Since 10 November 2025, one of the largest corruption scandals during the war has unfolded in Ukraine — the so-called “Mindichgate”. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), together with the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), conducted a large-scale special operation in the energy sector codenamed “Midas”, which affected the immediate circle of President Volodymyr Zelenskyi.
NABU officially announced the exposure of a “high-level corrupt network” in the energy sector that, according to investigators, had been operating for at least 15 months and had access to strategic enterprises, including NAEK Energoatom and NEC Ukrenergo. The main mechanism, according to investigators, was the systematic receipt of illicit benefits from contractors of Energoatom – 10–15% of the value of concluded contracts.
The investigation is considering versions involving rigged tenders, inflated equipment prices, and the distribution of contracts through affiliated companies linked to certain officials and business groups previously close to the President. As part of the “Midas” operation, NABU conducted more than 70 searches, seized large amounts of cash and a huge volume of documentation. The total volume of possible kickbacks is preliminarily estimated at around $100 million.
At the centre of the investigation is Timur Mindich — a businessman, co-owner of the Kvartal 95 studio and former business partner of President V. Zelenskyi. NABU considers him one of the organisers of the scheme, coordinating interaction between officials and commercial entities that received lucrative contracts in the energy sector, as well as influencing former Energy Minister Herman Galushchenko (now Minister of Justice) and, in the defence sector, former Defence Minister Rustem Umerov (currently Secretary of the NSDC). Timur Mindich himself left Ukraine a few hours before the searches began, giving rise to versions of a possible information leak. Some reports claimed he had been tipped off and left in advance. Pre-trial investigation established that during 2025 Mindich, using his influence and friendly ties with the President of Ukraine, organised illegal activities in various sectors of the economy.
According to NABU, Mindich has been served with a notice of suspicion in a case opened on 21 August 2025. The charges include creating a criminal organisation (Part 1, Article 255 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) and leading it; money laundering obtained through crime by an organised group (Part 3, Article 27; Part 4, Article 28; Part 3, Article 209 of the CCU); unlawful influence on a government member (Part 1, Article 344 of the CCU) — specifically mentioning alleged influence on former Defence Minister Rustem Umerov. The investigation also believes that, with the assistance of Herman Galushchenko’s team, Mindich controlled financial flows in the energy sector — in particular through NAEK Energoatom.
The so-called “Mindich tapes” are also actively discussed, which may contain a voice resembling President V. Zelenskyi. According to NABU, the investigation possesses many hours of wiretap recordings in which negotiations about the distribution of contracts and possible instructions from above are allegedly recorded. NABU has released portions of the recordings. In the conversations captured by detectives, T. Mindich (“Karlson”) directs financial flows, discusses reserving trusted persons through fictitious employment, gives instructions on “security”, and demonstrates awareness of possible NABU attention.
NABU, SAPO and media affiliated with them point out that four Ukrainian government ministers are implicated in Mindich’s scheme: two former — Oleksandr Chernyshov (former Deputy Prime Minister for Recovery of Ukraine, ex-Minister of Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Development) and former Defence Minister Rustem Umerov (currently Secretary of the NSDC, on a trip to Turkey), and two current — Energy Minister Svitlana Grinchuk and former Energy Minister, now Justice Minister Herman Galushchenko. On 19 November, the Verkhovna Rada, despite the opposition blocking the rostrum, dismissed Herman Galushchenko and then Svitlana Grinchuk from their posts.
In addition to T. Mindich (“Karlson”), the criminal organisation allegedly included:
- Ihor Myronyuk (“Rocket”) — former advisor to the Energy Minister; acted as an intermediary.
- Dmytro Basov (“Tenor”) — Executive Director for Security at NAEK Energoatom; coordinated the scheme inside the company.
- Oleksandr Tsukerman (“Sugarman”) — part of the “back-office” for money laundering.
- Ihor Fursenko (“Reshik”) — also back-office, handled transit of funds through shell companies.
- Lesya Ustymenko — employee of commercial structures involved in the scheme; handled fictitious documentation.
