Авторы публикации
ANALYTICAL REVIEW OF THE MAJOR DOMESTIC, FOREIGN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EVENTS OF THE WEEK
17.01.- 23.01.2022
CONTENT:
SUMMARY AND MAIN TRENDS.
DOMESTIC POLICY.
1. Return of P. Poroshenko to Ukraine. The decision of the court on the measure of restraint.
2. "Servant of the people" can recall 61 deputies of local councils, to whom the procedure of an imperative mandate will be applied.
3. Sociology. Citizens began to trust sociologists less.
FOREIGN POLICY.
1. Negotiations E. Blinken and S. Lavrov in Geneva.
2. Press conference by Joseph Biden.
3. Statements by the Commander of the German Navy on the Crimea and his subsequent resignation.
4. Statement by the British Foreign Office on the formation of the future "occupation government" of Ukraine.
ECONOMY.
1. The fall of the hryvnia due to the withdrawal of funds by foreigners from government bonds.
2. Mass refusal of retail trade to use POS terminals and transition to cash settlements.
3. From January 1, 2022, all landowners are subject to minimum tax liability.
4. Growth of utility tariffs, growth of housing and communal services debts and reduction in the number of recipients of subsidies from the beginning of 2022.
SUMMARY AND MAIN TRENDS.
Summing up the results of the past week, we note the following trends:
Firstly , this week the trend of "tightening the screws" continued in the domestic politics of the country, aimed at discrediting and suppressing the main political and economic competitors of V. Zelensky, as well as strengthening the power of the Office of the President at all levels. As part of this trend, the Pechersk Court of the capital in the "coal case" chose a preventive measure for Petro Poroshenko in the form of a personal obligation, for their part, the OGPU promises to change the preventive measure to a tougher one by filing an appeal. Politically, in the short term, this situation does not look like a victory for the Office of the President, but like a defeat, since the society perceives a light preventive measure for the main domestic political opponent V. Zelensky as a weakness of the current government and its inability to complete what has been started. However, in the long term, the choice of a measure of restraint for the ex-president provides the authorities with a means of controlling his movements and contacts. P. Poroshenko finds himself "under the hood" of power structures controlled by the authorities. As for the reasons for choosing such a mild measure of restraint for P. Poroshenko, the main ones are the fact that the ex-president has guarantees of immunity from Western partners, the fear of his supporters organizing mass riots, and, in part, sabotage by individual employees of law enforcement agencies and the judiciary .
Secondly , as part of attempts to strengthen the “vertical of power”, the Servant of the People party is trying to use any levers of influence on its representatives and may recall 61 deputies of local councils, to whom the procedure of an imperative mandate will be applied.
Thirdly , the main foreign policy trend of the outgoing week is the lack of compromise between the United States and Russia in negotiations on Russian demands for security guarantees. At the moment, the United States is delaying the provision of a written response from the Russian Federation in order to get as much time as possible to prepare for possible Russian measures of a “military and military-technical” nature.
Fourthly , Great Britain has actively joined in whipping up military hysteria around the prospect of an “imminent Russian invasion of Ukraine”. This week, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the kingdom published a list of members of the "occupation government of Ukraine", which is allegedly being prepared in the Kremlin. Most likely, this information stuffing was aimed at justifying military supplies to Ukraine (in particular, the supply of anti-tank systems) in the eyes of the British society. Other possible reasons for the British statement about the formation of an “occupation government” of Ukraine by Moscow may be related both to the desire to maintain the general intensity of the information campaign around a potential Russian invasion of Ukraine (this is necessary, among other things, to support the American position in negotiations with the Russian Federation), and and with a desire to cause problems for Yevgeny Muraev, as one of the representatives of the anti-Western trend in Ukrainian politics. It is likely that London sees a threat in any policy that criticizes the dependence of the current Ukrainian authorities on instructions from the West, and therefore they expect to provoke criminal prosecutions or NSDC sanctions against Y. Muraev with their statement.
