On March 7, President of Ukraine V. Zelensky announced that he had agreed on the candidacy of the Ukrainian Ambassador to the UK; he will be the ex-commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine V. Zaluzhny. Later, the request for an agrément for V. Zaluzhny was confirmed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs D. Kuleba. Also, The Washington Post published a complimentary article about this decision with the main message that “the United States is not against it.”
Theoretically, such an appointment could be beneficial to two parties: V. Zelensky will get rid of a political competitor who creates a feeling of dualism in the political system, and V. Zaluzhny will be able to maintain a clean reputation for subsequent predicted problems at the front and in the country by leaving for Great Britain, and at the same time being in the public eye and waiting for his political chance.
But so far, the ex-commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, V. Zaluzhny, has not publicly reacted to his appointment as ambassador to the UK. The general has remained silent for several days and has not yet confirmed his desire to accept this position.
It strengthens the suspicion of a specific game on the OP's part, aiming to expel V. Zaluzhny from Ukraine under the pretext of diplomatic work. The Ukrainian opposition (in particular, P. Poroshenko's entourage) thinks so, especially against the backdrop of SOCIS ratings, which demonstrate the electoral dominance of V. Zaluzhny over V. Zelensky.
The transfer of V. Zaluzhny to the UK may represent a strategic move by V. Zelensky aimed at neutralizing possible attempts to involve the former commander-in-chief in the country's political confrontation.
It is evident that with the appointment of V. Zaluzhny, the opposition loses a probable leader—a "ram" against V. Zelensky. The opposition will try to convince V. Zaluzhny not to accept the President's proposal (especially the team of ex-President P. Poroshenko).
V. Zaluzhny's silence may indicate that he does not particularly agree with the new position, and the behind-the-scenes bargaining or pressure on him from the Office of the President and some Western partners continues.
Although Western media report that the nomination of V. Zaluzhny for the post of Ukrainian ambassador to the UK resulted from an agreement between him and the President of Ukraine, V. Zelensky, this is most likely not the case. And the President's speech with a proposal for V. Zaluzhny came as a surprise to him.
V. Zaluzhny may refuse the President's proposal, citing health reasons. It would further intensify political turbulence in Ukraine against an intensifying parliamentary crisis.
We wrote back in January that if a reorganization of power begins in Ukraine, it will start with the parliament. The factor of the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, V. Zaluzhny, around whom the opposition may rally today, can play a decisive role. A majority "for Zaluzhny" is gradually forming in parliament, which could ultimately cause a rebellion against the authorities.
The mono-majority in parliament allowed Vladimir Zelensky to establish complete control over the government and security forces - which turned into mono-power. And if the President loses his majority in parliament, he cannot independently pass the laws he needs.
It has become increasingly more work for the authorities to organize deputies to vote.
So last week, The leadership of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine decided to cancel parliamentary meetings for two weeks. Officially, the reason is that members of the Servant of the People faction go on trips to army units on the front line.
However, the opposition suggests that the reason for the cancellation of parliamentary meetings could be the need to consider the bill concerning the tightening of mobilization in the second reading. This document was already regarded as problematic in securing a sufficient number of votes, and the situation has only worsened. The draft of the new mobilization law is causing concern among civilians and irritation among military personnel, many of whom are waiting to strengthen their ranks or secretly counting on the possibility of rotation.
However, both the adoption and rejection of this bill will impact the authorities' authority: in the first case, they risk losing part of their electorate that opposes mobilization, and in the second, misunderstandings and growing discontent among the military may arise.
The parliamentary crisis also manifests within the Servant of the People faction, which is increasingly fragmented. One group of deputies continues to focus on the OP or Western partners, while the other is looking for alternative sources of the future (the opposition or V. Zaluzhny's project).
Internal contradictions echo other critical factors - the situation at the front, which raises fears for the country's future and doubts about the current government's prospects. Another one is related to the efforts of P. Poroshenko and other opponents of V. Zelensky to raise the question of the legitimacy of the President after May 20, 2024. In this case, we are discussing completing the five-year term of V. Zelensky's constitutional powers.
