, over the past two decades, that framework has effectively been unraveled. The United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, which had limited missile defense systems since 1972. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated an entire class of U.S. and Soviet land-based missiles, fell apart in 2019 amid mutual accusations of violations. In 2020, the United States also withdrew from the Open Skies Treaty, which had allowed unarmed aerial observation flights, and Russia followed suit in 2022. By the 2020s, New START remained the only major arms control agreement still in force between the two nuclear superpowers. In early 2021, the parties succeeded in extending the treaty for another five years, until February 5, 2026. The move preserved the limits on each side’s nuclear forces and bought time for negotiations on a possible subsequent agreement.
In the past few years, however, even the New START Treaty has come under significant pressure. Inspections under the treaty were suspended in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In November 2022, a scheduled meeting of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (the treaty’s implementing body) in Cairo was unilaterally postponed by Russia, ostensibly due to U.S. “rhetoric and actions” towards Ukraine. By early 2023, the U.S. State Department concluded that Russia was in non-compliance with the New START Treaty because it continued to block on-site inspections and refused to resume dialogue on the treaty. Moscow rejected the U.S. report on treaty compliance, saying that any concessions on New START were “unjustified… until Washington reconsider its hostile policy towards Russia”—a clear reference to U.S. support for Ukraine.
The tension culminated when President Putin announced on February 21, 2023, that Russia was suspending its participation in New START. He explicitly linked the resumption of treaty implementation to U.S. behavior: Moscow would consider returning to the treaty only if Washington ended its military support for Ukraine and if other NATO nuclear powers (the United Kingdom and France) were brought into arms control discussions. Russia’s position was that it could no longer ignore the West’s combined nuclear capabilities. Putin stressed that before any future negotiations, Russia must understand how the arsenals of other NATO nuclear countries—Great Britain and France—will be accounted for along with the capabilities of the United States. Further escalation of the war in Ukraine has also further complicated substantive dialogue on the treaty.
Following the Russian suspension, the key pillars of New START effectively ceased. Bilateral data exchanges and on-site inspections ceased in 2023, depriving both sides of the treaty’s transparency mechanisms. By mid-2023, the United States announced that it would stop sharing its own semi-annual data updates in response to Moscow’s likely violation of the spirit of the 1,550-warhead limit. However, both governments have so far stated their intention to remain within the treaty’s central nuclear force limits until at least 2026. This mutual adherence to limits in the absence of formal enforcement suggests that neither side wants to immediately launch an arms race, but the clock is inexorably approaching the treaty’s expiration, after which even these voluntary commitments to restraint may cease.
The Russian Proposal for a One-Year Extension of New START Limitations
Against this tense backdrop, Russia put forward a new proposal in late 2025. On September 22, at a meeting of the Russian Security Council, Putin stated that “Russia is prepared to continue adhering to the central numerical limits under the New START Treaty for one year after February 5, 2026,” provided that the United States does the same. In essence, Moscow proposed an informal mutual extension of the New START Treaty ceilings (but no formal extension of the treaty, which legally cannot be extended again after its extension in 2021). Putin argued that allowing New START to expire without follow-up agreements would be a “grave and short-sighted mistake” with “adverse implications for the objectives of the .” By voluntarily maintaining the New START Treaty’s limits of 1,550 deployed warheads and 700 delivery vehicles for another year, both sides could prevent a destabilizing arms buildup and buy time for more comprehensive arms control negotiations.
Russian officials publicly presented the proposal as a gesture of goodwill. Putin claimed that the proposal was in the interests of global non-proliferation and could help stimulate dialogue with Washington on broader arms control agreements. Significantly, the Kremlin did not a priori demand that the United States fulfill Russia’s previous conditions before the extension would be applied. In fact, the proposal marked a change in Moscow’s tone, indicating a willingness to separate strategic stability from the Ukrainian issue, at least temporarily. Russia, however, added an important caveat: The voluntary restrictions would remain viable only if the United States does not take “steps that would undermine or disrupt the existing balance of deterrence.” From a Russian perspective, this refers to destabilizing initiatives such as U.S. plans to deploy missile defense interceptors in outer space. There are long-standing Russian concerns that the uncontrolled expansion of U.S. missile defense could undermine the strategic balance. Indeed, earlier, in May 2025, Moscow issued a joint statement with Beijing opposing U.S. missile defense projects such as the proposed Golden Dome space system.