Fifthly , the fanning of panic in the Western and Ukrainian media regarding the alleged threat of a Russian invasion of Ukraine has already collapsed the hryvnia by 7.5% due to the flight of speculative capital, which used to speculate on government bonds. According to the National Bank, for the period from the beginning of 2020 to September 2021, non-residents' deposits in government securities of Ukraine decreased by $583 million - from $27.4 billion at the end of 2019 to $26.9 billion at the end of September 2021: deposits in government bonds decreased by $1.3 billion, while deposits in Eurobonds increased by $714 million. The current withdrawal of money by foreigners from Ukrainian government bonds is a continuation and acceleration of this trend.
Sixthly , a new stage of tax reform from the beginning of 2022 turned into a massive concealment of PPOs by retailers and a transition to cash settlements, including due to the unavailability of the STS servers for the influx of entrepreneurs' applications at the end of December 2021.
Seventh , the three main trends of the heating season 2021/2022: a rapid increase in household debt for housing and communal services; reducing the number of subsidies while reducing the average size of the subsidy; increase in the amount of bills for housing and communal services.
DOMESTIC POLICY.
Briefly :
This week, the domestic policy of the country continued the trend of “tightening the screws”, aimed at discrediting and suppressing the main political and economic competitors of V. Zelensky, as well as strengthening the power of the Office of the President at all levels. As part of this trend, the Pechersk Court of the capital in the "coal case" chose a preventive measure for Petro Poroshenko in the form of a personal obligation, for their part, the OGPU promises to change the preventive measure to a tougher one by filing an appeal. Politically, in the short term, this situation does not look like a victory for the Office of the President, but like a defeat, since the society perceives a light preventive measure for the main domestic political opponent V. Zelensky as a weakness of the current government and its inability to complete what has been started. However, in the long term, the choice of a measure of restraint for the ex-president provides the authorities with a means of controlling his movements and contacts. P. Poroshenko finds himself "under the hood" of power structures controlled by the authorities. As for the reasons for choosing such a mild measure of restraint for P. Poroshenko, the main ones are the fact that the ex-president has guarantees of immunity from Western partners, the fear of his supporters organizing mass riots, and, in part, sabotage by individual employees of law enforcement agencies and the judiciary .
As part of attempts to strengthen the "vertical of power", the Servant of the People party is trying to use any levers of influence on its representatives and may recall 61 deputies of local councils, to whom the procedure of an imperative mandate will be applied.
1. Return of P. Poroshenko to Ukraine. The decision of the court on the measure of restraint.
On January 17, the fifth president of Ukraine and leader of the European Solidarity party P. Poroshenko returned from Poland to Ukraine. From the airport he went to court. Recall that Petro Poroshenko was signed on suspicion of treason and promoting terrorism as part of an investigation into the case of illegal supplies of coal from uncontrolled territories. On January 19, the Pechersk Court of the capital chose a measure of restraint for Petro Poroshenko in the form of a personal obligation. In addition, the property of P. Poroshenko and his wife M. Poroshenko was seized. P. Poroshenko must surrender his passports to travel abroad, not leave Kiev or the Kiev region without the permission of the investigator, prosecutor or court, appear when called by the investigator, prosecutor or court [1].
Prosecutor General Irina Venediktova said she would appeal against the chosen measure of restraint [2]. The prosecution petitioned for an arrest with the alternative of posting a bail of 1 billion hryvnia. By analogy with the defendants in the "coal case" - People's Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk, ex-Minister of Energy Vladimir Demchishin and businessman Sergei Kuzyara, the preventive measure should have been the same or more severe. The Prosecutor General added that the very fact of choosing a measure of restraint for P. Poroshenko indicates that the court recognizes that the suspect was handed over to the accused.
The above events continue the trend of "twisting bunnies" - the suppression and discrediting of the main political and economic competitors of power. “Coal business” was initially aimed at P. Poroshenko, since they tried to get evidence from all of his defendants.
At the same time, a relatively soft decision on the measure of restraint for P. Poroshenko, with a high probability, will negatively affect the rating of V. Zelensky. It was expected that the court's decision would be tougher and comparable to the decisions that the judges took on S. Kuzyara and V. Medvedchuk. It can be assumed that such a soft decision is connected not only with the personal position of the judge (who was appointed under Poroshenko), street pressure (mass protests near the airport and the Pechersky district court) or behind-the-scenes negotiations between the OP and the judiciary, but also with the fact that P. Poroshenko immunity guarantees from Western partners. These days, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Germany and Canada, and, most importantly, a bipartisan delegation of the US Congress headed by Senator Rob Portman and Senators Chris Murphy, Gene Shaheen, Amy Klobuchar, Richard Blumenthal, Roger Vicker, stayed in Ukraine these days. Also, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken held a number of meetings in Kiev with the leadership of Ukraine. The announcement of a tough decision in the case of P. Poroshenko, in such conditions, increased the risks of criticism of the authorities by representatives of Western political elites.