However, the CEC believes that after May 20, there can be no doubt about the legitimacy of President V. Zelensky. The CEC refers to Articles 106 and 108 of the Constitution of Ukraine. Also, the Law of Ukraine "On the legal regime of martial law" determines that during the period of martial law, the powers of the President of Ukraine cannot be terminated (part one of Article 10). In the event of the expiration of the term of office of the President of Ukraine during martial law, his powers continue until the newly elected President of Ukraine, elected after the lifting of martial law, takes office.
However, this aggravation can lead to severe consequences only if the presidential administration loses control over the parliamentary majority and his opponents can seize it. In such a scenario, a change in the parliament speaker and an attempt to take control of the government is possible. However, it is unlikely that Western allies will support such opposition moves due to fears of destabilization in general. However, in the event of further deterioration of the situation in the country and at the front, any development of events is not excluded.
This week, the sociology Socis was widely circulated in the Ukrainian media; its data show that the ex-commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine V. Zaaluzhny would have scored 41% in the first round of elections, and V. Zelensky - 23.7%. Poroshenko (6.4%) and Razumkov (5.6%) were left far behind. In the second round, V. Zaluzhny would defeat V. Zelensky with 67.5% of the votes against 32.5%.
In the event of parliamentary elections, the conditional “Zaluzhny Bloc” would win - 46.4%. The Zelensky Bloc would have gained 21.1%, and P. Poroshenko’s party - 7.5%. The blocs of P. Pritula and D. Razumkov would have received approximately 7% each.
Most respondents (59.7%) rejected holding elections during the war, compared with a quarter (24.2%) who said the vote should occur.
However, in general, this sociology may have specific political overtones.
Regarding peace negotiations, Opinions for and against continuing the war were divided almost equally in Ukraine. 36% of Ukrainians agree to compromise to end the war through the mediation of other countries. 8.2% favor suspending hostilities and freezing the conflict on the front line. In general, 44.3% of respondents favor stopping the war through compromises in one form or another. At the same time, only 33.5% of respondents support the continuation of the war with access to the 1991 borders. Another 11% want to fight until the return of territories captured after a full-scale invasion in 2022 (that is, without Crimea and the “LPR”). In total, 44.5% of Ukrainians support the continuation of the war in one form or another.
It becomes clear that in November 2024. Joe Biden (Democratic) and Donald Trump (Republican) will again fight for the right to take the US presidency. Let us recall that last week, the US Supreme Court rejected the decision of a Colorado judge who excluded Donald Trump from the Republican primaries because he took part in "insurrection or insurrection." Similar to Colorado's decision, several other states issued similar bans on Trump.
The results of the US elections (depending on who becomes President, D. Trump or D. Biden) may significantly affect the political balance worldwide and in Europe in particular.
The latest American primaries show that ex-President D. Trump is beginning to lead current US President D. Biden by an average of 4%, while his ratings show positive dynamics. In this regard, the President of Ukraine's team is trying to find different ways of interacting with the Republican camp and D. Trump, in particular. Still, so far, these attempts have yet to be entirely successful. In addition, this is causing an adverse reaction in the White House, where they are making it clear that these steps are not going unnoticed.
In the West, they predict that, in general, without an increase in military assistance from Western allies and a change in Ukraine's war strategy, the position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces at the front could sharply worsen by the summer.
The most crucial package of US military and financial assistance for Ukraine is now stuck in Congress. The assistance issue to Ukraine in the United States will likely be considered at the end of March—beginning of April 2024.
Last Thursday, US President D. Biden delivered a message to Congress, part of which he dedicated to Ukraine and Putin. He called for unblocking aid to Ukraine and promised that American soldiers would not fight for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
In Europe, Ukraine's main allies have increasing disagreements regarding the nature of the volume and range of military assistance to Ukraine. Currently, due to the problematic situation at the front in Ukraine, there is increasing fear in Europe and Germany, in particular, of being involved in a war with the Russian Federation, which is fraught with escalation into a global nuclear conflict. Officially, the Bundestag has refused to provide Ukraine with long-range Taurus missiles.
