On June 23, 2025, the third round of negotiations between the Ukrainian and Russian delegations took place in Istanbul.
The Ukrainian delegation was once again led by Rustem Umerov (this time in his capacity as Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council rather than as Defense Minister), while the Russian delegation was headed by Vladimir Medinsky, aide to the President of the Russian Federation.
On the eve of the negotiations, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky held a special meeting with Umerov and the Head of the Presidential Office, Andriy Yermak, after which he announced his intention to focus during the talks on the following issues:
- the immediate and complete ceasefire, including an end to attacks on energy infrastructure;
- the return of prisoners of war and children illegally taken to Russia;
- preparations for a high-level meeting involving the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and Turkey.
Before the start of the negotiations between the Ukrainian and Russian delegations, their heads—Umerov and Medinsky—held a private meeting attended by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. No details of this meeting were disclosed publicly. The Turkish representative only stated that Turkey could contribute to prisoner exchanges and take on the task of monitoring the ceasefire regime if such an agreement is reached between Ukraine and Russia.
As for the negotiations themselves, progress was achieved only on humanitarian issues: the exchange of prisoners and bodies. Both sides agreed to exchange approximately 1,200 prisoners of war each. Russia also agreed to hand over up to 3,000 bodies of fallen Ukrainian soldiers. The return of detained civilians, including children, is under discussion.
The Russian side also proposed short-term ceasefires (lasting 24–48 hours) along the front line for the evacuation of the wounded and the bodies of the dead. In addition, the Russian delegation suggested establishing three working groups—on political, humanitarian, and military issues—to operate in an online format.
Ukraine, for its part, proposed a full and unconditional ceasefire along the entire front line and a meeting between the Presidents of Ukraine and Russia by the end of the summer. However, the Russian side essentially rejected this proposal, arguing that a leaders’ meeting should only take place after the text of a peace agreement is fully agreed upon.
It should be recalled that on June 2 in Istanbul, the second meeting of the delegations took place, during which the sides exchanged memoranda outlining mutually exclusive positions. Ukraine insists on an immediate ceasefire without preconditions, the release of prisoners, the return of deported children, international security guarantees, maintaining its course toward NATO and EU membership, and categorically refuses to recognize any territorial losses. Russia, in turn, demands agreement on its conditions before a ceasefire: recognition of the annexed territories, Ukraine’s neutral status, renunciation of NATO membership, limitations on the size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, recognition of the Russian language, and the lifting of sanctions.
It can be stated that the third round of negotiations between Ukraine and Russia was rather forced and formal in nature, with its real potential largely limited to humanitarian issues.
"We are seeing progress on the humanitarian track, but there is no movement at all on a ceasefire," said the head of the Ukrainian delegation, NSDC Secretary Rustem Umerov, following the meeting.
No breakthrough on peace was expected from the outset, as the positions of Ukraine and Russia remain irreconcilable. Both sides publicly demonstrate openness to dialogue, but this does not reflect any genuine willingness to move closer to each other’s positions or reach fundamental agreements.
The parties traditionally accuse each other of dragging out the process, seeking instead to show Washington—and personally U.S. President Donald Trump—their “readiness for peace.” For Moscow, these negotiations are an important element of a diplomatic game with the U.S.: to demonstrate flexibility and try to influence the American stance. Kyiv, for its part, is highly skeptical of the current format, viewing it as an attempt by the Kremlin to create the illusion of a peace process. The decision to continue negotiations is largely driven by the insistent position of the American side: Donald Trump demands at least the appearance of an ongoing negotiation process.
This forces the Ukrainian authorities to participate in meetings despite the lack of real progress and internal doubts about the effectiveness of such dialogue. Despite public statements of support for Ukraine, concerns persist within the Presidential Office about the unpredictability of Washington’s policy.
Against the backdrop of unsuccessful attempts by the U.S. to secure real concessions from Russia for a peace agreement, harsh statements have been made toward the Kremlin. Republican Senator Lindsey Graham declared that President Trump “is going to kick Putin’s ass” by imposing 100% tariffs on the main buyers of Russian oil—China, India, and Brazil. According to Graham, these countries account for about 80% of Russia’s oil export revenues, which sustain its war machine. Graham believes they will be given a choice between the American economy and supporting Putin, and they will inevitably choose the U.S.
