Perspective – Written by Péter-Pál Kránitz & Ruslan Bortnik & Sándor Seremet
The full analysis is available here.
The European Union’s South Caucasus policy is broken. A diplomatic breakdown with Georgia, political disengagement from Azerbaijan, and unrealistic expectations placed on Armenia have eroded European influence in a region critical for energy security, connectivity, and geopolitical balance. By applying norms without strategy, Brussels has weakened its partnerships, empowered rival powers, and jeopardized access to vital transport corridors. Repairing this policy requires halting escalation with Georgia, rebalancing ties with Azerbaijan, grounding engagement with Armenia in realism, cooperating closely with the United States and Türkiye, and establishing a model for regional relations with Iran and Russia. Without decisive action, Europe risks losing its foothold in the South Caucasus entirely.
The Strategic Vacuum Created by the EU in Georgia
It was a strategic—and a potentially irreparable—mistake by the European Union to cut ties with the Georgian government and attempt to delegitimize and isolate its closest political partner in the South Caucasus. The EU decision to freeze Georgia’s accession process, the statements made by the European Commission and the European Parliament delegitimizing Georgia’s 2024 parliamentary and presidential elections, and the threats of sanctions on government officials and visa restrictions for both Georgian diplomats and everyday citizens have damaged the perceived credibility of the European Union in Georgia severely and undermined bilateral cooperation in all spheres from economy to politics.
Debates over which side initiated the ongoing standoff between Tbilisi and Brussels are unproductive, but it is well-founded to assert that the ongoing diplomatic row first exploded in 2022. The Russian invasion of Ukraine destabilized regional security and shifted the balance of power in Europe’s eastern neighborhood significantly. It gave momentum to Euro-Atlantic integration from Sweden through Moldova to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It seemed that the time had come for Georgia to transform its hard-earned European and North Atlantic partnership into a comprehensive political and economic association and for the EU to strengthen its normative power and expand its limited geopolitical footprint in the South Caucasus. But the EU instead refused Georgia’s candidacy in 2022 and attempted to pressure the country of 3.7 million to join its sanctions regime against Russia. This instigated a chain of events that led to a crisis in bilateral relations and a complete lack of communication between the two partners. There is an ongoing and spiraling escalation of political conflict that is fueled by recurrent mutual gestures of discord, such as the European Commission’s decision not to invite Georgia to high profile political forums on security and enlargement or the chair of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) joining street protesters calling for the overthrow of the government, which resulted in Georgia’s decision not to attend the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly.
The strategic vacuum that Brussels leaves behind in Georgia poses grave strategic and security threats to both the EU and Georgia. The South Caucasus is a region with key geostrategic significance for the European Union. It is home to transport corridors and energy infrastructure crucial for the future of secure and stable European supply chains and energy security, especially in light of the EU’s implemented and planned sanctions regimes on transportation through Russia and its aim to end all Russian fossil imports by the end of 2027. Without the Georgian foothold, the EU has little to no room for political maneuver in the region and is therefore reliant on the good faith of other regional players—however, it has allowed its relations with all three regional powers, Russia, Türkiye, and Iran, to deteriorate. All of strategic connectivity infrastructure connecting the EU to the Caspian region—pipelines, railways, and highways—run through Georgia, and access is of geostrategic significance. Georgia has a lot to offer. For example, it is yet to make a final decision on the future of the development of the Anaklia port, one that has the potential to handle 600,000 containers annually and become a major gateway for EU–Asia trade. The Georgian government has repeatedly called for the restoration of high-level communication and the consolidation of relations with EU decision makers, and it is high time to do so, all the more so because the South Caucasus is a top foreign policy priority for other regional powers, most essentially for Russia, which would not hesitate to reinstate its regional influence once the opportunity arises. Although the row between the EU and Georgia might not be that opportunity, it certainly increases Georgia’s exposure to foreign influence.