Also, French President E. Allies strongly criticized Macron's statement about the possible deployment of troops in Ukraine. It was clarified that France could send troops to Ukraine if the front moves towards Kyiv or Odesa (as the Secretary of the French Communist Party, Fabien Roussel, conveyed E. Macron's words after the President met with the leaders of French parties).
Germany noted that E. Macron’s comments “really do not help solve Ukraine’s problems.”
So far, the possible prospect of entering into a direct war with the Russian Federation, with the threat of it escalating into a nuclear one, has caused an open split within NATO and created conditions for the growth of the number of supporters of the idea of an early end to the war. It also plays against increasing aid to Ukraine.
Privately, the German government complains that while Macron has been tough on Ukraine, he has not given it the same military support as Germany.
Germany's Kiel Institute, which collects data on national contributions to the war effort for Ukraine, ranks France as a clear laggard with military aid at 640 million euros, compared with Germany, which has provided or pledged 17.7 billion euros.
The French dispute these figures and argue that they provide weapons that matter at the front.
So far, most European allies are striving to maintain a certain balance regarding the Ukrainian-Russian war - to help Ukraine continue the war, but at the same time not to directly enter into it themselves.
But in general, a protracted war in Ukraine in the future creates significant risks of European countries being drawn into it in one way or another. Ukraine's mobilization potential is limited and is 2-3 times less than in the Russian Federation. Therefore, if the war in such a regime and with such intensity as it now lasts for another 1.5-2 years, then the presence of Western troops in Ukraine will become essential.
Let us recall that the Russian Federation has intensified its threats regarding the use of nuclear weapons recently. If previously, this was mainly discussed publicly by Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, D. Medvedev, and journalists from federal television channels of the Russian Federation, now V. Putin himself has joined them.
Thus, Russian President V. Putin, in his message to the Federal Assembly, made it clear that the Russian Federation could launch a nuclear missile strike on those NATO countries that send their troops to Ukraine.
In an interview with D. Kiselev for Rossiya 1 and RIA Novosti, V. Putin said that from a military-technical point of view, Russia is ready for a nuclear war. He also added that the Russian nuclear triad is more modern than the triads of other states.
The Russian President criticized the entry of Finland and Sweden into NATO. He stated that he would station troops on the border with Finland, ready to use nuclear weapons if necessary.
According to him, the use of nuclear weapons is envisaged only if the existence, sovereignty, and independence of the Russian Federation are threatened.
V. Putin does not believe that the United States or other allied countries are now ready to send their troops to Ukraine, but warned that if they do this, then the Russian Federation “will be ready and will react.”
Due to the problematic situation at the front for Ukrainian troops, calls around the world are intensifying for the resumption of the peace process. Thus, the Pope's statement regarding starting negotiations with the Russian Federation caused a significant resonance. When asked by a journalist about his attitude towards Ukraine's possible defeat, the Pope said that he considers the one who thinks about people and sees the situation more robust and who "dares to raise the white flag and negotiate." Today, this can be agreed upon with the help of international powers. For the most part, in Ukraine, this statement by the pontiff was perceived as a call for Ukraine to recognize itself as the losing side in the war and agree to negotiations and capitulation, which caused a corresponding adverse reaction. President V. Zelensky indirectly responded to the Pope that he was engaged in "virtual mediation between those who want to live and those who want to destroy you."
The Vatican later clarified that the Pope did not call for Ukraine to capitulate but called for negotiations to end the war. "The Pope also uses the term 'white flag' in response to the image suggested by the interviewer, denoting a cessation of hostilities, a truce achieved through the courage of negotiations." Based on this quote, the Pope did not call for Ukraine to capitulate but for negotiations to end the war.