But Moscow’s proposal to extend the agreement may also have narrow political goals: raising the stakes, maintaining the momentum of direct negotiations between the United States and Russia in the context of their sporadic stagnation, leveling the negotiating field with the United States by raising Russia to the level of nuclear parity, or simply using the proposal as a tool for improving Russia’s international reputation. Moreover, both Moscow and Washington understand that, from a strategic standpoint, Russia cannot afford a nuclear arms race for numerous economic and technological reasons. Therefore, Russia is seeking to freeze the current balance of deterrence in the nuclear arms sphere.
Washington’s initial response to Putin’s extension proposal was cautiously positive but without much interest. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said the proposal sounded “pretty good,” and President Donald Trump, asked about it by a Russian reporter, replied, “It sounds like a good idea to me.” Trump, who took office in January 2025, had previously made it clear that he did not want New START to simply expire, calling it “not an agreement you want expiring.” However, despite this rhetorical openness, the United States has yet to provide an official response. There has been diplomatic exchange—for example, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov discussed the bilateral agenda, including arms control, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in late September—but no concrete progress has been announced. A complicating factor is the U.S. tying arms control to the war in Ukraine: President Trump previously stated that substantive arms talks with Russia can only take place after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine ends. This suggests that geopolitical considerations may limit Washington’s willingness to conclude any agreement while the active conflict continues in Europe.
In addition to the United States, other nuclear stakeholders also responded to Putin’s move. China, which the United States has persistently invited to join trilateral arms control talks, praised Russia’s “positive attitude” in seeking to extend New START. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman welcomed the proposal and reiterated Beijing’s view that the responsibility lies with Washington and Moscow, as the major nuclear powers, to continue significant reductions in a verifiable and irreversible manner. At the same time, China has vehemently rejected being drawn into trilateral talks at this stage, arguing that its arsenal (estimated at 400–600 warheads) is far smaller than that of the superpowers. It has no interest in negotiations until parity is achieved. U.S. allies in Europe, for their part, have quietly welcomed any move that might limit nuclear forces, but European leaders have been relatively inactive in the public eye. The question is what scenarios might develop next, and what each of them will mean for strategic stability.
Scenarios for the Future of Strategic Stability
Scenario 1: One-Year Extension and Continued Negotiations
In the first scenario, Washington and Moscow agree—at least tacitly—to mutually extend the key New START restrictions for another year (until 2027). This could be done in the form of an “implementing agreement” or parallel political commitments, as there is no legal basis for a formal extension of the treaty. Such an understanding would effectively freeze strategic nuclear forces at their current levels for some time. The immediate benefit would be to prevent the collapse of the restrictions in February 2026 and avoid a nuclear arms race in the near future.
However, an extension without additional measures would be a temporary and fragile solution. One key issue is the lack of verification. Russia’s proposal, as currently drafted, does not commit to resuming on-site inspections or data sharing. Treaty monitoring mechanisms remain suspended, meaning that each side must rely on its own satellites and intelligence to estimate the other side’s number of warheads. U.S. officials have warned that without inspections and notifications, confidence in the other side’s compliance will decline over time. Indeed, the U.S. government reportedly assessed in early 2025 that Russia may have exceeded the 1,550 deployed warhead limit in 2024—a difficult-to-verify assertion that underscores growing suspicions as they remain in the dark. While an informal extension of the limits buys time, it does not fully resolve the trust deficit. The two sides could try to reach a separate agreement, however, to at least exchange basic data or notifications during the extension period, even if on-site inspections remain suspended.
