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DOMESTIC POLITICS.
1. Detention of the “Rusagro” holding founder Vadim Moshkovich.
On March 26, a major Russian businessman, the head of the Rusagro holding Vadim Moshkovich was detained. He is suspected of involvement in fraudulent schemes with land assets in the Belgorod region. The FSB has been carrying out technical measures (wiretapping and surveillance) on Moshkovich for several months. Searches were conducted in the offices of Rusagro in a number of regions.
In the Russian expert community, the detention of Vadim Moshkovich and the opening of a criminal case against him is associated with the businessman's position in relation to the Russian authorities. Until recently, Moshkovich tried to position himself as an independent player, maneuvering between the "Kremlin towers" (elite groups), but not joining any of them and striving to maintain independence.
The threat of persecution and "coercion to the system" hung over him already in 2022, when the Russian authorities were intensively engaged in the issue of ensuring the complete loyalty of large businesses against the backdrop of the war that had begun in Ukraine. The independence of large entrepreneurs then began to be perceived by the Russian leadership as a threat of a potential alliance between such business representatives and Western structures of influence for the internal destabilization of the Russian Federation. In 2022, Moshkovich was saved by a personal meeting with Vladimir Putin, which he managed to organize, and during which he assured the Russian president of the absence of destructive intentions.
Now, when the war in Ukraine, according to the prevailing belief among the Russian elites, is "entering the home stretch", Moshkovich has been taken on with renewed vigor. It is no coincidence that the reasons for his detention include machinations with land in the Belgorod region. The latter is considered a strategically important and potentially threatening region in the Russian Federation due to its location on the border with Ukraine. The influence of Russian security forces in the Belgorod region and their powers there are much broader than in other regions.
As a result, a situation is emerging in which the security groups of influence in the Kremlin are pursuing two goals by detaining Moshkovich:
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To persuade a large agricultural entrepreneur to unconditional loyalty to the authorities and the security forces of the elite by entering his business as minority shareholders and in exchange guaranteeing “protection” from encroachments by security forces.
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If Moshkovich persists, to redistribute part of his agricultural business in favor of entrepreneurs loyal to the authorities.
2. Tightening of migration policy and the main areas of work of the Presidential Administration in this field.
The stable anti-migration trend in domestic Russian politics continues to gain momentum. The Presidential Administration is extremely concerned that migrants in the Russian Federation currently commit 14-15% of all crimes, becoming victims of crime 2-3 times less often than representatives of the native population. For regions such as Moscow, St. Petersburg and the regions of the North Caucasus, the problem of migrant crime is becoming especially urgent.
In this regard, in the foreseeable future, the Presidential Administration intends to continue the policy of combating illegal migration in a number of areas, including:
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Complications in obtaining residence permits. The Ministry of Labor is intensively reducing the list of professions for which labor migrants will be able to obtain a residence permit.
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Combating fictitious marriages for the purpose of obtaining temporary residence permits. Now, to obtain a temporary residence permit, it is necessary to live in a marriage with a citizen of the Russian Federation for at least three years.
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Language filters. A mandatory Russian language exam for children of migrants when entering Russian schools will come into effect on April 1.
The main difficulty in solving the migration problem for the Russian leadership is the obvious contradiction between the economic side of the issue and security issues. Before the war in Ukraine, economic priorities in the formation of Russian migration policy were completely dominant.
The main lobbyists for the mass import of labor migrants were and continue to be large construction companies. They also lobby media campaigns against tightening migration legislation, emphasizing the issue of the shortage of personnel in the Russian labor market.
At the same time, the main lobbyists for tightening the rules of entry and stay in the Russian Federation for migrants are the security forces (primarily the Investigative Committee and the FSB). The latter, through media resources under their control, publicly emphasize the danger emanating from migrants and the potential terrorist threat. The dissemination of these narratives is facilitated by real cases of migrants participating in terrorist attacks, such as last year's attack on Crocus City Hall. In the context of military operations against Ukraine, coupled with an increased level of sabotage and terrorist threat in the Russian Federation, the Presidential Administration has been steadily taking the side of the security forces in the migration issue for the third year in a row. The result of this position is the above-described tightening of the rules of stay in the Russian Federation for migrants.
3. Continuing preparations for the Duma elections and forming a new political landscape.
The Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation continues to work on forming a parliamentary political landscape before the elections to the State Duma, which will be held in 2026. The main innovation of the upcoming election campaign will be the positioning of the New People party as "systemic critics of the system." This line of work of the AP was recently emphasized by its deputy head Sergei Kiriyenko, who attended the New People congress.