In general, it is evident that "shuttle negotiations" between the parties to the conflict have now intensified. In particular, the PRC and Turkey again show their initiative as the principal negotiators. At the same time, Ukraine is trying to persuade China and Turkey to its position.
So, on March 7, China's Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs, Li Hui, officially visited Ukraine. A briefing was held for Ambassador Xi Jinping and the entire Chinese delegation, chaired by the head of the Office of the President Andriy Yermak.
The PRC, which has never condemned the Russian aggression against Ukraine, is now holding extensive "shuttle negotiations" on the possibility of peace between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The country's authorities are negotiating with both sides of the conflict and Western countries, drawing up their own picture of the situation. So, before he visited Ukraine, the Chinese special representative held a meeting in Moscow. After Ukraine, Li Hui, along with other representatives of the Chinese government, will visit Poland, Germany, and France. They will also see the EU headquarters in Brussels. Ukraine is actively trying to involve China on its side of the confrontation with the Russian Federation and to participate in the Global Peace Summit, offering it projects in the agricultural and energy sectors. Still, the development of this cooperation (except for the war factor) is hampered by the position of the United States and previously accumulated misunderstandings between the parties (for example, the situation around Motorsichi). In general, Li Hui's visit was informational and monitoring - the PRC checked whether Ukraine was ready to compromise with the Russian Federation.
President of Ukraine Vladimir Zelensky paid an official visit to Turkey, where he held a bilateral meeting with President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan and representatives of Turkish defense companies. V. Zelensky expressed Ukraine's interest in strengthening bilateral cooperation and partnership with Turkish defense companies. Ukraine is counting on Turkey's help in the release of prisoners of war and other Ukrainian citizens who are in Russian captivity.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has again offered his country as a platform for peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. He expressed regret that the potential of the negotiation platform that Turkey created in March 2022 was not used. Ankara supports new agreements between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, such as the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
V. Zelensky, for his part, once again emphasized that he expects to receive fair peace for Ukraine as a result. He said he spoke with Recep Tayyip Erdogan about the upcoming peace summit in Switzerland and counted on Turkey's leadership role in implementing this initiative. V. Zelensky noted that at this stage, the Russian Federation will not be invited to the summit, and first, "civilized countries will develop a plan, and only then representatives of the Russian Federation will be invited."
At the front, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation continue their gradual advance in Avdiivka on the Donetsk front. So, the Russians advanced east of the settlement Berdychi northwest of Avdiivka. There are battles in the eastern part of Orlivka, and to the south, the Russians are attacking Tonenke from the flanks. But the Ukrainian Armed Forces counterattacked there, knocking Russian forces out of several buildings. In the Maryinka direction, the Russians advanced south of the village of Georgyivka and southwest of Novomykhailivka. Attempts to advance also resumed near the town of Ugledar in the Donetsk region and advanced to the center of the village Ivanivske near the city of Bakhmut.
In Ukraine, a forced evacuation of children was announced in four settlements of the Donetsk region (where it was not reported); the same was done in the Kupyansky district of the Kharkiv region, where Russian troops again advanced on the northern outskirts of the village of Sinkovka.
One factor in Russian troops' small but frequent advance at the front is the massive use of aerial bombs. The Russian Federation's advantage in the number of artillery shells is also essential. The Russian Army now fires 10,000 shells a day, while the Ukrainian Armed Forces fire 2,000.
According to NATO intelligence estimates, Russia produces about 25,000 artillery ammunition per month or about 3 million annually. In comparison, the United States and Europe can collectively produce about 1.2 million ammunition annually for shipment to Ukraine.
In its "Monthly Macroeconomic and Monetary Review," the National Bank reports that the state budget deficit in January-February 2024 increased due to a decrease in external revenues. The NBU does not indicate the exact size of the deficit, but they report that in the first two months of the year, Ukraine received only $1.2 billion in external funding ($0.9 billion - in grants).
