Perspective – Written by Written by Ruslan Bortnik & Sándor Seremet & Péter-Pál Kránitz
The full analysis is available here.
Today, Europe stands at a strategic crossroads, determining Ukraine’s future security order. The continent’s own history offers two very different legacies: one of stabilizing integration and one of devastating conflict. After the Cold War, Europe successfully integrated most of the former Warsaw Pact states into NATO and the European Union, spreading peace and stability to the east. Yet Europe was also the cradle of two world wars, both of which erupted due to the mismanagement of power and the miscalculations of European elites. European leaders must now decide whether to play a stabilizing role for Ukraine or risk destabilization reminiscent of past tragedies. In the strict sense of realpolitik, this is not a moral choice, but a strategic imperative based on power dynamics and self-interest. A secure, sovereign Ukraine, linked to a strong European security architecture, will strengthen Europe’s own strategic position. Conversely, a fragmented or neglected Ukraine could become a flashpoint that triggers a great power confrontation on Europe’s doorstep.
That’s why, given its political geography, Europe is compelled to be and must act as a pragmatic balancer and guarantor of Ukraine’s security, using its collective power to seek peaceful solutions, create a stable equilibrium, and protect its geopolitical interests in Eastern Europe. Europe can fulfill this role by pursuing a sober strategy: balancing deterrence and diplomacy, pooling its strategic leverage, and shaping a new doctrine based on interests rather than illusions.
Europe’s Dual Legacy: Stabilizer or Destabilizer?
Europe’s past demonstrates its ability to both entrench stability and, when mismanaged, foment instability. On the one hand, the integration of Central and Eastern Europe into Euro-Atlantic structures after 1991 represents a triumph of strategic stabilization. Countries from Poland to the Baltics transitioned from the Soviet sphere to NATO and EU membership, sealing a new balance of power and expanding the zone of peace across half the continent. This orderly expansion reflected the harsh calculations of realpolitik: Western Europe secured new allies and buffer states, while these countries received security guarantees—a mutually beneficial power arrangement. As a result, since the end of the Cold War, not a single armed conflict has erupted on NATO or EU territory in Europe—a stark contrast to the blood-soaked first half of the twentieth century.
European history, however, also warns of an alternative. Both World War I and World War II originated in Europe and were triggered by the inability to contain aggressive powers and maintain a stable balance. In the 1910s, competing alliances and misperceptions led to continental conflagration; in the 1930s, the appeasement of an expansionist Germany and the unfettered political ambitions of elites led to all-out war. These cautionary tales underscore how European passivity, disunity, and miscalculations, coupled with arrogance and narrow-mindedness, can unleash chaos. Today’s conflict in Ukraine represents a similar turning point. A weak or hesitant European approach, stuck in the imagery of the past, is proving utterly incapable of stabilizing Ukraine, either through integration or by leading peace negotiations with Russia. At the same time, simply maintaining current trends—arming and financing Ukraine in a war that is gradually being lost—practically guarantees a historical catastrophe for the Ukrainian people and a geopolitical one for all of Europe.
Rethinking Deterrence: From Militarization to Strategic Stability
Effective deterrence is the cornerstone of any security architecture, but Europe needs to redefine deterrence in more nuanced terms than simply militaristic escalation. In European political debates today, deterrence is often confused with maximalist military measures: large defense budgets, troop buildups on the eastern flank, and aggressive rhetoric. The response to Russia’s invasion has indeed pushed Europe toward arms buildups and forward deployments. However, classical deterrence is not synonymous with endless armament or “raising the stakes.” At its core, deterrence aims to prevent conflict, not to incite it. It is based on a balance between credible defense, communication, and restraint. Genuine deterrence has historically relied on negotiations and binding commitments, transparency and confidence-building mechanisms such as mutual inspections, and even disarmament, which is viewed as a security tool rather than a weakness. In other words, deterrence is strong not only when the adversary is convinced that aggression will fail or entail unacceptable costs, but also when channels exist to manage fears and avoid accidents, and cooperation between the parties is not only possible but also far more advantageous than confrontation.
