2024 HIGHLIGHTS FOR UKRAINE: WAR, POLITICS, PUBLIC OPINION, ECONOMY, INTERNATIONAL SITUATION; SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS

 

Introduction. Main trends.

1. Geopolitics. The situation around Ukraine. Negotiations.

1. The political balance in the USA has changed. Democrats are yielding power to Republicans: election results and their impact on US foreign policy strategy. There is a possibility of adjusting sanctions and military aid policy.

2. Allied assistance to Ukraine: issues of allied coordination and the impact of war fatigue.

3. Initiatives and prospects for peace negotiations. Evaluation of proposals of international mediators (China, Brazil, etc.). The role of the new US President in this process.

4. The impact of other conflicts and wars on the situation in Ukraine.

5. The process of Ukraine’s European integration.

6. "Ukraine's cutting board": Acceleration of the formation of warring military alliances—"Ukrainian+" and "Russian+." Risks of scaling the war into a new World War and nuclear escalation.

2. The course of the war in 2024: military operations.

1. The struggle for initiative: early 2024 – August 2024 – strategic deadlock and a certain stability at the front.

2. (August 2024—present) is the transition of the tactical military initiative to the Russian army, which is exploiting its personnel and resource advantage. In 2024, Russian troops accelerated significantly in their advance.

3. Ukrainian offensive on Russian territories.

3. Domestic policy.

1. The decline in the popularity of the government and the formation of an alternative center of political trust (head of the Main Intelligence Directorate K. Budanov, former commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine V. Zaluzhny), personnel rotations and corruption scandals, the situation surrounding the elections, disagreements among the military-political leadership, etc.

2. Mobilization. Society's reaction to mobilization processes.

3. Transformation of public opinion. Radical changes in public opinion in Ukraine.

4. Change in humanitarian policy.

 

4. Macroeconomic situation and macroeconomics

1. Key economic indicators.

2. Social policy. Changes in fiscal policy and other instruments to replenish the budget against the backdrop of reduced aid from Western partners.

3. Financing of the State Budget of Ukraine. Impact of assistance from Western partners and international financial institutions, conditions for providing assistance.

4. State budget of Ukraine for 2025

5. Russian strikes on critical infrastructure.

6. The situation surrounding the export of Ukrainian agricultural products.

 

V. Conclusions and forecasts for 2025.

Introduction. Main trends.

1. In 2024, the war dynamics in Ukraine transitioned from a strategic impasse and are now in a certain strategic balance, as evidenced by Russia conducting the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk operation and Ukraine conducting the Kursk operation. At present, The Russian Federation has completely seized the military initiative at the front. The advance of Russian troops has accelerated significantly, with Russian forces capturing over 3,000 square kilometers between January 1 and December 26, 2024. In comparison, over the entire 2023, the front changed by only 200 square kilometers in favor of Ukrainian troops.

2. The dynamics on the southern front of the Donetsk region have acquired a negative dynamic for the Ukrainian troops, where the speed of advance of the Russian troops in October reached (up to 50-79 sq. km. per day) in several areas. Both sides are adapting to the course of military operations and are actively using new models of drones and missiles. At the same time, territorial changes do not create a strategic risk of defeat for one of the parties and prerequisites for capitulation.

3. Both sides are suffering heavy losses in men, equipment, and other resources. The total loss of the Ukrainian army since the beginning of the great war as a result of deaths and injuries may reach 500 thousand people. Of these, on average, 50-80 thousand were killed; 54 thousand were missing. Russia's losses in the war may amount to about 615 thousand people, of which 115 thousand were killed and 500 thousand were wounded. Ukraine and Russia are already facing a shortage of ammunition and the exhaustion of their troops, against this background, the role of external assistance is becoming critically important.

4. The Russian offensive and the formation of a local, tactical advantage are conditioned, among other things, by the instability and the non-systematic nature of Western aid to Ukraine and the gradual exhaustion of human resources for mobilization. At the same time, Ukraine has become a testing ground for the use of the most advanced military technologies and is today, in fact, a mix of the First, Second, and Third World Wars.

5. Before the inauguration (January 20, 2025) and the presentation of the peace plan of the new US President D. Trump's team, maximum military escalation can be expected. Each side will seek to achieve as much military success as possible and capture more territory to improve their negotiating positions. Russia will probably try to liberate the territory of the Kursk region from Ukrainian troops and may launch a new offensive in the Zaporizhzhia direction. In addition, new cross-border operations aimed at the Bryansk or Kursk regions of the Russian Federation cannot be excluded as a possibility.

6. 2024 becomes the year of a radical change in the political balance in the United States. After four years of Democratic rule, Republicans again occupy the White House and key positions in Congress. As a result of the elections on November 5, D. Trump became the new President of the United States.

7. D. Trump's victory will significantly increase the risks of political turbulence in Ukraine. The US President-elect is taking a course towards a quick end to the war in Ukraine, his position regarding V. Putin's aggression is more flexible than that of his outgoing predecessor J. Biden.

8. Based on the positions already voiced by D. Trump's team, it becomes clear that potential peace agreements may imply: territorial concessions to the Russian Federation, partial lifting of sanctions, and Ukraine's refusal to join NATO. D. Trump, with a high probability, will not provide Ukraine with security guarantees from the United States, and Kyiv, in turn, will not accept any guarantees as reliable without Washington's participation. Ukraine now insists that it is ready to consider a peace agreement only within the framework of security guarantees.

9. With the arrival of Trump, the US may significantly cut or stop military aid to Ukraine. Republicans have repeatedly raised the issue of the need to cut it and audit the financing of Ukraine. Also, D. Trump may shift this burden onto Europe.

10. The Ukrainian government and proponents of continuing the war in the West (including Macron, Great Britain, Republican Party "hawks" and others) are trying to convince D. Trump to abandon proposals to end the war along the current front line. Instead, they are calling for support for the "Zelensky formula" to restore the 1991 borders. One of the arguments in favor of this approach is the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, which is seen as a sign of Moscow's weakening position.

11. At present, both sides of the conflict, Russia and Ukraine, are hoping to convince D. Trump that they are right, trying to "pit" him against an enemy that "does not want peace." The image of the "main problem for a peaceful settlement" is gradually being created for Ukrainian President V. Zelensky: he is firing long-range missiles at the territory of the Russian Federation, "escalating" the situation (D. Trump) and refusing the Christmas truce (Hungarian Prime Minister V. Orban), etc.

12. Ukraine continues to be at the center of a global geopolitical confrontation. Currently, the world is rapidly polarizing into the countries of the Global South and the Western world. This is especially noticeable in the peace talks on Ukraine, which are currently splitting into two large camps: the West (Ukraine, the United States, and allies) and the East (China and the countries of the Global South). The former is in favor of a just peace on Ukraine's terms, while the latter is in favor of a speedy end to the war, resumption of negotiations, cessation of hostilities along the front line, and the lifting or easing of sanctions. Against the backdrop of Russia's isolation, economic, military, political, and technological ties have deepened between, Iran, China, and the DPRK. These states have begun to define common interests, coordinate their rhetoric, and coordinate military and diplomatic activities.

13. The European Union has set a course for deeper integration with NATO. In addition, in response to the invasion, it has granted formal candidate status for membership to Ukraine, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Georgia, opening accession talks with the first three, accepted a formal application for membership from the partially recognized Republic of Kosovo, and initiated the creation of the European Political Community.

14. The election of Donald Trump as US President creates risks of global changes in international relations. The results of the 2024 elections could seriously affect the US shift towards Ukraine and other aspects of international policy. At the global level, D. Trump's team will most likely change the priority of tasks. Instead of the issue of Ukraine, the main issue for the US will now be another more important issue - to reduce the growing influence of China in the world and destroy the emerging alliance of Russia and China. The US will fight with China for such critical technologies as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, quantum computing, etc.

15. At the end of the year, it can be stated that neither the Russian Federation nor Ukraine with its coalition of allies have achieved their key goals in this war. Russia was unable to overthrow the Ukrainian government and create a political regime in Ukraine that is loyal to itself, to carry out a territorial redistribution of the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine – to annex the so-called "Novorossiya" within its historical borders, and to achieve the liquidation of the unipolar world under the leadership of the United States. The United States and its partners were unable to weaken the Russian Federation to the required degree and achieve its destabilization and reorganization. And Ukraine was unable to oust Russia from all occupied territories and restore its borders in 1991.

16. Ukraine remains a fully functional state with relative political stability (but uncertain prospects), enormous military-political and social tensions, and a chronic crisis at the front.

17. Ukraine continues to change in political, economic, military, territorial, demographic, ethnic and religious terms. And this process is still ongoing. Ukraine is gradually ceasing to be a multicultural and agrarian-industrial country with high political competition, turning into a more monocultural and agrarian country headed by one political leader.

18. Changing the political balance in the USA (Ukraine's main ally and donor), the delay in Western aid, the unsuccessful counteroffensive, and the worsening situation at the front, as well as the general prospects of a possible future reduction in funding by allies have weakened the position of Ukrainian President V. Zelensky's team and his party within the country.

19. V. Zelensky is losing his status as an undisputed leader against the backdrop of the growing popularity of other alternative figures, such as former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valeriy Zaluzhny or Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate Kirill Budanov. Society's war fatigue is creating a demand for peace talks and a cessation of hostilities, as well as a reduction in foreign policy support - all of this could subsequently create a complex and unstable political environment within the country, in which traditional methods of governing power may no longer work.

20. The political situation in Ukraine is currently becoming increasingly tense. The pro-presidential mono-majority in Parliament continues to fall apart. There is a significant risk of a split and the creation of several parliamentary groups on its basis.

21. With the victory of D. Trump in the US presidential elections, the likelihood of holding elections in Ukraine has increased. This is due to expectations that the new US administration may put pressure on the Ukrainian leadership to activate the peace process, part of which may be elections or an internal political crisis.

22. On March 31, 2024, the following events were to take place in Ukraine: Presidential elections, but they were not scheduled due to martial law in Ukraine. In particular, in November, the President signed laws for the 13th time on extending martial law and general mobilization for 90 days - from November 10, 2024, to February 7, 2025. Despite the international understanding of the situation, several of Ukraine's Western partners emphasized the importance of restoring the electoral processes as soon as possible.

23. Ukrainian President V. Zelensky and his team are making active efforts to accelerate the process of Ukraine's European integration. This step is due not only to Ukraine's strategic goals of rapprochement with the European Union but also to the need to demonstrate political achievements against the backdrop of a difficult situation at the front and changing public opinion within the country. However, the prospects for further European integration will be determined by the situation at the front and the negotiation process. EU membership may become a bargaining chip for peace agreements.

I. Geopolitics. The situation around Ukraine. Negotiations.

1. Change of political balance in the USA. Democrats yield power to Republicans. Election results and their impact on US foreign policy strategy. Possibility of adjusting sanctions and military aid policy.

2024 - the year of the presidential elections in the United States becomes a year of a radical change in the political balance in the country. After four years of Democrat rule, Republicans again occupy the White House and key positions in Congress.

The US election campaign has been very tense for most of the year, and its results have been difficult to predict since the gap between the main rivals was within a margin of error of 2 to 4%.

In April 2024, the current US President Joe Biden, who was the detached leader of the Democratic Party, announced his intention to run for a second term. His opponent from the Republican Party is former President D. Trump.

On June 27, 2024, J. Biden performed unsuccessfully in a televised debate against Donald Trump, which led to a decline in his support within the Democratic Party and calls for his withdrawal from the election.

On July 15, former President Donald Trump, two days after the assassination attempt on him (July 13), was officially declared the Republican Party's candidate for President of the United States. After that, he chose his potential vice president – Ohio Senator JD Vance. It is known that D. Vance is against arms supplies to Ukraine and is a supporter of a speedy end to the war through negotiations. He also called for linking military and other aid to Ukraine with an end to pressure on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC).

On July 21, 2024, J. Biden announced his intention not to run for a second term, becoming the eighth President in US history to decline re-election 107 days before the election.

Vice President Kamala Harris is the new Democratic nominee. However, a certain split within the Democratic Party has weakened her position, as she failed to create a unified coalition and gain support from the leaders of the governors of the swing states. The lack of a clear election program and new ideas made her candidacy less attractive to voters who were looking for change amid economic instability. Harris also failed to distance herself from Joe Biden and his unpopularity, which also negatively affected her chances.

As a result, Republican candidate D. Trump won the US presidential election on November 5, 2024, receiving 312 electoral votes against Kamala Harris's 226. The inauguration of the new US president, who will govern the country for the next 4 years, will take place on January 20, 2025.

In addition, the US Republican Party will control the Senate and the House of Representatives of the US Congress following the elections, although with an insignificant majority. In the Senate, the Republicans have 53 seats, and the Democrats have 47; in the House of Representatives, the Republicans received 220 seats, and the Democrats - 215. That could create some complications for House Speaker Mike Johnson and new President Donald Trump as they seek to quickly push a broad conservative policy agenda through Congress.

The election of Donald Trump as US President creates risks of global changes in international relations. The results of the 2024 elections could seriously affect the US shift towards Ukraine and other aspects of international policy.

US President-elect D. Trump has repeatedly made it clear that his position regarding V. Putin’s aggression against Ukraine is significantly more flexible than that of his outgoing predecessor J. Biden.

During the election campaign, Trump repeatedly promised to end the war in Ukraine quickly, saying he could reach an agreement within 24 hours. However, he later acknowledged that such a quick resolution to the conflict was unlikely.

Republicans, especially Trump supporters, are actively discussing the need for an audit and cutting funding for Ukraine. The Trump administration could make the Russian-Ukrainian war a European problem: significantly cut or even stop military and financial aid to Ukraine, which would create the risk of internal political instability.

D. Trump may conclude a deal with Russian President V. Putin, which will probably be limited and require mutual concessions. An adjustment of the sanctions policy is possible, a partial easing of sanctions in exchange for certain concessions from the Russian Federation. Ukraine may be forced to refuse to join NATO. The conflict will most likely be stopped along the front line, without Ukraine officially renouncing the occupied territories.

The United States may begin to put pressure on both sides of the conflict to reach a peace agreement.

Pressure will be put on Ukraine through cutting aid and provoking internal political turbulence.

Russia could face increased sanctions, including secondary sanctions against its trading partners, as well as increased military aid to Ukraine.

Overall, there is no guarantee that the peace initiatives of D. Trump’s team will ultimately be successful.

D. Trump's victory will significantly increase the risks of political turbulence in Ukraine. If Ukrainian President V. Zelensky and D. Trump fail to find common ground on peace talks, the new US administration may reorient itself to supporting other political forces in Ukraine. This may accelerate the holding of presidential, parliamentary, and local elections, which will likely take place as early as 2025.

But we must understand that D. Trump will also not allow Ukraine's absolute defeat (its destruction as a state). The unconditional victory of the Russian Federation means the spread of Russian influence to Eastern (Warsaw) and Southern Europe (to the Balkans), which poses a threat to strategic American interests.

 

With the arrival of D. Trump's team to power, one can expect changes in the US foreign policy strategy.

At the global level, D. Trump's team will change the priority of tasks. Instead of the issue of Ukraine, the main issue for the US will now be another more important issue - to reduce the growing influence of the PRC in the world and to destroy the emerging alliance of the Russian Federation and the PRC.

For China, the ideal outcome of the US election would be four more years of caution under a Biden-Harris administration. While President Biden has maintained targeted pressure on Beijing, his emphasis on détente and aversion to escalation would provide predictability for Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

After his victory, D. Trump is ready to aggressively use US power against China, as he did during his first term.

The US will compete with China for critical technologies such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, quantum computing, and more.

In particular, D. Trump announced to introduction of a 10% (or even 20%) tariff on imports from all countries and a 60% duty on imports from China. This could reduce China's GDP by 2%.

D. Trump said that Xi Jinping will not dare to provoke him over Taiwan because the Chinese leader knows that he is "crazy." D. Trump threatens tariffs of up to 200% on Chinese goods if China takes military action.

Xi could retaliate by restricting American companies’ access to Chinese markets, but that could further upset foreign investors already wary of China’s economic trajectory. As a last resort, China could escalate tensions over Taiwan or the South China Sea, but that would risk energizing U.S. alliances and increasing the U.S. military presence in the region.

In Europe, the rise to power of D. Trump's team in the US is mostly perceived with restrained apprehension. The general trend in the reactions of European leaders is the desire to emphasize the importance of the transatlantic partnership and readiness for cooperation. The general trend in the reactions of European leaders is to emphasize the importance of the transatlantic partnership and their willingness to cooperate.

D. Trump is pushing for European NATO member states to increase their defense spending to 3% of GDP, above the current target of 2%. He has threatened that the U.S. will not defend NATO countries that fail to meet their financial obligations to the alliance.

Trump has promised to impose tariffs on all foreign goods entering the United States, which could seriously damage the export-oriented economy of Europe. His tough policy towards China could also force Beijing to redirect trade flows to the European market, which would lead to an influx of cheap goods, further complicating market competition.

In addition, D. Trump criticized the current volume of US aid to Ukraine, calling it excessive, and hinted at a possible reduction or termination of military aid. The new US President may shift most of the financial burden of supporting Ukraine to European countries. According to Goldman Sachs, this will increase the EU's fiscal burden by 0.5% of GDP per year.

All these statements and plans of D. Trump caused great concern among many European and Ukrainian leaders.

On the other hand, Trump's victory is perceived by populist leaders in Central Europe as an opportunity to strengthen their positions and change the EU's course, especially concerning Ukraine and Russia.

European leaders such as Prime Minister Viktor Orban (Hungary), Andrzej Duda (Poland) and Andrej Babis (Czech Republic), Prime Minister of Slovakia R. Fico, Prime Minister of Italy D. Meloni actively congratulated Trump on his victory.

Support from D. Trump could help populist parties in their struggle with traditional EU political structures on issues of migration, sovereignty, economic policy, etc.

In particular, D. Trump's rise to power strengthens the position of Hungarian Prime Minister V. Orban in Europe. Viktor Orban was one of the first to congratulate Trump on his victory, calling it "the greatest comeback in Western political history." Hungary will play the role of one of the key negotiators. Taking into account the fairly good personal relations between V. Orban and D. Trump. Let us recall that this summer, Hungarian Prime Minister V. Orban held major shuttle negotiations in the format of Ukraine-Russia-China-USA. Presumably, through V. Orban, the newly elected US President D. Trump received a roadmap for peace negotiations and a general outline of the positions of the parties (Ukraine, Russia, China).

Good relations with the Italian Prime Minister Meloni and US billionaire Enrique Musk could also influence Italy’s ties with the United States and Donald Trump. Meloni could leverage her relationships with Musk and Trump to secure favorable bilateral deals, such as lower tariffs on Italian exports. A more astute strategy for Meloni would be to use her influence to build a strong European consensus, particularly on defense and technology policy. For example, rather than seeking bilateral deals with the US that could fragment the EU’s negotiating power, Italy could take the lead in shaping the European response to the next administration in Washington. This would include coordinating with France and Germany to forge a cohesive strategy on issues ranging from China to digital sovereignty. Meloni’s nationalist leanings, however, could prevent her from prioritizing European unity over immediate national gains.

 

2. Allied assistance to Ukraine: issues of allied coordination and the impact of war fatigue.

Ukraine is now heavily dependent economically and militarily on aid from its Western partners. To cover its budget deficit, the country needs additional funding from its allies of $3 billion to $5 billion a month, according to the government.

According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy ( IfW Kiel ), as of the end of October 2024, there is a significant gap between the declared and allocated aid to Ukraine. Thus, the EU declared - 241 billion euros, but allocated - 125 billion euros. The United States allocated - 88 billion euros out of its promised - 119 billion euros.

Thus, the total declared aid to Ukraine exceeds 360 billion euros, and the allocated aid amounts to 213 billion euros.

The explanation for the gap between pledged and committed aid from the European side is the significant increase in aid commitments in October, amounting to around €52 billion, of which €35 billion from the EU and its institutions is intended for budget support to the Ukrainian government. The US has pledged €18 billion in budget support.

The European commitments were made possible by new financial instruments (Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loans) secured by the profits from frozen Russian assets. These new assets are primarily available to European donors and can help them compensate for the loss of American funds in the future. The commitment of external donors, especially democratic countries, is often limited by upcoming elections.

Weakening international support.

By the end of 2024, doubts about Ukraine's ability to return territories within the 1991 borders had grown in Washington and Brussels. With Donald Trump's rise to power, the idea of a compromise deal involving the cession of territories began to look more realistic.

Let us recall that the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the summer of 2023 strengthened the position of Ukraine skeptics both in the European Union and in the American political system, especially among Republicans. As a result of partisan disagreements between Republicans and Democrats, the aid package for Ukraine (worth $61 billion) was blocked for about six months in the US Congress. Even though funding was finally adopted in April 2024, negative processes for Ukraine are already underway: changes in public opinion in the West and within the country. The situation on the front cannot be corrected, since the supply of European ammunition is much lower than the levels that the EU promised to provide. After the first deliveries of American packages of weapons, the speed of the Russian troops' advance slowed somewhat, but Ukraine would no longer be able to develop major offensives due to the exhaustion of Ukrainian troops. This situation continued until the end of the year.

In April 2024 The United States presented a report on the use of funds allocated to Ukraine. The White House Budget Office reported that almost 80% of aid to allies (Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan, totaling $95.3 billion) went either to U.S. arms manufacturers to replenish stockpiles and deliver weapons, or to fund Defense Department operations in the United States and abroad (including training Ukrainian soldiers). Almost $57 billion (about 60%) will never leave the United States. Instead, these funds will be invested by American arms manufacturers. About $24.5 billion will go to replenish stockpiles of weapons transferred to Ukraine, Israel, and other countries. Almost $14 billion will go to purchase advanced weapons systems for Ukraine, such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. Another $1.6 billion will go to replenish U.S. military stockpiles located in Israel. Almost $5 billion is intended to expand military production capacity to meet the needs of Ukraine, Israel, and other countries.

The United States is the main donor of financial and military aid to Ukraine, which cannot yet be fully replaced by its European partners. The suspension or termination of American aid could play a decisive role in the war.

