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Contemporary political science traditionally treats democracy as a stable state of the political regime of the same name. It presupposes not only the holding of elections, but also the permanent existence of mechanisms of public participation: the activity of parties, political competition, freedom of expression, public oversight, the possibility of peaceful protest, and regular interaction between citizens and state institutions. In other words, a citizen in a democratic system should, ideally, remain a political subject not only on the day of voting, but throughout the entire political cycle.
However, there exist political systems in which democratic mechanisms are preserved but function intermittently. At certain — rare — moments, citizens gain the opportunity to genuinely influence power, yet afterward this opportunity is again substantially curtailed. Such moments may be elections, mass protests, political crises, or other situations in which the authorities find themselves compelled to temporarily expand the space of public participation.
To describe such a configuration, we propose the concept of discrete democracy. It is understood as a state of the political system in which the democratic participation of society is intermittent, "time-to-time," and event-based: it arises in separate "political windows," after which a significant portion of citizens again finds itself alienated from direct decision-making.
Discrete democracy is not necessarily a separate type of political regime alongside democracy or authoritarianism. Rather, it is an additional characteristic of a regime that allows one to examine the very rhythm of the functioning of democratic mechanisms. An authoritarian, illiberal, delegative, or post-democratic system may simultaneously also possess a high degree of discreteness of political participation.
Therefore, the central question of this concept is not only whether citizens in principle have a real right to participate in politics, but also how often this right turns into, again, a real possibility of influencing power. Let us try to make sense of the situation — both in theory and through concrete examples.
1. Theoretical Foundations of Discrete Democracy
1.1. Democracy as a Continuous Political Process
In the classical understanding, democracy presupposes the constant political subjectivity of citizens. Elections are merely one of the mechanisms of this system. After voting, a citizen should not disappear from the political process: he retains the ability to participate in the activity of parties and public organizations, to address representatives of power, to express political demands, to criticize state decisions and to seek their change, etc.
Consequently, the mere presence of elections does not yet characterize the degree of real democracy of a political system. What matters is how constantly, continuously society is able to use existing institutions to influence state power.
It is precisely here that the problem of political alienation arises. The majority may retain the formal status of the source of power and state legitimacy, yet in fact be excluded from the decision-making process. This is that very Baudrillardian "shadow of the silent majority": its political presence (Dasein) exists formally and statistically, but far from always turns into full-fledged political subjectivity. At the same time, political silence cannot automatically be considered support for the authorities or even simple loyalty to them. It may be a consequence of apathy, fear, the absence of alternatives, distrust of institutions, or the conviction that participation is incapable of changing the outcome.
In the traditional analysis of democracy, attention is usually focused on institutions, rights, and procedures. The concept of discrete democracy proposes to add to them one more dimension — the temporal (time-related) one. A political system may possess formal democratic institutions, yet grant citizens the opportunity to actually use them only sporadically. It is precisely this temporal parameter that becomes central for the proposed concept.
1.2. The Discreteness of Political Participation
We have established that the concept of discreteness allows us to consider democracy from the standpoint of time. In a stable democracy, political participation is a constant environment, whereas under discrete democracy it manifests in the form of separate episodes. At a certain moment, the political system may (partially) open up: elections arrive, a protest spontaneously arises, a political crisis occurs, or a decision is adopted that provokes a mass negative reaction. Society mobilizes and for a short period gains the opportunity to genuinely influence power. After the crisis ends, the space of participation narrows again.
Discreteness cannot be equated simply with low political activity. A society may be politically passive while retaining full-fledged institutions of participation. Discreteness appears when the very possibility of real influence on power becomes episodic and irregular.
From this follows a fundamental proposition of the proposed concept: a democratic act can be simultaneously real and discrete. Citizens can indeed change a decision of the authorities through protest, a voter can indeed vote against the incumbent government, and a competitive candidate can indeed receive support. But if such an opportunity arises only occasionally — in a controlled manner or entirely by chance — and does not turn into a permanent mechanism of control, democracy acquires that very discrete character.
1.3. Democracy as an Event
Under conditions of discrete democracy, the latter ceases to be a constant state of the political system and turns into an event. Thus elections become a moment when the authorities, extremely reluctantly, are forced to address citizens as the source of legitimacy, and protest becomes a moment of direct pressure by society on its own state.
A political crisis creates a situation in which the authorities, for a short time, find themselves significantly more receptive to public demands. But after such a critical episode ends, the system closes again. This is precisely why one can speak of "democracy as an event," for an event has a beginning and an end. It stands out from the everyday political process and temporarily changes the relations between society and power.
If a citizen can influence the state permanently, constantly, continuously, democracy is an environment. But if such influence becomes possible predominantly during elections, crises, or protests, democracy turns into an isolated event.
2. Empirical Manifestations of Discrete Democracy
2.1. Russia: Elections as a Periodic (Partial) Opening of a Closed Political System
The 2026 parliamentary elections in the Russian Federation are taking place under conditions of substantially curtailed, extremely limited political competition. Most opposition candidates are barred from participation, and the liberal and anti-war party "Yabloko" has been officially removed from the elections through a formal court. At the same time, individual representatives of the party continue to participate in the struggle for seats in single-mandate districts.
