As preparations for the resumption of peace talks initiated by the elected US president begin, Ukraine is entering a new phase of political and social transformation. This process is driven by the increasingly complex situation at the front, declining support for the Ukrainian government from Western allies seeking to coordinate their actions with the new US administration, and Ukrainian society tired of the protracted conflict. Against this backdrop, Ukraine's political life is also intensifying, with the growth in popularity of political leaders alternative to President V. Zelensky, the launch of political projects, and fundraising, for future parliamentary or presidential elections, which may take place as early as 2025, is observed.
The team of elected US President D. Trump can consider three main options for a peaceful settlement, which include two general provisions: territorial concessions in favor of the Russian Federation and removing the issue of Ukraine's membership in NATO from the agenda.
Recently, D. Trump nominated Keith Kellogg for Assistant to the President and Special Representative for Ukraine and Russia. Kellogg previously served as Chief of Staff of the White House National Security Council during Trump's first term and was an adviser to Vice President Mike Pence. In the spring of 2024, he, together with Fred Fleitz, the former head of the National Security Council staff, published a plan for settling the war in Ukraine, which will likely become the first and basis of the future policy of the Trump Administration.
In their study "America First, Russia, and Ukraine," Kellogg and Fleitz propose tying further military aid to Ukraine to its participation in peace talks with Russia. They believe that the United States should continue to arm Ukraine and strengthen its defenses to ensure that Russia cannot advance further and does not attack again after a ceasefire or peace agreement is concluded. However, the United States will continue to supply weapons to Ukraine only if Kyiv agrees to negotiate. At the same time, Moscow will be warned about increasing American aid to Ukraine if Russia refuses to negotiate. Thus, it is proposed to use military aid as a tool to encourage Ukraine to participate in negotiations, as well as to pressure Russia to achieve a ceasefire and a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Ukraine's membership in NATO will be postponed, but Kyiv will receive security guarantees from the United States, including additional arms supplies after the agreement is concluded.
The second idea of the new US Vice President J.D. Vance is based on the creation of a demilitarized zone on the front lines, which would be fortified to prevent further incursions. The plan excludes Ukraine's membership in NATO, but the details of the proposal remain unclear.
The third option for peace agreements is the concept of Richard Grenell, former acting director of national intelligence of the United States, which includes the creation of autonomous zones in eastern Ukraine. He was one of the few people at the September meeting in New York between D. Trump and V. Zelensky. He also believes that Ukraine's membership in NATO does not meet the interests of the United States.
At this time, these messages somewhat resonate with the position of the Ukrainian leadership. The team of the President of Ukraine V. Zelensky is also trying to integrate into the future negotiation process and strives to maintain room for maneuver and bargaining, primarily with the leadership of NATO, the United States, and Europe.
Ukrainian President V. Zelensky said that he sees the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO, but allows for the possibility that the Alliance's Article 5 on collective self-defense will not apply to the entire territory of the country. He said this at a meeting with European commissioners who arrived in Kyiv.
V. Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine "will never accept" an invitation to NATO in a truncated form, implying the need to join with the inclusion of all territories. However, he also noted that he understands that the effect of Article 5 in war conditions cannot be applied to the entire territory of Ukraine:
"We understand that the 5th Amendment cannot operate during a war on the entire territory of Ukraine because NATO countries are against the risks of being drawn into the war. Ukraine has never drawn anyone into this war. I mean the army of NATO members," the President said.
V. Zelensky also added that he would lose the support of half of his allies if he raised the issue of deploying NATO troops on Ukrainian territory.
In general, Ukraine may be sending signals to its Western allies that in the process of probable negotiations, the Ukrainian leadership (not legally, but formally) is ready to turn a blind eye to the Russian occupation of 18.5% of its territory. But in return, Ukraine needs either NATO membership without the spread of Article 5 (which is partly in tune with K. Kellogg's plan), or an invitation to NATO and membership in the European Union.
Russian President Vladimir Putin may also be reluctant to negotiate, as the current situation allows him to keep Ukraine in a difficult position and continue to benefit from further territorial gains.
Maintaining a tough stance, V. Putin shows no willingness to give up his conditions for a ceasefire. Among his demands are Ukraine’s refusal to join NATO and recognition of Russia’s control over four regions that Moscow considers part of its territory. Currently, Russia already controls all of Crimea, about 80% of the territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk), more than 70% of the Zaporizhia and Kherson regions, as well as small parts of the Mykolaiv and Kharkiv regions. Therefore, Russia will probably take a wait-and-see position to assess what concessions the new Trump administration can offer to attract it to the negotiation process.