Moreover, an unbridled arms race or a strategy of deterrence through pure intimidation could backfire. Europe is quickly sliding toward a logic of confrontation with Moscow, fueled by fear and domestic political pressure. Militarist rhetoric, the lifting of past arms restrictions, and ever-increasing troop deployments no longer constitute genuine deterrence—they amount to mutual intimidation and provocation. Such a stance could exacerbate Moscow’s insecurity and drive it into a corner, plunging it into recklessness, increasing the risk of accidental or deliberate escalation. An overly tense standoff makes Europe less safe, raising the likelihood of a direct confrontation—the very outcome deterrence is designed to avoid. To avoid this trap, Europe must rethink deterrence as a comprehensive strategy: maintaining a credible defensive posture to thwart Russian objectives, while simultaneously seeking a return to equilibrium through arms control agreements and open channels of communication. A revived system of mutual restraints, whether through a review of conventional force limits, missile deployments, or transparency measures, would help stabilize the military situation and signal that Europe’s goal is strategic equilibrium, not offensive advantage. This is a tough strategy, not idealism: By reducing the likelihood of miscalculation, Europe maintains its power and avoids scenarios in which it could be drawn into a full-scale war. Diplomatic engagement and clear strategic communication should therefore complement Europe’s military deterrence. Deterrence is most effective when Europe can both “talk softly” through diplomacy and “carry a big stick” in terms of defense, making war pointless for the adversary.
Ukraine’s Image in the Eyes of Europe: An Anchor of Stability or a Source of Instability?
For Ukraine, Europe represents both a beacon of stability and a potential source of instability, and European policy must account for this dual perception. For many Ukrainians, Europe is the “sun”—an attractive center of gravity offering hope for security, prosperity, and national survival. The prospect of EU integration and alignment with the European political and economic model has been the driving force behind Ukraine’s resistance to Russian domination. A Europe fully committed to Ukraine’s sovereignty—through military aid, economic support, and eventual EU accession—serves as an anchor of stability. This gives Kyiv the confidence that it will not act alone, thereby strengthening Ukraine’s resolve and signaling to Moscow that Ukraine is supported by a powerful bloc. Indeed, European engagement to date—from aid packages to the supply of modern weapons—has been crucial in raising the cost of Russian aggression and preventing Kyiv’s rapid capitulation. In the future, credible European guarantees and integration efforts could also strengthen Ukraine’s place in a stable order, preventing any revanchist relapses.
Europe’s role is not, however, seen as unambiguously positive. The “sun” can also scorch if mishandled. Europe cannot offer Ukraine anything—neither EU membership nor security guarantees—until it finds an unconditional and lasting internal consensus among its members regarding Ukraine’s place and role in the European space. Otherwise, the process of Ukrainian integration could provoke a monstrous internal rift in Europe, the signs of which are the numerous political and economic disputes already simmering, undermining internal European stability. The Ukrainian issue could become an acid, corroding the foundations of European politics and societies.
Even security guarantees for Ukraine, which are de facto equivalent to its inclusion in the European zone of influence, must be backed by real capabilities and political will, and not just declarations. European countries have already pledged long-term military assistance and even discussed deploying troops for a future peacekeeping or “assurance” mission in Ukraine. But these commitments differ: France and the United Kingdom are leaning toward proposals to lead the force, while others (Germany, Spain, Italy, etc.) remain skeptical or oppose sending troops. This discrepancy must be reconciled. A guarantee backed by only a few European countries—or one in which the United States is not involved at all—is no guarantee and presents only risks for those involved. It will be difficult for European forces alone to reliably guarantee Ukraine’s security without U.S. support, given gaps in long-range strike capabilities, air power, and nuclear deterrence. Unrealistic guarantees could provoke an escalation of tensions. Ukrainian leaders themselves insist that security guarantees without America are not real security guarantees. The implications for Europe are clear: If it seeks to anchor Ukraine’s security, it must either significantly strengthen its joint military capabilities or ensure a strong transatlantic link in any security agreement—preferably both. In practice, this includes increased defense investment, interoperable European forces, and possibly coordination with U.S. assets in the theater of operations, even if American troops are absent. By speaking as a united front and backing up its commitments with tangible force, Europe can bolster its image as a source of Ukraine’s stability—a force whose engagement guarantees lasting peace, not a fragile ceasefire.
Embracing National Interests: New European Diplomacy with the Great Powers
To overcome the Ukrainian crisis and beyond, Europe needs to formulate a new foreign policy doctrine based on strong national interests and skillful diplomacy. The era of constant strategic alignment with the United States or reliance on abstract values to dictate policy is over; great power politics has returned with a vengeance. European policymakers must therefore think and act as adherents of realpolitik. This begins with a sober assessment of interests: Every major EU member state—from Warsaw to Paris—shares a key interest in preventing a hostile power from dominating Ukraine or threatening Europe’s eastern flank. It is in the concrete interests of each country to see a stable and independent Ukraine that contributes to a balanced European security system. Supporting Ukraine from the perspective of national and continental interests—security, stability, control of migration flows, and maintaining economic cooperation benefits Europe—will strengthen resolve better than any moral exhortations. Simply put, Ukraine’s defense serves Europe’s own strategic goals of ensuring a secure and mutually beneficial neighborly relationship.