This allows us to consider Russian elections as a kind of periodic (partial) opening of the political system. In ordinary political life, the space of open competition in Russia is significantly limited. However, during the election period, the authorities are compelled to address citizens as the source of their own legitimization. Put simply, this is about acclamation: citizens are required to confirm that power is power.
In this sense, elections become a stress for the system. For a certain period, the state must demonstrate the ability to hear society, acknowledge the existence of various moods, and grant citizens at least a limited opportunity to express them. However, the mere presence of a voting procedure does not yet mean equality of political opportunities. If a significant portion of alternatives is excluded even before the moment of voting, the space of choice turns out to be structurally and institutionally limited.
It is precisely here that the discrete character of the Russian political system manifests itself. The democratic mechanism does not disappear entirely, but it "switches on" in a controlled and periodic manner. It creates the possibility of expressing public attitudes toward the authorities, yet does not automatically turn into a permanent mechanism of control and correction of the political course. Consequently, the Russian case shows that democracy can exist as a periodically activated mechanism of legitimization, without becoming a permanent characteristic of the political process.
2.2. Iran: The Right to Choose, Limited by the System
Iran before the war with the United States represented another variety of discrete democracy. Here democratic and non-democratic elements are institutionally built into one another and organically complement one another, forming in synthesis that very unique model of the Islamic republic. The country has an elected president, parliament, and Assembly of Experts. However, candidates for elections undergo preliminary vetting by the Guardian Council of the Constitution. The latter consists of 12 members: six Islamic jurists are appointed by the supreme leader (Rahbar), and another six jurists are approved by parliament from among candidates proposed by the judiciary — which, in turn, is also appointed by the Rahbar!
The Council vets candidates in elections to parliament and the Assembly of Experts. As a result, the citizen does indeed choose — but does so within a pre-formed space of political alternatives. This is precisely why the Iranian example allows us to speak of a discrete right of the people to choose. Elections exist, they can be competitive and can have real significance within the permissible political space. However, citizens do not gain the opportunity to freely determine all the parameters of the political order. Not to mention that the population of Iran also does not elect the supreme ayatollah.
Thus, discreteness in the Iranian case has not only a temporal but also an institutional dimension. A citizen regularly gains the opportunity to participate in elections, but the very space of permissible competition is limited in advance by the institutional design of the political system.
2.3. Ukraine: "Cardboard" Protest as a Discrete Mechanism of Public Influence
The Ukrainian case differs fundamentally from the Russian and Iranian ones. The restriction of customary political participation in Ukraine is connected, above all, with the full-scale aggression of the Russian Federation and the operation of martial law. Under these conditions, elections are not held, and political activity is substantially limited. However, even the absence of elections does not mean the disappearance of public political subjectivity. It can manifest through other forms — for example, through protests.
Particularly indicative is the crisis around the anti-corruption bodies in the summer of 2025. After the adoption of a law expanding the powers of the prosecutor general with respect to NABU and SAP, the first mass rallies since the start of the war began in Ukraine. Subsequently, the legislative changes were revised, and the independence of NABU and SAP was restored.This episode is important precisely from the standpoint of discrete democracy. In the absence of the possibility of expressing attitudes toward the authorities and their decisions through elections, part of society used protests — which, incidentally, are also restricted under martial law — as a direct mechanism of political (in)fluence.
It is important to note: the protesters at the "cardboard Maidan" cannot automatically be considered an expression of the position of the entire society. A group of activists close to grant and anti-corruption circles, and the majority of the population, are not one and the same. However, what is politically significant is the very fact that an organized part of society was able to exert direct influence on a state decision in the direction of its repeal/change.
An analogous episode occurred in the summer of 2026, when public protests led to large-scale changes in Ukraine's military-political leadership. Thus, the protesters secured the dismissal of the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine — and this in a country at war\! However, the authorities satisfied their demands only halfway, since former defense minister Fedorov was never returned to his post. Nevertheless, the key conclusion is this: in the absence of elections and other legal political activity, public pressure through protest became the main channel of political feedback.
3. Discrete Democracy and Similar Political Science Concepts
The closest to discrete democracy is the concept of imitative democracy. However, these concepts describe different sides of the political system. Imitation points above all to the gap between formal democratic institutions and their actual content. Discreteness answers a different question: how often and at what moments these institutions actually allow society to influence power.
Therefore, a democratic act, as we noted above, can be simultaneously real and discrete. For example, a protest is capable of genuinely leading to a change in a government decision. This does not necessarily mean an imitation of democracy. But if society is able to secure a change in a decision only in rare moments of mass mobilization, such a democracy remains discrete.
A similarity also exists with Colin Crouch's concept of post-democracy. In the classic work Post-Democracy, Crouch analyzed the weakening of mass political participation and the strengthening of the influence of political and economic elites. However, post-democracy and discrete democracy emphasize different sides of the political process. Post-democracy above all describes a change in the very essence of democracy (a departure from content toward form and ritual) and a change in the balances between society, elites, and institutions. Discrete democracy, by contrast, draws attention to the rhythm and frequency of political participation, answering the question of what the temporal structure of society's access to political (in)fluence is.
