On the front, the Russian Federation continues its offensive in 12 directions, slowly pushing the Ukrainian troops to the north and west. It is how the Russian Armed Forces are trying to develop the main offensive in the Donetsk region. The situation is especially difficult for the AFU east of Chasov Yar in the Bakhmut direction and near the villages of Berdychi and Uman in the Avdiivka direction. The Russian Federation troops have come practically close to the eastern outskirts of Chasov Yar near the Kanal microdistrict (the advance is noted from the direction of Bogdanivka and Ivanivske).
Using their aviation advantage and the massive use of planning bombs, Russian troops made significant advances to the west—towards the village of Umanske and also in the southern part of Semenivka. To the north of Avdiivka, Russian troops advanced towards Novokalynovo. To the south, in the Maryinka direction, Russian troops attacked the village of Krasnogorovka.
The pace of Russian advances on the front in 2024 has accelerated slightly due to the effects of delayed U.S. aid to Ukraine. Russian forces captured about 305 square kilometers between January 1 and April 1, 2024.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces have gone on the defensive at all sections of the front because, according to Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, the Ukrainian Armed Forces do not have enough shells for a counter-offensive. Still, they have enough for a defensive war. Also, according to the statements of the Ukrainian leadership, the construction of fortifications is 92-98% ready on all the main front lines.
Ammunition shortages force Ukraine to conserve ammunition and prioritize limited resources on critical parts of the front. It increases the risk of a Russian breakthrough in other, less well-endowed sectors. Ukraine expects the Russian Federation to intensify offensive actions in late spring and early summer, primarily in the Donetsk direction. Likely, there will not be a powerful Russian offensive (expected in the summer); Russian troops will continue exerting pressure along the entire front line, gradually exhausting the Ukrainian army and searching for weaknesses. Ukraine's limited military resources provide Russian forces with the flexibility to conduct offensive operations and may also enable Russia to achieve more significant operational successes.
In general, the situation on the front line is very fragile for the Ukrainian forces, which have practically utilized all key reserves. And, if the Russian Federation finds additional military reserves, Russian troops could advance 30-40km before the end of the year.
Since mid-March this year, The Ukrainian-Russian border has become a new active front line in the Belgorod region. The number of Russian strikes on border areas in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts has sharply increased. The city of Kharkiv is now subjected to frequent Russian shelling; it is hit by modernized versions of Russian KABs (about 90 kilometers depth of impact). The shelling has particularly affected the city's energy system, causing a significant population outflow.
In general, the Russian Federation can consider two main scenarios for Kharkiv and the border zone in the northern regions of Ukraine. The first is an attempt to seize these territories as part of the strategy to create a gray buffer zone there. The second is an attempt to destroy and turn these territories into a zone unfit for the population to live there.
The options for Kharkiv's defense rest on the issue of building up the air defense system. Such resources are limited for Ukraine, and to cover Kharkiv, it is necessary to remove air defense from certain parts of the frontline or strategically essential objects in the rear. European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell believes the E.U. should urgently provide Ukraine with more air defenses and ammunition. He said the E.U. should pay more attention to Ukraine's future reconstruction and how to prevent its destruction. He said this after Germany said that European allies had run out of Patriot systems for their transfer to Ukraine. According to Borrell, Europe has about 100 Patriot batteries and cannot give Ukraine 7.
The authorities have so far denied that a Russian offensive threatens Kharkiv (there are no signs of the formation of a strike group), as President Zelensky, the National Security and Defense Council's GUR and the Center for Combating Falsehoods, as well as the head of the presidential office, A. Yermak, have said. In an interview with Politico, Yermak said that Russia considered Kharkiv the most likely target for a significant strike. Then, these statements were refuted by the O.P.'s press service. They noted that the Politico piece was about missile strikes on Kharkiv. This city for Russia is now becoming the main target of strikes. But there were no words from the head of the O.P. about an attack on Kharkiv. These discrepancies are probably because A. Yermak's speeches for Politico were more intended for a Western audience, considering the need to put pressure on international donors to speed up allocating a package of aid to Ukraine in the United States.