In developing a new doctrine, Europe must also reclaim the diplomatic initiative, including engaging with rival powers when it serves strategic objectives. Diplomacy is a tool of statecraft for advancing interests. Paris and Berlin once engaged in dialogue with Moscow (the Normandy format), the failure of which likely triggered the Russo-Ukrainian war. Going forward, selective reengagement with Russia will ultimately be necessary to strengthen any peace settlement or arms control regime and Europe’s socioeconomic well-being. This does not mean trusting the Kremlin’s goodwill but rather negotiating to establish verifiable limits on its military posture—for example, the deployment of missiles or troop deployments beyond defined lines.
Equally important is cultivating ties with China, a global power with growing influence over Russia’s calculations. Beijing also supports the peace process in Ukraine and could become a sincere ally of Europe in achieving a settlement. European leaders should capitalize on this by engaging China in negotiations, thereby strengthening their own position. In terms of sheer power, engaging China is a way for Europe to gain leverage in a multipolar game —a signal to both Washington and Moscow that Europe has other options and will not be a pawn in superpower deals. Such engagement carries risks, of course, but it takes advantage of the fact that China also seeks stability in its international partnerships and can deter Russia from nuclear or unrestrained escalation if it is interested in a settlement.
Moreover, Europe must be prepared for differences with the United States but not seek or exploit them. Washington’s priorities may shift—especially under a more transactional US administration promoting a realpolitik approach to resolution. Indeed, the US government is seeking a deal with Moscow to focus on other theaters of confrontation, such as Asia. From a realpolitik perspective, Europe cannot afford to blindly confront the US, but it must be prepared to quietly balance such moves and advance its own initiatives. This could mean using proactive peace initiatives and leverage against the United States, emphasizing Europe’s own importance in containing China. It also means redoubling efforts to build Europe’s autonomous defense capabilities—so that if the reduction of “America First” leaves a void, Europe can take care of its own affairs. Essentially, Europe needs a Plan B, one in which European power would be sufficient to ensure its own security and maintain unwavering influence over Ukraine in the long term, even if American involvement diminishes. This is not a call to replace the transatlantic bond with NATO, but to strengthen Europe’s foothold within it. Investments in joint European weapons production, air and missile defense networks, and possibly the use of British and French nuclear deterrence within a more collective European framework are all ways to increase strategic autonomy.
Critically, even as Europe arms, its doctrine must keep diplomatic channels open. A new Ostpolitik for the twenty-first century could combine deterrence through denial with an active pursuit of arms control, risk mitigation measures, and crisis communication with Moscow. This balanced approach would maximize Europe’s strategic leverage: Europe would negotiate and use incentives or sanctions relief as bargaining chips. In short, a realistic European foreign policy doctrine for the post-Ukrainian war era should be based on three pillars: (1) internal unity and maintaining consensus on strategic issues, (2) strength and credible commitments to defend its interests, (3) pragmatic diplomacy with all relevant powers (including adversaries) to prevent unbridled escalation, and (4) uncompromising pursuit of European interests, even if this means Europe acting independently. Such a doctrine, implemented uniformly and consistently, would strengthen Europe’s role as the main guarantor of stable peace in Ukraine.
A Pragmatic Way Forward: Policy Recommendations
To implement the above strategy, European policymakers (together with their American colleagues who share realistic views) should take the following concrete steps:
- Unify Europe’s strategic position: develop a common European position on Ukraine’s future security arrangements. This entails resolving internal disagreements on issues such as Ukraine’s place and role in the European space, economic and social cooperation, the deployment of peacekeeping forces, and security guarantees by reaching a credible, lowest common denominator of commitments. Europe must present a united front in negotiations with both Washington and Moscow, ensuring that its interests are not marginalized in any peace agreement. A special EU–NATO coordination group could be established to coordinate Ukraine’s defense plans and post-war assistance.
- Strengthening robust defense and deterrence: Strengthen Europe’s military deterrence capabilities, thereby strengthening any security guarantees. This entails increasing defense spending (for example, pursuing a new goal of 5–7 percent of GDP in major European economies), accelerating joint production and procurement of weapons (especially ammunition, air defense systems, and heavy armored vehicles), and enhancing the readiness of European rapid reaction forces. The emphasis should be on deterrence by denial (for example, by helping Ukraine implement a “porcupine” defense with layered air defenses and anti-tank obstacles, and by reinforcing NATO’s eastern flank with defensive systems). At the same time, Europe should discuss how its existing nuclear deterrent—the arsenals of France and the UK—could provide credible support in a last resort—a delicate but necessary dialogue to strengthen deterrence.