So far, we can only talk about the tactical victory of P. Poroshenko. In the future, it is possible that prosecutors will actually try to change the preventive measure by filing an appeal. In any case, the authorities managed to hang P. Poroshenko on a "judicial-investigative" fishing line, which will be regularly pulled. In addition, consideration of the case may stretch until the next presidential election. And all this time, a toxic halo around the figure of P. Poroshenko will remain in the information field. "Coal business" will hit the patriotic part of his electorate, putting P. Poroshenko in the range of public perception between "a corrupt official and an accomplice of the Kremlin."
2. "Servant of the people" can recall 61 deputies of local councils, to whom the procedure of an imperative mandate will be applied.
This week it became known that the Servant of the People party has prepared a preliminary list of 61 deputies of local councils, to whom the procedure of an imperative mandate can be applied. The procedure is carried out for the first time and the initial decisions, which will be made by regional organizations and approved at the level of the party leadership, are expected in February.
The head of the Servant of the People party, Elena Shulyak, said that at the “central level” the party had already worked out this issue with lawyers. On January 27, they also plan to hold a meeting of one of the governing bodies of the party - the National Council of Communities, where candidates for local deputies will be discussed, to whom an imperative mandate will be applied. In general, the number of deputies of local councils from the Servant of the People is 6,407 people, so 61 deputies submitted by regional organizations for an imperative mandate is a very small percentage. The imperative mandate is applied if the deputy has not joined the faction, has been expelled from it, or if he does not vote in accordance with the decisions of the faction.
At the same time, E. Shulyak stated that she was a fan of the imperative mandate "at all levels" and would like to apply it to people's deputies, for example, who are moving from the "Servant of the People" to the inter-factional association "Reasonable Politics" [3]. Earlier, E. Shulyak proposed the creation of a Disciplinary Commission, which would choose punishment for deputies from the Servant of the People who find themselves in all sorts of scandalous situations [4].
Probably, with such methods, the leadership of the Servant of the People is trying to use any levers of influence on the deputies of its political force, mainly in order to restrain the process of shedding the mono-majority in parliament. The application of the imperative mandate procedure to a relatively small number of deputies of local councils here can also act as an instrument of intimidation and pressure in relation to deputies of political forces in parliament. After the resignation of D. Razumkov and the creation of the inter-factional association “Reasonable Politics”, in fact, another group of internal opposition was formed, which can now simultaneously vote against the position of the party leadership and deprive the “Servant of the People” of a mono-majority in parliament. At the same time, de jure deputies are not going to leave the faction because of the risk of losing their mandate.
3. Sociology. Citizens began to trust sociologists less.
On January 18, the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) [5]published a study according to which citizens began to trust sociologists less. The level of confidence in the research of sociological centers among the population of Ukraine has decreased by 13% over the past 5 years.
If in 2016 they trusted sociological centers - 50%, and did not trust -14% (balance + 36%). At the end of 2021, the ratio was already 37% to 23%, respectively. And the balance of trust was +14%.
In total, from 2016 to December 2021, the balance of trust in the research of sociological centers among the population of Ukraine lost 22%.
At the same time, for comparison, KIIS cites the figures for 2002, when the results were even worse. 36% trusted the studies of sociological centers, and 29% did not trust them. The balance of trust, respectively, was half as much as it is now + 7%.
According to our estimates, one of the reasons for the growing distrust of sociological services has been the widespread use by Ukrainian political forces of the technology of "formative" sociological surveys in recent years.
FOREIGN POLICY.
Briefly:
The main foreign policy trend of the outgoing week is the lack of compromise between the United States and Russia in negotiations on Russian demands for security guarantees. At the moment, the United States is delaying the provision of a written response from the Russian Federation in order to get as much time as possible to prepare for possible Russian measures of a “military and military-technical” nature.