In a series of new strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure, Russia is attempting to bring down the Ukrainian economy. Russia has changed its tactics for attacking Ukraine's energy infrastructure, using precision missiles to destroy power plants in areas less protected than Kyiv, some of which may not be fully restored until next winter.
According to the government, electricity generation will drop 30-50% of the demand in the worst-case scenario. At the same time, electricity prices will inevitably rise to cover the cost of repairs and, apparently, to import electricity from Europe. DTEK has lost 80% of its generation due to Russian attacks. After two massive Russian strikes in March, the cost of restoring damaged thermal power plants is 230 million dollars.
Consideration of the law on mobilization continues. The mobilization process in Ukraine is being launched under pressure from Ukraine's military leadership and Western partners, who are constantly hinting (not officially) that the level of military support may be suspended if mobilization measures are not strengthened.
On April 11, Bill N 10449 from 30.01.2024, "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Certain Issues of Military Service, Mobilization and Military Accounting," will be put to a final vote in Parliament. However, at the moment, there have yet to be any votes in favor of this bill in the Verkhovna Rada. The Office of the President and the Government hope these votes will be collected with the participation of our Western partners and military leadership, who believe that the country needs a new large-scale draft. Allies and government officials explain this need because the Russian Federation may mobilize 300,000 people by June 1 (probably to prepare a new offensive). However, the AFU Commander-in-Chief, A. Syrsky, assures that additional troops on the front line can be provided by transferring rear personnel to the front. This proposal is probably based on the interests of the Office of the President, which fears that too harsh mobilization measures will lead to a surge of discontent in society and another drop in ratings.
The vote in Parliament for the draft law on mobilization may further manifest the parliamentary crisis. There are no guarantees that the document that splits the Verkhovna Rada (some M.P.s oppose the law's adoption in this version) will be adopted precisely on April 11. The M.P.s, in turn, demand more influence on the executive authorities and more parliamentary participation in controlling financial flows in the state.
At the same time, if the law on mobilization fails, it may not only fix the state of the parliamentary crisis in Ukraine but also serve as a starting point for an escalation of relations between Parliament and the Office of the President. The consequence could be the resignation of the Servant of the People's leadership in the Verkhovna Rada. Or attempts to form new formal or non-formal coalitions. The situation in Parliament and the law on mobilization can trigger the deterioration of relations between the military and civilian leadership on the one hand and between different groups of influence within the government on the other.
The President has already virtually resigned himself to being responsible for mobilization in the country. He signed three laws concerning mobilization processes adopted in previous years, although they are also negatively perceived in society.
Also, the military leadership - the new commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, A. Syrskyy, demonstrates readiness to assume political responsibility for the unpopular mobilization (unlike the previous commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, V. Zaluzhny).
In particular, Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed Law 3127-IX on amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On Military Duty and Military Service," which lowers the mobilization age of the Ukrainian army from 27 to 25 years. The Verkhovna Rada approved the law in May 2023; it came into force on April 3, 2024. The corresponding change is made to the text of the law "On military duty and military service" of 2006. At the same time, conscription for compulsory military service in Ukraine remains canceled for the period of martial law: this norm was also previously approved by the Verkhovna Rada. In other words, men under 25, who should be drafted into the army as conscripts, will remain outside the mobilization processes - if they do not voluntarily desire to serve.
Western experts estimate that the law, which lowers the mobilization age of the Ukrainian army from 27 to 25, will allow the Ukrainian Armed Forces to recruit 140,000 additional men. Lowering the mobilization age from 27 to 25 will support the Ukrainian armed forces' ability to rebuild and form existing units and create new ones. Lowering the mobilization age in Ukraine will help address the troop shortage, but Western assistance will also be needed to arm those mobilized.
The long U.S. debate over U.S. military assistance to Ukraine and the delay of Western aid could affect how Ukraine can rebuild degraded and create new units.