Within the country, V. Zelensky is losing his status as the undisputed leader against the backdrop of the growing popularity of other alternative figures, such as former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valeriy Zaluzhny or Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate Kirill Budanov. Society's war fatigue is creating a demand for peace talks and a cessation of hostilities, as well as a reduction in foreign policy support – all of this could subsequently create a complex and unstable political environment within the country, in which traditional methods of governing power may no longer work.
In particular, a turning point in public opinion in Ukraine has been recorded: the majority of Ukrainians now support peace talks. Last week, the American Gallup Institute published the results of a social survey, according to which support for peace talks in Ukraine reached 52%, exceeding the majority mark for the first time since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion. Thus, fatigue from military actions and fear of further deterioration of the situation are already becoming dominant factors in public sentiment. Previously, these changes were noted only in closed sociological studies, but their publication right now is of particular importance.
The Ukrainian leadership is preparing for difficult negotiations with the winner of the US presidential election, Donald Trump, who has declared his desire to end the war in Ukraine as quickly as possible. One of the arguments of the Ukrainian authorities against ending the war as soon as possible was the thesis that the majority of Ukrainian citizens do not support such a scenario. However, the results of the Gallup survey partially undermine this position, demonstrating that the majority of Ukrainians are in favor of ending the war through negotiations.
The government team is inclined to blame Russia and its hidden allies for the emergence of these processes, which is one of the reasons why the Ukrainian leadership is striving for further escalation of the confrontation and raising the stakes – to show that the enemy’s information operations and subversive activities will not force the Ukrainian government to make unfavorable compromises.
There is a chronic crisis for Ukrainian troops at the front. Russia continues to slowly advance in several directions and a week has occupied another 140 sq. km of Ukrainian territory, thus Russia already controls almost 111,480 thousand sq. km - about 18.5% of Ukraine.
The most difficult situation for Ukrainian troops is developing in the Kurakhovo area in the Donetsk region, where Russian troops are already closing the small semi-encirclement in the area of the settlements of Uspenivka, Ganivka, Yelizavetivka, and the "big semi-encirclement" is already directly in the area of the city of Kurakhove itself, a significant part of the city is already under the control of Russian troops. From the north, Russian troops have advanced into the settlement of Starye Terny, which is key to the defense of the city of Kurakhovo (they reach the dam of the Kurakhovskaya TPP).
The city of Velyka Novosilka was half-encircled. Russian troops cut off two northern roads: Velikaya Novosyolka - Bogatyr and the road that goes through Novy Komar. Today, you can only drive from the area of the settlement of Shevchenko to Velikaya Novosyolka, and even then, this road is already under fire control.
Potentially, the loss of the city of Velyka Novosilka threatens the continuation of the Russian offensive into the Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporizhia regions through the area of the city of Gulyaipole and further into the area of the city of Orekhovo and further on to the city of Zaporizhia itself.
A difficult situation is also developing in the Kupyansk direction. Where in the area of the river Oskol (near the settlement of Kruglyakovka) the division of the Ukrainian group into Kupyanskaya and Borovskaya is expanding. At the same time, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have driven the Russian Armed Forces from their bridgehead on the right bank of the river Oskol north of the settlement of Dvurechnaya, liberating the settlement of Novomlynsk.
In the Kursk region; Russian troops have pushed the Ukrainian Armed Forces beyond the border of the Glushkovo district.
The Russian leadership will seek to oust Ukrainian troops from the Kursk bridgehead before the inauguration of the new US President D. Trump (January 20, 2025), while Ukraine, for its part, will hold this bridgehead to have a certain "trump card" in the upcoming negotiations.
To achieve its goals, the Russian Federation may be planning an even larger offensive in other areas of the front. Currently, the Russian army has sent its best units (about 45 thousand) to the Kursk region, which are attacking the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces around the clock. The Russian forces in different areas outnumber the Ukrainian ones by 3-10 times in terms of infantry. At the same time, the brigades here are well-equipped and rotate regularly, unlike in Donbass. Constant attacks have allowed the Russian Federation to recapture almost half of the territory captured in August in recent weeks. Ukraine now controls 536 square kilometers in the Kursk region, with another 171 remaining in the gray zone. At the peak of its offensive in the Kursk region in August 2024, Ukraine controlled 823 square kilometers, with 416 square kilometers in the gray zone.
Rumors are again spreading in the media about the possible resignation of Kirill Budanov from the post of head of the military intelligence of Ukraine (GUR). In his place, they allegedly plan to appoint the deputy head of the SBU Oleksandr Poklad, who, according to sources, is considered more loyal to the country's leadership. This process, according to media sources, is being lobbied by the head of the Presidential Office (OP) Andriy Yermak, and Oleksandr Poklad himself. Attempts to dismiss K. Budanov may intensify in December when the political situation becomes especially tense.