At the same time, newly elected US President D. Trump allowed for a reduction in US aid to Ukraine (in an interview with NBC News). Trump also said that Europe should finance Ukraine, not the United States. “ We are putting in $350 billion. And Europe is putting in $100 billion. Why doesn’t Europe contribute as much as we do? This is what needs to happen: Europe should match us. Europe is only contributing a small part. And the war with Russia is more important to Europe than it is to us. It is important to everyone, but it is more important to Europe than it is to us. We have one small thing — an ocean between us. ” — Trump said. Reducing or stopping aid to Ukraine, according to the plan of K. Kellogg (whom Trump nominated for the post of Assistant to the President and Special Representative for Ukraine and Russia) is an instrument of pressure on the Ukrainian leadership to stop the war.

European officials have said they have given Ukraine $120 billion in aid since the war began, $40 billion of which is military aid. The US (Republicans) say they have given at least $150 billion.

The effectiveness of sanctions imposed by allies against the Russian Federation often demonstrates its ineffectiveness and is limited by the existence of workarounds and weak international control. The Russian authorities were able to adapt the economy to several economic restrictions; the fact that such large countries as India and China did not join Western sanctions also played into the hands of the Russian Federation. At the same time, the sanctions have caused significant damage to European countries, especially in the energy sector. At the beginning of 2024, the European Union estimated losses from anti-Russian sanctions at almost $1.5 trillion. The International Energy Agency predicted that Russia's share in international energy trade would decrease from 20% in 2022 to 13% by 2030, losing market share to the United States and the Middle East.

Under pressure from D. Trump, Europe will likely have to take on primary responsibility for Ukraine's defense. However, the lack of consensus on the introduction of peacekeeping forces highlights that European countries do not yet have a clear solution to the Ukraine issue.

One of the ways that Europe could use to maintain support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces is to confiscate Russian assets worth about 250 billion euros frozen in the EU. However, the EU is concerned about the financial consequences of such a step. It is about undermining the trust in the European financial system in third countries, which could cause an outflow of capital from the EU. It would also greatly complicate the subsequent restoration of relations with the Russian Federation.

The US and Europe have not yet reached an agreement on who will support Ukraine financially and militarily and in what way. At present, European elites are making it clear that they are not ready to fully finance the war in Ukraine.

But one way or another, the war in Ukraine in 2024 is increasingly becoming a problem for Europe, gradually disappearing from the main agenda in the United States against the backdrop of the elections. According to Eurobarometer, 50% of Europeans believe that the war in Ukraine is the main challenge facing the EU at present. By comparison, the US no longer considers this issue a priority. According to Quinnipiac University, Americans consider the preservation of democracy in the United States to be the most important issue, with the war between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip in 8th place. While the war in Ukraine is not even in the top eight most pressing issues.

 

The Eurobarometer survey (conducted in April-May 2024) also shows that Europeans continue to support several measures taken in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, with the figures not changing significantly since October 2023.

● Almost nine in ten -87% agree with providing humanitarian support (-2% since October 2023)

● More than eight in ten -83% - agree that the EU should accept refugees (-1% since October 2023).

● 70% agree with providing financial support to Ukraine. (-2% from October 2023).

● 72% - support economic sanctions against Russia (the figure has not changed since October 2023). Against -27%

● Purchases and deliveries of military equipment to Ukraine are supported by -60% (the figure has not changed since October 2023). 36% are against it.

In December, The Guardian, citing YouGov data, published a poll showing that willingness to support Ukraine “until it wins” had fallen sharply across Western Europe. Support for an alternative solution to the conflict – a negotiated end to hostilities, even if that left Russia in control of parts of Ukraine – had increased in all countries. In France, Germany, and Sweden, the proportions of wanting and caring for Ukraine to win have remained stable since early 2023, although they have declined in other countries.

 

Thus, the willingness to support Ukraine until it defeats Russia remains high in Sweden (50%) and Denmark (40%), and in the UK – 36%, but this level has fallen by as much as 14 points compared to the January figures of 57%, 51% and 50%.

Over the same period, the percentage of those who prefer peace through negotiations rose to 55% from 45% in Italy, 46% (38%) in Spain, 43% (35%) in France, and 45% (38%) in Germany, which corresponds to a corresponding decrease in the willingness to support Ukraine until it wins.

Public opinion may further push the leadership of European countries to seek different ways to end the war. Especially in a scenario where the US abandons its active sponsorship role and Europe itself will have to increase military and financial assistance to Ukraine, which will provoke serious economic and political difficulties.

 

As for the mood in the US, according to the Gallup survey (conducted from December 4 to 15, 2024), support for helping Ukraine "for as long as necessary" declined from 66% in August 2022 to 48% by December 2024.

Now 50% of Americans support ending the war quickly, even if it means Ukraine doesn't get all of its land back. That compares to 31% in August 2022. This marks a departure from previous versions when most Americans supported fighting for Ukraine's complete victory.

The recent increase in Americans’ desire to end the war quickly is driven by a 20% increase among Republicans (to 74%) and a 9% increase among Democrats (to 30%) since March — new highs for each group. Meanwhile, independents’ current 47% preference for ending the war quickly is statistically identical to March’s 52%.

 

 

Most Americans believe that neither the Russians nor the Ukrainians are winning the war in Ukraine, including a recent 68%. 22% believe that Russia is winning, and 10% believe that Ukraine is winning.

A slim majority of Americans now say the U.S. is doing too much to help Ukraine (37%), down 4 percentage points from October 2023 (41%), when Ukraine's counteroffensive failed to deliver the expected results.

They believe that support is sufficient - (31%), for comparison in October 2023 it was -33%.

They believe that support for Ukraine is insufficient (30%); in October 2023, 25% thought so.

Supporters of U.S. involvement in the war continue to differ sharply along party lines. Republicans generally favor ending the war quickly and favor less support for Ukraine, while Democrats generally support a long-term commitment and at least maintaining current levels of aid to Ukraine.

There are attempts by Western countries to “write off” the difficult situation at the front for Ukrainian troops to processes that are not connected with Western aid – the low rate of mobilization and corruption of power in Ukraine. At the same time, assistance from allies is not systematic and in sufficient quantity for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to develop an effective counteroffensive.

The absence of any significant progress in Ukraine's accession to NATO is noted. The NATO summit held in Washington (July 9-11) recorded the absence of prospects for Ukraine's accession to the Alliance before the end of the war. The situation can also be perceived as a preliminary negotiating position for resuming dialogue with the Russian Federation, which they are categorically opposed to.

During the year, Ukraine continued to conclude Bilateral Security Agreements, which already have 28 signatories. Among them: Great Britain, Germany, France, Denmark, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Finland, Latvia, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Sweden, Iceland, Norway, Japan, the USA, the EU, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Luxembourg, Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Ireland, Croatia and Greece. So far, 7 out of 32 NATO countries have not signed the agreements: Albania, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, Slovakia, Turkey, Hungary, and Montenegro. In addition to NATO countries, Japan, Ireland, and the EU have signed.

It is worth noting that the agreements do not provide security guarantees to Ukraine under the principle of NATO Article 5. These documents guarantee the provision of long-term support, including military, intelligence sharing economic assistance, etc.

None of the agreements have been ratified by the parliaments of the countries that signed them, which means that problems could arise in the future in connection with a change of power in these countries. These agreements are aimed, first of all, at creating conditions under which Ukraine will be able to defend itself, but there is no talk of joint defense.

The proposed documents do not say that an attack on Ukraine should be interpreted as an attack on countries that guarantee security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity and an automatic declaration of war against them. The proposed security guarantees do not contain automatic mechanisms for providing troops or military assistance to Ukraine in the event of aggression, and nothing is said about the regime for ensuring nuclear safety. In essence, these treaties provide the allies with wide room for maneuvering, allowing them to take certain steps if political conditions allow.

In the period preceding the presidential elections in the United States, the main strategy of the Ukrainian leadership was to maximally involve Western allies in the war against the Russian Federation in military and financial terms, while not allowing any agreements between the West and the Russian Federation behind Ukraine’s back in the future.

In September - October To increase funding and military aid to Ukraine amid a growing budget crisis, President V. Zelensky presented his "Victory Plan" to Western partners and then to the Ukrainian Parliament. As V. Zelensky himself reported, the document spoke about "security, Ukraine's geopolitical position, very strong military support, and that Ukraine itself should decide how to use this or that thing." The plan also contains a clause on economic support for the country.

The plan envisages strengthening Ukraine with its allies to such an extent that Russia would agree to negotiations on Ukrainian terms. According to V. Zelensky, the "Victory Plan" is a bridge for the implementation of the "Peace Formula" (which, in essence, implies the capitulation of the Russian Federation) and will not allow Ukraine to be forced into an unfair peace with the Russian Federation. If everything goes according to the "Victory Plan", the war can be ended by the end of next year.

As a result, none of the points of the "Victory Plan" were officially supported by the White House or European allies (although there was no direct refusal to implement them either). Thus, the US Presidential Administration will postpone all key decisions on Ukraine until the elections are over.

On November 19, 2024, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky presented to the Verkhovna Rada an internal Sustainability Plan, which consists of ten points and focuses on industrial development, the work of the energy sector, military mobilization, and the defense of the country. V. Zelensky emphasized the importance of the unity and cohesion of Ukraine in the conditions of war, as well as the need for the active participation of all segments of society in the restoration of the country.

In terms of communication, the "Resilience Plan" aims to address the growing sense of despair among Ukrainians, fueled by fears about a possible change in U.S. foreign policy after Donald Trump's victory. The plan is meant to show citizens a path to strengthening the country despite potential cuts in U.S. aid.

At the same time, it is also a signal to Western allies and the team of newly elected US President D. Trump that Ukraine does not intend to agree to any peace agreement not on its terms.

3. Initiatives and prospects for peace negotiations. Evaluation of proposals of international mediators (China, Brazil, etc.). The role of the new US President in this process.

Since the beginning of 2024, Western partners have begun to reassess their attitude towards Ukraine, the reason for this was the unsuccessful counteroffensive of the Ukrainian forces in the fall of 2023. The so-called "peace advocates" have become more active; behind the scenes, they are beginning to try to resume the negotiation process. China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Vatican, Brazil, South Africa, and even Hungary are trying to take the role of the main negotiators between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

China and Brazil have proposed their simplified six-point formula for ending the war in Ukraine.

Countries offer:

- stop military actions along the front line

- recognize that dialogue and negotiations are the only possible way out

- advocate for increased humanitarian aid, protection of civilians, and exchange of prisoners of war.

According to the plan:

- it is necessary to counteract the use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons,

- support international cooperation in the fields of energy, finance, trade, etc.

In 2024, a fictitious demonstration of openness to negotiations has become characteristic of Ukraine and its allied countries, and the same tactics can be observed on the part of the Russian Federation. This is done to form the loyalty of the countries of the "Global South", which insist on an immediate cessation of hostilities and the resumption of negotiations.

Also, the main parties to the conflict (both the West and the Russian Federation) periodically test each other for readiness to compromise, which is why certain scenarios for ending the war (Kolokoltsev's plan, etc.) are voiced in the press from time to time.

Previously, as a prerequisite for negotiations, Ukraine demanded the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from the 1991 borders.

Recently, representatives of the Ukrainian government have begun to allow the start of negotiations with the Russian Federation without the return of all territories or the withdrawal of troops to the borders by February 24, 2022).

At the same time, Ukraine does not abandon attempts to consolidate V. Zelensky's "Peace Formula" at the international level, providing its points to the world community "in portions". Thus, in June 2024, at the first Global Peace Summit in Switzerland, only 3 points of V. Zelensky's "Peace Formula" were considered:

- nuclear safety,

- food security,

- exchange of prisoners in the format of "all for all", as well as the return to Ukraine of illegally abducted children from the occupied territories.

Other points of V. Zelensky's "Formula of Peace" (withdrawal of Russian troops, reparations, punishment of war criminals, etc.), which have caused much debate among the countries of the "Global South", have not yet been considered. Which does not mean that Ukraine has agreed to territorial concessions.

In June 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin named the conditions under which, according to him, Moscow would be ready to end the war in Ukraine. To do this, Ukraine must internationally renounce five of its regions (Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson regions), this also includes the neutral status of Ukraine and the lifting of sanctions. After the start of the Kursk operation in August 2024, the Russian Federation stated that the topic of negotiations with Ukraine had lost its relevance.

On November 5, 2024, Republican candidate D. Trump won the US presidential election, which serves as a pretext for reviving the negotiation process. In the short term, this means that under his pressure, negotiations may begin between Russia and Ukraine, which will open up new opportunities for other international mediators, such as Hungary, the Vatican, or Turkey.

To achieve the goals of the negotiations, D. Trump can exert significant pressure on both sides of the conflict. At the same time, the likelihood of success of peace agreements is not guaranteed. There are no points of contact between the main opposing parties (Ukraine and the Russian Federation) to reach constructive agreements.

In general, the strategy of “shuttle diplomacy” of D. Trump’s team probably consists of using the “carrot and stick” method to force Russia, Ukraine, Europe, and China to stop military operations in Ukraine.

- The suppression of the so-called “war supporters” party in Ukraine and Europe will most likely be through cutting funding for Ukraine or completely shifting this function onto the shoulders of European countries.

- For the Russian Federation, the method of coercion into negotiations may be the threat of increasing military aid to Ukraine, new sanctions, and the involvement of China in economic pressure.

- For the sake of alliance in this matter, economic pressure may also be exerted on China. As we remember, D. Trump promised to introduce large duties on Chinese goods - up to 60% (for comparison, on European goods - 10%), perhaps the percentage of these duties will become a subject of bargaining.

The peace proposals of D. Trump's team will probably include two general provisions - territorial concessions in favor of the Russian Federation and removing the issue of Ukraine's membership in NATO from the agenda.

The first plan of K. Kellogg, who was recently nominated by D. Trump for the post of Assistant to the President and Special Representative for Ukraine and Russia. K. Kellogg, together with Fred Fleitz, former head of the National Security Council staff, previously published a plan for settling the war in Ukraine. In the study "America First, Russia, and Ukraine". Probably, this plan will become the basis for the future policy of the Trump Administration regarding the Ukrainian issue.

- It is proposed to use military aid as a tool to encourage Ukraine to participate in negotiations, as well as to put pressure on Russia to achieve a ceasefire and a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

- The United States must continue to arm Ukraine and strengthen its defenses to ensure that Russia cannot advance further and does not attack again after a ceasefire or peace agreement.

- but the US will continue to supply weapons to Ukraine only if Kyiv agrees to negotiations.

- Moscow will also be warned about increasing American aid to Ukraine if Russia refuses to negotiate.

- Ukraine's membership in NATO will be postponed, but Kyiv will receive security guarantees from the United States, including additional arms supplies after the agreement is concluded.

The basic positions of the parties to the peace negotiations on Ukraine are as follows:

1. Position of Ukraine.

Ukraine has not yet officially abandoned the “V. Zelensky Peace Formula”.

But recently, representatives of the Ukrainian government and the President himself in public speeches have begun to allow for negotiations with the Russian Federation and an end to the war by the end of 2024 without the return of all territories.

- V. Zelensky insists on full security guarantees for Ukraine.

- does not agree to the reduction of the army at the request of the Russian Federation

- supports the introduction of peacekeepers into Ukraine if joining or inviting NATO is impossible.

- regarding the start of negotiations in the Office of the President, they already agree to the withdrawal of Russian troops to the borders by February 24, 2022.

- V. Zelensky admits that Ukraine cannot now recapture Crimea and Donbas, but at the same time it does not at all give up its territories.

The Office of the President of Ukraine V. Zelensky insists that he will not accept or listen to any mediators other than those who propose strengthening Ukraine. The Ukrainian leadership is also trying to enter into direct negotiations with D. Trump to convince him.

Ukraine continues to enjoy support and build relations with representatives of the so-called "war party" in Europe. V. Zelensky has already met with French President E. Macron and NATO Secretary General Rutte in Brussels.

2. Supporters of continuing the war in the West (including French President E. Macron, Great Britain, Democrats, and the "hawks" of the US Republican Party).

- are trying to convince Donald Trump to abandon proposals to end the war along the current front lines.

- instead, they call for support for "Zelensky's peace formula" to restore the 1991 borders.

One argument in favor of this approach is the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, which is seen as a sign of Moscow's weakening position.

If Trump does offer peace terms to Moscow :

- Western allies insist on including such demands as Ukraine's accession to NATO.

This would make the agreement unacceptable to the Kremlin and would lead to an escalation of Trump's relations with Russia, which in turn could provoke a further escalation of the war.
3. The conditional party of “peace in the West” (Hungary, the Vatican, Türkiye, etc.), whose services Ukraine refuses:

- they are trying to portray V. Zelensky as the scapegoat in this situation, that he does not want peace.

In particular, Hungarian Prime Minister V. Orban accused V. Zelensky of ignoring the ceasefire proposal. "We will not respond to any provocations. There is a ceasefire proposal on the table. Accept it or reject it. It is your responsibility," the Hungarian Prime Minister wrote. This is how he commented on the words of the Ukrainian President that he "will not allow" V. Orban to mediate in peace talks because he does not influence V. Putin.

What this will lead to depends on the strategy and assessment of D. Trump himself.

If D. Trump believes that V. Zelensky is guilty and that he is sabotaging any agreements, Ukraine will face an increase in crisis phenomena, in particular, the country may receive less aid, and complex political processes may begin within the country.

If D. Trump can somehow be convinced that V. Putin is guilty of continuing the war, then the Ukrainian one will work strategy, and V. Zelensky will win.

2. Position of the Russian Federation.

The Kremlin also wants to convince D. Trump to put pressure on Ukraine and Europe so that they accept the conditions V. Putin voiced in June:

- the demand that Ukraine transfer the entire territory of Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia regions to the Russian Federation, and officially recognize Crimea as Russian.

- neutral status of Ukraine

- lifting of sanctions against the Russian Federation.

In addition to these demands, there are controversial issues regarding several humanitarian issues and Ukraine's membership in NATO and the EU.

In general, the Russian Federation is taking a wait-and-see position and is not verbally refusing to negotiate.

3. The position of the team of the new US President D. Trump.

Judging by what D. Trump himself says, he is currently leaning toward a compromise option that will not fully satisfy either the Ukrainian government, the Western “war party,” or the Kremlin.

- the end of the war along the front line,

- refusal to accept Ukraine into NATO

- possible partial lifting of sanctions against the Russian Federation.

D. Trump promised to present his peace plan for Ukraine after his inauguration (January 20, 2025). Currently, there is an active process of bargaining regarding the format of future negotiations and possible peace agreements.

During a meeting in Paris on December 7, Ukrainian President V. Zelensky proposed to US President-elect Donald Trump to increase support for Ukraine and officially invite it to NATO or deploy Western troops in Ukraine, emphasizing the need to continue military operations until reliable security guarantees are received.

However, upon returning to the United States, D. Trump called for an immediate ceasefire and the start of negotiations and also hinted at a possible reduction in aid to Kyiv after his inauguration.

At the same time, these messages somewhat contrast with the position of the Ukrainian leadership, which is also trying to integrate into the future negotiation process and seeks to maintain room for maneuver and bargaining, primarily with the leadership of NATO, the United States, and Europe. In particular, Ukrainian President V. Zelensky continues to insist on the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO but allows for the possibility that the effect of Article 5 of the Alliance on collective self-defense will not extend to the entire territory of the country.

The Office of the President of Ukraine also stated that Ukraine "may think" about E. Macron's proposal to deploy Western troops as a security guarantee. V. Zelensky also intended to discuss the issue of inviting Ukraine to NATO with the current US President J. Biden. "I am going to call President Biden shortly if he has such an opportunity to talk to me and raise the issue of an invitation to NATO. Because he is now the current US President, and a lot depends on his position. And there is no point in discussing with President Trump something that today, while he is not yet in the White House, does not depend on him," V. Zelensky said.
But J. Biden made it clear that Ukraine would not receive any invitation to the Alliance before his departure.

V. Zelensky made it clear to D. Trump that he did not want to "rush" to end the war.

"Trump knows about my desire not to rush anywhere to the detriment of Ukraine. The country has been fighting for its sovereignty for a long time. No matter how many presidents or prime ministers want to declare an end to the war, we are not going to simply give in and renounce our independence," the Ukrainian President said in an interview with Le Parisien magazine.

According to him, there is a "danger" in "freezing" the war and quickly reaching agreements with Russia. "We must put Putin in his place," he added.

V. Zelensky also said that D. Trump does not yet have access to all the necessary information about the war, in particular, to intelligence data, the Pentagon, and diplomatic channels. "When he is there (in the White House, - Ed.), we will be able to speak the same language, with the same level of information," the Ukrainian president said. Recall that Trump previously said that he already receives weekly reports from intelligence agencies and departments on the situation in Ukraine. On this basis, he stated that the losses of the Ukrainian Armed Forces are higher than officially declared.

Earlier, the Russian Federation commented on D. Trump's statement calling for an immediate ceasefire. Russian Presidential Press Secretary D. Peskov said that the Kremlin "carefully studied Trump's statement on the settlement in Ukraine." At the same time, he accused the Ukrainian authorities of unwillingness to negotiate. "To enter a peaceful trajectory, Zelensky only needs to lift the ban on negotiations with the Russian Federation and instruct to return to dialogue based on "Istanbul," Peskov said. Recall that earlier, Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov, in an interview with Tucker Carlson, a former Fox News host, voiced the main conditions of the peace agreements. He confirmed V. Putin's demand that Ukraine withdraw its troops from the four regions that Russia annexed in September 2022 and abandon its desire to join NATO. Also, any peace agreement must guarantee the rights of the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine.

Putin's press secretary did not elaborate on whether the Russian Federation will now insist on Ukraine's complete transfer of 4 regions (Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Lugansk regions) or limit itself to stopping military operations along the front line.

Since Russian troops are now conducting a successful offensive at the front, the Russian Federation is also not interested in freezing the war and believes that it can achieve its goals by military means.

The possible failure of the negotiation process initiated by D. Trump practically means a new escalation of the war and its continuation in the coming years.

Commentary by the Director of the Ukrainian Institute of Politics Ruslan Bortnik :

Ruslan Bortnik notes that Donald Trump's intentions to quickly end the war are facing significant obstacles. According to him, Ukraine's key allies, such as France and Great Britain, which the Ukrainian leadership is guided by, are taking a hard line. This alliance is in favor of continuing the war until complete victory is achieved. "France and Britain, which Zelensky is guided by, which modern Ukraine is guided by, this alliance is in favor of war to a victorious end over Russia, is against any search for compromises with Russia that could be interpreted as a victory on its part. And Trump, sensing this resistance, said several very interesting things," notes R. Bortnik.