The trajectory of the New START Treaty will have profound implications for the global architecture of strategic stability. If the treaty is preserved (even temporarily) or further developed, it could reinvigorate arms control as a tool for managing great power rivalry. Negotiations on New START could reopen a channel of communication between Washington and Moscow that has been largely closed since 2022. This would have collateral benefits: Even limited interaction could soften dangerous rhetoric and provide a forum for clarifying intentions—for example, discussing each other’s plans for missile defense or hypersonic weapons to avoid misinterpretations. It would also normalize the idea that an arms race is unacceptable, at a time when other states are watching closely.
If arms control is revived, there is potential to update the concept of strategic stability in the twenty-first century. This could include new transparency measures, agreements on intermediate-range missiles (including regional agreements to avoid dangerous deployments in Europe or Asia), and even agreements on non-interference with nuclear command-and-control systems in the cyber and space domains. Reaching these agreements would significantly strengthen stability, although, of course, emerging players such as China would need to be included in this new system.
Crucially, the viability of the first scenario will depend on broader political dynamics. If the war in Ukraine de-escalates or a ceasefire is reached, the parties will be more willing to accept an arms limitation agreement. Conversely, if the conflict escalates or either side takes provocative actions (such as the United States testing space-based missile interceptors or Russia deploying new types of nuclear delivery systems), the fragile agreement could fall apart.
Scenario 2: Expiration of New START and Nuclear Arms Race
In a second, more dire scenario, New START expires in February 2026 without any extension or replacement, leaving the strategic forces of the United States and Russia completely unhindered for the first time in more than half a century, beyond financial and technological constraints. Such a breakdown would certainly provoke a new nuclear arms race.
Both countries have loading capabilities, meaning they can quickly increase the number of warheads on existing missiles. One estimate found that in a scenario in which there is no treaty in place, each side’s deployed strategic warheads could roughly double in number if all existing missiles were loaded to a maximum number of warheads. The Federation of American Scientists estimates that the United States could deploy significantly more warheads on its Ohio-class submarines and Minuteman III ICBMs, by loading missiles with multiple warheads up to their technical limits, while Russia could similarly deploy warheads on its SS-18/Sarmat ICBMs and ballistic missile submarines, although economic constraints and sanctions could limit the speed of production expansion. This race to redeploy multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), however, would reverse the progress made in warhead reduction since the end of the Cold War. The rapid expansion of China’s nuclear weapons—China could reach one thousand warheads within the next decade—is further increasing the pressure, and some American defense planners argue that the United States may need a larger deployed arsenal to maintain deterrence.
Each side may suspect the other of secretly increasing warheads or deploying new systems, leading to worst-case scenario planning. The United States, with its larger economy and technological base, may eventually outpace Russia in the quantitative arms race, especially if it also seeks to counter the rise of China. Russia, however, has demonstrated its ability to create new qualitative challenges—for example, by deploying the Avangard hypersonic glider or by deploying nuclear-capable missiles in Belarus. The result could be a more unpredictable and unstable equilibrium, as each side will be less confident in the invulnerability of its retaliatory strike capabilities.
Beyond loading warheads, both countries are already modernizing their nuclear delivery systems, and without New START, they would be free to accelerate these programs and add more launchers. The United States is fielding new Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines, a new B-21 stealth bomber, and Sentinel, a next-generation intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) to replace the Minuteman III. Meanwhile, Russia is deploying new Yars and Sarmat ICBMs, Borei-class submarines, and developing new systems such as the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle.
The strategic balance in an unconstrained environment may initially still favor parity—both the United States and Russia maintain stockpiles of around 4,000 or more total nuclear warheads (deployed plus reserve). The United States currently has around 3,700 warheads in its active inventory, versus approximately 4,300 for Russia. This includes many non-deployed or “tactical” warheads not constrained by New START. If the United States were free from treaty constraints, it could deploy many of its stored warheads—for example, by coupling reserve warheads to submarine-launched missiles—potentially outstripping Russia in deployed strategic weapons. Russia, however, possesses a much larger arsenal of tactical (shorter-range) nuclear warheads, which have never fallen under the purview of any treaty. Ultimately, the failure of New START could trigger an arms race on several fronts: an increase in the number of warheads, the emergence of new types of weapons (for example, nuclear-powered cruise missiles or nuclear-powered underwater drones being developed by Russia), and possibly even the deployment of new systems in third countries.