As of March 1, 2024, Ukraine’s international reserves amounted to $37,052.0 million. USA, contracting by 3.8% in February. It is noted that the NBU's foreign exchange interventions predetermine such dynamics to maintain exchange rate stability and the country's debt payments in foreign currency, which were partially offset by receipts from international partners. At the same time, the demand for foreign currency decreased in February due to the containment of budget expenditures, a good export situation, and an improvement in the population's exchange rate expectations.
In just two years of full-scale war, Ukraine has attracted more than $75 billion in foreign aid. The state spends only internal resources on security and defense needs. Other areas require help from partners. About 37 billion were raised in 2022, more than 42 billion in 2023, and at least 37 billion this year.
This year's budget deficit is over 20% of the country's GDP - 37 billion. The government expects us to attract $17.3 billion from the EU Ukraine Facility mechanisms (50 billion euros for four years).
In January 2024, record volumes of products were exported during a full-scale invasion—12 million tons, of which 8.7 million were exported by sea. The most significant increase was recorded in iron ore supplies, which almost doubled to 3.2 million tons.
Ukraine increased the volume of electricity exports thanks to repairs in the energy sector. Thanks to the increase in generation capacity, a surplus of electricity is recorded in the energy system. In February, Ukraine sold 64 thousand MWh of electricity to its neighbors in just six days of March - 57 thousand MWh. For more than 120 days of the heating season, Ukraine applied for so-called emergency assistance only eight times when it urgently received electricity from neighboring countries. At the same time, Ukraine itself provided such aid 12 times.
The volume of remittances to Ukraine, previously one of the primary sources of foreign currency entering the country, has declined for the second year. According to the report of the National Bank, for 2023, the volume of remittances from individuals decreased by 7.8%, and in 2022, by 10.5%. In absolute terms, the dynamics are as follows: 2021 - $14 billion; 2022 - $12.5 billion; 2023 - $11.6 billion. Also, much more money is now “ flowing" out of Ukraine through the expenses of Ukrainians abroad than coming into the country through remittances.
The main reasons for the decrease in cash receipts may be as follows: some of the labor migrants who were abroad even before the full-scale war, after it began, gradually took their relatives with them, and they no longer needed to send money to Ukraine; rising prices for goods and services in Europe, which reduce cash balances in the hands of workers and transfers home; There is also a decrease in the activity of the IT sector and income in the form of salaries for programmers from abroad.
Combat map.
Internal situation in the country.
President of Ukraine V. Zelensky announced the appointment of V. Zaluzhny to the post of Ambassador to the UK.
On March 7, President of Ukraine V. Zelensky announced that he had agreed on the candidacy of the Ukrainian Ambassador to the UK; he will be the ex-commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine V. Zaluzhny. Later, the request for an agrément for V. Zaluzhny was confirmed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs D. Kuleba. Also, The Washington Post published a complimentary article about this decision with the main message that "the United States is not against it."
The President and the Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs justify their decision regarding V. Zaluzhny because they had previously discussed his possible diplomatic career with him. At the same time, neither V. Zelensky nor D. Kuleba directly says that this decision to send V. Zvaluzhny as ambassador was agreed upon with Zaluzhny himself.
In such a situation, V. Zelensky may also hope his British partners will actively persuade V. Zaluzhny to accept this proposal. After all, the announcement about sending V. Zaluzhny as ambassador was made after the President of Ukraine's meeting with the British Secretary of State for Defense Grant Shapps.
At the same time, such an appointment could benefit two parties: V. Zelensky will get rid of a political competitor who creates a feeling of dualism in the political system, and V. Zaluzhny will be able to maintain a clean reputation for subsequent predicted problems at the front and in the country by leaving for Great Britain, while at the same time being in the public eye and waiting for his political chance.
But so far, the ex-commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, V. Zaluzhny, has not publicly reacted to his appointment as ambassador to the UK. The general has remained silent for several days and has not yet confirmed his desire to accept this position.