The United Kingdom has actively joined in whipping up military hysteria around the prospect of an “imminent Russian invasion of Ukraine”. This week, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the kingdom published a list of members of the "occupation government of Ukraine", which is allegedly being prepared in the Kremlin. Most likely, this information stuffing was aimed at justifying military supplies to Ukraine (in particular, the supply of anti-tank systems) in the eyes of the British society. Other possible reasons for the British statement about the formation of an “occupation government” of Ukraine by Moscow may be related both to the desire to maintain the general intensity of the information campaign around a potential Russian invasion of Ukraine (this is necessary, among other things, to support the American position in negotiations with the Russian Federation), and and with a desire to cause problems for Yevgeny Muraev, as one of the representatives of the anti-Western trend in Ukrainian politics. It is likely that London sees a threat in any policy that criticizes the dependence of the current Ukrainian authorities on instructions from the West, and therefore they expect to provoke criminal prosecutions or NSDC sanctions against Y. Muraev with their statement.
1. Negotiations E. Blinken and S. Lavrov in Geneva.
On January 21, talks were held in Geneva between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken [6].
According to Lavrov, Russia received a preliminary reaction from the United States to Russian initiatives, and the American side also asked clarifying questions. The US will submit a written response next week. Blinken indicated two days before the meeting that Washington would not provide any documents at it.
In general, the latest US-Russian talks revealed that the parties are trying to present even their subject in different ways.
From the statements of US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, it followed that the Americans see the main subject of negotiations "the situation around the Ukrainian crisis" and "de-escalation near the Ukrainian borders."
The Russian side, in turn, constantly reminds its counterparts that the main topic of the talks is the discussion of Russian demands for security guarantees, the main of which is documenting the ban on NATO expansion to the East and the withdrawal of US troops in Europe to the positions they occupied as of for 1997.
The foregoing eloquently indicates that the positions of the US and Russia on security issues in Europe in general and in Eastern Europe in particular remain diametrically opposed. This makes further escalation almost inevitable.
By postponing a written response to Russian demands for another week, Washington is playing for time in the hope of preparing as best as possible for Russian countermeasures of a “military and military-technical nature.”
There is a lot of rumor and speculation going around as to exactly what these measures will be. However, from our point of view, they may be associated with the deployment of Russian intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles in areas where they would directly threaten the United States or its main NATO allies in Europe.
2. Press conference by Joseph Biden.
On January 20, US President Joseph Biden held a press conference following the results of his first year in office [7].
One of its main topics was issues related to negotiations with the Russian Federation, their prospects, and the situation in Eastern Europe (including around Ukraine).
As for negotiations with Russia on security guarantees, J. Biden said that the only thing that the United States agrees to agree to within them is an agreement on the non-deployment of American missile weapons in Ukraine. The rest of Moscow's demands, including the non-expansion of NATO to the East, are dismissed in Washington.
Another important statement Biden made during the press conference is that the severity of the US response to a potential Russian invasion of Ukraine will depend on the scale of this invasion. If it is large-scale, the American president threatened the Russian bank with a ban on foreign trade operations with the dollar.
It should be noted that this measure, if applied, will indeed deal a powerful blow to the Russian economy. However, only in the short term. As for the medium and long term, the effect of such a ban will be minimal, since over time Russia will transfer those 50% of its foreign trade, which are now conducted in dollars, to other currencies (Yuan, Euro, etc.).
As a result, the United States itself will suffer losses from such economic measures of influence on the Russian Federation.
3. Statements by the Commander of the German Navy on the Crimea and his subsequent resignation.
On January 21, speaking at a conference of the Indian Institute of Defense Studies Manohar Parrikara, the commander of the naval forces of the Federal Republic of Germany, Vice Admiral Kai-Ahim Schoenbach, announced the impossibility of returning Crimea to the control of Ukraine [8].
This statement caused a sharply negative reaction from the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry. The German ambassador in Kiev was called to the carpet.
The next day, Kai-Achim Schönbach submitted his resignation from his post.
This situation, despite all its absurdity and lack of diplomacy, sheds light on what representatives of European military and political elites really think about Crimea. Of course, few of them allow themselves to express this publicly, making a "good face on a bad game." However, the opinion of Admiral Schönbach, most likely, is shared by most of not only the German, but also the French politicians. And this can be considered one of the defeats of Ukrainian diplomacy in the European direction.