During the last election campaign, the New People party was conceived by the Russian leadership partly as a project to unite representatives of medium-sized businesses, whose loyalty to the government has always raised some doubts, and partly as a platform for integrating conditional "systemic liberals" into state policy.
Now, the Presidential Administration has decided to somewhat reformat the party. In view of the squeezing out of the "systemic liberal" agenda from the Russian political discourse, in the upcoming elections, New People will position themselves as "the main advocates for solving problems on the ground." In this regard, a more ramified regional structure will be created for the party, and more people from the regions will appear on its lists.
Under this project, a number of truly important bills that have a chance of being adopted will also be introduced to the Duma through New People. For example, we recently wrote about Vladimir Putin's solidarity with the provisions of the bill on "migrant ID" submitted on behalf of this party. This is being done in order to attract to New People a part of the electorate interested in solving urgent problems for Russian society.
By pursuing this policy, the Presidential Administration expects to achieve two goals:
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Increase turnout in the upcoming elections at the expense of the electorate that does not trust the authorities, but is ready to vote for political forces capable of solving problems at the local level and in the center.
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Channel the mood of the potential opposition electorate, preventing them from spilling over into protest.
At the same time, no one in the Presidential Administration is going to make New People the ruling party. The United Russia will remain it. But the described measures illustrate that the practice of "managed democracy" in Russian politics is alive and actively developing. Also, in the Russian near-political environment there are now rumors about preparations for the creation of a certain "party of patriots" from right-wing conservative politicians and veterans of the war in Ukraine. However, this project is still raw and there is insufficient information on it.
4. The level of anxiety in Russian society.
On March 27, Kristina Dzhgamadze, an expert from the Department of Political Research at VTsIOM, cited data from a study conducted by the Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. According to it, 39% of Russian respondents have signs of depression, and 24% have symptoms of anxiety. She also stated that, according to VTsIOM research, over the past 15 years the number of Russians seeking professional psychological help from a specialist has increased significantly (from 6% in 2009 to 13% in 2024).
These figures can be called relatively low, since during the COVID-19 pandemic the level of anxiety among Russians reached 86%.
In general, Russian society is demonstrating quite high psychological resilience during the ongoing war.
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FOREIGN POLICY.
1. Results of expert group consultations to Ukraine in Saudi Arabia.
On March 23, 24 and 25, consultations of American, Russian and Ukrainian expert groups on issues of peaceful settlement in Ukraine were held in Saudi Arabia. First, US representatives held a short (several hours) meeting with their Ukrainian colleagues. The next day, they held negotiations with the Russian side, which lasted 12 hours. And on the 25th, repeated US-Ukrainian consultations were held, which lasted about an hour and a half.
There was no joint statement by the parties following these negotiations. On March 26, the US published two separate statements on negotiations with the Russian and Ukrainian delegations, and the Kremlin released a statement on consultations with the American party.
The main points of these statements were the agreement on an "energy" truce for a period of 30 days, as well as a "maritime" truce and the unblocking of civilian cargo shipping in the Black Sea. On the second point, the Russian side put forward the lifting of a number of Western sanctions as a condition for its launch, namely:
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Lifting all financial restrictions from Rosselkhozbank and other financial organizations involved in ensuring operations on international trade in food (including fish products) and fertilizers, their connection to SWIFT, opening the necessary correspondent accounts.
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Lifting restrictions on trade finance operations.
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Lifting sanctions and restrictions from companies producing and exporting food (including fish products) and fertilizers, as well as lifting restrictions on the work of insurance companies with food cargo (including fish products) and fertilizers.
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Lifting restrictions on servicing ships in ports and sanctions on ships under the Russian flag involved in the trade of food (including fish products) and fertilizers.
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Lifting restrictions on the supply of agricultural machinery to the Russian Federation, as well as other goods involved in the production of food (including fish products) and fertilizers.
Donald Trump and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio have already confirmed their readiness to review the sanctions. However, Russian demands also concern the lifting of sanctions imposed by the EU. And this will clearly cause problems, since the Europeans do not intend to ease the sanctions.