Recalibrating the EU’s Ties with Azerbaijan, Its Trans-Caspian Gateway
Azerbaijan had emerged as a regional powerhouse in the South Caucasus. It is first in size, population, natural resources, economic output, military strength, and practically all sociopolitical and geoeconomic spheres in the region. This enabled Baku to restore its territorial integrity by force in 2020 and 2023. The failure of international institutions to foster a peaceful resolution to the Karabakh conflict was followed by the failure of European and multilateral mechanisms to offer substantial contributions to peacemaking efforts, particularly since 2023. The official reason given by Azerbaijan is the perceived bias of the EU and some of its member states toward Armenia. President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly claimed that France and the EU are supporting Armenian separatism in Nagorno-Karabakh, which was put forth as the official reason for Baku’s rejection of EU-brokered peace negotiations.
Azerbaijan’s perception of bias on the European side has had far-reaching consequences beyond the peace process. Azerbaijan has de facto cut political coordination with the European Union, especially in the realms of human rights, good governance, democratic norms and institutions, and regional development, limiting bilateral dialogue to economic cooperation, particularly in the areas of trade and finance. One symbolic episode of this process was Azerbaijan’s suspension of its participation in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, citing bias, political corruption, discrimination, and double standards.
The absence of Europe in Azerbaijan may prove to be consequential for the EU’s energy security and its economic engagement in the South Caucasus and beyond, particularly in Central Asia. Azerbaijan’s proven reserves of hydrocarbons stand at seven billion barrels of crude oil, or some 0.4 percent of global reserves, and 60 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, which is one percent of the world’s total reserves. As most of Azerbaijan’s pipeline system runs to the West, over 75 percent of its fossil fuel production is exported to the EU. Bilateral trade volumes are steadily increasing and will further increase if the EU goes through with its plan to fully decouple from Russian energy. Moreover, Azerbaijan is the EU’s gateway to Central Asia. All land routes from Europe to the landlocked region run through either Russia, Iran, or Azerbaijan, the latter remaining the only viably corridor due to European sanctions. As Central Asia emerges as a global hub for future production of critical raw materials, the EU will need access to Azerbaijan’s dynamically developing transportation infrastructure, and such dependencies require strong political ties.
We do not argue that the EU needs to abandon its European values and democratic norms in its foreign policy. On the contrary, if the end goal is truly to protect human rights in Azerbaijan and the rights of the Armenian refugees of Nagorno Karabakh, the EU must first establish a working relationship with both sides—both Yerevan and Baku. Intraregional issues, regular and forced migration among them, may only be settled once a peace treaty is ratified, and the EU can only play a secondary role in the process. Sustainable long-term arrangements require bilateral consensus that is founded on geopolitical realities and considers the specifics of regional political and social systems.
The EU’s Abuse of Soft Power in Armenia
The European Union has overextended its soft power in Armenia by giving false hopes of European integration that it is neither willing nor prepared to fulfill. Armenia is in an extremely fragile regional and international environment in which a geopolitical realignment, such as a pivot by Yerevan to the EU, could pose severe security risks. Take energy security, for example. Armenia is dependent on Russian and Iranian energy: Russia accounts for over 80 percent of its natural gas imports, and Iran accounts for the rest. Although oil imports are more diversified, Russia provides some 80 percent. Should Armenia join the EU tomorrow, it would have to cut all its fossil imports from Iran due to sanctions, and by the end of 2027, it would be forced to ban Russian fossils too. That would leave Armenia completely reliant on its western and eastern neighbors, Türkiye and Azerbaijan, with whom, as of today, it has no open borders, does not maintain official diplomatic or economic ties, and shares unresolved territorial, ethnic, and historic conflicts. Energy is but one aspect of the immanent antagonisms of Armenia’s European integration, and there are many. Armenia is a member of another single market, the Eurasian Economic Union. Armenia’s largest trade partner has long been Russia, which accounted for 41 percent of foreign trade in 2024—the EU accounted for only 7.5 percent. But among all the frictions of Armenia’s European integration, geography stands out. Armenia is a landlocked country in a distant region. More than one thousand kilometers, a sea, and a 311-kilometer-long closed border stand in between Armenia and the EU’s eastern borders, which will hinder comprehensive connectivity projects for the foreseeable future.