- Lyudmila Zorina — accountant and assistant in the back-office; kept records and prepared fake reports.
At a meeting of the temporary investigative commission of the Parliament, MP Yaroslav Zheleznyak (Holos faction, distinctly Western-liberal orientation) noted that NABU has not yet identified about 40 nicknames of figures in the Mindich case. One of the suspects, A. Tsukerman, allegedly invented pseudonyms for politicians who “used money-laundering services”: Herman Galushchenko — “Sigmund” or “Professor”, Oleksiy Chernyshov — “Che Guevara”.
Oleksiy Chernyshov — former Deputy Prime Minister for Recovery, previously accused of corruption and linked to the construction of the “Dynasty” cottage community allegedly for the President. On 19 November, a bail of 51 million UAH was posted for him, and he is expected to be released from pre-trial detention soon.
Within the “Mindichgate” scandal, NABU hints that the investigation continues and new suspects may appear. Some media mention unnamed “overseers” from the Office of the President. Versions are circulating that Andriy Yermak, Head of the Office of the President, is involved under the nickname “Ali-Baba” — this is actively promoted by media close to anti-corruption bodies and by MP Yaroslav Zheleznyak.
Opposition demands the dismissal of Andriy Yermak and the resignation of the government, as well as the formation of a broad coalition including the opposition (European Solidarity, Holos, later Batkivshchyna). Part of Zelenskyi’s own circle (Arakhamia group, Hetmantsev, Fedorov, Budanov, some Servant of the People MPs, etc.) also demands Yermak’s resignation.
For the opposition, the “Mindich case” is an excellent opportunity to weaken Zelenskyi, create a political crisis and possibly street protests that could force him to “share power”.
Yermak is the key figure through whom a huge number of internal and external policy issues are handled. His departure would risk the President losing control over the entire power vertical. Therefore, Zelenskyi will most likely do everything possible to avoid it, unless forced by Western pressure, new leaks directly implicating him and Yermak, or an open rebellion inside the Servant of the People faction that would destroy the parliamentary majority.
Overall, the Mindich case should be viewed in the broader context of the power struggle in Ukraine. The timing of the information dump suggests the main goal was to damage the reputation and political authority of the authorities. The case casts a shadow directly on President Zelenskyi and Andriy Yermak, whose personal relations Mindich used as a tool to build his corrupt network, as well as on the presidential law-enforcement agencies (SBU, Prosecutor General’s Office, SBI), which allegedly received a share according to the wiretaps.
The confrontation has several levels: an attempt to deprive the Ukrainian leadership of control over key financial sources and make it more dependent on the anti-corruption vertical and Western partners; a struggle for control of Ukraine’s energy sector (30–40 billion USD annually).
This is a continuation of the struggle between the “presidential” vertical and the anti-corruption (pro-Western liberal) vertical that began long before the “cardboard Maidan” and has now moved into an open phase. The trigger for the activation of the Mindich case was, among other things, the SBU and Prosecutor General’s Office launching their own investigations in the energy sector (including checks on Ukrenergo head Oleksandr Kudrytskyi and former restoration agency head Mustafa Nayyem — figures close to the anti-corruption camp), as well as the case against NABU detective Ruslan Magamedrasulov for aiding the aggressor state.
The main drivers behind the “Mindich process”, besides NABU/SAPO, are Ukrainian oligarchs and opposition forces: Kolomoiskyi, Fiala, Pinchuk, politicians such as ex-President Poroshenko and Kyiv Mayor Klitschko, structures oriented toward former liberal-democratic centres of influence in the US and EU, various grant-funded NGOs, etc.
It is less likely that global forces — Washington or Brussels — are behind it, although they may have been aware; the scandal objectively weakens the Ukrainian leadership and can be exploited by Moscow.
The consequences of “Mindichgate” for President Zelenskyi could be severe: huge public outcry amid blackouts and war fatigue, damage to domestic ratings and to his image among Western allies and the White House.
The most sensitive recordings that could directly implicate Yermak or Zelenskyi have not yet been made public — which may indicate ongoing behind-the-scenes bargaining or that such recordings do not exist.