4. Statement by the British Foreign Office on the formation of the future "occupation government" of Ukraine.
On January 23, the British Foreign Office published a list of members of the "occupation government" that Moscow allegedly plans to install in Ukraine after the "invasion" [9].
"We have information that the Russian government plans to install a pro-Russian leader in Kiev if it decides to invade and occupy Ukraine. Former MP Yevgeny Muraev is being considered as a potential candidate," the ministry said.
The Foreign Office writes that "Russian intelligence maintains links with numerous former Ukrainian politicians." Which, apparently, are also considered as "rulers".
The British included former Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Arbuzov, former head of Yanukovych's administration Andriy Klyuev, former People's Deputy Volodymyr Sivkovich and former Prime Minister Mykola Azarov on their list.
For anyone who is even slightly familiar with Ukrainian politics during the last years of V. Yanukovych's rule, the thesis that Azarov and Arbuzov can get along in the same government is obviously absurd. Not to mention the fact that Evgeny Muraev appears on the list, against whom Russia imposed sanctions a few years ago and still has not lifted them.
Thus, this statement looks like information technology aimed at maintaining tension in the media.
This becomes especially relevant given the fact that several British aircraft arrived in Ukraine this week with a cargo of anti-tank missile systems supplied for the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Military supplies to Kiev must be justified in the eyes of the British public. This is probably what the above statement of the UK Foreign Office is aimed at.
Other possible reasons for the British statement about the formation of an “occupation government” of Ukraine by Moscow may be related both to the desire to maintain the general intensity of the information campaign around a potential Russian invasion of Ukraine (this is necessary, among other things, to support the American position in negotiations with the Russian Federation), and and with a desire to cause problems for Yevgeny Muraev, as one of the representatives of the anti-Western trend in Ukrainian politics. It is likely that London sees a threat in any policy that criticizes the dependence of the current Ukrainian authorities on instructions from the West, and therefore they expect to provoke criminal prosecutions or NSDC sanctions against Y. Muraev with their statement.
ECONOMY
Briefly:
Fanning panic in the Western and Ukrainian media regarding the alleged threat of a Russian invasion of Ukraine has already collapsed the hryvnia by 7.5% due to the flight of speculative capital, which used to speculate on government bonds. According to the National Bank, for the period from the beginning of 2020 to September 2021, non-residents' deposits in government securities of Ukraine decreased by $583 million - from $27.4 billion at the end of 2019 to $26.9 billion at the end of September 2021: deposits in government bonds decreased by $1.3 billion, while deposits in Eurobonds increased by $714 million. The current withdrawal of money by foreigners from Ukrainian government bonds is a continuation and acceleration of this trend.
A new stage of tax reform from the beginning of 2022 turned into a massive concealment of cash registers by retailers and a transition to cash settlements, including due to the unavailability of the STS servers for the influx of applications from entrepreneurs at the end of December 2021.
Three main trends of the heating season 2021/2022: a rapid increase in household debt for housing and communal services; reducing the number of subsidies while reducing the average size of the subsidy; increase in the amount of bills for housing and communal services.
1. The fall of the hryvnia due to the withdrawal of funds by foreigners from government bonds .
Starting in the fall of 2021, key Western media began to publish news about Russian troops allegedly pulled up to the Ukrainian border. As a result, as of the end of January 2022, the hryvnia began to plummet due to the withdrawal of foreign speculative capital, which had previously been invested in Ukrainian government bonds.
Thus, from October 2021 to January 2022, the hryvnia weakened by 7.5% - from 26.32 hryvnia per US dollar in October to 28.31 hryvnia per US dollar in January 2022 [10].
According to the National Bank, for the period from the beginning of 2020 to September 2021, non-residents' deposits in government securities of Ukraine decreased by $583 million - from $27.4 billion at the end of 2019 to $26.9 billion at the end of September 2021: deposits in government bonds decreased by $1.3 billion, while deposits in Eurobonds increased by $714 million.
The current withdrawal of money by foreigners from Ukrainian government bonds is a continuation and acceleration of this trend.