EU–Armenia relations are yet another example of the democratic double standards that the European Commission employs in its relations with Eastern Partnership and other candidate countries. Armenian authorities have taken actions widely criticized as contrary to democratic norms: Up to a dozen top clergymen, two Archbishops among them, the mayor of the second largest Armenian city, Gyumri, and the country’s wealthiest businessman, Samvel Karapetyan, have been detained or imprisoned since June 2025. Yet the European Commission and the European Parliament have failed to denounce these incidents or condemn Armenian authorities. In Armenia, the EU employs neither norms nor strategy: It is pushing Armenia’s pivot to the West to its limits without clear political goals or offering substantial alternatives to previous geopolitical arrangements. The EU’s single contribution to Armenia’s stability, its unarmed monitoring mission, is set to either end or withdraw from the border regions once a peace treaty is ratified between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The EU’s South Caucasus policy is broken. Its approach has been driven by an irresponsible mix of chance, voluntarism, and the selfish interests of individual EU countries, often framed through the prism of competition and confrontation with Russia, Iran or Türkiye. Its policy poses serious security and strategic risks to both the bloc and some of its own regional partners and needs to be repaired. The EU needs to shed its geopolitical lens and recognize the subjectivity and interests of the South Caucasus countries as a starting point for negotiations.
To mitigate the risks of the row with Georgia, the escalation of the diplomatic quarrel must stop, and high-level bilateral communication needs to be reestablished. The EU should refrain from meddling in Georgia’s internal affairs, namely the discursive delegitimization of past elections, and from other provocations such as the participation of EU ministers and MEPs in anti-government protests. If the EU is indeed committed to Georgia’s European integration, it should remove the suspension of the visa-free regime for Georgian citizens from its political agenda and instead support mechanisms for people-to-people, educational, and cultural cooperation and coordination. The EU should extend an economic and financial umbrella to Georgia that would contribute to Georgia’s resilience to foreign coercion and interference. The EU has neither the sticks nor the carrots to enforce its will on the Georgian government. Its focus on liberal and democratic norms without a comprehensive foreign policy strategy are therefore as ineffective as laws without enforcement or words without will.
The European Union should recalibrate its political relationship with Azerbaijan in a way that recognizes regional geopolitical dynamics and realities. This translates to a more nuanced and attentive approach to regional developments that takes into account the most significant foreign and security policy principles of all conflicting sides. The Armenian government has invested enormous political capital into fostering and furthering the peace process, including commitments to shift decades-long traditions of Armenian memory politics that were extremely unpopular among the voters despite the proximity of the 2026 parliamentary elections. Should the EU openly accept and support the guiding principles of the bilateral peace process—rescheduling the issue of mutual refugee repatriation, for example—it could reestablish a working political relationship with both Armenia and Azerbaijan and assert some of its interests in the region. Balanced European engagement in Armenia and Azerbaijan would be well-founded on the shared political volition to diversify the region’s geopolitical dependencies, which were traditionally characterized by strong Russian political and economic influence.
The EU should do everything within its power to contribute to the development of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which was put forth by the Washington Declaration signed on August 8, in order to secure the establishment of a new regional transport corridor that truly benefits all participating states by interconnecting East–West and North–South transport links within Armenia and expanding regional connectivity rather than division. The route has the potential to bear witness to the feasibility of regional cooperation and connectivity and to an old geopolitical wisdom long overlooked by European decisionmakers: There is no connectivity between the EU and the South Caucasus and no substantial Western South Caucasus policy without Turkish participation. The EU must therefore establish partnership and cooperation with Türkiye and with Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan at the bilateral and minilateral levels. The establishment of a 3+1 format comprising the three states in the region and the EU or a 3+2 format that also includes Türkiye may be wise.
If the EU intends to repair its broken policy in the South Caucasus, it must cooperate with Türkiye and develop a pragmatic model of regional relations with Iran and Russia. Without European will and means to participate in the dialogue that will shape the region’s future, the geopolitical arrangements of the South Caucasus will be forged by a transactional United States, an assertive Türkiye, a self-confident Azerbaijan, and potentially even an upset and combative Russia and Iran—with no democratic Europe at the table. In doing so, the EU could overcome its recent tactical failures and strategic irresponsibility in the South Caucasus and prevent yet another historic catastrophe for both Georgia and Armenia.