Ultimately, the decisive factor will be whose side key Western partners (Brussels and Washington) take and which model of wartime governance they consider more acceptable for Ukraine. For example, if the West ultimately decides that it is still inexpedient to weaken President V. Zelenskyi's monopoly on power, any protests by the domestic opposition — even if they break out — will have no real practical effect. On the contrary, if Western partners demand the dismissal of A. Yermak or a full government reboot, there is a high probability that, given Ukraine’s heavy dependence on foreign aid, the Ukrainian leadership will have to comply with those instructions.
Peace settlement process
Against the backdrop of the internal political crisis and the “Mindichgate” scandal, the world press has again intensified publications about the existence of a supposed US-Russian peace plan. According to Western media, the concept is allegedly being worked on by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, President Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff and Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner. Reports claim that Witkoff held closed consultations in October with Kirill Dmitriev, a special representative of the Russian president.
The discussions allegedly concern long-term security guarantees “for all parties, including what Ukraine wants”. Official US representatives emphasise that no final document exists, the plan is at the “working draft” stage and key parameters still require negotiation. Nevertheless, media write that the discussed points may include significant territorial concessions to Russia, Kyiv’s renunciation of an international peacekeeping mission, reduction of the Ukrainian army, restrictions on long-range weapons, admission of inspection missions and temporary fixation of the line of contact. No official confirmation from the US or Russia. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said no negotiations are taking place, though certain contacts exist.
Such leaks may pursue different goals: pressure on Zelenskyi from the internal opposition and some Western media; or an attempt by the Ukrainian side itself to shift the information agenda from the corruption scandal to “external peace pressure”; or an element of internal US political struggle to portray Trump as a “Russian agent”.
Military situation (13–20 November 2025)
Over the week, Russian forces captured approximately 90 km² of Ukrainian territory and now control 115,539 km² in total — 19.14% of Ukraine’s territory.
The pace of the Russian advance in November has slightly increased compared to October, when weekly gains did not exceed ~50 km². For reference, throughout the entire month of October Russia expanded its zone of control by 267 km² — roughly the same rate as in September. The largest territorial losses for Ukraine in October occurred in the Novopavlivka–Huliaipole sector (border between Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions), which accounted for 69% of all territory captured that month, despite only 16% of assault actions taking place there.
The most intense fighting in recent days has been recorded on the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad, Kostiantynivka, and Lyman directions in Donetsk Oblast, around Kupiansk (Kharkiv Oblast), and in the south-eastern part of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
In the Donetsk Oblast, Russian forces are advancing in the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad agglomeration, where the “grey zone” has significantly expanded.
Russian troops have pushed forward east of Myrnohrad and north of Pokrovsk, approaching close to the Hryshyne supply road that sustains the Ukrainian garrison. The key Pokrovsk supply artery via Pavlohrad was cut earlier.
Additionally, Russia is attacking at the base of the Dobropillia salient toward Shakhove, as well as in the areas of Volodymyrivka and toward Sofiivka.
Lyman direction. The threat of a Russian breakthrough toward Lyman persists: constant pressure is observed along with attempts to reach the Lyman–Siversk road. East of Yampol, the enemy is occupying forest belts, fortifying positions there, and repeatedly trying to enter the settlement, taking advantage of deteriorating weather conditions.
Novopavlivka – Mezhove (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast). Russian forces have entered Novopavlivka, a tactically important settlement. Its loss opens the way for Russia toward Mezhove and creates a threat of flanking the Ukrainian grouping that holds the Pokrovsk–Dobropillia line from the rear.
Huliaipole – Zaporizhzhia direction. South of Novopavlivka, Russian troops continue advancing toward Huliaipole, with confirmed activity in the areas of Rivnopil and Sladke — west of the recently eliminated VSU bridgehead at Uspenivka.
Nechaievka (border of Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions). Russia has declared the capture of Nechaievka, located south of Danylivka on the road between Pokrovske and Huliaipole. Ukraine has not officially confirmed this loss.