В. Zelensky signed into law Law No. 10062 On the Electronic Cabinet of Persons liable for military duty. The bill amends the laws "On the Unified State Register of Conscripts, Persons liable for Military Duty and Reservists" and "On the Status of War Veterans and Guarantees of Their Social Protection." The unified electronic register of persons liable for military duty will contain information on all conscripts, persons liable for military duty, and reservists between 18 and 60. The Ministry of Justice, the State Tax Service, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs will transfer personal data on persons liable for military duty to the e-register of conscripts, persons liable for military duty, and reservists. A portal of electronic services for servicemen and persons liable for military service will also be created, where it will be possible to obtain the status of a participant in military operations online, offline, and automatically if the necessary data are available in the system. Ukrainians will be issued military registration documents using the Register of Conscripts, persons liable for military duty, and reservists.
An electronic conscript's office will also appear within the framework of this law. This function is not mandatory. However, the register will collect all sorts of data on citizens without their consent. In particular, we are talking about data on travel abroad; details of internal and foreign passports, TIN; telephone numbers, e-mail addresses; information on the right to own weapons; the presence of a driver's license; information on the possession of foreign languages; data on the parents of a person liable for military service; information on criminal records, etc.
Also, the President signed Law 10313, "On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on Ensuring the Rights of Servicemen and Police Officers to Social Protection," according to which the norm on "restricted fitness" of military conscripts is abolished. The law excludes limited fitness from the Law of Ukraine "On Military Duty and Military Service." Now, according to the document, all "limited fit" must undergo a repeated military medical commission within nine months to fall under one of the remaining categories - "fit" or "not fit." It should be noted that such examination will be possible after the by-laws, particularly Order No. 402 of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, are brought in line with this law. The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine has its own internal Order No. 402, which contains a list of diseases, according to which military conscripts are classified as "fit," "limited fit," and "unfit." According to lawyers, until the Defense Ministry changes this order, there will be no reclassification of the "limitedly fit."
As for the issue of peace talks, talk has recently intensified behind the scenes of world politics about a possible halt to hostilities in Ukraine. Given the problems with U.S. funding and the exhaustion of weapons stocks for the front, Ukraine and Western countries are now interested in such a truce. In both Europe and the U.S., election processes are underway, control systems are overloaded, and European MICs need help to keep up with the Ukrainian army's needs. From July to August, the election campaign in the U.S. will enter its peak, and, of course, if the situation on the front in Ukraine is negative, it will hurt the prospects for Biden's re-election. Biden's prospects for re-election.
It cannot be ruled out that China may present a more detailed peace plan for Ukraine. China's special envoy for Eurasian affairs, Li Hui, recently visited Ukraine, Russia, and several European countries. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian said that China supports convening an international peace conference with "equal participation of all parties and impartial discussion of all peace initiatives" (which both Ukraine and Russia should recognize).
Ukraine's attempt to convene a summit with Switzerland on President Zelensky's "peace formula" (this plan, according to the Ukrainian authorities, should be the only option for implementing the peace agreements with the Russian Federation) is encountering specific difficulties. A year after the PRC's peace plan was made public, it became the main alternative to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's "peace formula," which suits the Russian Federation to a greater extent.
This week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov officially visited China. As a result, Lavrov supported the Chinese settlement plan, which (unlike the Ukrainian plan) envisages a ceasefire along the front line without withdrawing Russian troops to Ukraine's 2013 borders.
С. Lavrov said that he and his Chinese colleagues confirmed the conclusion that any international events that do not take into account the position of the Russian Federation and promote "Zelensky's ultimatum formula for peace" are futile; thus, in his words, they are "completely detached from any realities."
The Russian Federation is counting on China and many other countries in the Global South to ignore the big Peace Summit in Switzerland. The Russian Federation also seeks to discredit Ukraine in the international arena by demonstrating its involvement (in one form or another) in the organization of the terrorist attack in Crocus City in the Moscow region, which may also have negative consequences both for the approval of V. Zelensky's "peace formula" and in the future for the conclusion of any peace agreements.