The consequences for global security would be profoundly negative. Ending mutual restraints could undermine strategic stability, under which neither side has an interest in launching a first strike in a crisis. If one side fears the other is gaining a nuclear advantage, it may increase nuclear readiness or adopt a more dangerous posture. The risks of miscalculation could increase, especially in a tense geopolitical environment. Moreover, the collapse of U.S.–Russia arms control could undermine the broader nuclear non-proliferation regime. Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), nuclear-weapon states (especially the United States and Russia) are expected to work in good faith toward disarmament. A new arms race would send the opposite signal—that disarmament is off the table—potentially undermining the commitment of non-nuclear states to the NPT. Other nuclear powers, such as China, India, and Pakistan, could also use the U.S. and Russian arms buildup as justification to expand their own arsenals, leading to a more saturated and unstable nuclear landscape.
In summary, the second scenario represents a relapse into a Cold War-style arms race, with all the dangers that this entails. A strategic offensive arms race could be accompanied by a parallel race in missile defense and the militarization of outer space (as the United States develops advanced defensive systems, while Russia and possibly China develop offensive countermeasures) and new technologies (for example, hypersonic weapons, cyberweapons, and artificial intelligence in nuclear weapons control systems). Once these dynamics gain momentum, the momentum will be difficult to reverse. Washington and Moscow publicly declare that they want to avoid such a future, but without diplomatic compromise, it will become the default outcome after the expiration of New START.
Scenario 3: Toward a New Comprehensive Arms Control Agreement
The third scenario goes beyond stopgap measures or unchecked competition: negotiating a new, possibly more comprehensive, arms control agreement to replace New START. This is not only the most ambitious path, but also the most challenging given the current geopolitical divide. Any subsequent treaty would have to overcome obstacles that New START was unable to surmount. For example, the United States has stipulated that future negotiations should cover the entire nuclear warhead universe, not just deployed strategic warheads—a way to include Russia’s thousands of tactical (short-range) nuclear warheads. U.S. officials have also expressed concern about Russia’s new strategic systems (such as the Poseidon nuclear torpedo and the Burevestnik nuclear cruise missile), which were not constrained under New START’s definitions. Russia, on the other hand, insists that any new deal must consider U.S. missile defenses and the nuclear forces of other NATO allies. This implies that Moscow is seeking either multilateral negotiations involving London and Paris or at least that the nuclear potential of the United States and its allies be considered jointly.
Multilateral arms control involving additional nuclear-armed states is largely uncharted in territory. France and the UK have much smaller arsenals (less than three hundred warheads each) and have historically been reluctant to join bilateral treaties between the United States and Russia. Meanwhile, China, now the world’s third-largest nuclear power, aims to significantly increase its nuclear arsenal and thus threatens both the United States and Russia. China has repeatedly rejected calls to join negotiations as long as its arsenal remains a fraction of U.S. and Russian levels, although it is expected to reach near-parity with the United States and Russia in five years. This would be a fundamentally different situation compared to the Cold War era when there were just two powers with thousands of weapons. Beijing argues that if the United States and Russia expect it to participate in negotiations on a new agreement now, the superpowers must reduce their weapons closer to China’s level. Ultimately, no deterrence system will work without considering China.
Achieving a comprehensive agreement may require creative new formats, such as a series of parallel bilateral agreements or a framework that commits the UK, France, and China to at least some transparency or freeze. Solutions could include establishing a ceiling on the number of warheads for all nuclear weapons at the current levels of the United States and Russia or a gradual reduction in the number of U.S. and Russian warheads to China’s level. One proposal put forward in international security circles is for the five NPT nuclear-weapon states (the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France) to agree to mutual declarations and limitations on their shared arsenals or on certain categories of weapons. However, achieving such a global agreement remains extremely difficult. Also, given the new geopolitical realities, it is impossible to ignore the overall balance of nuclear weapons between the so-called Global West and the Global South, as the United States could soon feel vulnerable to the combined potential of Russia and China.