At the same time, the SBU denied the possible appointment of A. Poklad as the head of the GUR called rumors about this "a Russian special services leak." Of all the versions of personnel reshuffles in the intelligence leadership, this one is the most confrontational about Budanov personally. The head of the GUR had previously made it clear that A. Poklad could be involved in the murder of the intelligence officer, banker Kireyev, in March 2022 in Kyiv. In early 2023, K. Budanov gave several interviews in the media, where he developed this topic in detail. Although a criminal case was opened for Kireyev's murder, nothing is known about the results of the investigation. Bankova said that the murder occurred due to a breakdown in communication between various Ukrainian special services in the first weeks of the war.
Let us recall that rumors about the possible resignation of K. Budanov were spreading back in early autumn. K. Budanov was allegedly going to be fired due to his conflict with A. Yermak. Although the information about personnel changes in the GUR is officially denied, it is obvious that there is a certain tension between the Office of the President and individual representatives of the military leadership, which may further negatively affect the strategic stability of Ukraine.
According to some opinion polls, K. Budanov has surpassed Volodymyr Zelensky in the population's trust ratings and now occupies the second position in the rating after the former commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Zaluzhny. V. Zelensky occupies only the third place. Such a situation creates a political threat for the President's team, especially on the eve of possible elections next year, which may be necessary given the negotiations initiated by D. Trump.
The Social Monitoring Center, commissioned by American Political Services, released the results of a study at a press conference, according to which Ukrainians trust the former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and current Ambassador of Ukraine to the UK V. Zaluzhny (72% versus 22%), as well as the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense K. Budanov (55% versus 32%) more than the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky, who is trusted by only 44% versus 52% of those who do not trust. The electoral rating for whom citizens are ready to vote as President has not yet been announced.
But in the potential parliamentary elections, the hypothetical party of the former commander-in-chief and current Ukrainian ambassador to Great Britain Valeriy Zaluzhny wins by a large margin. In particular, the results of the parliamentary elections would look something like this:
Valery Zaluzhny's party – 34%;
Volodymyr Zelensky's Party – 12%;
"European Solidarity" of P. Poroshenko - 9%;
Kirill Budanov’s party – 7%;
Dmitry Razumkov's party – 6%;
Yulia Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna – 6%;
“August 24” by Serhiy Prytula – 6%;
In addition, the majority of Ukrainians surveyed (64%) said they support the start of talks on "freezing military action" because Ukraine has already suffered heavy losses. 31% do not support it. At the same time, 39% of respondents said that victory in the war should be reaching the country's internationally recognized borders of 1991, but 56% disagreed with this.
The devaluation of the national currency has accelerated in Ukraine. On December 2, the National Bank of Ukraine raised the official hryvnia to the dollar exchange rate to a new historical maximum — 41.6461 UAH/$. On the interbank market, quotes reached 41.71 UAH/$, and in bank cash desks, sales reached 42.10 UAH/$. On the black market and in bank cash desks, the dollar also continues to rise in price, forecasts indicate a further weakening of the hryvnia and reaching the rate of 41.9 UAH/$ by the end of the week.
Experts associate the gradual weakening of the hryvnia with the devaluation agreement with the IMF. This allows for a more profitable conversion of international aid and covering the budget deficit. It is noted that the reduction of the exchange rate to 42.5-45 UAH/$ can add significant amounts to the budget due to the devaluation effect.
The total financing of the Ukrainian budget for November 2024 amounted to UAH 509 billion. Of these, internal resources amounted to UAH 239 billion. External aid - 6.48 billion dollars (about 270 billion UAH).
There is a rollback of expenditures (by 21%) of national currency reserves; in November, the National Bank sold currencies worth 2.7 billion dollars. In October, we sold a nearly record amount of currency - $3.43 billion. The largest amount was in December 2023, when the sale of currency was $3.55 billion.
Let us recall that in October the budget faced a deficit of UAH 26.5 billion. Expenditures for the month amounted to UAH 314.2 billion, while revenues were only UAH 287.7 billion. External aid in October amounted to only $1.4 billion (UAH 57.7 billion), of which $1.1 billion came from the IMF and $300 million from Canada.
Compared to September, when there was no external financing at all, the situation in October was partially stabilized, but the volume of aid was significantly lower than in August. In August, Ukraine received a record $8.4 billion (UAH 346 billion), which allowed it to close the month with total receipts of UAH 527.7 billion.
Maps of military operations.
Donetsk region.