However, it is unlikely that Russia will seriously consider any proposals for a peaceful settlement this year. Putin will likely focus all his efforts on inflicting a strategic defeat on Ukraine or at least "squeezing" more territory from it to maximize his negotiating position in the dialogue with the new U.S. Presidential Administration (after the November 2024 elections).
The U.S. Congress vote on allocating aid to Ukraine may be postponed for a few more weeks. Behind-the-scenes bargaining with the White House is probably happening around the U.S. aid to Ukraine. The Western press reports that the vote for the relevant Senate bill ($95 billion in assistance to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan, $60 billion of which is earmarked for Kyiv) will take place in mid-April and possibly later. House Speaker M. Johnson said he would change the terms of the aid; it could be a loan, confiscation of Russian assets as compensation, or something else. In general, M. Johnson's team has not yet provided a final aid plan and has not yet decided what concessions should be demanded from D. Biden, so there is no support for a vote yet.
The delay in U.S. aid is causing serious concern in Ukraine. For example, Ukrainian President Zielenskyy said that Ukraine might lose the war against Russia if the U.S. Congress does not pass a bill on aid to Ukraine soon.
For their part, European allies are considering alternative options for financing Ukraine. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has proposed the creation of a five-year fund to help Ukraine in the amount of 100 billion dollars. The Alliance leaders could sign the document at the summit in Washington in July. J. Stoltenberg believes that in this way, it is necessary to ensure reliable and predictable security assistance to Ukraine in the long term in the context of uncertainty regarding assistance from the United States. The prospect of Donald Trump returning to the White House has raised concerns among European officials that he may cut off U.S. aid to Ukraine in light of comments that D. Trump will try to end the war within a day. There is also concern in Europe that there are no guarantees that the U.S. will continue to invest in the security of NATO countries.
Stoltenberg's proposal needs the approval of NATO's 32 members, which will likely change before the leaders agree. In the worst-case scenario, the initiative will become the subject of disputes among the 32 members of the Alliance, for example, with Turkey and Hungary, which have slightly different positions on assistance to Ukraine. If this NATO assistance to Ukraine is agreed upon, it could signal that the Alliance is counting on the long-term prospect of fighting in Ukraine. Therefore, Ukraine will unlikely receive an official invitation to join the NATO Summit in July.
March 2024 set an absolute record in Ukraine's history in terms of external financing, with a total of more than $9bn (UAH 555bn).
- $4.9 billion is from the E.U.
- $880 million from the IMF
- $1.4 billion from the World Bank (Japan + U.K.)
- 1.5 billion $ Canada
- $230 million from Japan
But this is not to say that the situation has improved. Minimal external financing was received in January-February. There will be fewer tranches in the future, and they will come irregularly. Since we have "approximated" a lot of aid, there will be no more aid for the rest of the year.
Recall that foreign aid was meager in February, at only $800 million. In January 2024, the level of Western aid was the lowest since the beginning of the war—only $390 million.
For comparison, in December 2023 it was about $5bn (on average in 2023 Ukraine received $3-4bn in foreign aid per month). According to the government, Ukraine needs from $3 to $5bn of international aid per month. The budget deficit this year is more than 20% of our GDP. For this year, the state needs at least 37bn. About 37bn was attracted in 2022, more than 42bn in 2023.
Battle map.
Internal situation in Ukraine.
Russian shelling of Ukrainian infrastructure.
In a series of new strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure, Russia is attempting to bring down the Ukrainian economy. Russia has changed its tactics for attacking Ukraine's energy infrastructure, using precision missiles to destroy power plants in areas less protected than Kyiv, some of which may not be fully restored until next winter.