It strengthens the suspicion of a particular game on the part of the OP to expel V. Zaluzhny from Ukraine under the pretext of diplomatic work. The Ukrainian opposition (in particular, P. Poroshenko's entourage) thinks so, especially against the backdrop of SOCIS ratings, which demonstrate the electoral dominance of V. Zaluzhny over V. Zelensky.
The transfer of V. Zaluzhny to the UK may represent a strategic move on the part of V. Zelensky aimed at neutralizing possible attempts to involve the former commander-in-chief in the country's political confrontation.
It is evident that with the appointment of V. Zaluzhny, the opposition loses a probable leader—a "ram" against V. Zelensky. The opposition will try to convince V. Zaluzhny not to accept the President's proposal (especially the team of ex-President P. Poroshenko).
V. Zaluzhny's silence may indicate that he does not particularly agree with the new position, and behind-the-scenes bargaining or pressure on him from the Office of the President and some of the Western partners continues.
Although Western media report that the nomination of V. Zaluzhny for the post of Ukrainian ambassador to the UK resulted from an agreement between him and the President of Ukraine, V. Zelensky, this is most likely not the case.
And the President’s speech with a proposal for V. Zaluzhny came as a surprise to him.
V. Zaluzhny may refuse the President's proposal, citing health reasons. This would further increase political turbulence in Ukraine against an intensifying parliamentary crisis.
Economy.
In its "Monthly Macroeconomic and Monetary Review," the National Bank reports that the state budget deficit in January-February 2024 increased due to a decrease in external revenues. The NBU does not indicate the exact size of the deficit, but they report that in the first two months of the year, Ukraine received only $1.2 billion in external funding ($0.9 billion - in grants).
As of March 1, 2024, Ukraine’s international reserves amounted to $37,052.0 million. USA, contracting by 3.8% in February. It is noted that the NBU's foreign exchange interventions predetermine such dynamics to maintain exchange rate stability and the country's debt payments in foreign currency, which were partially offset by receipts from international partners. At the same time, the demand for foreign currency decreased in February due to the containment of budget expenditures, a good export situation, and an improvement in the population's exchange rate expectations.
In just two years of full-scale war, Ukraine has attracted more than $75 billion in foreign aid. The state spends only internal resources on security and defense needs. Other areas require help from partners. About 37 billion were raised in 2022, more than 42 billion in 2023, and at least 37 billion this year.
This year's budget deficit is over 20% of the country's GDP - 37 billion. The government expects us to attract $17.3 billion from the EU Ukraine Facility mechanisms (50 billion euros for four years).
In January 2024, record volumes of products were exported during a full-scale invasion—12 million tons, of which 8.7 million were exported by sea. The most significant increase was recorded in iron ore supplies, which almost doubled to 3.2 million tons.
Ukraine increased the volume of electricity exports thanks to repairs in the energy sector. Thanks to the increase in generation capacity, a surplus of electricity is recorded in the energy system. In February, Ukraine sold 64 thousand MWh of electricity to its neighbors in just six days of March - 57 thousand MWh. For more than 120 days of the heating season, Ukraine applied for so-called emergency assistance only eight times when it urgently received electricity from neighboring countries. At the same time, Ukraine itself provided such aid 12 times.
The volume of remittances to Ukraine, previously one of the primary sources of foreign currency entering the country, has declined for the second year. According to the report of the National Bank, for 2023, the volume of remittances from individuals decreased by 7.8%, and in 2022, by 10.5%. In absolute terms, the dynamics are as follows: 2021 - $14 billion; 2022 - $12.5 billion; 2023 - $11.6 billion. Also, much more money is now “ flowing" out of Ukraine through the expenses of Ukrainians abroad than coming into the country through remittances.
The main reasons for the decrease in cash receipts may be as follows: some of the labor migrants who were abroad even before the full-scale war, after it began, gradually took their relatives with them, and they no longer needed to send money to Ukraine; rising prices for goods and services in Europe, which reduce cash balances in the hands of workers and transfers home; There is also a decrease in the activity of the IT sector and income in the form of salaries for programmers from abroad.
Sociology.