In particular, D. Trump declared the need for an immediate cessation of hostilities, calling what was happening "madness", and noted the significant human losses in Ukraine - 400 thousand soldiers and even more civilians. At the same time, he emphasized that "now is the time to act". This call, according to the expert, can be addressed both to V. Zelensky, in the context of the initiative for a peaceful settlement, this fits into the model of D. Trump and K. Kellogg, and to another "Vladimir", which gave rise to some speculation in the media.

Trump's position on China is also interesting. Despite his anti-Chinese rhetoric, Trump expressed a desire to involve Beijing in resolving the conflict, he said that "China can help." According to R. Bortnik, this may be expressed in China's pressure on Russia to cease fire, as well as in financial support for the restoration of Ukraine. Thus, Trump is trying to involve China in the settlement process, offering it the role of mediator and partner.

R. Bortnik points to a serious paradox: both sides of the conflict, Ukraine and Russia, today unanimously reject the idea of freezing the war, declaring their intention to continue the fight until their goals are achieved. In this context, Trump’s invitation to China to participate in the conflict settlement is a unique step that runs counter to the current approaches of Kyiv and Moscow, which underlines the difficulty of reaching a compromise.

4. The impact of other global and regional conflicts on the situation in Ukraine

Even though Ukraine continues to be at the center of global geopolitical confrontation, other conflicts unfolding in various regions of the world are increasingly beginning to distract the attention of its main allies, which significantly affects the scale and timing of international support for Ukraine.

Many factors are now capable of radically changing the course of events in Ukraine: in the US – the unpredictability of Donald Trump’s policies; in the Middle East – the escalation of the conflict between Iran and Israel; in Europe – the growing popularity of right-wing parties skeptical about helping Ukraine.

All these conflicts are part of one global confrontation, where there is approximately the same set of global forces and main players (the USA and its allies, China, Russia, and its other allies). The dispersion of American resources, in particular, on Israel had negative consequences for the provision of assistance to Ukraine.

1. Middle East: conflict between Israel and Iran.

For a year now, Israel has been waging a war in the Gaza Strip against the terrorist organization Hamas, which attacked it on October 7, 2023. In its fight against Israel, Hamas supports the Palestinian militants with the Hezbollah movement, which effectively controls much of Lebanon and shells Israel from the south of the country. In turn, both Hezbollah and Yemen's Houthi rebels, who attack merchant ships in the Red Sea, are supported by Iran.

The situation in the Middle East could become "completely unpredictable" after Iran launched a massive missile attack on Israel on October 1, 2024. The United States, Israel's most important ally, has promised to support Israel to achieve "severe consequences" for the Iranian regime.

Trump's team is discussing potential preemptive strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities in light of recent developments in the Middle East, including the fall of the Assad regime and Israel's actions against Hezbollah and Hamas. Options for strengthening the US military presence in the region, including additional troops, aircraft, and ships, as well as the use of military threats and sanctions are reportedly being considered. At the same time, Israel is currently not at all interested in de-escalation and sees the current situation as an opportunity to decisively weaken Iran and change the state of affairs in the Middle East.

2. Indo-Pacific: Taiwan and China.

Growing tensions around Taiwan, China's increased military presence in the South China Sea, and pressure on neighboring countries are creating a new geopolitical hotbed. The United States and its allies in the region (Japan, South Korea, Australia) are concentrating their efforts on containing China, diverting their attention from the European theater of military operations.

China's support for Russia in the Ukrainian conflict is growing as part of its competition with the West. China remains the key beneficiary of the conflict. The war has distracted the United States, strengthening Beijing's position. Russia is becoming weaker under China's influence, but it remains a reliable partner. However, North Korea's intervention and possible involvement of South Korea could escalate into a regional crisis affecting China's interests.

3. Africa: rebellions and the growing role of Russia.

The partial distraction of Western countries to stabilizing the situation in Africa. Coups in Niger, Sudan, and other countries have attracted the attention of Europe and the United States. Russia is increasing its influence in Africa through the presence of private military companies there, gaining access to resources and diplomatic support. Economic resources received by Russia from African countries can be directed to continue the war.

The conflict in Mali has become a proxy war between Russia and Ukraine. Russia uses the Wagner PMC to strengthen its influence in the region, while Ukraine tries to undermine Russia by supporting local groups. In late July 2024, fighting in the Tin-Zouatin area on the Malian-Algerian border left a significant number of Wagner PMC fighters dead. On August 4, a few days after the Tuareg attack, the Malian military junta announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Ukraine. On August 7, neighboring Niger did the same, accusing Kyiv of supporting "terrorist groups." The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, in turn, tried to disavow the representative of its military intelligence, stating that no evidence of Kyiv's involvement in the incident in Mali was provided.

4. Overthrow of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria.

On December 8, 2024, the Bashar al-Assad regime was overthrown in Syria. The Assad regime began to collapse during the offensive of the Syrian opposition, which began on November 27. The offensive culminated in the fall of the capital, Damascus, and the flight of Assad from the country; he and his family received asylum in the Russian Federation. Despite statements that the Russian Federation "lost interest" in this conflict against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, it looks like one of the biggest geopolitical failures of V. Putin during his time in power. This gives the so-called "war supporters" camp from among Ukraine's Western allies a reason to claim that the Russian Federation is losing, it is weakened and there is no point in reaching an agreement with it.

5. South Caucasus: Escalation between Armenia and Azerbaijan

The situation in the South Caucasus also remains fragile. The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has led to a change in the balance of power in the region. In 2023, Azerbaijan took complete control of Nagorno-Karabakh. The president of the unrecognized “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (Artsakh)” Samvel Shahramanyan signed a “decree” according to which the “republic” ceased to exist as of January 1, 2024. In April 2024, the long-awaited border delimitation process began between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The interests of different geopolitical players are also intertwined in this region. Having played the Armenian card, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the Russian Federation will most likely try to transfer this experience to Ukrainian realities. For the Russian Federation, both the war in Nagorno-Karabakh and in Ukraine are a continuation of the same geopolitical doctrine. Iran, which is against the attempt on the territorial integrity of Armenia. But to what extent it will be ready to intervene militarily in the situation is not yet clear. Iran is pursuing its interests here. In particular, the border regions of Iran are populated by the Azerbaijani ethnic group. In addition, it has numerous conflicts and competition with Turkey, as well as with Syria. Therefore, Iran does not want to get a hostile Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance on its border instead of a friendly Armenian state.

 

Allies' diminished focus on the war in Ukraine: Ukraine's main sponsors, such as the US and the EU, are forced to reallocate their resources and attention between multiple global crises.

Russia uses Middle East conflicts as a way to strengthen its diplomatic and military support. Moscow uses the West's distraction to other regions to strengthen its position in the war, economic recovery, and alliances. Strengthening ties between Russia, Iran, Syria, and DPRK. Iran transfers drones to Russia for use on the Ukrainian front.

Growing dependence on Europe: The reduction in US aid under Trump could increase the burden on European countries, leading to a slower response and a reduction in the scale of support.

Internal instability in Europe. The rise of far-right parties in countries such as Hungary, Italy, and Germany puts pressure on EU unity on aid to Ukraine. Problems in consolidating EU decisions and slowing procedures for providing financial and military support.

5. The process of European integration of Ukraine.

Ukrainian President V. Zelensky and his team are making active efforts to accelerate the process of Ukraine's European integration. This step is due not only to Ukraine's strategic goals of rapprochement with the European Union but also to the need to demonstrate political achievements against the backdrop of a difficult situation at the front and changing public opinion within the country.

In the context of a protracted conflict and economic difficulties, European integration is becoming an important tool for strengthening domestic and foreign support for the Ukrainian government. Rapid progress in this direction can be perceived as a significant victory, capable of increasing trust in the government and relatively stabilizing the socio-political situation.

Back in November 2023, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen noted that Ukraine had completed 90% of the reforms that the EU expected of it to move forward on the path to joining the European Union.

On 25 June 2024, the European Union formally launched accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, noting significant progress by these countries in meeting the requirements for starting negotiations.

Hungary ( since 1 July, holds the presidency of the EU Council) put forward a list of 11 demands to Ukraine (which should guarantee the rights of the Hungarian national minority in Ukraine) to unblock Kyiv's further path to joining the European Union. For its part, Ukraine promised to fulfill these demands and continue bilateral consultations with Hungary in this direction.

In autumn 2024, the European Commission recommended promptly starting negotiations with Ukraine, stressing that the first clusters could be opened by early 2025. Priority areas include the rule of law, the fight against corruption, improving the judicial system, protecting the rights of national minorities, and public administration reforms.

The EU accession negotiation process consists of 35 chapters, grouped into 6 clusters. These clusters cover key areas: the rule of law, the economy, human rights, the environment, trade, and others. Each cluster is opened in stages, depending on the candidate country's progress in meeting the relevant requirements.

President Volodymyr Zelensky noted that Ukraine is at a historically high level of rapprochement with the European Union and NATO. According to him, the necessary architecture for the negotiation process with the EU has already been created. He expressed the desire to make the process of Ukraine's accession to the EU as fast as possible to become an example for other candidate countries.

Ukraine plans to open two clusters during Poland's presidency of the EU Council (from January 1 to June 30, 2025). Poland's presidency of the EU in itself will not speed up the process of Ukraine's European integration. This issue now needs to be considered in the context of current geopolitical events, the change in the political balance in the United States, D. Trump's rise to power, and the formation of his relations with the EU. In addition, in general, Poland's position may be additionally supported by the interests of larger players, such as Great Britain, France, and the United States.

The issue of Ukraine's accession to the EU may become part of the bargaining in possible negotiations in the context of ending the Ukrainian-Russian war, which will intensify in January 2025 after the inauguration of the new US President D. Trump.

The prospects for further European integration will be decisively influenced by the situation at the front. If the military actions in Ukraine are not stopped and the Russian Federation continues its offensive, the issue of Ukrainian European integration may be removed from the agenda due to the increasing military and political instability.

If the conflict is frozen in the process of peace negotiations, then Ukraine will be able to take advantage of the European decision to start negotiations and eventually join the EU. In particular, if the new US Presidential Administration and the Office of the President of Ukraine reach a certain consensus on peace agreements, D. Trump can put pressure on the European Union to speed up the process of Ukraine's accession to the EU (which in turn can act as a factor of compensation for possible concessions from Ukraine).

There are still several difficult stages of negotiations ahead, the most difficult of which will be the formation of the agreement on Ukraine's membership in the EU - conflict issues of agriculture, transport, guaranteeing property, specific human rights, regional and tax policy, energy, internal affairs, and justice; and the ratification of the Agreement by individual EU countries with blackmail of Ukraine.

Among current EU members, the prospect of Ukraine joining is a matter of great debate due to the significant increase in costs. If Ukraine joins the EU, the subsidies it will be entitled to will be significant. Also, not everyone currently supports attempts to revise the EU's basic treaty, abandon the unanimous voting rule, and adopt the "majority rule" instead (such a change would significantly increase Ukraine's chances of becoming an EU member).

Under current rules, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), admitting agricultural giant Ukraine into the EU would put a huge strain on the EU budget. If Ukraine were included in the CAP subsidy system, it would be entitled to receive around €16 billion annually on its own. And that’s before any adjustments are made for additional investment to bring Ukrainian agriculture up to EU standards.

Integrating a country with significant economic problems could prove extremely costly, potentially straining EU finances and diverting funds from poorer member states such as Poland, Greece, Hungary, and Romania, which have so far been net recipients of funds.

The additional burden of additional subsidies for Ukraine could turn countries like Poland and Hungary from net beneficiaries of the EU budget into net contributors, as they would shoulder their share of the costs. Given that any major decision in the EU is taken unanimously, it is currently very unlikely that net beneficiaries would seek a situation (promoting Ukraine's accession to the EU) where they would have to forgo EU funds.

Therefore, the issue of Ukraine's European integration should now be considered in the context of current geopolitical events, the change in the political balance in the United States, the rise to power of D. Trump, and the formation of his relations with the EU. The issue of Ukraine's accession to the EU may become part of the bargaining in possible negotiations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which will intensify in January 2025 after D. Trump's inauguration. Also, the further prospects for Ukraine's European integration will be associated with the offer or non-offer of military action.

6. "Ukraine's cutting board": acceleration of the formation of warring military alliances - "Ukrainian+" and "Russian+". Risks of scaling the war into a new World War and nuclear escalation.

During the war, an international coalition led by the United States and Western allies formed around Ukraine - more than 60 countries in the world provided military assistance to Ukraine to varying degrees in the Rammstein+ format.

On the other hand, a coalition of more ardent allies has also formed around Russia – Belarus, North Korea, Iran, and more situational ones – such as China, India, and other countries of the Global South.

Ideological struggle. Both sides formulate the conflict through global ideological frameworks. Ukraine positions itself as a fighter not only for its sovereignty and statehood but also for the foundations of world democracy. Russia declares a "crusade" against US hegemony and the injustice of the "collective West".

At the global level (including due to the war in Ukraine), the world is polarizing into the countries of the Global South and the Western world. This is especially noticeable in the process of peace negotiations on Ukraine, which is currently splitting into two large camps - the West (Ukraine, the USA, and allies) and the East (China and the countries of the Global South). The former is in favor of a fair peace on Ukraine's terms, while the latter is in favor of a speedy end to the war, resumption of negotiations, a halt to hostilities along the front line, and the lifting or easing of sanctions. The position that the Russian Federation is currently insisting on for the countries of the Global South is too radical.

The European Union has set a course for deeper integration with NATO. In addition, in response to the invasion, it has granted formal candidate status to Ukraine, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Georgia, opening accession talks with the first three, accepted a formal membership application from the partially recognized Republic of Kosovo, and initiated the creation of the European Political Community.

In the wake of Russia's invasion and isolation, closer economic, military, political, and technological ties have deepened between Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea. These states have begun to identify common interests, align their rhetoric, and coordinate military and diplomatic activities.

In 2024, the war is gradually internationalizing. This is because the war in Ukraine is increasingly turning into a "war of attrition," where duration and resources are not in Ukraine's favor. Ukraine and Russia are already facing a shortage of ammunition and the exhaustion of their troops, so the role of external assistance is increasing and becoming critical. Russia and Ukraine are experiencing difficulties with mobilization, relying on foreign assistance, including the recruitment of fighters from other countries.

Overall, as long as the war in Ukraine continues, there is a possibility that new players will be drawn into the fighting, which only complicates the prospects for its end.

While direct involvement of foreign troops remains limited, the conflict has become a space for testing "red lines". Russia has brought in troops from North Korea, as well as mercenaries from Cuba, Syria, Serbia, Nepal, and elsewhere. Ukraine has used Western weapons to strike Russian targets, including the Black Sea Fleet, and has launched an operation in Russia’s Kursk region. Representatives of the so-called “war party” in Europe (mainly Britain and France) are increasingly raising the question of the need for Western troops in Ukraine.

In November 2024, Russia ratified a "comprehensive strategic partnership" agreement with the DPRK, marking a new stage in their military cooperation. As part of these agreements, North Korean troops were deployed to support Russian operations in the war against Ukraine, including in the Kursk region. The presence of North Korean troops has caused significant resonance in the international arena, exacerbating criticism of the Russian Federation for escalating the conflict and attracting external allies. Ukraine is using this factor to pressure its Western allies to become more involved in the war on its side. In particular, this is permission to use long-range Western weapons on Russian territory or the involvement and presence of troops from Western allies in Ukraine.

In 2024, in the context of the war between Russia and Ukraine, nuclear escalation manifested itself in a new way. Russian officials continue to periodically threaten to use nuclear weapons because some Western elites are raising the stakes by increasing aid to Ukraine and expanding the boundaries of the permissible use of new long-range weapons against Russia and others.

In November 2024, US President Joe Biden, at the end of his presidential term, did what Ukraine had been seeking for several months: he lifted the ban on ATACMS ballistic missile strikes on Russian territory. France and the UK followed the US example and permitted SCALP/Storm Shadow strikes. In addition, J. Biden is handing over anti-personnel mines banned by conventions to Ukraine. Ukraine is a signatory to the convention on their complete ban since such mines cause enormous damage to the civilian population. J. Biden's decision caused a storm of criticism from the team of the newly elected US President D. Trump. There they viewed this decision as an attempt by the Biden administration to unleash a third world war and prevent D. Trump from quickly ending the conflict in Ukraine.

The reasons for this decision by US President J. Biden may be the following:

The political and strategic reason is an attempt to leave D. Trump with a legacy that he will not be able to start peace talks with Russian President V. Putin or at least will not be able to conclude a quick peace. This creates the preconditions for an even greater escalation, in which Russia can respond symmetrically militarily, which could also harm the West or make negotiations and a quick resolution of the conflict, as well as ending the war in principle, impossible. Since a quick end to the war would be a reproach to the Biden administration and their allies in Europe. If D. Trump's attempts to establish peace in Ukraine ultimately fail, this will practically mean a new escalation of the war and its continuation in the coming years.

Tactically – the military reason is the deterioration of the situation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Kursk region, which may lead to the loss of the Kursk salient by Ukraine in the coming weeks. Accordingly, it will not be able to use this argument in future negotiations with the new US President D. Trump, and the Russian Federation. At the same time, permission for missile strikes on the territory of the Russian Federation will help Ukraine maintain its defense, but this will not bring a significant turning point in the war.

In response to the White House's actions in 2024, Russia amended its nuclear doctrine, which was approved by decree of President V. Putin on November 19, 2024.

Main changes and their significance:

Expanding the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons: In the new version of the doctrine, Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons not only in the event of a direct nuclear threat but also in the event of a “critical threat” to the country’s sovereignty, even if the aggression is carried out using conventional weapons.

Joint Attack: The doctrine now considers aggression by any non-nuclear state supported by a nuclear state to be a joint attack on Russia. This means that any action against Russia supported by nuclear powers could result in a nuclear response.

Conditions for the use of nuclear weapons: New conditions for the use of nuclear weapons have been established, including "reliable information about a massive launch" of air attack weapons such as aircraft and drones.

Mention of Belarus: The new doctrine also mentions Belarus, which implies the extension of nuclear deterrence to its territory in the context of the Union State.

Ambiguity of wording: Some wording in the updated doctrine remains vague, which may be part of a deterrence strategy that creates uncertainty for potential adversaries.

Strengthening Nuclear Deterrence: The updates highlight Russia's intention to use nuclear weapons as a deterrent against any threat, increasing the risk of conflict escalation.

Undermining the Non-Proliferation Regime: These changes could undermine the international nuclear non-proliferation regime established by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) because they expand the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons.

Overall, the situation creates the preconditions for further escalation of the war, given that the Russian Federation is beginning to respond militarily.

On November 21, 2024, Russia struck the city of Dnepr with an intercontinental ballistic missile designed for use with nuclear warheads.

There is uncertainty regarding the exact type of missile used in the city of Dnepr. The Ukrainian side claims to have used an intercontinental ballistic missile ICBM and is already asking the Americans for air defense systems capable of shooting down such missiles. At the same time, Russia claims to have used the latest medium-range ballistic missile MRBM "Oreshnik".

The essence of these disagreements boils down to the fact that if we admit that an ICBM was used against the city of Dnieper, this means (as in the case of the Korean troops) a significant increase in the level of escalation of the conflict and at the international level Ukraine can demand new military equipment and air defense systems from its allies to protect against these missiles. At the same time, the statement of the Russian Federation about the use of the Oreshnik IRBM is already a political message for D. Trump. Probably, this is how the Russian Federation reminds D. Trump of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) (signed in December 1987 between the USSR and the USA). During his first term, D. Trump announced his intention to withdraw from the INF Treaty, accusing Russia of violating the terms of the treaty and in August 2019 the INF Treaty was terminated. Against the background of the upcoming negotiation processes, the Russian leadership is probably hinting to the new White House Administration about the need to return to this issue. Future discussions of a new INF Treaty format treaty may also take place with the participation of the PRC.

After the Russian Federation struck the city of Dnepr, V. Putin stated that such strikes could be repeated if the shelling of Russian territory by Western long-range missiles continued.

The use of a ballistic missile (intended for nuclear war) was a key escalation in Russia's war against Ukraine and indicates Russia's intention to raise the stakes in nuclear blackmail against the West after the adoption of a new nuclear doctrine.

In any case, the situation has taken another step forward on the escalation ladder towards a direct clash between Russia and some NATO countries. Which could mean the start of a new world war in the worst-case scenario. The situation will now largely depend on the actions of the new US President's Administration and its ability to negotiate and reach agreements. Until D. Trump (who promises to end the war in Ukraine) takes office, the Russian Federation will most likely refrain from radical actions.

II. The course of the war. Military operations.

2024 was the year of the gradual transfer of the initiative to the Russian army, despite significant losses. In 2024, the advance of Russian troops accelerated significantly, as Russian forces captured more than 3,000 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory between January 1 and December 26, 2024. For comparison, for the whole of 2023, the front changed by only 200 square kilometers in favor of Ukrainian troops. Thus, according to the Deep State map, if on January 1, 2024, Russian troops controlled 108.51 thousand square kilometers of Ukrainian territory, then on December 26 they already controlled 111.79 square kilometers.

The main successes of the Russian Federation are concentrated in the Donetsk direction, where it managed to capture strategically important cities ( Maryinka, Avdiivka, Ugledar ). Ukrainian troops are going on the defensive in most areas of the front. At the same time, the Ukrainian army demonstrated the ability to conduct local counterattacks and developed an offensive on the territory of the Russian Federation in the Kursk region, but was unable to consolidate the success. The situation remains tense, and both sides are preparing for further escalation of the conflict.

1. (Early 2024 – August 2024) – this is a strategic dead end and a certain stability at the front.

Back in October 2023, the Russian army launched a massive offensive on Avdiivka. The goal was to encircle the city and destroy the defensive fortifications of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

January 2024: After months of heavy fighting, Russian troops captured the ruins of Maryinka, a town that was vital as a staging area for further operations in the southwest.