However, in practice, Washington’s policy toward Russia appears far more restrained. President Donald Trump, taking a 50-day pause on introducing his own secondary sanctions, has—given the lack of concessions from Russia in peace talks—effectively delegated the task of increasing pressure on Moscow to European partners, through the 18th EU sanctions package and parallel British sanctions measures.
On July 18, 2025, the European Union approved another, the 18th sanctions package against Russia (covering both economic and individual restrictive measures), targeting the energy sector, oil export logistics, and financial infrastructure. The EU Council expanded the sanctions list by adding 14 individuals and 41 legal entities, bringing the total number of sanctioned individuals to over 2,500. A full transaction ban was imposed on an additional 22 Russian banks and on any operations with the Russian Direct Investment Fund and its structures. Export restrictions were tightened against suppliers of Russia’s military-industrial complex: 3 Chinese, 8 Belarusian companies, and 26 new organizations (including 7 in China/Hong Kong and 4 in Turkey) were placed under sanctions.
One of the key elements of the new EU package was lowering the price cap on Russian oil from $60 to $47.6 per barrel (a 15% cut), as well as measures against 105 additional ships of the “shadow fleet,” bringing the total number of vessels on the list to 444. In the longer term, this new price cap of $47.6 per barrel could reduce Russia’s revenues to approximately €2.5–2.7 billion per month. However, this estimate assumes strict and complete enforcement of the price-cap policy, which is not always followed even now. Russia’s budget losses from declining oil and gas revenues, as well as additional logistics and foreign debt servicing costs, are on average estimated at about $100 billion annually.
However, the new EU and UK sanctions packages—no matter how tough—rarely contradict Washington’s current strategy. U.S. President Donald Trump, having taken a 50-day pause on introducing his own secondary sanctions, has effectively given the “green light” to his European partners to increase pressure on Moscow in the absence of Russian concessions in peace negotiations. This allows him to avoid direct escalation until the end of the Kremlin’s “trial period.” Thus, both sanctions and real long-range weapons supplies from Germany and other European countries should be viewed as elements of a complex diplomatic game and coordinated Western pressure on Russia. Trump himself keeps his distance and avoids direct escalation, leaving Moscow under a “soft pressure” of sanctions and diplomatic maneuvers. In other words, Washington has temporarily handed over the levers of pressure to its allies for the duration of this 50-day “trial period” for the Kremlin.
Moscow’s skepticism toward Trump’s threats only reinforces the Russian leadership’s confidence in its ability to continue advancing its interests both on the battlefield and diplomatically. Russia is using this pause to intensify military operations and strikes on Ukraine: on July 21, one of the most massive Russian attacks in recent times was recorded—426 drones and 24 missiles were launched at Ukrainian territory, including Kyiv.
Under current conditions, the slowing of the peace process objectively benefits Moscow, which is betting on exhausting Ukraine’s resources, eroding international support, and gradually advancing militarily. The Kremlin hopes that amid Western political fragmentation and the rising costs of supporting Kyiv, pressure on Ukraine will eventually force it to accept less favorable terms. Russia seeks to turn the current negotiation format into an analogue of “Minsk-2”—a protracted process in which advantages are gained not at the negotiating table but on the battlefield.
In this configuration, real de-escalation is unlikely without active U.S. involvement. Only Washington’s return as a fully engaged political actor—willing to invest not only political statements but also concrete actions and guarantees—can move the situation off dead center. For now, the diplomatic field remains effectively paralyzed, and the pause only increases Russia’s motivation for offensive operations.
The United States continues its policy of distancing itself and is gradually shifting the responsibility for Ukraine’s military and financial support onto Europe and NATO structures.
In July 2025, Donald Trump and the new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte agreed on a new strategy (a “deal”) under which a significant share of Western aid to Ukraine should formally be channeled through NATO and EU structures. The U.S. is supplying limited volumes of critical weaponry (Patriot systems, ammunition, GMLRS) “against future compensation” from European allies, while Europe assumes the coordination and financing of new large-scale defense packages. In other words, Europe will have to pay for all weapons deliveries. As of July 2025, this deal is more of a political-logistical compromise than an immediate game-changer at the front. It opens the prospect for long-term Western support for Ukraine but does not yet make up for the critical shortage of shells, missiles, and real-time intelligence. Its impact on the battlefield will not be felt until at least autumn 2025, when Europe is expected to ramp up deliveries and establish stable supplies under these “new rules.”
Essentially, Washington is moving its relations with Europe and Ukraine onto a commercial basis: new deliveries of weapons and technologies are mostly carried out “against future compensation” from European allies.