According to the government, in the worst-case scenario, electricity generation will drop by 30-50% of the demand. At the same time, electricity prices will inevitably rise to cover the cost of repairs and, apparently, to import electricity from Europe. DTEK has lost 80% of its generation due to Russian attacks. After two massive Russian strikes in March, the cost of restoring damaged thermal power plants is 230 million dollars. The main repair work will take place in April-May to have time to recover before the summer peak.
Kharkiv is subjected to frequent shelling by the Russian Federation, with strikes by Shaheds every night and ballistic missiles several times a day. The city's energy system has been particularly affected, causing a significant population exodus. Kharkiv is now being reached by modernized versions of Russian KABs, which can hit 90 kilometers. The Russian Federation itself interprets the strikes on Kharkiv as its response to the massive shelling of Belgorod, which began in the run-up to the Russian presidential election.
In general, the Russian Federation can consider two main scenarios for Kharkiv and the border zone in the northern regions of Ukraine. The first is an attempt to seize them as part of the strategy to create a gray buffer zone. The second is an attempt to destroy and turn these territories into a zone unfit for the population to live there.
The options for Kharkiv's defense rest on the issue of building up the air defense system. Such resources are pretty limited for Ukraine, and to cover Kharkiv, it is necessary to remove air defense from certain parts of the frontline or strategically essential objects in the rear. European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell believes the E.U. should urgently provide Ukraine with more air defenses and ammunition. He said the E.U. should pay more attention to Ukraine's future reconstruction and how to prevent its destruction. He said this after Germany said that European allies had run out of Patriot systems for their transfer to Ukraine. According to Borrell, Europe has about 100 Patriot batteries and cannot give Ukraine 7.
The authorities have so far denied that a Russian offensive threatens Kharkiv (there are no signs of the formation of a strike group), as President Zelensky, the National Security and Defense Council's GUR and the Center for Combating Falsehoods, as well as the head of the presidential office, A. Yermak, have said. In an interview with Politico, Yermak said that Russia considered Kharkiv the most likely target for a significant strike. Then, these statements were refuted by the O.P.'s press service. They noted that the Politico piece was about missile strikes on Kharkiv. This city for Russia is now becoming the main target of strikes. But there were no words from the head of the O.P. about an attack on Kharkiv. These discrepancies are probably because A. Yermak's speeches for Politico were primarily intended for a Western audience, taking into account the need to pressure international donors to speed up allocating a package of aid to Ukraine in the United States.
Mobilization process.
Consideration of the law on mobilization continues. The mobilization process in Ukraine is being launched under pressure from the military and Western partners, who are constantly hinting (not officially) that the level of military support may be suspended if mobilization measures are not strengthened.
On April 11, Bill N 10449 from 30.01.2024, "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Certain Issues of Military Service, Mobilization and Military Accounting," will be put to a final vote. But at the moment, there have yet to be any votes for this bill in the Verkhovna Rada. The Office of the President and the Government hope these votes will be collected with the collaboration of our Western partners and military leadership, who believe the country needs a new large-scale draft. Allies and government officials explain this need by saying the Russian Federation may mobilize 300,000 people by June 1 (probably to prepare a new offensive). However, the AFU Commander-in-Chief, A. Syrsky, assures that additional troops on the front line can be provided by transferring rear personnel to the front. This proposal is probably based on the interests of the Office of the President, which fears that too harsh mobilization measures will lead to a surge of discontent in society and another drop in ratings.
The vote in Parliament for the draft law on mobilization may further manifest the parliamentary crisis, and there are no guarantees that the document that splits the Verkhovna Rada (some M.P.s oppose the adoption of the law in this version) will be adopted exactly on April 11. The M.P.s, in turn, demand more influence on the executive authorities and more parliamentary participation in controlling financial flows in the state.
At the same time, if the law on mobilization fails, it may not only fix the state of the parliamentary crisis in Ukraine but also serve as a starting point for an escalation of relations between Parliament and the Office of the President. The consequence of this could be the resignation of the leadership of the Servant of the People faction in the Verkhovna Rada. Or attempts to form new formal or non-formal coalitions. The situation in Parliament and the law on mobilization can act as a trigger for the deterioration of relations between the military and civilian leadership on the one hand and between different groups of influence within the government on the other.