February 2024: The end of the occupation of Avdiivka (the city's defense lasted 2 years) was a major tactical success for the Russian Federation. After this, Russian troops began to advance westward, forming the Ocheretyno salient. This salient made it possible to create a base for attacks towards Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk, a key transport hub for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

In February, the battles for the settlement of Krynky on the left bank of the Dnieper in the Kherson region ended.

February–May 2024 :

• On the Kurakhovsky front, Russian troops began operations to create “pincers”, trying to encircle the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

• Attacks on the towns of Toretsk and Chasov Yar intensified, where the Ukrainian defense suffered significant losses but held its positions.

May 2024: Russian troops launched an offensive in the northern part of the Kharkiv region, crossed the border into the Belgorod region, and began advancing towards Vovchansk and Lyptsi. However, after several weeks of fighting, this offensive stalled due to insufficient coordination and the strengthening of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' defenses.

In the southern direction (Zaporizhia, Kherson), Russian troops captured the settlement of Robotyne, which the Ukrainian Armed Forces recaptured during the summer counteroffensive in 2023.

2. (August 2024 – present) is the transition of a tactical military initiative to the Russian army.

The Russian Federation is realizing its numerical and resource advantages. In 2024, the advance of Russian troops accelerated significantly.

The second half of the year was marked by an intensification of military operations.

In the Donetsk direction, taking advantage of their personnel superiority and new reserves, the RF Army achieved significant success. In August, the city of Krasnogorivka was captured, and in October, an important fortified area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the city of Vuhledar (in the south of Donetsk Oblast).

Novogrodivka, Ukrainsk, Selidove, and Girnyak were also captured.

These settlements were of strategic importance for controlling transport routes and supply lines for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Kupyansk direction: The Russian army intensified assault operations near the Oskil River, seeking to split the Ukrainian Armed Forces into Kupyansk and Borovsk. However, a counterattack by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Dvuricha area allowed them to temporarily regain control over Novomlynsk. This slowed down the Russian advance in this area.

Southern direction (Zaporizhzhia, Kherson):

The Russian Federation continues to strike at infrastructure but does not conduct active offensive actions. However, the likelihood of a large-scale offensive in the Gulyaipole area remains.

3. Ukrainian offensive on Russian territories.

From March 12 to March 21, 2024, volunteer military units operating on the side of Ukraine carried out a raid into the Belgorod and Kursk regions on the territory of the Russian Federation. In the area of the Russian-Ukrainian border, the following were attacked: the settlement of Tetkino in the Kursk region, the town of Grayvoron, the settlement of Zhuravlevka, Lozovaya Rudka, in the Belgorod region, etc.

On the Ukrainian side, the participation of the following formations was confirmed: the Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK), Freedom of Russia Legion, and the Siberian Battalion (RDK and Freedom of Russia Legion conducted the previous raid in June 2023). They carried out a series of operations against several Russian facilities, including military warehouses, logistics points, and substations, which caused power outages in border areas. The attack took place during the Russian presidential elections (March 15-17), the main goal of the raid was to demonstrate the vulnerabilities of the Russian border areas, and the inability of the Russian government to ensure their security, thereby undermining the morale of Russian troops and increasing anti-Putin sentiments within the Russian Federation.

In August 2024, Ukraine launched a surprise operation in the Kursk region. Ukraine concentrated its most trained and combat-ready units in the Kursk direction, which allowed it to achieve significant success in a short period in advancing deep into Russian territory. In particular, 52 settlements were occupied, including the strategically important city of Sudzha. At the peak of the offensive in August 2024, the Ukrainian army controlled 823 square kilometers of the Kursk region, with another 416 square kilometers in the gray zone.

The reasons for the Kursk operation were primarily political – a kind of game-changer, an attempt to change the negative political and information trend. The Kursk region was attacked to raise morale inside Ukraine, strengthen the position of President V. Zelensky's team, and fundamentally change the views on the war among Western allies, to receive additional political, financial, and military assistance. The Kursk operation emphasized Ukraine's capabilities to operate on Russian territory. The attack on the Kursk region was supposed to demonstrate to the allies that the Kremlin's threats and its "red lines" were a bluff, which, according to the plan of the Ukrainian leadership, should contribute to the easing of restrictions on the use of supplied weapons (we are talking about the ability to strike on the territory of the Russian Federation). The Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, A. Syrsky, gave the following justification for the start of the fighting in the Kursk region: "We needed to disrupt the offensive on Kharkiv and Sumy. The Russians left no choice. This allowed us to reduce the Russian offensive potential and reduce the number of attacks in these areas."

However, the concentration of significant resources and elite units in one direction led to the weakening of the Ukrainian Armed Forces positions in other areas of the front. This created the preconditions for active offensive actions by the Russian army in the Donetsk and Kupyansk regions.

 

Map of military operations in Ukraine (01.01. 2024).

The Russian Federation occupied 108.51 thousand sq. km.

(Infographics by the Institute for the Study of War)

 

Map of military operations in Ukraine (12/26/2024).

The Russian Federation occupied 111.79 thousand square kilometers.

(Infographics by the Institute for the Study of War)

 

Map of military operations in the Kursk region (12/26/2024)

Ukraine controlled 482 sq. km, grey zone – 156 sq. km.
(infographics Institute for the Study of War)

At present, the situation at the front for the Ukrainian Armed Forces remains difficult. The dynamics of the advance of Russian troops in December has somewhat slowed down compared to the autumn due to weather conditions and the concentration of Russian reserves in the Kursk region and in the Zaporizhzhia direction (where a new offensive by the Russian Federation may be prepared).

However, local successes of Russian troops are observed. The Russian Armed Forces continue to advance in the Donetsk region. There are battles for the cities of Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, and Kurakhove (most of the city is under Russian control). The assaults aimed at encircling the Pokrovsk-Mirnograd agglomeration are also intensifying. There is a possibility that Kurakhove and Pokrovsk may be completely lost by January 20, 2025. According to the Ukrainian military, Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are already trying to get into Pokrovsk from the south.

In the direction of the Kurakhove in Donetsk Oblast, Russian troops eventually eliminated the "Uspenovsky pocket" south of Kurakhove, capturing Trudove and Uspenivka. The village of Konstantinopolske has also been captured. The Russians have consolidated their positions in the Zelenivka area, expanding their flanks there – this is less than two kilometers from the cut-off point of the road from Kurakhove to Zaporizhzhia. Around the city of Kurakhove itself, assault actions are continuously being carried out from the settlement of Stari Terny in the direction of the Shevchenko-Andriivka section, additional pressure is also present from the settlement of Sontsivka, which the Russians recently occupied completely.

Pokrovsk direction. The Ukrainian Armed Forces carried out counterattacks in the area of the settlement of Shevchenko (which was captured by the Russian Federation) to stabilize the front line south of Pokrovsk. Problems on this section of the front were caused by the refusal of some fighters to take up combat positions. At the moment, the combat contact line has been stabilized. But the settlements of Novotroitske and Pushkine were captured. The distance to the southern outskirts of the city was reduced to one and a half kilometers.

The city of Velyka Novosyolka is half-encircled. The recent capture of the settlement of Blagodatne by Russian troops allowed them to align their eastern flank to the settlement of Razdolne. Even though Ukrainian forces managed to dislodge the enemy from the settlement of Novy Komar, through which the last logistical artery to Velyka Novosyolka passes, Russian troops continued to attack this point in separate groups. The capture of the settlements of Makarivka and Blagodatne creates a threat of Russian troops entering the city from the southern direction.

Potentially, the loss of the city of Velyka Novosilka threatens the continuation of the Russian offensive into the Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporizhia regions through the area of the city of Gulyaipole and further into the area of the city of Orikhovo and further on to the city of Zaporizhia itself.

In the area of the city of Toretsk, there are serious problems for the defending units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Convenient positions for defense are gradually being exhausted, which creates risks for holding the front.

In the Kupyansk direction in the Kharkiv region, In the area of the river Oskil (near the settlement of Kruglyakivka) the division of the Ukrainian group into Kupyansk and Borova is expanding. At the same time, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have driven the Russian Armed Forces from their bridgehead on the right bank of the river Oskil north of the settlement of Dvurechna, liberating the settlement of Novomlynsk. At the same time, the Russians again broke through to the left-bank part of the city of Kupyansk. Only at the end of November was it reported that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had completed the cleansing of the city of Kupyansk after the previous similar breakthrough by the Russians.

In the Kursk region; Russian troops have pushed the Ukrainian Armed Forces beyond the border of the Glushkove district, advanced south of the town of Sudzha in the direction of the settlement of Makhnivka, and also north in the area of the settlement of Russkoye Porechnoe. Frequent attacks have allowed Russia to retake almost half of the territory it seized in August. Ukraine now controls 482 square kilometers in the Kursk region, with another 156 remaining in the gray zone. At the peak of its offensive in the Kursk region in August 2024, Ukraine controlled 823 square kilometers, with 416 square kilometers in the gray zone.

The Russian leadership will seek to displace Ukrainian troops from the Kursk bridgehead before the inauguration of the new US President D. Trump (January 20, 2025), for its part, Ukraine will hold this bridgehead to have a certain "Trump card" in the upcoming negotiations. To achieve its goals, the Russian Federation may plan an even larger offensive in other areas of the front. Ukrainian troops will seek to hold the Kursk bridgehead until the inauguration of the new US President or even until the end of the active phase of hostilities to strengthen Ukraine's position in the upcoming negotiations, which the new White House Administration plans to organize soon.

Ukraine continues to suffer from a growing shortage of people, money, and material resources. For the team of Ukrainian President V. Zelensky, maintaining Western military aid is a critical issue. Ukraine is currently largely dependent on Western allies and, unless it receives additional large packages of military aid, it will be difficult for Ukrainian troops to even defend themselves. A new Ukrainian counteroffensive is only possible if the allies allocate new large funding in the amount of several tens of billions of dollars, which looks unrealistic with the coming to power of the Trump Administration in the United States.

The lack of sufficient funding and arms supplies from the allies will weaken Ukraine and it will be increasingly difficult to maintain defense in the Donbass. The loss of the salient in the Kurakhove region (Donetsk region) is possible shortly.

Also, the territories occupied by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kursk region may become a zone that will be extremely difficult to hold, which will increase the pressure in the northern direction. The Russian Federation may also try to conduct new large-scale offensives in the Zaporizhzhya and Donetsk regions, and later in the Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk regions.

The difficult situation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces at the front is caused, among other things, by internal problems – the problem is not so much in the number of soldiers, but in their low motivation and discipline, as well as the low quality of command and widespread corruption.

Corruption in the Ukrainian Armed Forces is one of the key reasons for the lack of troops at the front. According to the military, it is possible to avoid mobilization or "secure" a position in the rear for up to $5,000. This applies to both ordinary citizens and military personnel who are formally listed at the front, but in fact, remain in the rear. The morale of soldiers, who often face a lack of motivation and discipline, remains a serious problem. The level of trust in the command is declining against the backdrop of corruption and ineffective management.

Casualties of the parties. In December 2024, Ukrainian President V. Zelensky said that since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, 43,000 Ukrainian soldiers and another 370,000 were wounded. The independent estimates put the numbers even higher: The Economist recently estimated Ukraine's losses at 60,000-100,000 killed and about 400,000 wounded. According to US President-elect D. Trump, Ukraine has lost about -400,000 (probably meaning killed and wounded).

It is believed that Russia's losses are much higher. Regarding Russian losses, D. Trump voiced three options: 500 thousand, then 600 thousand, and the latest version is 700 thousand. According to Pentagon reports, Russia spent $200 billion on the war in Ukraine.

In general, the total loss of the Ukrainian army since the beginning of the great war as a result of death and injury may reach 500 thousand people. Of these, on average, 50-80 thousand were killed; 54 thousand were missing. Russia's losses in the war, according to Western sources, are about 615 thousand people, of which 115 thousand were killed and 500 thousand were wounded.

The initial invasion force of the Russian troops was - 100,000 people, now it has increased to 520,000 people, and by the end of 2024 it is planned to reach 690,000 people. For equipment and technology, the ratio is 1:2 or 1:3 for the worst of the Russian Federation. Since 2022, the number of Russian tanks has "doubled" - from 1,700 to 3,500. The number of artillery systems has increased threefold, and the number of armored personnel carriers has increased from 4,500 to 8,900 units.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces have successfully used long-range kamikaze drones to strike deep into Russia. They have struck “about 200 critical infrastructure facilities.” All were related to “military logistics,” and included factories, fuel depots, and ammunition depots. Drone and missile strikes have destroyed radars and missile launchers.

Naval drones have sunk about a third of Russia's Black Sea navy, and the Kremlin has been forced to "completely withdraw" from the Crimean port of Sevastopol after a series of Ukrainian attacks.

III. Domestic policy.

1. The decline in the authorities' popularity and the formation of an alternative center of political trust, parliamentary crisis, personnel rotations, and the situation around the elections.

Changing political balance in the USA (Ukraine's main ally and donor), the delay in Western aid, the unsuccessful counteroffensive, and the worsening situation at the front, as well as the general prospects of a possible future reduction in funding by allies have weakened the position of Ukrainian President V. Zelensky's team and his party within the country.

V. Zelensky is losing his status as an undisputed leader against the backdrop of the growing popularity of other alternative figures, such as former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valeriy Zaluzhny or Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate Kirill Budanov. Society's war fatigue is creating a demand for peace talks and a cessation of hostilities, as well as a reduction in foreign policy support - all of this could subsequently create a complex and unstable political environment within the country, in which traditional methods of governing power may no longer work.

At the moment, the Ukrainian political system is balancing on the factors of war; unconditional political and financial support of Ukraine's allies - primarily the US and the EU; high (albeit declining) electoral rating of the President of Ukraine V. Zelensky; the absence of an exit strategy / alternative public strategy (exit strategy) understandable to Ukrainian society among the main political competitors of the government; informational, political and forceful suppression of dissent in Ukraine: maintaining information mobilization. The political situation in Ukraine remains dynamic, and the emergence of new political forces could significantly affect the balance of power ahead of potential elections.

With the new Donald Trump administration in power in the United States, focused on ending the fighting as quickly as possible, American policy toward Ukraine is likely to undergo significant changes.

There is a certain political mistrust between the teams of the President of Ukraine V. Zelensky and the team of D. Trump, which has been formed since 2020. During the last presidential election campaign in the United States, when the Ukrainian government promised to investigate the corruption of Joe Biden's son Hunter Biden (the Burisma case), but did not keep its promise, Trump's team considered it a betrayal. After that, Volodymyr Zelensky and his team unconditionally and all the time supported the Democrats and the "White House". Which even resulted in a scandal during Volodymyr Zelensky's last visit to the United States (at the end of September this year), when the Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives M. Johnson officially demanded that the Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States Oksana Markarova (not yet fired) be fired from her post due to interference in the American elections, and Zelensky himself was criticized by Trump for a trip to a Pennsylvania weapons plant in Joe Biden's hometown. These crises have not been overcome.

And if the coordination of peace initiatives with V. Zelensky completely fails, D. Trump may move to open confrontation with the Ukrainian leadership or to support the Ukrainian opposition.

So, with the arrival of D. Trump, the following may become stronger: the former commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (and now the Ambassador of Ukraine to the UK V. Zaluzhny, the team of the former President P. Poroshenko and Y. Tymoshenko, and also, to some extent, the fragments of the former Opposition Platform – For Life, etc. may be revived. If V. Zelensky and D. Trump do not find a common language, elections (presidential, parliamentary, and local) in Ukraine may take place as early as 2025.

The opposition is already becoming more active and an active political struggle is unfolding. The likelihood of new political projects appearing is increasing, such as the potential party of the former commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valeriy Zaluzhny (or the party of volunteers and veterans), which could seriously compete with V. Zelensky's team. In addition to V. Zaluzhny, former President Petro Poroshenko and the leader of "Batkivshchyna" Yulia Tymoshenko remain potential strong political figures, but unlike V. Zaluzhny, they have high anti-ratings.

As preparations for the resumption of peace talks initiated by the US President-elect begin, Ukraine is entering a new phase of political and social transformation. This process is driven by the increasingly complex situation at the front, declining support for the Ukrainian government both from Western allies seeking to coordinate their actions with the new US administration, and from Ukrainian society tired of the protracted conflict.

Parliamentary crisis.

The pro-presidential mono-majority in Parliament continues to fall apart. A significant risk of a split and the creation of several parliamentary groups on its basis is being formed. Thus, 232 people remain in the coalition. And this is even though among them 2 are on the run, and another 6-7 are under suspicion of NABU, and two are not attending the parliamentary sessions at all. (a minimum number of 226 is required to pass laws), but given that many deputies of the mono-majority are informally in internal opposition (offended by the President or his office) and are often absent or do not participate in meetings, the process of passing laws is significantly complicated. The President already has to take into account or negotiate with representatives of individual centers of influence in Parliament (such as D. Arakhamia, ex-President P. Poroshenko, etc.). As we have written many times before, the process of the President losing power will begin precisely with the loss of his influence on Parliament.

Indicative in this regard was the situation around MP Yuriy Boyko. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (on December 19) excluded him from the Committee on Human Rights, Deoccupation and Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories at the second attempt. The decision was supported by 258 MPs, of which 182 votes were provided by the Servant of the People faction. Earlier, a statement by Y. Boyko caused a wide resonance. In it, he criticized the language and religious policies of the authorities, which caused a strong reaction in parliament and society. Against the backdrop of this statement, an attempt was made to deprive all MPs of the former Opposition Platform - For Life faction, transformed into the Platform for Life and Peace, of their mandates, but this initiative was also not supported in parliament. Boyko's statement and subsequent parliamentary proceedings became an additional field for debate in society about the admissibility and limits of criticism of the official language and religious policies. The situation around Yuriy Boyko and the Opposition Platform - For Life looks like an artificially provoked political crisis with many interested parties and potentially significant consequences.

Right-wing forces, in particular Petro Poroshenko, are using this situation to destroy the informal coalition of the Servant of the People and the remnants of the Opposition Platform – For Life in Parliament. This coalition allows for the majority of decisions to be made since the Servant of the People was able to vote for only 14% of initiatives on its own. A stable majority in the Verkhovna Rada is the key to control over the government and security forces. Without it, Volodymyr Zelensky risks losing the levers of power. To do this, it is necessary to do everything possible to promote the split of the informal coalition of the presidential mono-majority and the fragments of the former Opposition Platform – For Life in Parliament – the Platform for Life and Peace, which will lead to the Servant of the People becoming dysfunctional in Parliament.

And then, to pass the law that the authorities need, the "Servants of the People" will now have to negotiate not with Y. Boyko (which was much easier), but with P. Poroshenko. The most important areas for V. Zelensky's team are being attacked - the parliamentary coalition, social stability, support, and financing of Western allies.

Personnel rotations.

At the beginning of September, a significant personnel reformatting of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine took place. Among the main reasons for personnel rotations in the Government, one can note:

1. The need for additional funding from allies against the backdrop of an increasing budget deficit. At the end of July 2024, Ukraine's budget deficit was UAH 500 billion (USD 12 billion) (the amount announced by Finance Minister S. Marchenko). The updated composition of the Government must not only find additional external and internal funding but also begin urgent preparation of the draft State Budget of Ukraine for 2025.

To do this, it is necessary to fully form the government and renew its composition, taking into account that 6 Ministries were managed by “acting Ministers”, some government figures lost the trust of the President or the head of his Office, Western partners, or simply exhausted their potential in office.

The new personnel changes are expected to improve cost control and involve the establishment of new management balances.

2. In addition, the reboot of the Cabinet of Ministers by the authorities is also an attempt to remove the accumulated negativity in society. The current composition of the Government has high anti-ratings, which harm the President's reputation. There is a need to allow society to "let off steam" by reformatting the Government and although would partially restore trust in him in this way. The Ukrainian government is not trusted by about 73% of citizens (data from the Razumkov Center, June 2024)

3. This will also allow for savings and a reduction in the number of ministries (which the IMF insists on). As a result of the government renewal, the staff may be reduced by 30%-50%.

The following will retain their positions in the Cabinet of Ministers: Prime Minister D. Shmyhal and Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers O. Nemchinov; First Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine – Minister of Economy Y. Svyrydenko (she could take the position of the new Prime Minister); Vice Prime Minister for Innovation, Education, Science and Technology, Minister of Digital Transformation M. Fedorov; Minister of Finance S. Marchenko; Minister of Defense R. Umerov; Minister of Health V. Lyashko; Minister of Energy G. Galushchenko; Minister of Social Policy Oksana Zholnovych; Head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Ihor Klymenko; Minister of Education Oksen Lisovyi.

Dismissed: Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Reintegration of the Occupied Territories I. Vereshchuk (it is preliminary known that she may be appointed Deputy Head of the OP), Minister of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources R. Strilets, Minister of Justice of Ukraine D. Malyuska, Head of the State Property Fund V. Koval (will become Minister of Agrarian Policy), Minister of Foreign Affairs D. Kuleba. Answering the question about D. Kuleba's future position, President of Ukraine V. Zelensky noted that he cannot yet accurately predict "what duties this or that minister will perform." However, the Western press reports that D. Kuleba "will focus on strengthening Ukraine's relations with NATO" (he may become Ukraine's ambassador to NATO).

New appointments: A. Sybiha (former deputy head of the MFA) became the head of the MFA. Deputy head of the Office of the President O. Kuleba was appointed Vice Prime Minister for the Restoration of Ukraine, and Minister for the Development of Communities and Territories. O. Stefanishyna took the post of Minister of Justice and Vice Prime Minister for European Integration. A. Kamyshin (Minister for Strategic Industries) will become Deputy Head of the Office of the President instead of the recently dismissed R. Shurma. Herman Smetanin was appointed to the post of A. Kamyshin. Svetlana Grinchuk has been appointed the new Minister of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources of Ukraine. Natalia Kalmykova was appointed Minister of Veterans Affairs. Nikolai Tochitsky has been appointed the new Minister of Culture and Strategic Communications. Matvey Bedny as Minister of Youth and Sports (was acting). V. Koval was appointed to the post of Minister of Agrarian Policy.