But what happens if Europe fails to find additional funding for Ukraine? Or becomes bogged down in internal political and bureaucratic disputes? The number of countries that have already declared themselves unwilling to finance this deal exceeds the number of potential willing contributors.
Throughout the war, the dynamics of U.S. aid have clearly influenced the situation on the front. If the U.S. were to stop financial and military support for Ukraine, European countries could partially fill the gap in many areas or even fully compensate for it. However, a reduction in weapons and resource deliveries would severely limit the timeframe in which Ukraine could effectively resist.
Currently, European governments spend on average only 0.1% of their gross domestic product (GDP) per year on bilateral aid to Ukraine. To fully compensate for U.S. support, the contribution of all EU states and institutions would need to rise to 0.21% of GDP—a level already significantly exceeded by the Baltic and Scandinavian countries.
In absolute figures, this would mean increasing European assistance from the current €44 billion per year to €82 billion per year.
If Europe fails to effectively double its military spending, the phase of managed attrition could turn into a phase of strategic collapse for Ukraine. If aid is resumed, Ukraine would be able to maintain its defensive potential and contain further Russian advances throughout the next year. If aid stops, within a few months there could be a risk of deep breakthroughs and significant shifts of the front line to Ukraine’s disadvantage.
Combat Operations
During the week of July 16–23, 2025, Russian forces captured an additional 95 km² of Ukrainian territory, bringing the total area under Russian control to 114,119 km².
In the Donetsk region, the heaviest fighting continues around the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad agglomeration, which Russian forces are attempting to bypass from the northeast. North of Myrnohrad, Russian troops are advancing toward the city from the direction of Mayak. In Pokrovsk, Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups (SRGs) are already entering the city from the south, where the main Russian offensive is advancing.
Near Kostiantynivka, Russian forces have taken new positions near Popova Yara. There are also reported advances near Toretsk, in the areas of Leonidivka and Dyleivka.
Russian forces continue to push forward near the Dnipro region’s borders, advancing around Orekhove and Voskresenka, and they have captured Hrushevske.
In the Sumy region, Russian troops have advanced and captured Yablunivka.
In the Kharkiv region, there is an intensification of hostilities near Vovchansk, with a possible new Russian offensive direction being opened to divert Ukrainian reserves. The overall situation for Ukraine remains unfavorable: due to the long front line and a shortage of reserves, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are forced to react selectively, redeploying forces from other sectors of the front.
Battle Map:
Donetsk Region
Sumy Region.
Reshuffle of Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers
On July 17, 2025, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine carried out a major government reshuffle. The key goal of these changes was an attempt by the Presidential Office to strengthen its own influence, improve the manageability of the executive branch, and prepare for new stages of dialogue with Western partners, primarily with the White House. Additional motives included an effort to "release public pressure" amid extremely low trust levels in the previous Cabinet (according to various data, more than 50% of citizens distrusted it).
According to the authorities’ plan, the government reshuffle should help improve relations with the new U.S. Presidential Administration of Donald Trump. The main bet in this regard is placed on the new Prime Minister, Yuliia Svyrydenko, who previously served as First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy of Ukraine. She is considered a protégé of the Presidential Office and participated in signing, on Ukraine’s behalf, the natural resources deal with the U.S.
Former Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal has been appointed Minister of Defense of Ukraine, reflecting a personnel rotation that preserves the Presidential Office’s influence in the key defense sector.
Other key appointments include:
- Mykhailo Fedorov — appointed First Deputy Prime Minister while retaining his post as Minister of Digital Transformation;
- Oleksii Kuleba — appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Infrastructure and Regional Development;
- Taras Kachka, formerly Ukraine’s Trade Representative — appointed Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration.
- Herman Halushchenko was appointed Minister of Justice, while the Ministry of Energy is now headed by Svitlana Hrynchuk, who previously led the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources.
In several ministries, personnel changes did not occur:
- Matvii Bidnyi – Minister of Youth and Sports;
- Nataliia Kalmykova – Minister for Veterans’ Affairs;
- Ihor Klymenko – Minister of Internal Affairs;
- Oksen Lisovyi – Minister of Education and Science;
- Viktor Liashko – Minister of Health;
- Serhii Marchenko – Minister of Finance;
- Andrii Sybiha – Minister of Foreign Affairs.
The Minister of Culture portfolio remains vacant.