The devaluation of the national currency also means a devaluation of the purchasing power of citizens, since for the same salary they will be able to buy fewer products, especially due to the extremely high dependence of the Ukrainian market on imports. So, in mid-January, it became known that Ukraine was buying flour from Turkey [11]. Thus, prices for bakery products are predicted to rise by a quarter in the near future, since the import of products is carried out for US dollars.
2. Mass refusal of retail trade from terminals and transition to cash settlements.
On December 30, 2021, the server of the State Tax Service could not withstand the load due to the too high number of requests from entrepreneurs. There was a malfunction in his work [12]. The State Tax Service has not yet officially recognized this. The Checkbox private software logger server also crashed. As a result, software cash registers began to freeze en masse.
From January 1, 2022, the authorities expected to extend the obligation to use registrars of settlement transactions (RPO) to approximately 150,000 entrepreneurs throughout Ukraine. However, this aspect of tax reform threatens to backfire. Instead of increasing tax revenues to the budget, starting from January 1, 2022, entrepreneurs are massively hiding PPO from customers and asking them to pay in cash. On January 11, 2022, the Kiev department of the State Tax Service began explanatory conversations with entrepreneurs about the importance of using cash registers.
The Verkhovna Rada is considering the possibility of temporarily, for 2022, exempting from fines entrepreneurs who register cash registers before February 1, Danil Getmantsev, head of the parliamentary tax committee, said in an interview with the YouTube channel Legal Consultation - YANKIV.
" Unfortunately, the law [on PPO] is very weakly spelled out and allows for ambiguous interpretations. The situation is aggravated by the explanations of the tax authorities, who also turned out to be unprepared for the reform ," said Alexandra Tomashevskaya, a consultant to the KTsPRB.
Despite the announcement of this step 2 years ago, neither business nor the State Tax Service were ready for the actual introduction of mandatory cash registers for sole proprietors of 2-4 groups of single tax payers.
3. From January 1, 2022, all landowners are subject to a minimum tax liability.
From January 1, all landowners will be charged a minimum tax liability [13]. The minimum tax liability (MTL) includes the following taxes: land tax, tax on income from the sale of crops grown on this site, personal income tax, military levy on the wages of employees. Approximately additional revenues to the budget of local communities and the general budget per year from the minimum tax liability will amount to 10-12 billion hryvnia. The collected money from the Ministry of Taxation will be distributed as follows: to local budgets - 60%; state budget - 25%; regional - 15%.
Thus, the authorities neutralize the principle of private property enshrined in the Constitution - it is impossible to tax private property, otherwise it is no longer private.
4. Growth of utility tariffs, growth of housing and communal services debts and reduction in the number of recipients of subsidies from the beginning of 2022.
Ukraine entered the heating season (mid-October 2021) with household debts for housing and communal services in the amount of UAH 61.5 billion. (as of 01.10.2021), which is by UAH 6.9 billion. more than a year earlier - UAH 54.4 billion. (as of 10/01/2020) [14]. Since the beginning of the heating season 2021/2022, the debt of the population for housing and communal services has increased by UAH 11.2 billion. (including November 2021 by UAH 7.1 billion) and as of December 1, 2021 amounted to UAH 72.7 billion.
The increase in debt in October-November 2021 occurred in two main items:
• for natural gas – plus UAH 6.1 billion. (including in November - +3.1 billion UAH);
• for heat and hot water – plus UAH 4.5 billion. (including +4.0 billion UAH in November).
The increase in debt for housing and communal services occurs against the background of a decrease in the number of households receiving subsidies and the average size of the subsidy paid (November 2021 to November 2020):
• the number of subsidies decreases by 367.5 thousand households (minus 12.4%);
• the average subsidy is reduced by UAH 37. (minus 2.3%).
Bills for payment of housing and communal services in the heating season 2021/2022 increased by 19.6% compared to the previous heating season (+6.5 billion UAH):
• UAH 39.6 billion was accrued in October-November 2021, and UAH 33.1 billion in October-November 2020.
Taking into account the fact that UAH 47 billion was spent on subsidies from the budget in 2021, and only UAH 38 billion is provided for in the budget for 2022. (9 billion hryvnia less), all of the above trends in this heating season, unfortunately, will continue.
Edited by:
Ruslan Bortnik,
Daniil Bogatyrev.
Authors:
Daniel Bogatyrev,
Oksana Krasovskaya,
Andrey Timchenko.