Another aspect of the new treaty could be the inclusion of new technologies and non-nuclear strategic systems. For example, the next agreement could include restrictions on hypersonic glide vehicles or long-range non-nuclear strike systems that could pose a threat to nuclear forces. An attempt could also be made to revive restrictions on intermediate-range missiles (to replace the INF Treaty) or restrictions on the deployment of weapons in space. Each of these expansions complicates negotiations but may be necessary to truly strengthen strategic stability in a changing technological environment.
Politically, negotiations on a successor to New START will require at least a minimal détente. During the Cold War, arms control agreements, such as SALT I in 1972 and the INF Treaty in 1987, were concluded during periods of improved relations or following serious crises that pushed both sides to seek stability. If the current Russo-Ukrainian war continues unabated, it is difficult to imagine that there will be the level of trust and political capital necessary to conclude a comprehensive arms control treaty. Domestic politics also play a role: Ratification of any new treaty would require two-thirds support in the U.S. Senate, which, in the current atmosphere of mistrust toward Moscow, could become a serious obstacle.
Nevertheless, the strategic logic in favor of a new agreement remains. Both the United States and Russia recognize that unfettered arms competition is costly and dangerous. Both countries’ security services have decades of experience with the benefits of arms control for stability, including the predictability it provides and the reduced risk of nuclear war due to miscalculation. A future agreement may not be concluded immediately in 2026; perhaps, after a period of expiration and heightened risk, a security crisis or the financial burden of an arms race could instead bring both sides to the negotiating table. This was the case in the 1980s, when a renewed arms race and public pressure ultimately led to breakthroughs such as the INF Treaty.
In summary, the third scenario—a “New START II” or more comprehensive treaty—is the most stabilizing option in the long term. Such an agreement would strengthen nuclear stability and possibly include more parties and weapon types. However, it would likely require either a thaw in U.S.–Russia relations and painstaking diplomacy, which currently seems unattainable, or a new security crisis. This scenario could also materialize, however, if leaders in Washington and Moscow succeed in separating strategic stability negotiations from negotiations regarding other conflicts.
Will Arms Talks Bring the United States and Russia Closer Together?
Could renewed negotiations on New START and strategic stability be a stepping stone to normalizing U.S.–Russia relations? History offers a mixed picture. During the Cold War, arms control often paralleled intense geopolitical rivalry rather than emerging as the result of warm relations. The United States and Soviet Union signed their first nuclear arms agreements— SALT I and the ABM Treaty—in the early 1970s amid détente, but this détente was more a strategic necessity than genuine friendship. Later, even during periods of high tension, leaders recognized the importance of maintaining an open dialogue on nuclear risks. The Washington–Moscow hotline, for example, was established after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis precisely to avoid uncontrolled escalation, and agreements such as the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement helped control military confrontations. Arm control negotiations continued even when other issues generated deep mistrust—they were at times the only remaining channel of communication.
Under current circumstances, any progress on New START could improve the diplomatic atmosphere. This could create a modicum of trust, or at least professional respect, between the negotiators. Even a narrow agreement on nuclear arms limitation, coupled with “agreeing to disagree” on Ukraine, could set a precedent demonstrating the possibility of pragmatic cooperation on specific, vital interests. If sustained, this could open the door, albeit narrowly, to address other issues, such as restoring military de-escalation mechanisms or addressing the risks of miscalculation in other theaters of war.
But we must be careful not to overestimate the importance of normalization. The core conflicts complicating U.S.–Russia relations—primarily Russia’s war in Ukraine, but also issues such as economic and technological competition, election interference, cyberattacks, and human rights—will not be resolved by an arms control pact. At best, success on the New START front could create some goodwill and demonstrate that dialogue is mutually beneficial. At worst, it could remain isolated—the only area of cooperation in an otherwise hostile relationship.