The Russian side considers the conditions set for the Americans to lift a number of sanctions as a "test of negotiability" for the Donald Trump administration. If Washington manages to force the Europeans to lift the designated restrictions, the Kremlin will perceive this as a sign of the seriousness of the American side's intentions in the issue of a peaceful settlement of the war in Ukraine. If the European sanctions listed by the Russian Federation are not lifted, Moscow will not be ready to move further along the path of peaceful settlement. This is the vision of the situation shared by most Russian political experts familiar with the issue.
On March 27, Russian media reported that the next round of consultations between the American and Russian expert groups on Ukraine could take place in mid-April. Probably, it is by that time that we should expect the first results of the current agreements and an understanding of whether the parties are ready to implement them in order to move on to the next stage of the settlement.
Also last week, two restrained and critical assessments of the results of the American-Russian negotiations were made by the Russian Federation. In particular, Deputy Head of the Russian Foreign Ministry Sergei Ryabkov stated that “the US and Russia have not yet reached specific agreements on the Black Sea initiative, having discussed it in the most general terms. But the work is underway.”
This statement reflects Moscow’s position, which we described above: “first – lifting the aforementioned sanctions, then – a maritime truce.” Until the sanctions are lifted, Russian officials will express restrained skepticism about the agreements.
Russian senator Grigory Karasin, head of the expert group on Ukraine at the consultations with the US, expressed a similar skeptical tone this week. Nevertheless, he noted that "we managed to discuss many problems, there was a difficult but useful dialogue." In general, Moscow is still waiting for a "response" from the US with the lifting of sanctions, including European ones.
2. Vladimir Putin's statement on "UN external management" for Ukraine.
On March 27, Vladimir Putin visited Murmansk. There he attended a number of events and made many different statements. The statements made by the Russian president during a conversation with military submariners especially stand out from the rest.
All of them concerned Ukraine, military actions, and the prospects for a peaceful settlement.
First, Putin said: - "If earlier I said that we would crush the Ukrainian Armed Forces, now there is reason to believe that we will finish them off." It is possible that when Putin said this, he meant the prospect of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' front collapsing without American military aid. He could have been prompted to think like this by Donald Trump's reluctance to allocate new aid packages to Ukraine after those allocated under Biden are spent. However, it is also impossible to rule out that the aforementioned phrase was simply a rhetorical device, although this is less likely.
But Putin said the most interesting thing next. He once again stated that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is "illegitimate." But this time Putin added that "since the head of state is illegitimate, then all civil authorities are not legitimate." According to the Russian president, this means that it is impossible to negotiate or sign documents with the current Ukrainian authorities, since any subsequent leadership of the country will have grounds to consider them invalid.
Then Putin comes to the main point. Namely, his proposal to resolve the situation by establishing "external UN management" in Ukraine for the duration of the elections.
"As part of UN peacekeeping activities, there have already been several times what is called external management, temporary administration. This was the case in East Timor, I think, in 1999. This was the case in some parts of the former Yugoslavia, this was the case in New Guinea. In general, such a practice exists. And in principle, of course, it would be possible, under the auspices of the UN, with the United States, even with European countries, of course with our partners and friends, to discuss the possibility of introducing temporary governance in Ukraine in order to hold democratic elections, to bring to power a viable government that enjoys the trust of the people, and then conclude a peace treaty with it, sign legitimate documents that will be recognized throughout the world. But this is only one of the options. I am not saying that there are no others. No, they do exist. But this is one of the options. And such practice exists in the work of the UN,” the Russian president said.
Several points stand out in Putin’s aforementioned statements.
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Firstly, this is the first time he has declared the “illegitimacy” of not only Volodymyr Zelensky, but also the entire vertical of power in Ukraine. Earlier, the Russian Federation claimed that the Verkhovna Rada remains legitimate. But now, it seems, the concept in the Kremlin has changed. This circumstance fully reflects one of the main Russian goals in the ongoing war and negotiations with Washington on its settlement - the change of the regime established in Kyiv in 2014. By declaring the total illegitimacy of the Ukrainian government, Moscow makes it clear that it will not be satisfied with a simple replacement of Zelensky in the presidential post with any other legal politician in today's Ukraine. The Kremlin demands the replacement of the entire regime as such, including governors, officials of regional state administrations, etc.
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Secondly, the leadership of the Russian Federation understands that it is simply impossible to achieve elections in Ukraine with the participation of all currently banned "pro-Russian" parties and the release of political prisoners, which Moscow wants to get its "package of shares" in the post-war political system of the country, while maintaining the current government in Kyiv during the pre-election period. Simply put, if Zelensky and his entourage hold elections, they will successfully organize them in such a way as to elect either themselves or people loyal to them. In such a situation, there is no need to even talk about changing the political and legal order of 2014.
