1. After 1000 days of war, neither side—neither the Russian Federation nor Ukraine and its coalition of allies—has achieved its key objectives in this conflict. Russia has failed to overthrow the Ukrainian government, establish a loyal political regime in Ukraine, annex the so-called "Novorossiya" in its historical boundaries, or dismantle the U.S.-led unipolar world. The U.S. and its partners have not sufficiently weakened Russia or achieved its destabilization and restructuring. Meanwhile, Ukraine has not managed to expel Russia from all occupied territories or restore its 1991 borders.
2. The Russian army currently controls approximately 111,000 square kilometers (18.4%) of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, which is roughly equivalent to the size of two Croatias. Since February 24, 2024, Russia has occupied an additional 67,000 square kilometers. At the peak of Russia’s offensive in March 2022, Russian forces held about 25–30% of Ukraine’s territory, amounting to roughly 150,000–170,000 square kilometers. During its counteroffensive, Ukraine managed to liberate 42,500 square kilometers. Ukraine currently controls 593 square kilometers in the Kursk region, with an additional 246 square kilometers remaining in the gray zone. At the peak of its offensive in the Kursk region in August 2024, Ukraine controlled 823 square kilometers, with 416 square kilometers in the gray zone.
3. Importantly, Ukraine remains a fully functioning state with relative political stability (albeit with uncertain prospects), significant military-political and social tensions, and a chronic crisis on the front lines.
4. Over this time, Ukraine has become a different country, not only in political, economic, or military terms but also in territorial, demographic, ethnic, and religious aspects. This process is ongoing. Ukraine is gradually transforming from a multicultural, agrarian-industrial state with high political competition into a more monocultural and agrarian country led by a single political leader.
5. The war on the frontlines has maintained significant dynamics since the beginning of hostilities on February 24, 2022, which can be characterized by several phases/transitions:
First Phase of the Russian Invasion (February 24 – April 1, 2022): Russian leadership hoped to overthrow the Ukrainian government and secure a quick capitulation. However, due to a miscalculation of the state of Ukrainian society and its elites, the strategy of military coercion failed. As a result, Russia’s "Blitzkrieg" did not materialize, and the war entered a protracted phase.
Second Phase of the War (April 2022 – Late 2022): During this period, Ukraine gained a military advantage due to faster mobilization, public support, and the strength of its army. Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations, liberating nearly the entire Kharkiv region and the city of Kherson.
Third Phase of the War (January 2023 – August 2024): This phase was marked by a strategic stalemate and relative stability on the frontlines. Ukraine’s unsuccessful counteroffensive in the south and overestimated expectations led to severe political consequences, including reduced and delayed military assistance, as well as declining support among allied countries.
Fourth Phase of the War (August 2024 – Present): This phase saw a shift in tactical military initiative to the Russian army, which leveraged its numerical and resource superiority. During this period, Ukraine launched a military operation in the Kursk region, deploying its best reserves. However, defenses on other frontlines, particularly in the Donetsk region, began to falter. In 2024, Russian forces significantly accelerated their advance, capturing approximately 2,500 square kilometers between January 1 and November 19, 2024. By comparison, in all of 2023, the frontlines shifted only by 200 square kilometers in favor of Ukrainian forces
6. However, Russia has lost its initial strategic advantage of surprise and dominance in artillery and aviation, while Ukraine has lost its situational advantage in technology and troop numbers.
7. At this stage of the war, the situation has moved out of a strategic stalemate and is now in a state of strategic balance, as both sides adapt to the dynamics of combat. Russia’s Avdiivka-Pokrovsk operation and Ukraine’s Kursk operation demonstrate efforts by both sides to break the deadlock. Territorial changes remain minimal, which in turn does not create a strategic risk of defeat or prerequisites for capitulation for either side. For comparison, during the first 1000 days of the German-Soviet war in World War II, the German army managed to fully occupy Ukraine, advance to the Caucasus and the Volga, while the Soviet army subsequently liberated Ukraine entirely and pushed the frontlines into Eastern and Central Europe.
8. Russia has defined its strategy regarding the occupied territories, which it annexed and incorporated into its Constitution (Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions). In the fall of 2023, so-called "referendums" on joining the Russian Federation were held in these occupied territories.