The President has already virtually resigned himself to being responsible for mobilization in the country. He signed three laws concerning mobilization processes adopted in previous years, although they are also negatively perceived in society.
Thus, Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed Law 3127-IX on amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On Military Duty and Military Service," which lowers the mobilization age of the Ukrainian army from 27 to 25 years. The Verkhovna Rada approved the law in May 2023; it came into force on April 3, 2024. The corresponding change is made to the text of the law "On military duty and military service" of 2006. At the same time, conscription for compulsory military service in Ukraine remains canceled for the period of martial law: this norm was also previously approved by the Verkhovna Rada. In other words, men under 25, who should be drafted into the army as conscripts, will remain outside the mobilization processes - if they do not voluntarily desire to serve.
Western experts estimate that the law, which lowers the mobilization age of the Ukrainian army from 27 to 25, will allow the Ukrainian Armed Forces to recruit 140,000 additional men. Lowering the mobilization age from 27 to 25 will support the Ukrainian armed forces' ability to rebuild and form existing units and create new ones. Lowering the mobilization age in Ukraine will help address the troop shortage, but Western assistance will also be needed to arm those mobilized.
The long U.S. debate over U.S. military aid to Ukraine and delays in Western assistance could affect how Ukraine can rebuild degraded and create new units.
В. Zielenski signed into law Law No. 10062 On the electronic office of a person liable for military service. The bill amends the laws "On the Unified State Register of Conscripts, Persons liable for Military Duty and Reservists" and "On the Status of War Veterans and Guarantees of Their Social Protection." The unified electronic register of persons liable for military duty will contain information on all conscripts, persons liable for military duty, and reservists between 18 and 60. The Ministry of Justice, the State Tax Service, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs will transfer personal data on persons liable for military duty to the e-register of conscripts, persons liable for military duty, and reservists. A portal of electronic services will also be created for servicemen and persons liable for military service, where it will be possible to obtain the status of a participant in military operations online, offline, and automatically if the necessary data are available in the system. Ukrainians will be issued military registration documents using the Register of Conscripts, persons liable for military duty, and reservists.
An electronic conscript's office will also appear within the framework of this law. This function is not mandatory. However, the register will collect all sorts of data on citizens without their consent. In particular, we are talking about data on travel abroad; details of internal and foreign passports, TIN; phone numbers, e-mail addresses; information on the right to own weapons; the presence of a driver's license; information on the possession of foreign languages; data on the parents of a person liable for military service; information on criminal records, etc.
Also, the President signed Law 10313, "On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on Ensuring the Rights of Servicemen and Police Officers to Social Protection," according to which the norm on "restricted fitness" of persons liable for military service is canceled. The law excludes limited fitness from the Law of Ukraine "On Military Duty and Military Service." Now, according to the document, all "limited fit" must undergo a repeated military medical commission within nine months to fall under one of the remaining categories - "fit" or "not fit." It should be noted that such examination will be possible after the by-laws, particularly Order No. 402 of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, comply with this law. The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine has its own internal Order No. 402, which contains a list of diseases, according to which military conscripts are classified as "fit," "limited fit," and "unfit." According to lawyers, until the Defense Ministry changes this order, there will be no reclassification of the "limitedly fit."
The situation around Ukraine.
The peace negotiation process.
Recently, behind the scenes of world politics, talk of a possible halt to hostilities in Ukraine has intensified. Given the problems with U.S. funding and the exhaustion of weapons stocks for the front, Ukraine and Western countries are now interested in such a truce. In both Europe and the U.S., election processes are underway, control systems are overloaded, and European MICs are not able to keep up with the Ukrainian army's needs. From July to August, the election campaign in the U.S. will enter its peak, and, of course, if the situation on the front in Ukraine is negative, it will harm the prospects for Biden's re-election. Biden's prospects for re-election.