As a result, the resignation of D. Shmyhal and his possible replacement by the First Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine – Minister of Economy Y. Svyrydenko has not yet taken place. The dismissal of Prime Minister D. Shmyhal was allegedly attempted to be prevented by D. Arakhamia, with whom, according to the media, he has a trusting cooperation.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed presidential decrees on September 8 appointing Iryna Vereshchuk and Viktor Nikita (former head of the Zakarpattia Regional Military Administration) as deputy heads of the Presidential Office and appointing Oleksandr Kamyshin and Dmytro Lytvyn as his advisers. Kamyshin will advise Zelensky on strategic issues, and Lytvyn will advise him on communications.

These personnel changes once again allow the President and the head of the OP to increase their influence on the Government.

At the same time, the situation around the reformatting of the Government also becomes an indicator that it is often difficult for V. Zelensky's team to achieve the necessary decisions in Parliament, which is further evidenced by the failure of the votes on September 4 to dismiss individual ministers. Subsequently, none of the personnel appointments of new ministers received the required number of votes (226) from the pro-government party "Servant of the People" (the maximum number of votes from "SP" was 194). That is, the personnel rotations of the Cabinet of Ministers took place mainly due to the additional support of other parliamentary factions and groups.

Thus, to make the necessary decisions, the President already has to take into account the opinions or negotiate with representatives of individual centers of influence in Parliament, such as the head of the faction D. Arakhamia, the “Pavlyuk group” or the opposition.

On May 9, the Parliament decided to dismiss Oleksandr Kubrakov from the post of Vice Prime Minister for the Restoration of Ukraine – Minister of Development of Communities, Territories and Infrastructure of Ukraine. Also dismissed was Mykola Solsky, Minister of Agrarian Policy of Ukraine, whom NABU suspects in the seizure of state land for UAH 291 million and an attempt to seize land for UAH 190 million. The formal trigger for the resignation of A. Kubrakov was the fact that several energy facilities were disabled after shelling, for the strengthening of which the Ministry of Infrastructure was responsible, and for which large sums of money were allocated. But the main reason for his resignation is A. Kubrakov’s attempts to build connections with Western partners bypassing the Office of the President. In general, Western embassies did not support the resignation of A. Kubrakov, but did not interfere with it in any way. A year ago, A. Kubrakov was considered one of the key figures and candidates for the post of the new Prime Minister of the country.

In June, M. Nayem wrote a letter of resignation from the post of the head of the State Agency for Restoration and Development of Infrastructure (we wrote about this resignation in the issue of May 31-June 3). M. Nayem reported that the reason for this was systemic obstacles in his work. The decision to resign was made against the backdrop of the scandal with the disrupted business trip of M. Nayem to Berlin for an international conference on June 11-12, when Prime Minister D. Shmyhal refused to grant Nayem a business trip for the specified dates and summoned him to the government for a report. The dismissal of M. Nayem, as well as A. Kubrakov (from the post of Vice Prime Minister for Restoration of Ukraine) is largely because both built their communication with Western partners, bypassing the Office of the President.

In October, the Verkhovna Rada dismissed Prosecutor General A. Kostin. He resigned due to a scandal with the registration of disability by prosecutors. The scandal surrounding the "disability" of prosecutors also served as a pretext for the reorganization of Medical and Social Expert Commissions (MSEC) across the country and the redistribution of corrupt financial flows in this area (we wrote about this in more detail in the previous issue). The probable successor of A. Kostin will be the prosecutor, head of the Kyiv regional military administration - R. Kravchenko, "his" figure for the Office of the President or the Head of the Odesa regional state administration O. Kiper (against whom pro-Western activists are speaking out).

Oleksiy Khomenko, the first deputy of the current former Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin, has become the acting Prosecutor General of Ukraine.

Rumors have been circulating in the media about the possible resignation of Kirill Budanov from the post of head of the military intelligence of Ukraine (GUR). They allegedly plan to appoint in his place the deputy head of the SBU Oleksandr Poklad, who, according to sources, is considered more loyal to the country's leadership. This process, according to media sources, is being lobbied by the head of the Presidential Office (OP) Andriy Yermak, and Oleksandr Poklad himself. Attempts to dismiss Budanov may intensify in December when the political situation becomes especially tense.

At the same time, the SBU denied the possible appointment of A. Poklad as the head of the GUR called rumors about this "a Russian special services leak." Of all the versions of personnel reshuffles in the intelligence leadership, this one is the most confrontational about Budanov personally. The head of the GUR had previously made it clear that A. Poklad could be involved in the murder of the intelligence officer, banker Kireyev, in March 2022 in Kyiv. In early 2023, K. Budanov gave several interviews in the media, where he developed this topic in detail. Although a criminal case was opened for Kireyev's murder, nothing is known about the results of the investigation. The Bankova Street said that the murder occurred due to a breakdown in communication between various Ukrainian special services in the first weeks of the war.

Let us recall that rumors about the possible resignation of K. Budanov were spreading back in early autumn. K. Budanov was allegedly going to be fired due to his conflict with A. Yermak. Although the information about personnel changes in the GUR is officially denied, it is obvious that there is a certain tension between the Office of the President and individual representatives of the military leadership, which may further negatively affect the strategic stability of Ukraine.

According to some opinion polls, K. Budanov has surpassed Volodymyr Zelensky in the population's trust ratings and now occupies the second position in the rating after the former commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Zaluzhny. V. Zelensky occupies only the third place. Such a situation creates a political threat for the President's team, especially on the eve of possible elections next year, which may be necessary given the negotiations initiated by D. Trump.

 

The difficult situation at the front is causing a wave of criticism against the top military leadership of Ukraine, which, in turn, is causing personnel changes.

In 2024, significant personnel changes took place in the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Change of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - on February 8, 2024, President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Oleksandr Syrsky as the new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, replacing Valeriy Zaluzhny. This is how the line was drawn under the long-term confrontation between the team of President V. Zelensky and the team of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine V. Zaluzhny.

The reasons for the commander-in-chief's resignation were, among other things, political. V. Zaluzhny, with a position inconsistent with the OP, became an inconvenient figure for Bankova. He demonstrates high independence. His popularity and influence at the moment are comparable to those of the president in Ukraine.

Dismissing V. Zaluzhny from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was required to restore the monopoly power of V. Zelensky. But the Presidential Office was interested in the option of the Commander-in-Chief himself resigning (at his own will) (which did not happen), or even better, going abroad as an ambassador. This would mean excluding V. Zaluzhny from the country's political system and eliminating him as a political competitor.

Later, V. Zaluzhny will agree to the OP's proposal and become ambassador to Great Britain, but at the same time, he will retain his popularity and will continue to be the main competitor for the authorities if he enters the election campaign.

Instead of V. Zaluzhny, A. Syrsky becomes the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – he has vast military experience and political loyalty to the OP; he is the leader of successful operations near Kyiv in 2022 and the offensive in the Kharkiv region in 2022; as well as the failed counteroffensive near Bakhmut at the end of 2023. A. Syrsky initiated an audit among the brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to assess the situation with reserves, rotations, and training of personnel.

In February and March 2024, including appointments and dismissals of operational command commanders and other key positions.

On February 9, 2024, a new Chief of the General Staff was appointed - Major General Anatoly Bargilevich, who previously headed the Territorial Defense Forces. This appointment was also part of the changes initiated by A. Syrsky.

It should be noted that A. Syrsky, unlike V. Zaluzhny, has no political ambitions, which is very important for the Office of the President. At the same time, A. Syrsky's position remains unstable, he, in essence, has taken on himself all the negativity from the failures of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the front after V. Zaluzhny, and his actions are often subject to public criticism, in particular, from deputy M. Bezugla.

In the media space, M. Bezugla has often been associated with the Presidential Office and its head A. Yermak. Allegedly, she acted as a tool or "spearhead" for the OP to criticize guilty or inconvenient generals. The country's political leadership believes that they have done everything possible for the military - they have provided Western aid, started the mobilization process (while the law on demobilization has not been adopted), and are demanding positive results from the military: at the very least, stopping the Russian offensive.

Under criticism from M. Bezuglya, the following were deprived of their positions: former commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine V. Zaluzhny, former commander of the Air Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine N. Oleshchuk, former commander of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) Yu. Sodol and others.

On September 19, MP M. Bezuglaya was dismissed from the post of Deputy of the Defense Committee (she remains on the committee) and transferred to the Foreign Policy Committee. M. Bezuglaya herself wrote a resignation letter. It is noteworthy that the day before, the head of the Servant of the People faction, David Arakhamia, introduced a draft resolution with the same proposals. Even earlier, MP M. Bezugla left the Servant of the People faction also "of her own free will." In general, M. Bezuglaya's transfer to the Foreign Policy Committee should somewhat reduce her influence on the military environment, but she periodically continues to criticize the country's military leadership.

Despite M. Bezugla's criticism, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces A. Syrsky remains in his post for now. But he may be replaced in the event of a major collapse of the front in the Pokrovsk area or the loss of the Kursk bridgehead, to channel all the negativity and failures at the front onto him.

By the end of the year, the failures of the Ukrainian Armed Forces at the front provoked a new wave of personnel changes among the military leadership.

On November 29, 2024, Mykhailo Drapatiy was appointed the new Commander of the Ground Forces instead of Oleksandr Pavlyuk (he received his position in February 2024), and Oleg Apostol became Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

In December, after the Ukrainian Armed Forces were encircled in the "bag" near Kurakhove, as well as after the recent breakthrough of the Russian Federation to Pokrovsk, the commander in these areas was replaced. Oleksandr Tarnavsky was appointed commander of the Donetsk Operational-Tactical Command (OTC) instead of General Oleksandr Lutsenko. Oleksandr Tarnavsky previously led the Ukrainian counteroffensive on the Southern Front in 2023, which, despite ambitious plans, failed. His new appointment may be an attempt to revive the situation in the Donetsk direction, but success will depend on resources and operational planning. Such a replacement, among other things, may indicate a shortage of highly qualified military personnel, who simply cannot be replaced.

The issue of holding elections.

On March 31, 2024, Ukraine was supposed to host Presidential elections, but they were not scheduled due to martial law in Ukraine. In particular, in November, the President signed laws for the 13th time on extending martial law and general mobilization for 90 days - from November 10, 2024, to February 7, 2025.

Despite the international understanding of the situation, several of Ukraine's Western partners have stressed the importance of restoring electoral processes as soon as possible.

In the Russian Federation, elections were held from March 15 to 17, 2024, as a result of which V. Putin was re-elected for another term. Against this background, the failure to hold presidential elections in Ukraine is becoming an information trigger there.

Thus, in May 2024, Russian President V. Putin stated that, according to the Constitution of Ukraine, the extension of powers is supposedly provided for the Parliament, but not for the President of Ukraine. In particular, he stated: "The first thing that is visible and what is reported to me is that the Constitution of Ukraine provides for the extension of powers, but only for the parliament, and nothing is said about the extension of powers of the President of Ukraine." V. Putin added that "according to a preliminary assessment, the only legitimate authority in Ukraine remains the parliament and the speaker of the Verkhovna Rada."

The official response of the Central Election Commission (CEC) states that there will be no problems with the legitimacy of President V. Zelensky after May 20 (when his constitutional term expires). We have already written about it in more detail here. In particular, we note that the answer to the question about the terms of office of the President is spelled out in Articles 103, and 108 of the Constitution of Ukraine. Article 103 states that "the President of Ukraine is elected by citizens of Ukraine based on general, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot for a term of five years." Instead, Article 108 states that "the President of Ukraine exercises his powers until the newly elected President of Ukraine takes office."

The Law of Ukraine "On the Legal Regime of Martial Law" determines that during the period of martial law, the powers of the President of Ukraine cannot be terminated (part one of Article 10), and in the event of the expiration of the term of office of the President of Ukraine during the period of martial law, his powers continue until the newly elected President of Ukraine, elected after the lifting of martial law, takes office," the CEC response says.

The Central Electoral Commission also points to the continuity of power enshrined in the Constitution. This concerns the Verkhovna Rada, the President, and the Cabinet of Ministers (this is stated in Part 4 of Article 83, Part 1 of Article 90, Part 1 of Article 108, Part 4 of Article 115 of the Constitution of Ukraine).

Thus, the President exercises his powers until his successor takes office. At the same time, there is no reason to talk about the possible transfer of presidential functions to the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada. The CEC refers to Articles 106 and 108 of the Constitution of Ukraine. In particular, the only grounds for early termination of the President's powers (such cases are spelled out in Part 2 of Article 108 of the Constitution) are: resignation, inability to exercise powers due to health reasons, impeachment, and death (none of these conditions currently exist).

At the same time, Part 2 of Article 106 of the Constitution of Ukraine states that the President of Ukraine cannot transfer his powers to other persons or bodies (including the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, in the absence of the above-mentioned conditions of Part 2 of Article 108 of the Constitution).

The political situation in Ukraine is currently becoming increasingly tense. With Donald Trump's victory in the US presidential election on November 5, 2024, the likelihood of holding elections in Ukraine has increased. This is due to expectations that the new US administration may put pressure on the Ukrainian leadership to intensify the peace process, which may include elections or an internal political crisis.

It will take 4 to 6 months to prepare for the elections in Ukraine after the lifting of martial law and changes to legislation. Holding elections faces physical and logistical challenges. In the context of global population transformation, alternative forms of voting are being discussed, such as voting by mail or through a digital platform. However, these options are mistrusted and take time to implement. Since the war began, millions of Ukrainians have left the country or moved inside Ukraine. The Central Election Commission must update the data on displaced and emigrated citizens, which will require enormous resources. Only 1 in 16 Ukrainians abroad is registered with the consulate, making organizing voting abroad an extremely difficult task.

The main rivals of the current government in the elections could be: Valeriy Zaluzhny, former commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and current Ukrainian ambassador to the UK. V. Zaluzhny has become one of the most popular candidates. According to sociological research, he leads in trust ratings, significantly ahead of the current President Volodymyr Zelensky. His possible party may take leading positions in the new Parliament. The confrontation between V. Zaluzhny and V. Zelensky promises to become the main intrigue of the upcoming elections.

Kirill Budanov, head of the Main Intelligence Directorate Kirill Budanov also enjoys high support. His figure is dangerous for the current government, as he is seen as a potential leader of the "military party".

Yulia Tymoshenko, the leader of Batkivshchyna, is actively preparing for the elections, offering coalitions and places on the lists to other politicians. Despite the decline of her electoral base, Tymoshenko remains an important player, especially in regional politics.

Petro Poroshenko, the former president, maintains a stable rating of about 10%, concentrating on his traditional electorate. He is no longer considered a serious contender for the presidency but could play a significant role in a future coalition.

New political forces: new projects such as "military parties" or volunteer movements are appearing in the political field. These forces may become key in the formation of the future coalition.

Perhaps, the strengthening of the role of regional leaders, and the formation of a new political force uniting popular mayors of large cities. Here the main competition for the authorities may be the mayor of Kiev V. Klitschko.

The President of Ukraine V. Zelensky himself will most likely head another political project in the potential elections, dumping a significant portion of the accumulated negativity and toxicity on the "Servants of the People". As a result of the long war, an element of fatigue and a demand for new justice are already forming in society. A series of corruption scandals, including those involving deputies from the "Servants of the People", periodically appearing in the information field, acts as a trigger for irritation in society, reduces the fighting spirit of the army and, accordingly, negatively affects the ability to wage war.

3. Mobilization. Society's reaction to mobilization processes.

In April 2024, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Regarding Certain Issues of Military Service, Mobilization, and Military Registration" (No. 10449). The law entered into force on May 18, 2024.

The main provisions of the law:

Clarification of military registration data: All conscripts, persons liable for military service, and reservists are required to update their data within 60 days from the date the law comes into force at territorial recruitment centers (TRC), administrative service centers (ASC), or through an electronic account.

Reduction of the conscription age: The conscription age has been reduced from 27 to 25 years.

Basic military service: Basic military service is introduced for five months in peacetime and three months in wartime. Basic military training is planned to be introduced in universities in 2025.

Electronic accounts: Citizens can voluntarily register electronic accounts of conscripts, military personnel, or reservists. However, the provision on serving summonses through these accounts was excluded from the final version of the law.

Restrictions for Men Abroad: Men aged 18 to 60 who are abroad are required to update their military registration data. Otherwise, they may be denied consular services, including issuing a passport.

Responsibility for evading mobilization: Measures of influence are provided for citizens who do not fulfill their military conscription obligations, including possible restrictions on the right to drive vehicles.

Failure to show up at the Territorial Recruitment Center (TRC):

If a citizen fails to show up in response to a summons or other mandatory calls without good reason, he may be fined from 1,700 to 3,400 hryvnia.

Refusal to comply with a mobilization order:

Evasion of mobilization under martial law is classified as a criminal offense and is punishable under Article 336 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine: Imprisonment for a term of 3 to 5 years.

Additional liability measures:

Restriction of the right to drive vehicles: applies to citizens who evade mobilization obligations. Information about such citizens may be transferred to the police, which suspends their right to drive vehicles.

The possibility of temporarily restricting the right to travel abroad for men aged 18 to 60 who have not updated their data in the TRC.

Fines for organizations: Employers who fail to register their employees as liable for military service may be fined from 5,100 to 8,500 hryvnia.

For using fake medical documents:

If a citizen uses false certificates to evade mobilization, this is classified as a criminal offense with a possible punishment of up to 3 years in prison.

After the law came into force, the pace of mobilization in Ukraine changed somewhat but did not cover the needs of the front. In the summer of 2024, about 35 thousand people were mobilized monthly, but in the fall this figure dropped to 20 thousand, almost to the May level, which did not allow for the formation of reserves and barely covered combat losses. As of October 2024, 1 million 50 thousand citizens were mobilized, and in the next three months, it is planned to call up more than 160 thousand more to complete the military units to 85%. The decrease in the pace of mobilization is due to various factors, including public perception of mobilization processes and economic conditions.

The outgoing Administration of US President J. Biden called on Ukraine to lower the age of mobilization to 18 years. In turn, the Office of the President of Ukraine to do this. In particular, V. Zelensky does not rule out the option when the peace initiatives of the newly elected US President D. Trump will lead to a cessation of hostilities, and this, in turn, will inevitably launch electoral processes in the country. The refusal to lower the mobilization age will be a kind of bonus to voters for the current government.

In general, the mobilization processes became an element of the hidden conflict between society and the state, between the passionate, the military, and non-servicemen. After the introduction of the law on mobilization a conflict arises between different social groups, especially between those who actively participate in military operations (military personnel and passionate volunteers) and those who avoid mobilization. The perception of mobilization as a repressive mechanism, especially among civilians, increases the distance between society and the state. The indefinite mobilization of military personnel, the growth of cases of evasion, including corruption, the use of medical certificates, flight abroad, forced mobilization, and the participation of untrained reservists in military operations (which posed a threat not only to their lives but also to the success of operations) - all this, especially in the context of a deteriorating economy, created divisions in society and increased mutual distrust.

4. Transformation of public opinion.

In 2024, the government's ratings continue to decline. The electoral situation for the government team and "Servant of the People" has now become more complicated even compared to the pre-war period, when the pro-presidential party had to alternately fight for leadership with such parties as the Opposition Platform - For Life (V. Medvedchuk) and "European Solidarity" (P. Poroshenko). And at present, the SP party already has to face serious competition from both established and new political forces.

If at the beginning of the war, the trust rating of President V. Zelensky exceeded 90%, the Parliament and the Government were trusted by 40% and 60% respectively. Now the trust rating of the President has dropped to -59%, and the majority of citizens no longer trust the Parliament and the Government - over 70%. 48% of Ukrainians have a negative attitude towards the Servant of the People party (at the beginning of the war, about 40% had a positive attitude).

May 2024. A survey by the National Democratic Institute and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, conducted in May 2024, showed:

48% of Ukrainians surveyed have a negative attitude towards the Servant of the People party, 32% are neutral, and 13% are positive.

The All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna" negatively; 31% expressed a neutral attitude and 9% - a positive one.

71% of Ukrainians have a negative attitude towards the banned Opposition Platform – For Life; 19% are neutral; and 4% are positive.

The conditional party of S. Pritula, 34% – has a neutral attitude; positive and negative attitudes towards it amount to 28% respectively.

Towards "European Solidarity", while 47% are negative.

The UDAR party is viewed negatively by 34%, and only 18% are positive.

The parties "Reasonable Policy" and "Voice" are almost equally negative - 27% and 29%. Positive - 18% and 13% respectively.

Regarding the rating of sympathies to political parties or leaders, it is worth noting that they cannot be considered the electoral rating of these parties or politicians. Since sympathies do not yet mean that citizens are ready to cast their votes in elections.

The hypothetical party of the former commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine V. Zaluzhny may win the parliamentary elections by a large margin.

According to the survey conducted by the Social Monitoring Center (conducted from November 15 to 21, 2024), the potential parliamentary elections will be won by a large margin by the hypothetical party of the former commander-in-chief and current Ukrainian ambassador to the UK, Valeriy Zaluzhny.

In particular, the results of the parliamentary elections would look something like this:

Valery Zaluzhny's party – 34%;

Volodymyr Zelensky's Party – 12%;

"European Solidarity" of P. Poroshenko - 9%;

Kirill Budanov’s party – 7%;

Dmitry Razumkov's party – 6%;

Yulia Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna – 6%;

“August 24” by Serhiy Prytula – 6%;

Andriy Biletsky's Party – 4%;

Vitali Klitschko's IMPACT - 3%;

"For Peace! For Life" by Yuriy Boyko – 2%;

Oleg Lyashko's "Radical Party" - 1%;

Alexey Arestovich's party - 1%;

“The Voice” (Kira Rudyk) – 1%;

Another party - 3%.

During the study, sociologists deliberately did not mention the Servant of the People party to focus attention on the potential leadership of the head of the political force.

Also, the Social Monitoring Center, commissioned by American Political Services, released the results of a study at a press conference, according to which Ukrainians trust the former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and now the Ambassador of Ukraine to the UK V. Zaluzhny (72% versus 22%), as well as the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense K. Budanov (55% versus 32%) more than the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky, who is trusted by only 44% versus 52% of those who do not trust. The electoral rating for whom citizens are ready to vote as President has not yet been announced.

 

Ukrainian society itself began to reassess the situation in the country. At first, this manifested itself in the growth of demand for criticism of the government. Then in the growth of non-approval for corruption. The issue of corruption became the key claim of society to the state. 52.5% – expressed the opinion that it is possible to criticize the government for corruption during the war.