9. Both sides are incurring heavy losses in personnel, equipment, and other resources. Given that the war is being fought on Ukrainian territory, Ukraine also suffers severe economic and infrastructural losses, while Russia bears the burden of sanctions.
10. Casualties: Total Ukrainian military losses since the start of the war, including deaths and injuries, may reach 500,000. Of these, an estimated 50,000–80,000 are fatalities, and 54,000 are missing. Russian losses, according to Western sources, are approximately 615,000, including 115,000 killed and 500,000 wounded.
11. Russia’s offensive and the creation of local tactical advantages are partly due to the instability and inconsistency of Western aid to Ukraine and the gradual depletion of Ukraine’s mobilization resources. Simultaneously, Ukraine has become a testing ground for the most advanced military technologies and now effectively represents a hybrid of the First, Second, and Third World Wars.
12. Economically and militarily, Ukraine now heavily depends on assistance from Western partners. According to the Ukrainian government, the country needs additional monthly funding of $3 to $5 billion to cover its budget deficit. The total assistance provided by allies has already reached approximately $400 billion.
13. Due to the war on its territory, Ukraine faces significant losses, including: Destruction of infrastructure and production facilities; Disruption of logistics and a sharp decline in exports; Reduced investment and weakened consumer demand, partly due to active migration. In 2022, Ukraine's GDP fell from over $200 billion to $161 billion (-29.1%), but in 2023, GDP showed 5% growth. According to the government, Ukraine's direct economic losses exceed $700 billion. The World Bank estimates that Ukraine will need $486 billion for reconstruction.
14. In demographic terms, Ukraine has lost between 10 and 15 million of its population: Since the beginning of the invasion, Russia has captured territories where at least 3–3.5 million people live (overall, including Crimea, 6–9 million people may reside in territories occupied by Russia). According to official UN data, there are 6.5 million Ukrainian refugees worldwide (about 6 million in Europe), though these figures are likely incomplete. A significant number of refugees are also in Russia and Belarus.
15. The number of working-age Ukrainians has decreased by 5.5 million people, or 30%, since the invasion. This loss is greater than that experienced by Germany after World War II. Before the invasion, Ukraine had 17.4 million working-age resi
16. Ukraine's economic centers—successful companies and production facilities—have predominantly relocated to western regions of the country, which have become the new economic hub.
17. After sanctions were introduced, Russia faced challenges in servicing its foreign debt and was effectively deprived of access to Western financial markets. Before the war, Russia held approximately $640 billion in foreign currency and gold reserves, most of which were abroad and are now frozen (around $300 billion). Export revenues have significantly declined: Russian exports fell by 28.4% in 2023 compared to 2022, dropping from $592 billion to $424 billion. The trade balance decreased by 2.5 times, and the payment balance (including services and capital outflows) fell nearly fivefold. EU exports to Russia and imports from Russia have dropped by over 50% compared to 2021. EU restrictions and price caps on oil cost Russia €160 million daily.
18. However, the effectiveness of sanctions is limited by the availability of circumvention mechanisms and weak international enforcement. Russian authorities have adapted their economy to some restrictions, benefiting from the fact that major countries like India and China have not joined Western sanctions.
19. At the same time, sanctions have caused significant damage to European countries, especially in the energy sector. As of early 2024, losses from anti-Russian sanctions in the European Union were estimated at nearly $1.5 trillion.
20. The failure of Ukraine's counteroffensive in the summer of 2023 has fueled the activity of Ukraine skeptics within the European Union and the U.S. political system, particularly among Republicans. While aid to Ukraine—blocked for about six months in the U.S. Congress—was eventually approved in April 2024 (amounting to $60 billion), negative trends for Ukraine are already emerging. Public opinion in the West is shifting, support is eroding across multiple sectors, and the situation on the front remains unresolved.
21. Changes in the political balance in the U.S. (Ukraine’s primary ally and donor), delays in Western aid, the failed counteroffensive, and the worsening situation on the front, as well as the broader prospects of potential future reductions in allied financing, have weakened the position of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his party domestically.