It cannot be ruled out that China may present a more detailed peace plan for Ukraine. We shall remind you that China's special envoy for Eurasian affairs, Li Hui, recently visited Ukraine, Russia, and several European countries. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian said that China supports convening an international peace conference with "equal participation of all parties and impartial discussion of all peace initiatives" (which both Ukraine and Russia should recognize).
Ukraine's attempt to convene a summit with Switzerland on President Zelensky's "peace formula" (this plan, according to the Ukrainian authorities, should be the only option for implementing the peace agreements with the Russian Federation) is encountering specific difficulties. A year after the PRC's peace plan was made public, it became the main alternative to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's "peace formula," which suits the Russian Federation to a greater extent.
This week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov officially visited China. As a result, Lavrov supported the Chinese settlement plan, which (unlike the Ukrainian plan) envisaged a ceasefire along the front line without withdrawing Russian troops to the Ukrainian borders in 2013.
С. Lavrov said that he and his Chinese colleagues confirmed the conclusion that any international events that do not take into account the position of the Russian Federation and promote "Zelensky's ultimatum formula for peace" are futile; thus, in his words, they are "completely detached from any realities."
The Russian Federation is counting on China and many other countries in the Global South to ignore the big Peace Summit in Switzerland. The Russian Federation also seeks to discredit Ukraine in the international arena by demonstrating its involvement (in one form or another) in the organization of the terrorist attack in Crocus City in the Moscow region, which may also have negative consequences both for the approval of V. Zelensky's "peace formula" and in the future for the conclusion of any peace agreements.
However, it is unlikely that Russia will seriously consider any proposals for a peaceful settlement this year. Putin will likely focus all his efforts on inflicting a strategic defeat on Ukraine or at least "squeezing" more territory from it to maximize his negotiating position in the dialogue with the new U.S. Presidential Administration (after the November 2024 elections).
Financial and military assistance to Ukraine.
The U.S. Congress vote on allocating aid to Ukraine may be postponed for a few more weeks. Behind-the-scenes bargaining with the White House is probably happening around the U.S. aid to Ukraine. The Western press reports that the vote for the relevant Senate bill ($95 billion in assistance to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan, $60 billion of which is earmarked for Kyiv) will not take place until mid-April and possibly later. House Speaker M. Johnson said he would change the terms of the aid; it could be a loan, confiscation of Russian assets as compensation, or something else. In general, M. Johnson's team still needs to provide a final aid plan and has yet to decide what concessions should be demanded from D. Biden, so there is no support for a vote yet.
The delay in U.S. aid is causing serious concern in Ukraine. For example, Ukrainian President Zelensky said that Ukraine might lose the war against Russia if the U.S. Congress does not pass a bill on aid to Ukraine soon.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has proposed the creation of a five-year fund of 100 billion dollars to help Ukraine. The document could be signed by the alliance leaders at the summit in Washington in July. J. Stoltenberg believes that in this way, it is necessary to ensure reliable and predictable security assistance to Ukraine in the long term in the context of uncertainty regarding assistance from the United States. The prospect of Donald Trump returning to the White House has raised concerns among European officials that he may cut off U.S. aid to Ukraine in light of comments that D. Trump will try to end the war within a day. There is also concern in Europe that there are no guarantees that the U.S. will continue to invest in the security of NATO countries.
Stoltenberg's proposal needs the approval of NATO's 32 members, which will likely change before the leaders agree. In the worst-case scenario, the initiative will become the subject of disputes among the 32 members of the Alliance, for example, with Turkey and Hungary, which have slightly different positions on assistance to Ukraine. If this NATO assistance to Ukraine is agreed upon, it could signal that the Alliance is counting on the long-term prospect of fighting in Ukraine. Therefore, Ukraine will unlikely receive an official invitation to join the NATO Summit in July.
Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovskaya, Andrey Timchenko
for the Ukrainian Policy Institute