Based on the results of a survey conducted by the Sociological Group "Rating." The society subsequently recorded the highest levels of trust in the military:
96% now trust newly fighting ATO veterans
94% - trust the military of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and veterans of the current war
84% - veterans of the ATO (JFO) 2014-2021.
The number of those whose loved ones are fighting at the front today is growing.
55% of respondents noted that among their relatives and friends, there were those who took part in hostilities on Ukraine's territory from 2014 to 2021.
70% have among their loved ones those who fought or are fighting at the front, starting from February 24, 2022.
41% of respondents assume they may become veterans, while 53% have the opposite opinion. Residents of the western regions, the youngest respondents, and men with relatives and friends who have fought since 2014 and are currently fighting most often spoke about the possibility of becoming veterans.
76% of respondents believe that society today respects veterans; this number has remained almost unchanged (in September, this figure was 79%). Today, 18% have the opposite opinion.
The number of those who believe that the state is fulfilling its obligations to veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war continues to decrease: in August 2022, there were 69%; in January 2023, 53%; in September 2023, 33%; and in March 2024, 25%. Today, those who think otherwise are more than 60%.
Among the risk phenomena that veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war may face after returning from service, the first places are psycho-emotional instability, physical health problems, difficulties in obtaining medical care, lack of an inclusive space and an adapted workplace for people with disabilities, as well as problems with registration of social benefits.
The situation around Ukraine.
Initiatives for peace negotiations.
Due to the problematic situation at the front for Ukrainian troops, calls around the world are intensifying for the resumption of the peace process. Thus, the Pope's statement regarding starting negotiations with the Russian Federation caused a significant resonance. So, when asked by a journalist about his attitude to a possible defeat for Ukraine, the Pope said that he considers the one who thinks about people and sees the situation and who "dares to raise the white flag and negotiate" to be stronger. Today, this can be agreed upon with the help of international powers. For the most part, in Ukraine, this statement by the pontiff was perceived as a call for Ukraine to recognize itself as the losing side in the war and agree to negotiations, which caused a corresponding adverse reaction.
President V. Zelensky indirectly responded to the Pope that he was engaged in “virtual mediation between those who want to live and those who want to destroy you.”
The Vatican later clarified that based on this quote, the Pope did not call for Ukraine to capitulate but called for negotiations to end the war. "The Pope also uses the term 'white flag' in response to the image suggested by the interviewer, denoting a cessation of hostilities, a truce achieved through the courage of negotiations." Based on this quote, the Pope did not call for Ukraine to capitulate but for negotiations to end the war. They also recalled the Pope's phrase that "negotiations are never capitulation."
But it is worth noting that in this context – "capitulation" – the Ukrainian leadership and Western partners officially consider negotiations with the Russian Federation (without going to the 2013 borders). Therefore, in all likelihood, the pontiff in his interview still addressed Ukraine more than the Russian Federation, which does not officially reject the possibility of negotiations but is ready for them only on the terms of "recognition of the realities at the front."
But in general, it is evident that "shuttle negotiations" between the parties to the conflict have now intensified. In particular, the PRC and Turkey again show their initiative as the principal negotiators. At the same time, Ukraine is trying to persuade China and Turkey to its position.
So, on March 7, China's Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs, Li Hui, officially visited Ukraine. A briefing was held for Ambassador Xi Jinping and the entire Chinese delegation, chaired by the head of the Office of the President Andriy Yermak. As the press service of the OP reported, the main issue of discussion was the issue of security in Ukraine. A. Ermak and other representatives of the Ukrainian government reported to the delegation about the actual situation at the front. They also discussed the work of the "grain corridor," the protection of the rights of civilian hostages, the return of prisoners of war and deported Ukrainian children, demilitarization and deoccupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, ensuring nuclear safety and other international initiatives. The Ukrainian side also tried to involve the PRC in discussing the prospects for "establishing a just peace for Ukraine," restoring the country's territorial integrity and sovereignty based on V. Zelensky's Ukrainian "peace formula."