22. Opposition activity is increasing, and active political competition is unfolding. There is a growing likelihood of new political projects emerging, such as a potential party led by former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valerii Zaluzhnyi (or a party of volunteers and veterans), which could pose a serious challenge to President Zelensky's team. In addition to Zaluzhnyi, other potentially strong political figures include former President Petro Poroshenko and Batkivshchyna party leader Yulia Tymoshenko, though they face high disapproval ratings compared to Zaluzhnyi.
23. Despite the formal monomajority in Parliament, the Servant of the People party is increasingly unable to pass most decisions independently. There is a significant risk of the party fracturing into several parliamentary groups. Some MPs have left the faction, weakening the party's ability to pass legislation alone. The faction formally retains 233 mandates (the minimum required for passing laws is 226), but many monomajority MPs are informally in internal opposition (discontented with the President or his office), often absent, or refuse to participate in votes, making the legislative process increasingly difficult. The President is now forced to negotiate or compromise with representatives of other influence groups in Parliament.
24. Public trust in the government is declining. At the beginning of the war, President Zelensky's approval rating exceeded 90%, while 40% and 60% of citizens trusted Parliament and the Cabinet of Ministers, respectively. Currently, trust in the President has dropped to 59%, while over 70% of citizens no longer trust Parliament and the Cabinet. Negative sentiment toward the Servant of the People party has also grown, with 48% of Ukrainians expressing disapproval (compared to around 40% who had a positive opinion at the start of the war).
25. Ukrainian society has begun to reassess the situation in the country. Initially, this manifested as an increased demand for criticism of the government. Subsequently, public dissatisfaction with corruption grew. Corruption has become a key grievance for society, with 52.5% stating that it is acceptable to criticize the government for corruption during wartime.
26. Citizens are also gradually losing confidence in their future. In February 2024, a survey by KMIS showed that, for the first time since the beginning of the war, a majority of citizens believed the country was heading in the wrong direction—46%. In March 2022, when Russian troops were near Kyiv, 73% believed the country was moving in the right direction, whereas now, only 36% share this sentiment. This reflects not so much the actual state of affairs but a fundamental shift in public consciousness. Society is tired, disillusioned, and losing confidence in the prospects for positive developments.
27. Simultaneously, there is a growing public demand for ending the war, accompanied by elements of fatigue and a call for new justice. Over a third of the population now supports stopping the war or entering negotiations. Specifically, 35% of Ukrainians believe negotiations with Russia should begin immediately, and about 32% of respondents are willing to make territorial concessions to end the war. From May 2022 to October 2024, the proportion of those willing to make concessions increased fourfold, while the share opposing concessions dropped from 87% to 58%, though it remains the majority. Despite this, 63% of Ukrainians state they are willing to endure the war for as long as necessary. However, this figure fell by 10% from February (73%) to October 2024.
28. Primary sources of information. At the start of the war, restrictions were imposed on some media outlets, and state control over the information space was intensified to prevent the spread of misinformation. The state-run television marathon "United News" still dominates broadcast airtime, though it is trusted by only one-fifth of citizens. Most people now rely on alternative sources of information outside government control. Telegram is the most popular source for Ukrainians (47%, according to the Rating Sociological Group), followed by YouTube (26%) and "United News" (21%). For comparison, in May 2022, "United News" was trusted by 69% of citizens (KMIS data).
29. Periodic corruption scandals involving government officials, when publicized, serve as a trigger for societal frustration, reducing army morale and negatively affecting the capacity to sustain the war effort. Additional negative impacts on society include the inability to forecast the war's duration, its end, and the overall political and economic future of Ukraine, particularly regarding realistic timelines for EU and NATO membership.
30. In religious and linguistic terms, Ukraine has also undergone changes due to occupation and the outflow of wealthier urban populations. The number of Ukrainian speakers and the use of the Ukrainian language have increased. The Orthodox Church of Ukraine has become the dominant religious institution, replacing the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which maintains canonical ties with the Moscow Patriarchate.