Citizens are also gradually losing confidence in their future. In February 2024, a KIIS poll showed that for the first time since the beginning of the war, the majority of citizens began to believe that the situation in the country was moving in the wrong direction – 46%. In March 2022, when Russian troops were stationed near Kyiv, 73% believed that the country was moving in the right direction, now only 36% thought so. Therefore, we are talking not so much about the actual state of affairs, but about a fundamental change in public consciousness. Society is tired, disappointed, and is losing its positive confidence in how the situation will develop further.

At the same time, the demand for ending the war is growing in society, and an element of fatigue and a demand for new justice are forming. More than a third of the population is already in favor of ending the war or negotiations. 35% of Ukrainian citizens believe that negotiations with the Russian Federation should be conducted now. About 32% of Ukrainian citizens surveyed are ready to make territorial concessions to end the war. In general, in the period from May 2022 to October 2024, the number of those ready to make concessions increased 4 times, and the number of those opposed to concessions decreased from 87% to 58%, although it remains the majority. However, the majority of Ukrainians – 63% – say that they are ready to endure the war as long as necessary. From February (it was -73%) to October 2024, this figure decreased by -10%.

July. Public opinion polls in Ukraine show that despite growing war fatigue, society is not yet ready to make any compromises with the Russian Federation to end hostilities. According to a sociological study conducted by the Razumkov Center on behalf of ZN.UA, Ukrainians are ready for negotiations (44%), but are not ready to give in to the Russian Federation (61%). The minimum necessary condition for concluding a peace agreement with the Russian Federation is the liberation of Ukraine from Russian troops within the 1991 borders (51%). At the same time, 46% of Ukrainians believe that there is nothing shameful about being a draft dodger. If the government agrees to a peace agreement with the Russian Federation with borders along the front line, 49% predict civil resistance.

In general, one can observe somewhat paradoxical phenomena in the mood of Ukrainian society. The majority does not believe that there is anything shameful in being a draft dodger, but they want to return all the territories within the 1991 borders. The majority is ready for negotiations with the Russian Federation but is not ready to give in to anything.

Interestingly, similar sentiments are observed in Russian society. According to Russian Field, the number of those who support negotiations in the Russian Federation is 49%. However, there are very few supporters of real compromises. For example, only 1% are ready to return Ukraine to its territories within the 1991 borders.

October. In general, there is an increase in the feeling of crisis in Ukrainian society. The number of supporters of negotiations with the Russian Federation in one form or another in Ukraine continues to grow. 35% of Ukrainian citizens believe that negotiations with the Russian Federation should be conducted now, without any conditions, in September 2023 only 21% thought so (According to a study by the Razumkov Center). At the same time, about 50% continued to insist on negotiations after the liberation of all territories, a year ago 60% thought so. The majority of citizens continue to support the country's course towards joining the European Union (74%) and NATO (72%).

According to the Sociological Group, Rating, Ukrainians themselves mostly believe that Ukraine is not quite ready to join the EU. Thus, only 20% believe that Ukraine is already completely ready to join the EU. 57% believe that the country needs further reforms for this. 22% that Ukraine is not at all ready to join the EU. The share of those who see the need for further reforms has increased by 14% over the past year.

The number of those who believe in rapid accession to the EU is decreasing dynamically (the number of those who believe that EU membership is possible within 1–2 years has decreased from 66% in 2022 to 15% in 2024).

43% agree with the statement that Ukraine should join the EU. 48% of respondents are more inclined to believe that Ukraine may not join the EU, but should strengthen economic ties with it. 7% believe that Ukraine does not need to integrate into the EU at all.

68% believe that Ukraine should defend its interests and not agree to some of the EU's demands. 28% believe that all demands should be agreed to. 48% believe that the EU is interested in Ukraine's accession. 50% have the opposite point of view.

Main sources of information: Telegram is the most popular source of information for 47%. Next comes YouTube (26%), “Unified News Marathon” (21%), eyewitness accounts/acquaintances, and official government sources (19%).

In November, the final turning point in public opinion occurs, and support for peace talks reaches a historic high. Fatigue from fighting and fear of further deterioration of the situation are already becoming dominant factors in public sentiment. Previously, these changes were noted only in closed sociological studies, but their publication right now is of particular importance. Thus, the American Gallup Institute published the results of a social survey, according to which support for peace talks in Ukraine reached 52%, exceeding the majority mark for the first time since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation. Four out of 10 Ukrainians (38%) believe that their country should continue to fight until victory. As Gallup notes, the current attitude of Ukrainians to the war represents a decisive shift compared to what it was before. A survey conducted within a few months after the start of the war in 2022 showed that Ukrainians behaved defiantly: 73% preferred to fight until victory. 22% were in favor of negotiations. In 2023, support for fighting to victory fell to 63%, and for peace through negotiations - 27%. This year, fatigue increased: support for a peace agreement rose to 52%, reaching a majority for the first time.

This Gallup poll is already a response signal for V. Zelensky's team from Western partners, it demonstrates that the aspirations of the President of Ukraine (war to victory) do not quite coincide with the demands of Ukrainian society itself. In terms of information, this becomes a "cold shower" for the team of power in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian leadership is preparing for difficult negotiations with the winner of the US presidential election, Donald Trump, who has declared his desire to end the war in Ukraine as quickly as possible. At the same time, it is widely believed that the Republicans will try to encourage President Volodymyr Zelensky to agree to stop the war along the front line, which contradicts the official doctrine of the Ukrainian government, which insists on continuing the war until it reaches the 1991 borders.

One of the arguments of the Ukrainian government against ending the war as soon as possible was the thesis that the majority of Ukrainian citizens do not support such a scenario. However, the results of the Gallup survey partially undermine this position, demonstrating that a significant part of Ukrainians are in favor of ending the war through negotiations.

In December, more and more polls began to show that Ukrainian citizens were increasingly willing to lose territory to end the war and join NATO. (a survey by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation). In June, 47% answered this question affirmatively - 14% more than in June 2023. 36% are not ready for this, which is 16% less than a year and a half ago. 55% of respondents said that they consider joining NATO to be the best option for ensuring Ukraine's security. 39% spoke in favor of restoring the state's nuclear status. Only 12% of respondents support a neutral status ensured by international guarantees. Several countries, including the United States and Germany, oppose Ukraine's accession to NATO.

5. Change in humanitarian policy.

Linguistically and religiously, Ukraine has undergone significant changes, a consequence of both the war and socioeconomic shifts such as the exodus of wealthier urban populations. The number of Ukrainian-speaking citizens has formally increased, and the Ukrainian language has become even more dominant, but the number of native Ukrainian speakers has decreased. In the religious sphere, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine has become the dominant denomination, gradually displacing the Ukrainian Orthodox Church associated with the Moscow Patriarchate.

During the war, the attitude towards such moments, which are conventionally called “soft Ukrainization,” changed very much.

Language ombudsman Taras Kremen announced a transition from "soft" to "offensive" Ukrainization. In his opinion, the state language of Ukraine is in the sights of the Russian Federation and now it is simply necessary to strengthen its position. The strategy assumes strict control over the observance of language legislation (primarily, the Law of Ukraine "On Education", as well as the Law of Ukraine "On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language"), in particular, on the Internet and in public life. T. Kremen has issued 49 warnings and imposed 16 fines for violating the language law on the Internet since the beginning of 2024.

Even in December 2023, bill No. 10288-1 was adopted, aimed at amending some laws of Ukraine taking into account the recommendations of the Council of Europe. The bill only expands the rights of the official languages of the EU, such as Hungarian, Romanian, and Bulgarian (this was one of the conditions of the European Commission for the start of negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the EU), but excludes the Russian language as the language of the aggressor country. On the contrary, now the state policy is aimed at completely ousting any elements of Russian culture from almost all spheres of Ukrainian society.

In Ukrainian society, draft law No. 12086 has been actively discussed recently. It is aimed at further strengthening the Ukrainian language in educational institutions. The draft law requires the use of the Ukrainian language in all aspects of the educational process, including communication between teachers and students during breaks. The draft law adds the concept of a "Ukrainian-language environment", it does not provide for fines separately, but it strengthens the emphasis on the mandatory use of the Ukrainian language and defines the principles of communication in the state language in educational institutions. According to the current legislation, teachers are already obliged to conduct educational activities in the state language. At the moment, teachers are subject to fines of 3,400 to 11,900 hryvnia for violating language legislation. The initiative, according to the plan, should contribute to even greater Ukrainization of educational institutions.

At the same time, by the end of 2024, the Commissioner for the Protection of the State Language Taras Kremen reported that signs of a slowdown in Ukrainization began to appear in 2024. The ombudsman named the reduction in the share of participants in the educational process who consider Ukrainian their native language as one of the key signs of this (students - by 17%, parents - by 11%, teachers - by 8%), a decrease in the use of the Ukrainian language in the educational environment, the Russification of the Internet space and social networks. Kremneva separately focused on the problems in the language environment among young people: "Significantly, only 37% of students communicate with friends in Ukrainian, and 39% - at home. In addition, the number of students who prefer the Ukrainian language on the Internet has decreased by 10%. "

Thus, despite the demonstrative popularization of the Ukrainian language, the real percentage of its speakers in the country is decreasing. This is due to both the population decline in general and migration processes, in particular, a significant part of the Ukrainian speakers went abroad as a result of the war.

The situation around the UOC.

The Law came into force in September 2024. 3894-IX "On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on the Activities of Religious Organizations in Ukraine", new name - "On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Sphere of Activities of Religious Organizations", was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on August 20. The Council of Churches of Ukraine supported this law, emphasizing its importance for protecting national security and ensuring the spiritual independence of Ukraine. However, the law also raised concerns among representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), who believe that it could be used against them even though the UOC is not directly mentioned in the text of the law.

At the same time, it is believed that this law opens the way to a ban on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Let us recall that The law amends Ukrainian legislation to allow the termination of a religious organization by a court decision if authorized persons of the organization are convicted of crimes against the national security of Ukraine or for crimes specified in Articles 161, 258–258-6, 436–438, 442, 447 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. These articles concern violations of the equality of citizens (including religious beliefs), fraud, legalization of illegally obtained property, terrorist attacks, propaganda of war, denial of Russian aggression, genocide, and being mercenaries.

The state can also now begin to check any church community for "affiliation" with the Russian Orthodox Church. If officials establish such a connection, the religious community is given nine months to sever ties with the ROC. After this period, if the proper conditions are not met, the State Service for Ethnopolicy and Freedom of Conscience can go to court to terminate the activities of the religious organization.

Entire procedure of the actual ban on the UOC will begin in May-June 2025, by which time the processes of forming a new administration in the United States will be completed. After that, it will become clear to the team of power in Ukraine to what extent the new White House Administration will have a positive or negative attitude toward the UOC issue. Depending on this, the process of its ban may either accelerate or be suspended. The law postponed the issue of banning the UOC in the future. But the very fact of the adoption of this law has tightened the public discourse in Ukrainian society regarding the religious issue, which, in turn, has increased the pressure on the UOC structures at the local level.

IV. Macroeconomic situation.

1. Key economic indicators.

Ukraine is suffering significant losses due to the war on its territory. In particular, there is: the destruction of infrastructure and production facilities, disruption of logistics links and a drop in exports, a reduction in investment, and weak consumer demand, including due to active migration.

In 2022, Ukraine's GDP fell from over $200 billion to $161 billion (-29.1%) but already in 2023, GDP showed growth of 5.3% - $178.8 billion.

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts, Ukraine's real GDP growth in 2024 will be -4%. But already in 2025, a slowdown in GDP growth to 2.5-3.5% is predicted due to tensions in the labor market, the impact of Russian attacks on energy infrastructure, and continued military uncertainty.

The inflation forecast for the end of 2024 has been increased by 1% to 10%.

According to the Government, Ukraine's direct losses exceeded $700 billion. The environmental damage caused by military actions is estimated at approximately $71 billion. According to World Bank estimates, the restoration of Ukraine will require $ 486 billion.

In demographic terms, Ukraine has lost from 10 to 15 million of its population: 1. Since the beginning of the invasion, the Russian Federation has captured territories inhabited by at least 3-3.5 million people (in total, 6 to 9 million people may live in the territories of Ukraine occupied by the Russian Federation, including Crimea); 2. According to official UN data alone, there are 6.8 million Ukrainian refugees in the world (of which about 6 million people are in Europe), and most likely these figures are incomplete. A significant portion of the refugees are also in the territory of the Russian Federation and Belarus. Another 3.6 million are registered as internally displaced persons (IDPs). Another 4.3 million have already returned to their homes. That is, in total, about 15 million Ukrainians have left their homes since the beginning of the Russian invasion. And a third has already returned. Refugees and IDPs are gradually finding jobs. 45% of refugees abroad and 43% of displaced persons have already found work.

The number of able-bodied Ukrainians has fallen by 5.5 million, or 30%, since the invasion. That's more than Germany had after World War II. Before the invasion, Ukraine had 17.4 million able-bodied residents.

Economic centers of Ukraine - successful companies and production facilities were mainly moved to the western regions of Ukraine, which became the new economic center of the country.

Economically and militarily, Ukraine is now largely dependent on aid from Western partners. The total amount of declared aid from allies is already about $360 billion.

However, the non-systematic flow of Western funding into the budget forces changes in financial policy, such as the devaluation of the hryvnia or a sharp increase in taxes, which undermine the country's economy.

Over the year, the hryvnia has weakened by more than UAH 3.8 against the dollar. At the beginning of 2024, the official hryvnia exchange rate to the US dollar was about 38 UAH/$. And by December 2024, the rate reached a historical minimum, exceeding 41.9 UAH/ $.

Against the backdrop of a reduction in the flow of foreign aid, Ukraine’s state budget deficit and external debt are growing.

As of October 31, 2024, the state and state-guaranteed debt of Ukraine amounted to UAH 6,413.57 billion (+16.2% from December 31, 2023; when the total debt was UAH 5,519.48 billion). billion UAH), or $155.37 billion US dollars.

Including:

• Public and publicly guaranteed external debt — UAH 4,584.49 billion (71.48% of the total public and publicly guaranteed debt), or USD 111.06 billion;

• Public and publicly guaranteed domestic debt — UAH 1,829.08 billion (28.52%), or USD 44.31 billion.

2. Socioeconomic situation. Changes in fiscal policy and other instruments for replenishing the budget against the backdrop of reduced aid from Western partners.

Against the backdrop of a reduction in Western aid, an increase in military spending, and a budget deficit, the government is looking for alternative ways to fill the budget, including increasing the financial burden on business representatives and the population.

Despite the unprecedented resilience and adaptability of Ukrainian society in the face of war, the protracted conflict continues to complicate the situation in the country. Growing military spending, budget deficits, and declining Western aid are forcing the government to increase financial pressure on businesses and the population - increase in tariffs, taxes, in particular, charges for property tax (previously suspended), limitation of card transfers - limit on money transfers from card to card of clients for 150 thousand UAH per month, etc. All these measures reduce the standard of living of the population, which leads to negative consequences: reduction in consumer demand, increase in requests for social assistance (subsidies, unemployment benefits), as well as a crisis of non-payments, which will not be compensated. In the future, this may provoke a further outflow of population from the country and significantly complicate the recovery of the economy.

According to the United Nations, more than 80% of Ukrainians live below the poverty line. According to UN standards, if a person spends less than $5 a day on housing and food, and less than $150 a month, then he lives below the poverty line. In Ukraine, the daily subsistence minimum is one and a half dollars. If Russia's war against Ukraine drags on, 90% of the Ukrainian population may end up below the poverty line.

 

From June 1, the government increased the tariff for household consumers by 64% to 4.32 UAH/kWh. The new tariff will be in effect from June 1, 2024, until the end of April 2025. Previously, the Government planned to introduce a differentiated tariff: 4.8 UAH/kW h, provided that consumption exceeds 100 kW h per month. For consumers who use less than 100 kW h, the tariff was to remain at 2.64 UAH/kW h.

Since June For businesses, the maximum electricity prices will increase by 20-130% during peak hours and at night. This should affect import volumes to reduce the deficit in the energy grid.

Currently, Ukraine has the highest prices for utilities in Europe, taking into account the share of household expenses, in war conditions, this is superimposed by the growth of prices for goods and services, and accordingly the growth of inflation. The cumulative effect of negative socio-economic changes is expected to lead to a new increase in migration flows and a reduction in the functioning of private businesses.

In anticipation of the increase in electricity prices, a scandal erupted in the information environment due to the high salaries of top officials of Ukrenergo.

Thus, the OBOZ.UA publication sent a request to Ukrenergo asking them to announce the salary of the head of the board V. Kudritsky together with all incentives (bonuses and the like) and separately indicate the salary. They also asked to name the salary of the head of "Ukrenergo" by month. However, the company refused to voice this information, citing the fact that the law "On access to public information" does not require naming the salary "separately". Instead, the company named the salary of the entire board (the total amount received by the head and four board members was named). Thus, the average monthly salary for one board member reaches more than UAH 2 million (this is about EUR 50 thousand). At the same time, the size of salaries varies significantly depending on the month.

In general, the situation is becoming a marker of the presence of a corruption component in the energy sector, against the backdrop of military actions and rising tariffs, this will especially increase the level of irritation in society.

In September, the NBU sets limits on cash withdrawals abroad. Thus NBU Resolution No. 108 Two new limits are being set for payments from cards in dollars, euros, and other foreign currencies for the equivalent of 100 thousand UAH and 500 thousand UAH. Previously, there were restrictions on purchases abroad - no more than 100 thousand per month. But the 100 thousand limitation only applied to hryvnia cards of Ukrainian banks. And it did not apply to foreign currency cards. Now the NBU has extended the restrictions to foreign currency cards as well. In this way, the NBU is fighting the processes of hryvnia devaluation, since every money spent abroad also means an outflow of money abroad.

Also, new restrictions for currency cards (for 100 and 500 thousand UAH) in banks were explained by the schemes that Ukrainians have mastered. Most often, the schemes concern the legalization of funds abroad. It is allowed to pay for three categories of goods with currency cards of Ukrainian banks for no more than the equivalent of 100 thousand hryvnia per month:

- precious stones, metals, and jewelry - code 5094;

- watches, jewelry, and silver products - code 5944;

-coins and stamps - code 5972.

The second limit on transactions with currency cards - 500 thousand UAH/month - is introduced for paying for the services of real estate agents and managers abroad.

The restrictions will apply to these four areas; the restrictions will only apply to payments and only to currency cards. Non-cash currency payments for all other goods and services by our people can continue to take place without restrictions. It is important to understand that banks differentiate between the concepts of payments for goods and services and P2P transfers.

Since the beginning of the war, payments using currency cards abroad from Ukrainian bank cards have not been limited.

For several months now, the following have been limited:

- P2P transfers (from individual to individual) from cards in foreign currency - no more than 100 thousand UAH per month;

- foreign payments for goods and services from hryvnia cards - no more than 100 thousand UAH per month;

- cash withdrawals abroad from hryvnia cards - no more than 12.5 thousand UAH per week and 50 thousand UAH per month.

On October 10, the Verkhovna Rada adopted bill #11416-d on increasing taxes (the law was signed by the President on November 28). The new tax rules are a condition for the IMF loan and were supposed to work “retroactively” from October 1 and by the end of 2024 bring UAH 30 billion to the budget to finance the war. But Prime Minister D. Shmyhal reported that the law would come into force on December 1. The tax increase is expected to bring in about UAH 8 billion in 2024 and UAH 141 billion in 2025. Let us recall that international partners do not finance Ukraine's military expenditures. This is financed by taxes and domestic borrowing. They are the main source of financing for the country's military needs.

The main innovations of the law are as follows:

Military tax.

1. Increase in rates for individuals:

for salaries of individuals (including participants in the "Diia.City" regime) will increase from 1.5% to 5% from the moment the law comes into force. The exception is military personnel, for whom the rate remains 1.5%.

For other incomes of citizens (except salaries), the rate will increase from 1.5% to 5% from January 1, 2025.

For the military, the military tax remained at 1.5%.

2. For entrepreneurs (sole proprietors):

First, second, and fourth groups of sole proprietors: Military tax in the amount of 10% of the minimum wage (800 UAH at the moment).

The third group of sole proprietors a military tax in the amount of 1% of income.

Income tax.

1. For banks:

The income tax rate for 2024 increases from 25% to 50%. The new rate is applied retrospectively, taking into account taxes already paid at the old rate.

2. For non-bank financial institutions:

The tax rate will increase from 18% to 25% from January 1, 2025 (except for insurance companies).

3. Advance payments:

Gas stations (petrol stations): Monthly advance payments of income tax - 30, 45, or 60 thousand UAH for each station depending on its type. These amounts will not be taken into account when calculating future tax liabilities.

Currency exchange offices: Advance payment – 700 euros per office in Kyiv, 600 euros in cities with a population of over 50 thousand people, and 200 euros in other populated areas.

Other taxes and fees.

1. Land tax:

The minimum land tax is set at 700 UAH and 1,400 UAH per hectare.

2. Rent for the extraction of minerals:

Rent for the extraction of crushed stone, clay, granite, and sand is increasing, the minimum rate will be $5 per ton.

New reporting and exemptions.

1. Monthly reporting on personal income tax, military tax, and unified social contribution:

From 1 January 2025, monthly reporting will be introduced to monitor compliance with the new requirements, including within the framework of "economic reservation".

2. Tax exemption for "national cashback":

For 2024-2025, the "national cashback" is exempt from paying personal income tax and military tax.

Until the end of martial law, foreign aid received by Ukrainians abroad will be exempt from income tax. That is, refugees will not have to pay taxes in Ukraine on benefits received in the EU.

The adoption of the law on increasing taxes was one of the key factors that caused a surge in the closure of sole proprietors in the fall. Many entrepreneurs consider the new tax rates unfair, while officials emphasize that even taking into account the changes, the rates remain significantly lower than in the European Union.

 

In mid-December, the OpenDataBot platform initiated a large-scale nationwide survey of entrepreneurs to find out how the tax increase affected the plans of small and medium businesses. It turned out that from the moment the President signed the law on increasing taxes until December 17, 24.4 thousand individual entrepreneurs (IE) ceased their activities. On November 29, the day after the signing of the law, 2,332 business closures were recorded. On average, about 1,000 IEs closed daily after the law came into force, which is significantly higher than the usual level of 700 closures per day.