The PRC, which has never condemned the Russian aggression against Ukraine, is now holding extensive "shuttle negotiations" on the possibility of peace between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The country's authorities are negotiating with both sides of the conflict and Western countries, drawing up their own picture of the situation. So, before he visited Ukraine, the Chinese special representative held a meeting in Moscow. After Ukraine, Li Hui, along with other representatives of the Chinese government, will visit Poland, Germany, and France. They will also see the EU headquarters in Brussels.
This week, President of Ukraine Vladimir Zelensky paid an official visit to Turkey, where he held a bilateral meeting with President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan and representatives of Turkish defense companies. V. Zelensky expressed Ukraine's interest in strengthening bilateral cooperation and partnership with Turkish defense companies. Ukraine is counting on Turkey's help in releasing prisoners of war and other Ukrainian citizens who are in Russian captivity.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has again offered his country as a platform for peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. He expressed regret that the potential of the negotiation platform that Turkey created in March 2022 was not used. Ankara supports new agreements between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, such as the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
V. Zelensky, for his part, once again emphasized that he expects to receive fair peace for Ukraine as a result. He said that he spoke with Recep Tayyip Erdogan about the upcoming peace summit in Switzerland and counts on Turkey's leadership role in implementing this initiative. V. Zelensky noted that at this stage, the Russian Federation will not be invited to the summit. First, "civilized countries will develop a plan, and only then representatives of the Russian Federation will be invited."
Military and financial support for Ukraine.
In the West, they predict that, in general, without an increase in military assistance from Western allies and a change in Ukraine's war strategy, the position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces at the front could sharply worsen by the summer.
The most crucial package of US military and financial assistance for Ukraine is now stuck in Congress. The issue of assistance to Ukraine in the United States will likely be considered at the end of March—beginning of April 2024.
Last Thursday, US President D. Biden delivered a message to Congress, part of which he dedicated to Ukraine and Putin. He called for unblocking aid to Ukraine and promised that American soldiers would not fight for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
In Europe, Ukraine's main allies have increasing disagreements regarding the nature of the volume and range of military assistance to Ukraine. Currently, due to the problematic situation at the front in Ukraine, there is increasing fear in Europe and Germany, in particular, of being involved in a war with the Russian Federation, which is fraught with escalation into a global nuclear conflict. Officially, the Bundestag has refused to provide Ukraine with long-range Taurus missiles.
Also, French President E. Macron's statement on the possible deployment of troops in Ukraine came under intense criticism from the allies. It was clarified that France could send troops to Ukraine if the front moves towards Kyiv or Odesa (as the Secretary of the French Communist Party, Fabien Roussel, conveyed E. Macron's words after the President met with the leaders of French parties).
Germany noted that E. Macron’s comments “really do not help solve Ukraine’s problems.”
So far, the possible prospect of entering into a direct war with the Russian Federation, with the threat of it escalating into a nuclear one, has caused an open split within NATO and created conditions for the growth of the number of supporters of the idea of an early end to the war. It also plays against increasing aid to Ukraine.
Privately, the German government complains that while Macron has been tough on Ukraine, he has not given it the same military support as Germany.
Germany's Kiel Institute, which collects data on national contributions to the war effort for Ukraine, ranks France as a clear laggard with military aid at 640 million euros, compared with Germany, which has provided or pledged 17.7 billion euros.
The French dispute these figures and argue that they provide weapons that matter at the front.
So far, most European allies are striving to maintain a certain balance regarding the Ukrainian-Russian war - to help Ukraine continue the war, but at the same time not to directly enter into it themselves. But in general, a protracted war in Ukraine in the future creates significant risks of European countries being drawn into it in one way or another. The mobilization potential of Ukraine is limited and is 2-3 times less than in the Russian Federation. Therefore, if the war in such a regime and with such intensity as it now lasts for another 1.5-2 years, then the presence of Western troops in Ukraine will become essential.
Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovskaya, Andrey Timchenko
for the Ukrainian Institute of Politics