That is why Putin proposed the option of "external UN management" for the pre-election period, counting on the fact that if it is implemented, the situation during the formation of the post-war government in Ukraine will be much more favorable for the Russian Federation than the current one.
But the scenario with "external UN management" raises a number of questions.
The first and main one is the position of the United States.
The second question is the question of Zelensky. If the President of Ukraine is categorically not ready to lift martial law and announce elections during a potential ceasefire, not to mention handing over his powers for the duration of the election campaign to a conditional "new, compromise speaker of the Rada", then he will definitely not agree to any "external UN management". And the United States has no leverage to force him to agree.
Finally, the third question is how the potential "external UN management" will technically function. Will the extremely indoctrinated Ukrainian army and especially its units consisting of members of nationalist organizations (Azov, DUK "Right Sector", OUN battalion and others) be subordinate to it? And if not, then how will the "external UN management" be able to force it to obey? Theoretically, this would require military units subordinate to this very external management. But where to get them and from whom will they be formed? Moscow is categorically against peacekeepers from NATO countries. The involvement of hundreds (or even tens) of thousands of BRICS soldiers for these purposes is also something from the realm of fantasy.
The story with the "external temporary UN management" looks as if in order to ensure it, a foreign army comparable in number to the Armed Forces of Ukraine would first have to be brought into Ukraine, and a lot of civilian officials would have to be taken from somewhere. In fact, the realism of such a scenario is extremely doubtful. But the very fact that it was put forward by the Russian side as a subject for discussion with Washington is very indicative in terms of maintaining Moscow's unchanged goals in the ongoing war and searching for options to achieve these goals.
It is also interesting that similar statements about "external UN management" as a model for settling the war in Ukraine were previously heard only from the fugitive Ukrainian politician Yevgeny Murayev in an interview published in mid-January. This allows us to assume that this option is one of many being considered in Moscow. And the Kremlin has already "thrown" it into the masses to test the reaction.
However, it is obvious that there are other options, which Putin stated directly without mentioning them.
All of them, as we have already noted above, pursue the goal of restoring Russian influence on the territory of Ukraine not occupied by the Russian Armed Forces. First - in the format of a "shareholding" in a new, neutral political regime, and then - in attempts to transform this regime into a pro-Russian one.
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COMBAT ACTIVITIES.
1. New tactics of Russian attack drones.
This week, a clear change in tactics has been observed in attacks by Russian Shahed-type attack drones on targets deep in the Ukrainian rear. Now, the drones do not approach targets one by one, but gather in a group as they approach the target and dive at it almost simultaneously.
Last week, similar tactics were used to strike Odessa, and this week, Dnipro, Kharkov, Zhitomir and Sumy were subjected to similar strikes.
The main danger of the described strike tactics for the Ukrainian side and its main effectiveness for the Russian side lies in the difficulty of repelling air defenses against a simultaneous attack by a large number (up to 20) of drones. Until the Ukrainian Armed Forces invent countermeasures, this strike tactic will remain effective.
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ECONOMY.
1. Kirill Dmitriev's initiatives on economic cooperation with the United States and their significance.
On March 31, Vladimir Putin's Special Representative for Economic Cooperation with the United States, Kirill Dmitriev, called the extraction of rare earth metals an important area of potential Russian-American cooperation.
Dmitriev did not elaborate on his thesis. However, this statement alone, combined with his previous comments to the media, is enough to determine some of the nuances of the Russian side's position in negotiations with the United States.
Moscow sees the issue of the potential development of Russian-American economic cooperation as a "bait" for Donald Trump's team. The Russian leadership expects that, as an entrepreneur, the American president will appreciate the proposals for cooperation and will not want to miss out on the benefits. The Kremlin expects to use this circumstance for two purposes:
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To stop the introduction of any new sanctions against the Russian Federation by the Trump administration (including for the possible failure of a peaceful settlement in Ukraine).
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To provide the American party with a positive incentive to agree to Russia's terms of a peaceful settlement in Ukraine, as well as to lift some of the existing sanctions.
In addition, the issue of "joint business" plays an important role in the division practiced by the Russian side into the "Ukrainian track" and "all other issues" in negotiations with Washington. These directions in Russian foreign policy are connected and intersect, but the Kremlin does not want to make relations with the American administration dependent on the "Ukrainian issue."