Since the signing of the law on the introduction of military tax for small and medium businesses, there are 2 closed ones for every 1 new sole proprietorship. For comparison, in the same period last year, there was only 1 closed one for every 4 new sole proprietors.

 

From January 1, 2025, new rules for the provision of medical services in state and municipal healthcare institutions come into force in Ukraine. According to the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (No. 781 of July 5, 2024) "Some issues of providing medical services to the population for a fee from legal entities and individuals", medical services not included in the Medical Guarantees Program will be provided on a paid basis. These changes are aimed at reducing unofficial payments in the healthcare system.

The main cases when services will become paid:

Application without a doctor's referral. If a patient independently applies for a medical service without a referral from a family doctor or specialist, such a service will be paid.

Provision of services under contracts with legal entities. Medical services provided under contracts with enterprises or organizations will be paid for by these legal entities.

Services in institutions of the security and defense sector or the State Administration of Affairs. If the patient does not belong to the assigned contingent of these institutions, services for him will be paid.

Services not covered by the Medical Guarantee Program. The list of free services will be clearly defined; all other services will be provided for a fee.

Additional paid services.

Provision of medical services at home at the patient's request. If the patient wishes to receive medical care at home, not due to his physical condition, such a service will be paid.

Choice of attending physician for planned inpatient treatment. The patient can choose a specific physician for planned inpatient treatment for an additional fee.

Stay in a ward with increased comfort. At the patient's request, it is possible to be placed in a ward with improved conditions for an additional fee.

All medical institutions will be required to publish on their official websites and information boards a list of paid services with their cost, as well as a list of free services provided under the Medical Guarantees Program. Payment for paid services will be made exclusively in non-cash form through the hospital's official account at clearly defined rates.

3. Financing of the State Budget of Ukraine.

In 2024, Ukraine's general fund state budget received $53.4 billion in funding, according to the Finance Ministry. Of this amount, $15.7 billion came from the placement of domestic government bonds, and $37.7 billion from external funding. In particular, the volume of grants amounted to about $10 billion.

In December 2024, Ukraine expects to receive an additional $8.5 billion in international aid from its partners. This includes more than €4 billion under the European Union's Ukraine Facility and the seventh tranche of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Extended Fund Facility (EFF) loan of $ 1.1 billion.

The G7's $50 billion allocation to Ukraine from revenues from frozen Russian ERA assets will begin to arrive in early 2025 and will make up a significant portion of the expected external financing.

In 2025, Ukraine plans to attract $38 billion in foreign financing to fulfill budget obligations.

So far, $32.15 billion in funding has been confirmed from the European Union, as well as $2.7 billion from the International Monetary Fund. The rest could be raised from other sources, primarily through World Bank programs (including the remainder of the $50 billion pledged by the G7 countries), as well as from countries such as Norway and South Korea.

Overall, according to the Ministry of Finance, the volume of funding from international partners reached $111 billion in 2022–2024.

On average, Western partners' funding for 2024 was $2.9 billion per month, which is slightly less than in 2023 (about $3.5 billion). Let us recall that, according to the Ukrainian government, the country requires $3 to $5 billion in foreign aid to cover monthly budget expenditures. Thus, Western allies' funding for Ukraine in 2024 was at the lower level.

It is worth noting that Western aid is not systematic and unstable. Thus, aid from allies in 2024 varied from $9 billion (in March) to 0 (in September).

About the income/expense balance budget, the most difficult month of the year was May (balance -122 billion UAH), another 6 months of 2024 were also unprofitable: February (-51.2 billion UAH); April (- 3.4 billion UAH); June (-16.2 billion UAH); July (-23.5 billion UAH); September (- 58.3 billion UAH); October (-26.5 billion UAH).

 

Revenues and expenditures of the budget of Ukraine in 2024 *

*(The dynamics of expenditures and financial receipts to the budget are shown in the graph). The data is compiled from publications on the Telegram channel of the People's Deputy of Ukraine, First Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Finance, Tax and Customs Policy Yaroslav Zheleznyak.)

Total funding of the Ukrainian budget for November 2024 amounted to UAH 509 billion. Of these, internal resources amounted to UAH 239 billion. External aid - $6.48 billion (about UAH 270 billion). Before that, in October, the budget faced a deficit of UAH 26.5 billion. Expenditures for the month amounted to UAH 314.2 billion, while revenues were only UAH 287.7 billion. External aid in October amounted to only $1.4 billion (UAH 57.7 billion), of which $1.1 billion came from the IMF and $300 million from Canada.

Compared to September, when there was no external financing at all, the situation in October was partially stabilized, but the volume of aid was significantly lower than in August. In August, Ukraine received a record $8.4 billion (UAH 346 billion), which allowed it to close the month with total receipts of UAH 527.7 billion.

NBU currency investments

(Graphics from the Telegram channel of the People's Deputy of Ukraine, First Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Finance, Tax and Customs Policy Yaroslav Zheleznyak.)

During this period, there was also a rollback of expenditures (by 21%) of national currency reserves; in November, the National Bank sold currencies worth 2.7 billion dollars. In October, Ukraine sold a nearly record amount of currency - $3.43 billion. The largest amount was in December 2023, when the sale of currency was $3.55 billion.

Dependence on Western aid makes the country's defense vulnerable if support is cut or stopped. Let us recall that Ukraine cannot use funds from international partners for the country's defense needs; the only source of financing additional expenses is exclusively the country's internal resources. The government can try to attract funds through the domestic debt market or provide additional revenues through the devaluation of the hryvnia, which could be initiated by the National Bank of Ukraine. However, even these measures are not capable of covering all the necessary expenses for the security and defense sector, and the only real option remains to increase taxes.

Finance Minister Serhiy Marchenko said that if US President-elect Donald Trump stops aid to Ukraine, Kyiv will have enough funds to fight until at least mid-2025.

In July 2024 Ukraine reached an agreement with creditors on debt restructuring. The Ukrainian government has reached "agreements in principle" with the Committee of Ukrainian Eurobond Holders on the restructuring of part of its external debt. The Finance Ministry specified that the restructuring concerns government bonds worth $23.4 billion. The Committee of Ukrainian Eurobond Holders includes investors who together hold about 25% of the securities. They have waived claims for $8.67 billion. At least two-thirds of all Eurobond holders will have to approve the deal.

The agreements envisage that the existing Eurobonds will be exchanged for a package of new Eurobonds with a nominal reduction in the cost of debt of 37% at the initial stage and a reduction in the net present value of debt of approximately 60%.

Restructuring part of the external debt will allow Ukraine to save $11.4 billion in the next three years, and $22.75 billion by 2033. The agreement will also help avoid default. Recall that Ukraine froze payments on its external debt after Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. The moratorium expires on August 1, when Ukraine must make payments on part of the bonds. Until now, there was a threat that Ukraine would not reach an agreement with creditors and declare a default. Restructuring talks in early June were unsuccessful. Without the restructuring, the Treasury Department notes, the principal amount of the debt, $9.381 billion, would have been due between 2024 and 2029.

Following the completion of the restructuring, the maturity of the Eurobonds will be extended: the first payment of $1.172 billion will take place in 2029.

 

In December 2024, the IMF Board of Directors completed the sixth review of the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Financing Facility (EFF) for Ukraine, which made available about US$1.1 billion to Ukraine for budget support. This brings IMF financing to nearly $5.4 billion this year, with total EFF disbursements reaching $9.8 billion. The report says that despite the extremely challenging circumstances, the authorities continue to demonstrate strong overall program results. Ukraine has already met 35 structural benchmarks under the EFF, including 20 in the fiscal direction.

As a reminder, on March 31, 2023, the 48-month (until 2027) EFF agreement with access to SDR 11.6 billion (equivalent to USD 15.5 billion, or about 577 percent of quota) was approved and is part of the USD 151.4 billion support package for Ukraine. The program, implemented by the Ukrainian authorities and supported by the IMF, is intended to consolidate policy measures that support fiscal, external, and macro-financial stability in a period of exceptionally high uncertainty.

In October, the International Monetary Fund updated its memorandum with Ukraine. The program now envisages that the war should end in the last quarter of 2025 in the baseline scenario, and by mid-2026 in the worst case. Despite the revised assumptions, the war could last longer or escalate, which would lead to serious setbacks to economic performance or program goals.

The overall effectiveness of the program remains high, and discussions focused on updating programs for a longer war.

There are two deferred beacons in the document:

• NABU audit (postponed from the end of September to the end of January 2025);

• changes to the Criminal Procedure Code upon expiration of the pre-trial investigation period (postponed from the end of October 2024 to the end of December 2024).

The memorandum contains new beacons. Some of them have a deadline of the end of December 2024:

• reform of the Accounts Chamber;

• completion of the formation of the supervisory board of Ukrenergo with a majority of independent members;

• Amendments to the law on law-making activities to strengthen the independence of the National Commission for State Regulation of Energy and Public Utilities and to abolish the state registration of regulatory legal acts of the Commission.

New lighthouses for 2025

• changes to the Budget Code that will give the Ministry of Finance the authority to verify that all state investment projects have passed the necessary assessment and selection (by the end of January);

• The Cabinet of Ministers must approve the methodology for assessing state investment projects (by the end of February);

• election of a new Director of the BEB (before the end of February);

• registration in the Verkhovna Rada of the law on tax reporting for digital platform operators (by the end of April);

• appointment by the end of June of the Chairman of the State Customs Service and, as soon as possible, of the chairmen of regional customs offices;

• submit a budget declaration by the parameters agreed with the IMF (by the end of June).

Ukraine has fulfilled all structural benchmarks envisaged before the fifth review, and two more ahead of schedule. In total, five commitments have been fulfilled, namely:

• Development of a methodology for assessing the effectiveness of tax incentives, including their cost to the budget.

• A new law on the Bureau of Economic Security has been adopted.

• The main public companies seriously affected by the war have been identified and an analysis of potential fiscal and quasi-fiscal costs has been prepared.

• Amendments to the Customs Code have been adopted by best international practices (ahead of schedule).

• Based on the results of the roadmap for developing public investment management procedures, a government resolution was adopted with an action plan and implementation schedule, which will ensure a clear link between medium-term budget planning and capital expenditure (ahead of schedule).

Excess tax collections in the first half of 2024, including due to higher-than-expected yields on the extraordinary tax on bank profits applied this year. Revenues will further benefit from the recently passed legislation to align fuel excise duties with EU directives, which came into force in September.

Ratios of the Fund’s capacity to repay debt. Total Fund lending is expected to peak at 8.2% of GDP and 35.5% of gross reserves in 2024. Debt service to the Fund is expected to peak at 1.9% of GDP in 2025 and 8% of gross reserves in 2024. Downside risks would push these ratios higher, with total Fund lending expected to peak at 8.8% of GDP in 2025 and 45.7% of gross reserves in 2024; and debt service to the Fund expected to peak at 2% of GDP in 2025 and 10.3% of gross reserves in 2024.

Energy supply: Further attacks pose a serious risk of worsening the situation (both economically and in humanitarian meaning, given the approaching winter), while faster repairs and additional energy generation could potentially reduce these risks.

Reform fatigue: Policy adjustments and deeper structural reforms must continue in the coming years, and maintaining the momentum over a long period may prove challenging, including for social cohesion.

It is noted that only more active and long-term efforts to raise taxes can ensure greater self-sufficiency and a return to fiscal and debt sustainability by the end of the program. Additional tax efforts could include raising the basic VAT rate, as well as other actions that would be needed to advance EU accession, including phasing out preferential VAT rates in line with EU directives and reforming environmental taxation in advance of the final EU Border Carbon Mechanism regime to which Ukraine is subject.

4. State budget of Ukraine for 2025.

On November 19, the Verkhovna Rada adopted in the second reading the draft Law of Ukraine "On the State Budget of Ukraine for 2025".

According to the Ministry of Finance, by the adopted document:

Revenues are expected at the level of UAH 2.045 trillion, and expenses are planned at the level of UAH 3.6 trillion. The hryvnia exchange rate is UAH 45 per dollar.

Let us recall that the state budget revenues for 2024 were set at UAH 1.77 trillion, and expenditures at UAH 3.36 trillion, with an average annual exchange rate of UAH 40.8. for one dollar. At the same time, The Verkhovna Rada voted to increase spending by almost 500 million hryvnia.

GDP growth is projected: for 2024 – UAH 7.4 trillion (3.5%); forecast for 2025 – UAH 8.4 trillion (2.7%)

The state budget deficit should amount to 1.64 trillion hryvnia.

The planned volume of external financing is $38.4 billion.

By the end of 2025, the public debt is expected to be UAH 8.2 trillion (97% of GDP).

 

Defense spending will increase to UAH 2.22 trillion, which is 26.3% of the country's projected GDP. Of this, almost half - UAH 1.15 trillion - will go to salaries and almost UAH 739 billion - to the production, purchase, and repair of military equipment. The overall defense budget for 2024 was almost identical: 1.7 trillion was allocated immediately. Later, the Cabinet of Ministers demanded to add another 500 billion UAH, which is not enough for military salaries. Thus, a serious increase in spending on the Armed Forces of Ukraine next year is not expected yet.

The tax increase should bring in about UAH 8 billion in 2024 and UAH 141 billion in 2025.

It was decided to refuse to finance the state road fund for 43.21 billion hryvnia.

Consumer price growth to accelerate to 9.5% in 2025 compared to 2024 (expectations: 7.9%)

The unemployment rate will decrease slightly to 17.7% from 18.2% in 2024.

The average monthly salary is projected to grow in 2025, both in nominal terms by 18.5% and in real terms by 8.1% compared to the previous year.

The average monthly salary is set at - 24,389 UAH. In 2024, it was 20,581 UAH.

It is planned to introduce a 3-year moratorium on increasing social benefits.

In 2025, the basic state social standard, including the minimum wage and the subsistence minimum, will remain at the level of December 2024.

The project proposes to establish from January 1, 2025, the subsistence minimum per person per month for 2920 hryvnia, and the main social and demographic groups of the population:

• children under 6 years of age – 2563 hryvnia;

• children aged 6 to 18 years – 3196 hryvnia;

• able-bodied persons – 3028 hryvnia;

• able-bodied persons, used to determine the basic salary of a judge - 2102 hryvnia;

• able-bodied persons, used to determine the official salaries of employees of other government agencies whose remuneration is regulated by special laws, as well as employees of tax and customs authorities - 2102 hryvnia;

• able-bodied persons, used to determine the official salary of a prosecutor of the district prosecutor's office - 2102 hryvnia;

• persons who have lost their ability to work (minimum pension) – 2361 hryvnia;

• persons who have lost their ability to work used to determine the amount of additional payment for living in areas of radioactive contamination, including by court decisions - 1600 hryvnia.

Raising taxes. For 2025, an additional resource provided for by the draft amendments to the Tax Code of Ukraine on the specifics of taxation during the period of martial law" (No. 11416-d) for UAH 122.4 billion has been taken into account. In particular, an increase in the military tax rate from 1.5% to 5% will provide UAH 107.7 billion; the establishment of a military tax for taxpayers on a simplified taxation system, namely, for individuals-entrepreneurs of groups I, II, III, and IV - UAH 13.7 billion, legal entities of group III - UAH 929 million.

There is a reduction in spending on social protection. Thus, UAH 420 billion has been allocated to support socially vulnerable citizens (UAH 50 billion in 2024 was UAH 470 billion), of which UAH 237 billion is directed to the Pension Fund for pension payments, UAH 129 billion to help low-income families and individuals in difficult life circumstances, and UAH 42.3 billion to pay benefits and subsidies.

The number of recipients of subsidies and benefits will decrease by 400 thousand (by 12.5%). The total amount from the budget will be 15.2% less (a reduction from 49.9 billion hryvnia to 42.3 billion hryvnia).

217 billion UAH is allocated for medical expenses (in 2024 it was 201 billion UAH).

For education – UAH 198.9 billion (in 2024 it was UAH 69 billion)

For the development of culture and information space – UAH 10.3 billion. (in 2024 it was UAH 10.2 billion).

For the functioning of the Telemarathon - UAH 1.6 billion (in 2024 it was UAH 1.5 billion).

For digital transformation, in particular, for financing Innovative projects to meet the needs of the security and defense sector (BRAVE 1) - UAH 4.0 billion.

In support of scientific research, in particular, in the field of the military-industrial complex, energy and energy efficiency - UAH 14.5 billion.

UAH 10.5 billion allocated to support war veterans in 2025:

UAH 2.9 billion – for specialists to support veterans.

UAH 1.7 billion for rehabilitation, professional adaptation, and psychological assistance.

348 million UAH for the programs of the Ukrainian Veterans Fund.

An additional UAH 4.9 billion was allocated within the PIM for the construction of housing for veterans.

To stimulate small and medium-sized businesses, the following is provided:

18 billion UAH for affordable lending under the 5-7-9% program.

UAH 1.4 billion for grants for businesses.

3 billion UAH - to the Innovation Development Fund.

These measures are aimed at restoring the economy, preserving jobs, and supporting entrepreneurial activity in the country.

Social and humanitarian needs and economic recovery.

One of the key elements of the 2025 State Budget is the Public Investment Management (PIM) system, implemented with the support of the World Bank. This system ensures the efficient use of budget funds aimed at implementing priority projects that meet the country's strategic goals.

According to the Treasury, the PIM will increase spending transparency and improve the quality of investment in critical sectors, accelerating infrastructure recovery.

PIM Unified Project Portfolio:

Total volume of projects: 787 projects worth UAH 2.6 trillion.

Financing for 2025: UAH 224.2 billion, of which:

UAH 115 billion - under state guarantees for the restoration of critical infrastructure (transport, energy).

UAH 71.8 billion - loans and grants from international financial organizations for projects in the fields of transport, industry, healthcare, education, and energy.

UAH 36.4 billion from the general budget fund for the restoration of educational institutions, hospitals, and water supply in the affected regions.

5. Russian strikes on critical infrastructure.

In 2024, the Russian Federation continues to apply its strategy of regular missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian territory to weaken the will of the Ukrainian leadership and society to continue the war, causing economic, military, and infrastructural damage.

The main goals of such attacks are to create a humanitarian crisis, destabilize society, destroy energy infrastructure, and stop the work of industrial enterprises supporting the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

During 2024, the Russian Federation (RF) used about 1,100 missiles against the Ukrainian energy system. As of mid-December, it has carried out 12 massive attacks on Ukraine (according to the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations (UN) Sergei Kysilitsa).

In 2024, Russia changed tactics, starting to attack less-defended power plants in remote areas, which allowed it to bypass dense air defenses in Kyiv. In addition, Russia began to use high-precision, expensive missiles more often for critical targets, while simultaneously using inexpensive drones to destroy transformers. In particular, Russia continues to use Iranian Shahed drones in attacks on the Ukrainian power grid.

In the spring of 2024, after a three-month break, Russia resumed massive strikes on Ukraine's critical energy infrastructure. The attacks damaged dams, hydroelectric power plants, thermal power plants, substations, and power lines. The Trypilska Thermal Power Plant was destroyed and the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station was seriously damaged. According to the Financial Times, the strikes led to the loss of half of Ukraine's energy generation - from 55 to 20 GW.

In addition to the electric power industry, the following are also subject to intense shelling: port infrastructure, ammunition depots, and logistics routes for weapons supplies to Ukraine. This is largely due to the start of the new batch of military aid from the latest US package (61 billion dollars).

Frequent missile strikes were carried out on the city of Odesa, which is largely due to the desire of the Russian Federation to impede Ukrainian shipping. Since the Russian Federation's withdrawal from the grain deal (in July 2023), shipping from Ukrainian ports has practically restored to its pre-war volume. At the same time, they are transporting not only grain but also any other goods that the Russian Federation cannot control.

On May 8, as a result of another missile attack on the energy sector of Ukraine, thermal and hydroelectric power plants were damaged, and power outages occurred in 9 regions: Lviv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Kharkiv and Sumy, Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv.

As a result of the strikes, the following were destroyed: the Dnieper hydroelectric power station in Zaporizhzhia, the Kharkiv thermal power plant-5, the Zmievskaya and Trypilska thermal power plants of the Centrenergo company, and the Burshtynskaya, Dobrotvirskaya, and Ladyzhynskaya thermal power plants of the DTEK company were damaged. Their work is very important for the functioning of the entire energy system of Ukraine.

In June 2024, Ukraine was forced to import more electricity than in the whole of 2023, the analytical center DiXi Group reports, citing Energy Map data. In June 2024, Ukraine imported 858.4 thousand MWh of electricity. Which is 6% more than it purchased in the whole of 2023 (806.4 thousand MWh). This is the largest monthly import volume in the last 10 years. Compared to May 2024 (448.2 thousand MWh), imports have almost doubled, and compared to June 2023 (43.7 thousand MWh), they have increased almost 20 times. It is reported that there were no electricity exports in June. According to the results of June 2024, the largest volume of electricity was imported from Hungary - 357.1 thousand MWh or 42%. Another 297 thousand MWh came from Slovakia and Romania (17% each), 138.1 thousand MWh (16%) from Poland, and 66.2 thousand MWh or 8% from Moldova.

Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, Lviv, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Sumy regions, and other regions were subjected to frequent shelling. Despite the deployment of Patriot air defense systems, full protection of energy facilities is impossible - the effectiveness of shooting down is on average 60-80%.

In winter, the topic of energy security for Ukraine becomes more relevant than ever. In September 2024, the UN noted in its latest report that power outages in Ukraine in winter can last from 4 to 18 hours daily. Ukraine in winter may face serious problems in the energy sector, having only 20 GW of capacity for electricity production instead of the pre-war 55 GW. This harms various sectors of the economy. The head of the Ministry of Energy, G. Galushchenko, warned Ukrainians that the new winter will be more difficult than the previous one and after massive missile attacks, a "difficult" situation is developing in the energy sector. Ukraine has lost half of the energy capacity needed to provide for the winter.

In Ukraine, he assessed the readiness of the Ukrainian energy system for winter. Former head of Ukrenergo Vladimir Kudritsky believes that if the shelling by the Russian Federation is the same as we have seen before, "there will be no apocalypse." From time to time there will be restrictions on electricity supply, but centralized heat and water supply systems will work. In winter, the situation with outages may be approximately the same as in the heat of summer. Schedule 4 through 4, 4 through 6. Cold weather will be a trigger for power outages and the return of outages should be expected in December. In cold weather, outages will occur even if all plans for restoring generation are implemented.