It is also important to recognize domestic political lenses. In the United States, any engagement with Russia is viewed through the prism of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Critics of extending New START may argue that it rewards Moscow or signals a weakening of resolve. The current Trump administration must balance these perceptions. Indeed, President Trump has linked progress on arms control to ending the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, reflecting the view that normalization—even in arms talks—cannot move forward while the war rages. On the Russian side, anti-Western sentiment is still strong, and Putin will need to present any future deal as a victory for Russian security, which he has attempted to do by presenting the extension proposal as a responsible Russian stance on global stability.
In conclusion, resuming strategic stability talks may be a necessary first step toward halting the downward spiral in U.S.–Russia relations, but they are unlikely to be sufficient for genuine normalization. They address one critical dimension—the threat of nuclear catastrophe—and thereby remove a layer of fear and mistrust hanging over the relationship. Ultimately, whether these talks will become a stepping stone to normalization depends on political will and wisdom in both capitals. Arm control alone cannot resolve deep-seated grievances, but it can create a foundation of stability on which to build a broader peace and confirm that dialogue is still possible. At best, extending the principles New START could be a new beginning: a starting point for rebuilding a measure of trust and preventing the most dangerous outcomes, proving that cooperation can endure even when friendship crumbles. At worst, its collapse would serve as an ominous marker of a world in which competition completely eclipses cooperation. The coming months will reveal which path the United States and Russia—and the world around them—will take.
Endnotes
Saif Khalid, “What is the Missile Treaty Russia Has Walked Out Of – And Why?” Al Jazeera, August 5, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/5/what-is-the-missile-treaty-russ….
Saif Khalid, “What is the Missile Treaty Russia Has Walked Out Of – And Why?”
Xiaodon Liang, “Russia Proposes One-Year New START Extension,” Arms Control Association, October 2025, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2025-10/news/russia-proposes-one-year-n….
Shannon Bugos, “Russia Suspends New START,” Arms Control Association, March 2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-03/news/russia-suspends-new-start.
Shannon Bugos, “Russia Suspends New START.”
Shannon Bugos, “Russia Suspends New START.”
Shannon Bugos, “Russia Suspends New START.”
Steven Pifer, “Responding to Putin’s Proposal to Extend New START,” Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation, October 2, 2025, https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/news/responding-putins-proposal-extend-n….
Andrew Osborn et al., “Putin Offers Trump One-Year Extension to Nuclear Weapons Treaty,” Reuters, September 23, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-offers-trump-temporary-nuclear-arms….
Xiaodon Liang, “Russia Proposes One-Year New START Extension.”
Andrew Osborn et al., “Putin Offers Trump One-Year Extension to Nuclear Weapons Treaty.”
Xiaodon Liang, “Russia Proposes One-Year New START Extension.”
Andrew Osborn et al., “Putin Offers Trump One-Year Extension to Nuclear Weapons Treaty.”
Xiaodon Liang, “Russia Proposes One-Year New START Extension.”
Steven Pifer, “Responding to Putin’s Proposal to Extend New START.”
Xiaodon Liang, “Russia Proposes One-Year New START Extension.”
Xiaodon Liang, “Russia Proposes One-Year New START Extension.”
Andrew Osborn et al., “Putin Offers Trump One-Year Extension to Nuclear Weapons Treaty.”
Steven Pifer, “Responding to Putin’s Proposal to Extend New START.”
Julia Berghofer, “The Russian New START Initiative: How Can Europeans Respond to a Poisonous Offer?” European Leadership Network, October 15, 2025, https://europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-russian-new-start-….
Steven Pifer, “Responding to Putin’s Proposal to Extend New START.”
Shannon Bugos, “Russia Suspends New START.”
Shannon Bugos, “Russia Suspends New START.”
Steven Pifer, “Responding to Putin’s Proposal to Extend New START.”
Shannon Bugos, “Russia Suspends New START.”