Map of combat operations.
Donetsk region.
Attacks on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure
Russia continues its deliberate strategy to destroy Ukraine’s energy system. Over the past week, new series of strikes hit energy facilities in Chernihiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Sumy, Odesa, Poltava, Zaporizhia and Kyiv regions.
As of 18 November, blackout schedules have significantly increased — up to 15–17 hours per day in some areas. 12 regions have a serious electricity deficit. Most thermal power plants have sustained 30–70% damage. Only 9 nuclear units remain as the base for the winter season.
Massive strikes on Kharkiv and Poltava regions knocked out ~60% of Ukraine’s natural gas production. Attacks on western regions (Lviv, Ternopil) have increased; on 19 November a massive missile-drone attack on Ternopil killed at least 26 and injured about 100.
Railway infrastructure also targeted (Berestove in Kharkiv Oblast, Dnipro, etc.).
Incident on the Warsaw–Lublin railway line in Poland
In the night from Saturday to Sunday, 15–16 November 2025, an explosion occurred on the railway line between Warsaw and Lublin (Poland). The blast damaged the tracks and/or infrastructure near the settlement of Mika (actually in Lublin Voivodeship, close to the border with Volyn Oblast of Ukraine) on a route that is critically important for military and humanitarian supplies to Ukraine. Polish authorities described the incident as an “unprecedented act of sabotage”, as stated by Prime Minister Donald Tusk.
Polish officials reported that an explosive device detonated on the section between Warsaw and Lublin. Later, damage to the overhead contact wires was discovered on the same line. Another train travelling from Świnoujście to Rzeszów on the same route was forced to make an emergency stop on Sunday evening in Puławy, about 50 km from Lublin, due to damaged overhead wires, according to Poland’s Interior Minister Marcin Kierwiński. Approximately 60 metres of power lines were destroyed. Puławy lies between Mika and Lublin on the railway that connects Warsaw with the Ukrainian border.
Polish authorities are currently investigating whether the explosion is linked to Russia, Belarus, or their proxies. According to the investigation, the suspects are two Ukrainian citizens who entered Poland from Belarus this autumn and fled back across the border after the incident. It is assumed they were acting under the direction of Russian special services.
Ukrainian authorities reacted with serious concern and unequivocally placed full responsibility on Russia.
On 18 November, after Polish law-enforcement agencies announced they had identified the two Ukrainian nationals suspected of carrying out the sabotage on Russia’s instructions, Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official statement strongly condemning the acts of sabotage in Poland. The ministry emphasised that Russia deliberately recruits and uses individuals holding Ukrainian passports to conduct such hybrid attacks, stressing: “Russia is trying to shift the blame for its own crimes onto Ukrainians. But… Ukraine’s partners fully understand that the real source of these sabotage acts is the Russian Federation.” The MFA also assured that Ukraine is ready to provide all necessary assistance to Polish investigators in probing the incident and bringing the perpetrators to justice.
Ukraine has demonstrated complete solidarity with Poland. The damaged route is of strategic importance because it is used for aid and logistics heading to Ukraine.
JSC Ukrainian Railways (Ukrzaliznytsia) stated that it has accumulated considerable experience in countering sabotage on railway infrastructure and is ready to share it with Polish and other European colleagues.
On 19 November, the situation was discussed at the highest level: President Volodymyr Zelenskyi held a phone conversation with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. According to Zelenskyi, Tusk shared information from Polish law enforcement and intelligence regarding the sabotage. Zelenskyi noted that Ukraine itself faces similar subversive actions on a daily basis, including on its own railway infrastructure. The President of Ukraine stated directly: “All the facts point to a Russian trace. No one except the Russians has any interest in this.” The leaders agreed to jointly counter the threat: Ukraine and Poland will establish a joint task force to combat sabotage and prevent similar Russian operations in the future. Zelenskyi emphasised Kyiv’s readiness for comprehensive cooperation and full exchange of information with the Polish side.
Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovskaya, Andriy Timchenko
for the Ukrainian Institute of Politics