Currently, the first level of protection is built 100%, and the second one is built, but only at Ukrenergo substations (there are 60 of them). There are more than 200 objects that need this protection. The third level of protection has not yet been completed at any object. To protect 22 objects, about 100 billion hryvnias are needed, this money is not in the budget. Main substations cannot be decentralized. Therefore, they must be protected first. Ukraine has ordered as many transformers as it had before the first shelling. Now Ukraine has more of them than the entire consumption capacity of Poland.

The most dangerous thing for the Ukrainian energy sector is that by the end of 2024, the Russians have stepped up attacks on substations directly connected to nuclear power plants, forcing nuclear units to be shut down in an emergency or manual mode (which in itself is very harmful to the equipment, as it provokes its rapid failure and increased accident rate).

Thus, on December 13, the Russian Federation launched a new massive attack on the Ukrainian energy sector. According to Ukraine, the attack involved 93 missiles and about 200 drones, 81 missiles were allegedly shot down. Cruise aircraft missiles, sea-based Kalibr and Kinzhal missiles, and ballistics were involved. DTEK reported serious damage to its power plants. The Burshtynk and Pridneprovska TPPs were damaged. Substations in Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and other regions, as well as power lines, were also attacked. As a result of the shelling, Ukrenergo reported tightening restrictions on electricity, with three out of six shutdowns in effect. This means that half the country was without power at that time. In Odessa, where the situation is most severe, additional restrictions were introduced (7-11 hours without power).

According to the IAEA, five of the nine units of Ukrainian nuclear power plants were reducing their capacity. This was already the second major "shutdown" in the last two weeks. And if interference in the operation of the units continues with such frequency, serious problems may soon begin - emergency shutdowns even without shelling. And this is even though it is nuclear energy that provides the majority of Ukraine's generation.

This year, power outages have impacted operations for 8 out of 10 companies. Outages have forced 67% of companies to suspend operations, 60% have seen their production costs increase, 48% have had changes to their work schedules, 36% have reduced production or services, 11% have had contracts disrupted, and 3% have stopped operations entirely.

According to the National Bank of Ukraine, another 400,000 people are likely to leave the country in 2024 due to power outages and infrastructure damage. Because Ukraine will not be able to build up the required additional energy capacity and solve the problem of power outages before winter. The ongoing uncertainty caused by Russian shelling will make it difficult for Ukrainians to plan their short-term prospects.

6. Trade turnover of Ukraine. The situation around the export of agricultural products.

According to the State Customs Service, for 11 months of 2024, Ukraine's trade turnover amounted to $101.9 billion. In January-November 2024, Ukraine imported goods worth $63.6 billion and exported $38.3 billion. Taxable imports amounted to $52.1 billion (82% of total imports). The tax burden per 1 kg of taxable imports amounted to $0.51/kg, which is 4% more than for the same period in 2023. Let us recall that in 2023, Ukraine's trade turnover amounted to $99.4 billion. In particular, imports amounted to $63.5 billion, and exports - $36 billion. Taxable imports amounted to $52.6 billion, which is 83% of the total volume of imported goods.

 

Ukraine's main trading partners in 2024:

Import of goods to Ukraine:

• China: $13 billion

• Poland: $6.3 billion

• Germany: $4.8 billion

Export of goods from Ukraine:

• Poland: $4.4 billion

• Spain: $2.7 billion

• Germany: $2.7 billion

 

Main categories of imported goods (65% of the total volume):

1. Machinery, equipment, and vehicles: $22.2 billion.

Taxes paid to the budget during customs clearance: UAH 155.5 billion (29% of all customs revenues).

2. Chemical industry output: $10.7 billion.

Taxes paid to the budget: UAH 79.6 billion (15% of all customs revenues).

3. Fuel and energy products: $8.2 billion.

Taxes paid to the budget: UAH 142.3 billion (27% of all customs revenues).

Main categories of exported goods:

1. Food products: $22.6 billion.

2. Metals and metal products: $4.1 billion.

3. Machinery, equipment, and vehicles: $3.2 billion.

Over the 11 months of 2024, UAH 270.3 million was paid to the budget for customs clearance of exported goods subject to export duties.

If we consider the dynamics of Ukrainian agricultural exports, according to the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food, in January-November Ukraine exported about 65.4 million tons of agricultural products, and most of these exports - 57 million tons passed through ports. For comparison, in January-December 2023, 61.7 million tons of agricultural products were exported (through ports - 47 million tons).

For the marketing year 2023/2024 (from July 1, 2023, to July 1, 2024 ), Ukraine exported 67.3 tons of agricultural products, which is almost proportional to the export for the marketing year 2022/2023 - 67.8 million tons, when the grain deal was in effect. Approximately, exports under the grain deal could bring Ukraine about $ 10 billion, about 33 million tons of agricultural products were exported.

Currently, Ukraine transports the bulk of its agricultural exports – 80-90% – by sea. On average, The port throughput capacity in 2024 was 5.2 million tons of products per month (min -4; max -6.4). For comparison, in 2023 it was 4 million tons ( min -2.3; max -5.8)

Let us recall that in July 2023, the Russian Federation unilaterally withdrew from the "grain deal" agreement. Nevertheless, Ukraine, through its efforts, was able to organize an independent "grain corridor" along the western Black Sea coast. In August 2023, the first ship left Ukrainian ports, the safety of which was guaranteed only by Ukraine. Then the Ukrainian Navy reported that they had opened a temporary corridor that could be used by all civilian ships, including those in the ports of "greater Odesa" (Chornomorsk, Odesa and "Yuzhny"). In the first weeks of the route's operation, ship insurance rates reached 3-4%, now - less than 1%. Insurance is carried out jointly with the Ukrainian government and state-owned banks. Half of the risks are covered by Ukraine, and the other half by private insurance companies - those who are called the London pool of insurance companies, grouped around Lloyd's of London.

Ukrainian attacks on the territory of occupied Crimea also played a role, which in turn reduced the ability of the Russian Federation to attack Ukraine's port infrastructure.

Thus, in 2024, Ukraine managed to restore export corridors in the Black Sea. According to the Government, Ukrainian agricultural exports, thanks to the functioning of the Black Sea ports, reached pre-war levels back in February-April 2024 (up to 7 million tons per month). Subsequently (taking into account seasonal factors), the dynamics decreased slightly but remained at a high level. At the same time, the range of goods is now much wider than was envisaged by the "grain deal". In 2024, other important goods were traded through the sea corridors organized by Ukraine, including fuel, vehicles, ores, fertilizers, as well as military and humanitarian aid. In January-October 2024, the total cargo turnover of Ukrainian ports reached 82.3 million tons, which is almost 2 times higher than the figures for the same period in 2023 (46.1 million tons).

Ukraine's huge agricultural production has become a problem for EU farmers and has led to protests and blockades, particularly in Poland.

Ukraine, as a largely agricultural country, is a competitor in European markets.

In April 2024, Poland and Hungary officially banned the import of Ukrainian grain, citing protests from local farmers as the reason for this decision.

In September, when the EU ban on the transit of Ukrainian grain through its territory expired (September 15, 2023), Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia decided to unilaterally extend it.

Poland intends to amend the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union to determine the conditions for Ukraine's future membership in the EU. Poland exports approximately 12-13 million tons of grain, and often the very markets that Ukrainian or Russian exporters take away from them. Ukraine, according to the results of 2023/24 MY (June - July), exported 69.86 million tons of grain and oilseeds. Certain protective mechanisms against the influx of Ukrainian products were introduced by the European Commission's resolution back in June 2024. The EC launched the so-called automatic stop and introduced tariffs on certain products from Ukraine (oats, sugar, eggs, and honey). The measures taken were aimed at protecting European farmers from competition with cheaper Ukrainian products.

The blockade of the Polish-Ukrainian border, which began in the fall of 2023, led to a 90% reduction in border traffic. Polish truckers protested against the abolition of the permit system, which limited the number of Ukrainian trucks crossing the border. During the border blockade, Ukrainian truckers suffered average daily losses of 300 euros. As a result of the Polish border blockade, Ukraine lost about $160 million in exports and $700 million in imports per month.

In response to the protests, the governments of Ukraine and Poland held talks aimed at resolving the conflict issues. Temporary agreements were reached, but many problems remain unresolved, which continues to harm bilateral relations.

But despite the difficulties in trade and the blockade of borders, Poland remains a key trading partner for Ukraine (first in exports and second in imports). In 2023, Ukraine imported goods worth $63.5 billion, of which about $6.6 billion came from Poland. Exports to Poland amounted to about $4.7 billion. The share in Ukraine's total exports is 14.6%. Trade indicators for the 11 months of 2024 (which are given above) also show that trade turnover between Ukraine and Poland has changed insignificantly.

Transit of Russian energy resources through Ukraine.

In September Hungary agreed to extend the transit of Russian oil through Ukraine. Hungarian energy company MOL has reached an agreement that will ensure the continued flow of Russian crude oil through a pipeline running through Ukraine. Under the agreement, MOL, which controls refineries in Hungary and Slovakia, took over crude oil supplies at the Belarus-Ukraine border on September 9. Previously, the Russian side was responsible for transporting crude oil to sites in Hungary and Slovakia near the border with Ukraine.

In late June, Ukraine stopped the transportation of Russian oil from Lukoil. This caused a sharp negative reaction from Hungary, whose oil refining industry is heavily dependent on raw materials from Russia.

The new agreement provides a permanent solution for transporting crude oil via the Druzhba pipeline,” the statement said. Many took this as Ukraine’s approval of further cooperation between Russia and Hungary. But in fact, nothing has changed. Ukraine has not signed any changes to the contracts. They were signed by the Hungarians and the Russians. Now, MOL, not Russia’s Transneft, will be the owner of the oil on the Ukrainian section of the Druzhba pipeline. And MOL, not the Russians, will pay us for transit, which is also provided for in the current contracts. Hungary hopes that this maneuver will insure them against further sanctions from Ukraine, like those that were used against Lukoil. In reality, Ukraine has had and still has full control over the operation of the pipeline, and it can stop it at any time on completely understandable and legal grounds. From joining European sanctions against Russian oil to sudden accidents as a result of Russian shelling. Also, this maneuver does not save Budapest from the EU embargo on the import of Russian oil "Friendship", which received an exception until 2025.

If in 2021 the Russian Federation supplied about 30% of its oil to Europe, then in 2023 it was already about -7%. In 2021, Russia exported 263.6 million tons of crude oil (share in global supplies 12.8%), and in 2023 - 240.8 million tons (share - 11.3%).

Let us recall that Hungary, which supplies two-thirds of its oil needs through Russia, has achieved an exemption from the EU oil embargo introduced at the end of 2022. At the beginning of this year, according to the Finnish Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), Hungary imported Russian barrels worth 184 million euros per month and was the largest buyer of Russian oil in Europe.

Slovakia and the Czech Republic also purchase Russian oil via the Druzhba pipeline (for 149 and 104 million euros, respectively).

The contract for Russian gas transit through Ukraine is ending.

The transit agreement between NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine and Russia's Gazprom (signed in December 2019) expires on December 31, 2024. The following volumes of Russian gas were planned to be transported via Ukraine: 2020: 65 billion cubic meters; 2021–2024: 40 billion cubic meters annually. Thus, over the entire five-year period (2020–2024), the total transit volume was to be at least 225 billion cubic meters of gas.

According to the terms of the contract, Ukraine was to receive more than $7 billion for gas transit.

Russia expects Ukraine and the EU to reach an agreement on the future of gas transportation. But Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has made it clear that his country will not transit Russian gas unless it has guarantees that the Kremlin will not benefit financially while the war continues.

Russia supplies gas to Europe via various routes. In addition to Ukraine, the fuel is transported via the Turkish Stream pipeline section that crosses the Black Sea. Currently, about 15 billion cubic meters are supplied per year via each of the two routes. Supplies are also carried out by tankers in the form of LNG. Russian gas supplies to the European Union from January to November 2024 increased by 25% to 49.6 billion cubic meters. The increase was provided by pipeline supplies, which increased by 26% to 30.3 billion cubic meters. This is approximately 11.1% of all European gas imports. At the end of 2023, this figure was 8.4%. Total gas imports from Russia, including pipeline gas, account for about 16% of gas supplies to the EU. The Russian Federation's share in Hungary's gas imports is 47%, Slovakia's - almost 90%. Austria has completely refused Russian gas, but in January 2024 it received 97% from Gazprom.

It was previously reported that the Ukrainian authorities may agree to a scheme whereby European companies will buy gas from Gazprom at the Russian-Ukrainian border and then transport it via the Ukrainian GTS. That is, Ukraine may agree with a European country - an EU member - to use its gas transportation network for the transit of Russian gas. In this case, Ukraine will conclude a transit contract not with Gazprom, but with European companies. It is not yet known whether such a scheme will be implemente

V. Conclusions and forecasts for 2025.

Shortly, the negative military dynamics for the Ukrainian Armed Forces will persist at the front. The situation at the front has broken out of a strategic deadlock, and Russia has gained a tactical advantage. Therefore, the Russian army will continue its slow advance, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces will retreat. But a strong collapse or collapse of the Ukrainian defense in the Donbas is unlikely shortly. The main reason for this is not only the strength of the Ukrainian army, but also the high exhaustion of the Russian army, and new warfare technologies - reconnaissance equipment, and drones, which do not allow armies to advance quickly even after breaking through formal defense lines.

The lack of sufficient funding and arms supplies from the West will weaken Ukraine's defense capability and it will become increasingly difficult to maintain defense in the future. The loss of the salient in the Kurakhovo area (Donetsk region) is possible shortly, before the end of 2024. This could lead to the loss of operational space in the east of the country. The territories occupied by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kursk region could become an area that will be extremely difficult to hold, which will increase the pressure in the northern direction. With limited military aid to Ukraine, Russia may attempt to conduct new large-scale offensive operations in the Zaporizhia and Donetsk regions, and later in 2025 in the Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk regions.

The Trump administration could make the Russian-Ukrainian war a European problem: significantly cut or even stop military and financial aid to Ukraine, which would create the risk of internal political instability.

D. Trump may conclude a deal with Russian President V. Putin, which will probably be limited and require mutual concessions. An adjustment of the sanctions policy is possible, a partial easing of sanctions in exchange for certain concessions from the Russian Federation. Ukraine may be forced to refuse to join NATO. The conflict will most likely be stopped along the front line, without Ukraine officially renouncing the occupied territories.

The United States may begin to put pressure on both sides of the conflict to reach a peace agreement.

Pressure will be put on Ukraine through cutting aid and provoking internal political turbulence.

Russia could face increased sanctions, including secondary sanctions against its trading partners, as well as increased military aid to Ukraine.

Overall, there is no guarantee that the peace initiatives of D. Trump’s team will ultimately be successful.

If Ukrainian President V. Zelensky and D. Trump fail to find common ground on peace talks, the new US administration may shift its focus to supporting other political forces in Ukraine. This could speed up the holding of presidential, parliamentary, and local elections, which are likely to take place as early as 2025.

Overall, the probability of holding elections in Ukraine in 2025 is high, we estimate it at around -40%. The elections may become part of the peace process, but they may also be provoked by an internal political crisis, worsening relations with the United States, and a military crisis at the front.

A possible failure of the negotiation process initiated by D. Trump practically guarantees a new escalation of the war and its continuation in the coming years. In this case, a split between the US and its European allies (Britain and France) is possible. It is highly likely that in the future the EU will be forced to take on the bulk of the responsibility for supporting Ukraine. Britain and France, having their own historical and strategic interests in the region, may continue to support Ukraine even if the US is removed, to maintain control at least along the Kiev-Odessa line.

If, as a result of D. Trump's peace initiatives, a ceasefire does not take place and the war continues, and Ukraine does not receive the necessary military funding, or it is limited, a turning point in the war could occur during the winter of 2024 - spring of 2025. It is likely that this year and next year the Russian Federation will be able to seize significant territories of Ukraine in Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and, possibly, in the Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk regions. By the end of 2024, Ukraine may lose the salient in the area of Kurakhovo and the city itself in the Donetsk region. Also, next year, it will be extremely difficult for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to maintain control over the occupied territories of the Kursk region of the Russian Federation.

APPLICATION

 

• 1. Political calendar 2024 G.

 

1. In the Donetsk region, the Russian Federation captured an important fortified area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the city of Maryinka – January.

2. The final integration of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan will take place on January 1.

3. Ukrainian President V. Zelensky dismissed V. Zaluzhny from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – on February 8.

4. The death of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny "closes the door" to the restoration of any more liberal political model of governance in the Russian Federation - February 16.

5. Occupation of the city of Avdiivka in Donetsk region by the Russian Federation – February 17.

6. Sweden officially became NATO's 32nd member on March 7.

7. Raid in Belgorod and Kursk regions on the territory of the Russian Federation by volunteer military units operating on the side of Ukraine – from March 12 to March 21.

8. Presidential elections were held in the Russian Federation on March 15-17.

9. The US House of Representatives approved a bill to allocate approximately $61 billion in aid to Ukraine on April 20.

10. Russian troops launched an offensive in the Kharkiv region - on May 10th.

11. A new law on mobilization came into force in Ukraine on May 18.

12. Elections to the European Parliament – June 6-9.

13. The 50th G7 summit took place in Italy – June 13-15.

14. The 1st Global Peace Summit on Ukraine was held in Switzerland – June 15-16.

15. The European Union has formally launched accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova, noting significant progress in meeting the requirements for the start of negotiations on June 25.

16. The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov on June 25.

17. US presidential debate between Joe Biden and Donald Trump – June 27.

18. Hungary began its presidency of the EU Council - from 1 July to 31 December.

19. Parliamentary elections in France. The left-wing alliance "New Popular Front" won. It overtook both the centrists of President E. Macron and the far-right of Marine Le Pen. — June 30 - July 7.

20. UK parliamentary elections. The Labour Party wins, and Keir Starmer becomes the new Prime Minister of Great Britain - on July 4.

21. The NATO summit in Washington (USA) was dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the Alliance — July 9-11.

22. Assassination attempt on US presidential candidate Donald Trump — July 13th.

23. Republican National Convention. D. Trump becomes Republican presidential nominee — July 15-18.

24. Current US President Joe Biden announced that he will not participate in the presidential race - July 21.

25. Ukraine begins military operation in the Kursk region - on August 6th.

26. Democratic National Convention in the United States. Vice President Kamala Harris becomes the Democratic presidential nominee — August 19-22.

27. Major personnel reformatting of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine - September.

28. US presidential candidates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump debate on September 10.

29. Law 3894-IX "On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on the Activities of Religious Organizations in Ukraine" came into force in Ukraine, the new name is "On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Sphere of Activities of Religious Organizations". It is believed that this law opened the way to the ban of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) in Ukraine - on September 23.

30. Israel's invasion of Lebanon begins. Iran attacks Israel with some 200 ballistic missiles. - October 1.

31. Russian troops captured the city of Ugledar in the Donetsk region on October 1.

32. The Russian army launched a counteroffensive in the Kursk region - on October 10.

33. President Volodymyr Zelensky presented the Victory Plan in the Verkhovna Rada on October 16.

34. BRICS Heads of State Summit in Kazan (Russia) - October 22-24.

35. Presidential elections were held in Moldova. The current president Maia Sandu was re-elected for a second term - October 20 - November 3.

36. The US presidential election was held. Republican candidate Donald Trump won the election - on November 5th.

37. Ukrainian President V. Zelensky extended martial law and general mobilization for the 13th time for 90 days - from November 10, 2024, to February 7, 2025 - November.

38. The G20 summit was held in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) — November 18-19.

39. US President J. Biden permitted Ukraine to fire Western long-range missiles deep into Russian territory - November 18.

40. President Volodymyr Zelensky presented the internal Ukraine Resilience Plan in the Verkhovna Rada on November 19.

41. The Verkhovna Rada adopted the law on the state budget for 2025 - November 19.

42. Russia made changes to its nuclear doctrine - on November 19.

43. Russia strikes Dnepr with hypersonic missile - November 21st.

44. The International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu - on November 21.

45. The American Gallup Institute has published a poll, according to which support for negotiations in Ukraine has reached 52%, exceeding the majority mark for the first time since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in November.

46. Meeting in Paris of the newly elected US President D. Trump, the President of France E. Macron, and the President of Ukraine V. Zelensky - December 7th.

47. The Fall of Bashar al-Assad's Regime in Syria - December 8th.

48. Israel, considering the separation of forces agreement between Israel and Syria to be invalid, introduced troops into the buffer zone on December 8.

49. The Electoral College confirmed Donald Trump's victory in the US presidential election on December 17.

50. The contract for Russian gas transit through Ukraine ends on December 17.

• 2. Political calendar for 2025 G.

1. Poland will hold the Presidency of the Council of the European Union for the second time – from 1 January to 30 June.

2. Bulgaria and Romania will join the Schengen area on January 1.

3. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand will join the BRICS on January 1.

4. Inauguration of the elected US President D. Trump – January 20.

5. Kazakhstan to officially become BRICS partner country - January.

6. Presidential elections in Belarus - January 26.

7. General elections in Ecuador - February 9;

8. Early presidential elections in Abkhazia - February 15.

9. Early parliamentary elections in Germany, caused by the collapse of the ruling coalition, are scheduled for February 23.

10. Presidential elections in Romania – March.

11. Expo 2025 Osaka, Japan, opens on April 13.

12. Presidential elections in Poland – May.

13. The general elections in the Philippines, which could affect the country's domestic and foreign policies, are on May 12.

14. The 51st G7 Summit in Alberta, Canada – June.

15. The NATO summit will be held in The Hague (Netherlands) on June 24–26.

16. Bulgaria is expected to switch to the euro on July 1.

17. General elections in Bolivia - August 17.

18. Parliamentary elections in Norway - September 8.

19. End of official support for the Windows 10 operating system - October 14.

20. The BRICS summit will be held in Brazil. The exact dates for the summit have not yet been officially announced, but it is expected to take place in October.

21. The G20 summit will be held in South Africa. The exact dates for the summit have not yet been officially announced, but it is expected to take place in November.

 

Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovskaya, Andrey Timchenko

 

UIP, 2024