From illiberal democracy, discrete democracy should also be distinguished. Illiberality is connected, as is clear from the name, with the restriction of liberal principles, minority rights, the independence of institutions, and mechanisms of restraining power. Discreteness, by contrast, describes the periodicity and stability of public participation.
Finally, there may also be a connection between discrete democracy and Guillermo O'Donnell's concept of delegative democracy. In his classic 1994 work, O'Donnell described regimes in which the president and parliament are elected democratically, but the mechanisms of subsequent accountability of power remain weak, and power is gradually endowed with supra-powers without feedback. And yes, delegative democracy may have a discrete character if civic participation is in fact concentrated around the moment of elections, after which the elected authorities receive enormous space for independent action without regard for society.
However, discrete democracy, in our view, is still broader. It in principle does not require a presidential or parliamentary form of government. Moreover: it can manifest even under conditions where elections are temporarily absent. That is, the discreteness of democracy is best considered as an independent terminological and analytical dimension, which at the same time is capable of being superimposed on various types of political regimes.
4. A Theoretical Model of Discrete Democracy
To analyze discrete democracy, several interrelated parameters can be identified.
The first is the frequency of "political windows." If citizens possess permanent channels of influence, the degree of discreteness is lower. If such opportunities arise only during elections, crises, or mass protests, discreteness increases.
The second parameter is the duration of the "political window." An electoral campaign may create a space of participation for several months, while a protest is capable of changing the political situation within a few days.
The third parameter is the breadth of permissible competition. The example of pre-war Iran shows that political participation may be entirely regular, yet the space of choice is limited in advance by institutional filters.
The fourth parameter is the effectiveness of participation. The mere fact of voting or holding a rally does not yet mean high political subjectivity, is not identical to influence. What matters is the question of whether participation is capable of changing or influencing the decisions of the authorities.
The fifth parameter is the social concentration of participation. Under conditions of discrete democracy, a very small but well-organized and motivated group may gain disproportionately greater political influence than a passive majority. Nevertheless, this influence was and remains temporary and sporadic.
Finally, one must take into account the degree of institutionalization of political participation. The more political influence depends on exceptional circumstances of crisis, the higher the degree of discreteness.
On the basis of the foregoing, discrete democracy can be represented as a combination of four alternating states: political closure, the emergence of a "window of participation," short-term mobilization, and the subsequent return to closure and extremely limited or entirely absent participation. It is precisely the repeatability of this sequence that turns separate episodes into a stable characteristic of the political regime.
5. The Paradox of Discrete Democracy
The main paradox of discrete democracy lies in the fact that a political system may appear stable precisely because public participation is limited. But the absence of protests does not necessarily mean the absence of discontent, and the absence of political competition — the absence of alternative views. If a society for a long time lacks the opportunity to influence power, political tension accumulates, and then bursts forth, becoming a surprise for the authorities. However, such a "surprise" is like snow in winter.
This is precisely why the opening of even a small "political window" is capable of leading to disproportionately strong social mobilization. This is the peculiarity of discrete democracy: the less often society has the opportunity to be heard, the more large-scale and explosive each moment may become when the authorities are forced to hear it.
Elections in a controlled political system can become an important channel for expressing discontent. Protest under conditions of war can temporarily and to a limited extent compensate for the absence of elections. Limited competition can give citizens the opportunity to influence particular policy directions, without allowing them to call into question the fundamental foundations of the system. In all these cases, democracy exists not as a permanent political environment, but as an event. In all these cases, democracy is not continuous, but discrete.
6. Conclusion
Summing up, the concept of discrete democracy allows us to supplement the traditional analysis of political regimes with a temporal dimension. To understand the character of democracy, it is not enough to establish the presence of elections, a parliament, or other formal institutions. It is also necessary to determine how continuously citizens are able to exercise their political rights and turn participation into real influence on state decisions.
Discrete democracy arises where this connection between society and power becomes intermittent. It arises when classical public politics dies as a space of continuous dialogue between the state and society. Citizens gain the opportunity to influence the state not as a permanently acting political subject, but predominantly at separate moments — during elections, crises, protests, or other political events.
Therefore, discrete democracy should not be perceived as yet another name for authoritarianism, imitative democracy, post-democracy, etc. It is rather a characteristic of the rhythm of relations between society and the state. In a full-fledged democracy, a citizen remains a subject of politics even after the elections end. In a discrete democracy, by contrast, he can become a subject only for a certain short period, after which he again turns into, at best, an observer, and at worst, an object entirely.
From this follows the main definition of the proposed concept: discrete democracy is such a configuration of a political regime in which society gains a real opportunity to influence power not as a permanently acting subject, but predominantly at separate moments limited temporally or institutionally.
Thus, the central question of discrete democracy lies not only in whether the people have a voice, but also in how often the authorities are forced to hear it. It is precisely the interval between society's ability to speak and the authorities' necessity to listen that constitutes the space in which the phenomenon of discrete democracy arises.
Nikita Trachuk, political scientist at the UIP, specifically for the Ukrainian Institute of Politics