31. Mobilization processes have become a source of hidden conflict between society and the state, as well as between active patriots, military personnel, and civilians. Following the introduction of mobilization laws, conflicts emerged among different social groups, particularly between those actively participating in combat (service members and patriots) and those avoiding mobilization. The perception of mobilization as a repressive mechanism, especially among civilians, has deepened the divide between society and the state. Indefinite military conscription, increased cases of evasion (including through corruption, medical exemptions, and fleeing abroad), forced conscription, and deploying untrained reservists to combat zones (posing risks not only to their lives but also to mission success) have, especially in the context of a deteriorating economy, led to social fragmentation and heightened mutual distrust.
32. At present, Ukraine's political system balances on the factors of war: the unwavering political and financial support of its allies—primarily the U.S. and the EU; President Zelensky’s still relatively high (though declining) electoral rating; the lack of a clear exit strategy or alternative public strategy presented by his main political competitors; and the ongoing informational, political, and security suppression of dissent within Ukraine. The political situation in Ukraine remains dynamic, and the emergence of new political forces could significantly influence the balance of power ahead of potential elections.
33. Over the 1000 days of war, Ukraine has become a candidate for EU membership. An international coalition led by the U.S. and Western allies has formed around Ukraine, with more than 60 countries providing military assistance to Ukraine in the Ramstein+ format. Conversely, Russia has built its coalition of staunch allies—Belarus, North Korea, Iran—and more situational partners, such as China, India, and other Global South nations.
34. The war has led to a polarization of the world into the Global South and the Western bloc. This divide is particularly evident in peace negotiations over Ukraine, which have split into two major camps: The West (Ukraine, the U.S., and its allies): advocating for a just peace on Ukraine's terms. The East (China and Global South countries): pushing for an immediate end to the war, resumption of negotiations, cessation of hostilities along the front lines, and the lifting or easing of sanctions. Russia’s current stance, however, is seen as too radical for most Global South nations.
35. With Donald Trump's victory in the U.S. presidential election on November 5, 2024, the likelihood of elections in Ukraine has increased. This is tied to expectations that the new U.S. administration may pressure Ukrainian leadership to expedite a peace process, potentially involving elections or triggering a domestic political crisis.
36. To achieve his negotiation goals, Trump may exert significant pressure on both sides of the conflict: On Ukraine: by withholding military and financial aid, thereby provoking domestic political instability. On Russia: through additional sanctions, secondary sanctions on its trading partners, and threats of increased military support for Ukraine.
37. Nevertheless, the likelihood of successful peace agreements remains low. Both Ukraine and Russia have shifted their positions on peace negotiations and ending the war multiple times. Russia transitioned from its original plan to overthrow the Ukrainian government and demand recognition of Crimea, as well as the so-called “DNR” and “LNR” as confederal subjects, to outright annexation of territories after failed negotiations in Minsk and Istanbul. Ukraine, following Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territories, abandoned its initial conditions to return to the status quo of February 24, 2022, and now demands the full de-occupation of its territory, including the return of Crimea.
38. The potential failure of Trump-initiated peace talks would almost certainly mean renewed escalation and the continuation of the war for years. There are risks of a rift between the U.S. and Europe over this issue, particularly between the U.S., the U.K., and France.
39. In the near term (before Trump’s inauguration in January 2025), negative military dynamics for Ukrainian forces (AFU) are expected to persist. As previously predicted, the situation on the frontlines has exited the strategic stalemate, with Russia gaining a tactical advantage. The Russian army is likely to continue its slow advance, while Ukrainian forces may retreat. However, a complete collapse of Ukrainian defenses in Donbas is unlikely in the short term, due not only to the strength of Ukraine’s army but also to the exhaustion of Russian forces and the role of new warfare technologies—such as reconnaissance tools and drones—that slow advances even after breaches in formal defense lines.
40. If Trump’s peace initiatives fail to establish a ceasefire and the war continues while Ukraine receives insufficient or limited military funding, a turning point in the war could occur during the winter of 2024–spring of 2025. In this scenario, Russia may capture significant additional Ukrainian territories in Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and potentially Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk regions. By the end of 2024, Ukraine may lose its salient in the area of Kurakhove and the city itself in Donetsk Oblast. Furthermore, in the following year, it will likely be extremely difficult for Ukraine’s forces to retain control over captured territories in Russia’s Kursk region.
Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovskaya
for the Ukrainian Institute of Politics