- Renew arms control and risk reduction initiatives: In parallel with military measures, Europe should lead the push for renewed arms control negotiations and confidence-building measures with Russia when feasible to stabilize the situation. This could include proposals for renewed limitations on conventional forces in Europe, zones of mutual withdrawal of troops near Ukraine after the cessation of hostilities, and inspection regimes to ensure transparency. Even during an active conflict, preliminary communication channels (military-to-military hotlines, agreements to prevent incidents in the Black Sea, etc.) should be established. Such steps would demonstrate that Europe’s goal is to prevent further war, which would mean restraint even as it resolutely defends Ukraine. The goal is a long-term strategic equilibrium in which Russia understands that renewed hostilities would be futile, but its legitimate security concerns (for example, regarding NATO forces near its border) can be addressed through agreements rather than force.
- Engaging major powers in diplomatic balancing: A diplomatic strategy that engages global players to strengthen a stable outcome. Specifically, coordinate with the United States while cultivating ties with China. European leaders should seek to ensure that Washington includes Europe and Ukraine in any high-level negotiations with Moscow, arguing that lasting peace in Europe is impossible if Europe is sidelined. At the same time, channels of communication with Beijing should be opened: for example, by organizing a Euro-Chinese dialogue on Ukraine’s reconstruction and security or inviting China to co-sponsor a peacekeeping or observation mission with European powers in the event of a ceasefire. This balancing diplomacy will also signal to Washington that Europe is capable of a proactive grand strategy and will not passively accept a Pax Americana or a G2 (U.S.–Russia) deal. In essence, Europe is using its diplomatic weight to ensure that any settlement in Ukraine is a multilateral balance, rather than the result of dividing the conflict between others.
- Codify a doctrine of European interests-based security: Finally, EU member states should jointly develop a new European Security Strategy (ESS) or a similar document enshrining the principles of this realpolitik approach. It should clearly state that Europe’s priority is to ensure a balance of power that protects peace on the continent, including Ukraine’s sovereignty, through both force and diplomacy. It should reaffirm commitments to collective defense through NATO or the European framework and conflict prevention through diplomacy and public economic policy. By anchoring policy in a clear doctrine, Europe can consistently guide its future decisions. National governments should align their own strategic concepts with this ESS, emphasizing national interests and common European interests as the basis for action—a vital step away from any naive assumptions that the “end of history” or eternal US tutelage will secure Europe. This doctrine should also clarify Europe’s readiness to act independently if necessary: for example, by developing military options or diplomatic initiatives under the leadership of European coalitions if the US abandons or opposes certain measures. Having a doctrine of principled pragmatism will help manage transatlantic expectations and ensure Europe’s preparedness for any contingency.
Conclusion: Europe as a Balancer and Guarantor of Last Resort
In terms of realpolitik, Europe’s own security and power depend on its foreign policy, including the fate of Ukraine, and therefore, Europe must assume the role of the main guarantor and balancer in this crisis. The alternative is to remain a spectator and victim of events shaped in Washington, Moscow, or Beijing. This path will lead to destabilization, as history has shown when Europe failed to determine its own destiny. Instead, by acting decisively now, Europe can stabilize its eastern border on terms favorable to its interests. This means using all its tools: strengthening military deterrence, as well as using diplomacy and economic leverage to build a lasting peace mechanism. A Europe that succeeds in ending the Ukrainian crisis will also establish itself as a pole of influence in the emerging multipolar order—one that can hold its own alongside the United States and rising powers. Conversely, any architecture for the continuation of the war and security crisis for Ukraine that marginalizes Europe or lacks European resolve will be inherently fragile and dangerous.
Hard realism dictates that great power respect is earned through capability and coherence. By implementing the above recommendations, Europe will demonstrate both. It will show the United States that Europe is serious about burden-sharing and capable of strategic autonomy when necessary. It will demonstrate to Russia that Europe is a sovereign and intelligent geopolitical player. And it will demonstrate to other global actors (including China) that Europe is a pragmatic player seeking stability rather than escalation, thereby inviting them to cooperate in conflict resolution. In practice, Europe must be prepared to balance power with diplomacy—deterrence with one hand and negotiation with the other. Deterrence without dialogue can lead to unintended war; dialogue without deterrence provokes aggression. The combination of both, implemented through a united European front, will maximize strategic stability.
Europe’s role in Ukraine’s future security architecture is to be the most important regional power, ensuring balance. This is realpolitik in its most fundamental form: acting not out of sentiment, but out of enlightened self-interest, to create a world that serves European stability. Now is the time for Europe to decide whether it will secure a peaceful settlement in Ukraine and its future, or retreat and risk being consumed by a wider conflagration. The only viable course is the former. By acting as a pragmatic stabilizer and guarantor, Europe can help end this war on terms that will strengthen the balance of power and thereby ensure peace on the continent for decades to come. Anything less would be a strategic failure of historic proportions—one that Europe, and its leaders in particular, have every reason to avoid in defense of their national interests.