Structural changes also affected several ministries:
- The Ministry of Strategic Industries was merged into the Ministry of Defense;
- The Ministry of Social Policy and the Ministry of National Unity were merged, with Denys Uliutin (formerly Deputy to ex-Minister of Social Policy Oksana Zholnovych) appointed as the new head;
- A new Ministry of Economy, Environment, and Agriculture was created, headed by Oleksii Sobolev (previously Deputy to Yuliia Svyrydenko).
It is worth noting that the vote to appoint Yuliia Svyrydenko as the new Prime Minister was far from “smooth.” In particular, this appointment marks a decline in the parliamentary influence of David Arakhamia, head of the Servant of the People faction, who in the autumn had nearly won the “battle for the prime minister’s post” by keeping Denys Shmyhal in office. Arakhamia’s influence likely contributed to the fact that the Servant of the People’s parliamentary majority failed to gather the necessary votes on its own for Svyrydenko’s appointment — only 201 of the faction’s 232 MPs voted in favor. Out of the five votes on the dismissal and appointment of the Cabinet, the Servant of the People faction never once secured the required 226 votes independently (voting ranged between 190–201 votes). Svyrydenko’s appointment also faced open resistance from opposition forces: the factions of European Solidarity, Batkivshchyna, and several other groups (including Holos) did not support her candidacy.
The Presidential Office and President Volodymyr Zelensky still maintain dominant control over Parliament. However, this power rests on two main pillars:
- Domestic approval ratings, which are gradually declining (Zelensky is already trailing Valerii Zaluzhnyi in trust ratings);
- External support, which has become unstable following the arrival of the Republican administration of Donald Trump in the U.S.
If one of these pillars weakens further, the President’s influence over Parliament will diminish. An opposition to Zelensky has long existed within the Verkhovna Rada, and its ranks are now growing stronger.
Centralization of Control over the Anti-Corruption System
On July 22, 2025, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted in the second reading Bill No. 12414 “On Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine Regarding the Specifics of Pre-Trial Investigation of Criminal Offenses Related to the Disappearance of Persons under Special Circumstances during Martial Law.” Amendments to the law effectively strip the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) of their institutional independence, placing them under the direct control of the Prosecutor General.
Key Changes Introduced:
- The Prosecutor General can now seize criminal cases from NABU and transfer them to other bodies;
- The Prosecutor General becomes the de facto head of SAPO and may delegate SAPO prosecutors’ powers to other prosecutors;
- The Prosecutor General gains the right to issue binding written instructions to NABU detectives;
- The Prosecutor General may unilaterally close cases against top officials.
Significant Restrictions on SAPO’s Procedural Autonomy:
- The Head of SAPO loses the right to be part of prosecutorial groups on specific cases—this authority now belongs exclusively to the Prosecutor General;
- SAPO prosecutors can no longer determine NABU’s jurisdiction in exceptional cases;
- The SAPO Head may no longer resolve jurisdictional disputes or amend appellate and cassation complaints filed by SAPO prosecutors.
These legislative changes were adopted against the backdrop of a series of mass searches targeting NABU detectives, which resulted in several arrests. NABU and SAPO leadership publicly condemned the new provisions as the effective dismantling of their independence and urged the president not to sign the law. G7 ambassadors and the European Union also expressed concern over the further weakening of anti-corruption institutions. According to sources in Brussels, the adopted changes will negatively affect the European Commission’s annual assessment of Ukraine’s progress toward EU membership.
Nevertheless, President Volodymyr Zelensky has already signed the law.
The amendments adopted by the Verkhovna Rada are widely viewed as a political move, driven by the fact that anti-corruption bodies had begun creating certain inconveniences for the authorities. Following the rise to power of U.S. Republicans led by Donald Trump and the weakening of liberal circles in Washington, the position and activities of anti-corruption agencies in Ukraine—especially those previously supported by USAID—have become significantly less stable.
Under these conditions, the Ukrainian government is signaling that the influence of the liberal West on the country’s political system is no longer seen as critically important. At this stage, the aim is not to eliminate these institutions entirely, but rather to remove the influence of both liberal Western actors and certain political and business groups from the previous era (for example, former President Petro Poroshenko).
On the one hand, this expands the agency and maneuverability of the president, his team, and the government. On the other hand, it has predictably triggered growing distrust from the EU and G7 countries, which had already expressed concern over attempts to restrict the independence of the anti-corruption infrastructure.
Overall, the situation is not a confrontation between “black” and “white” but rather a struggle among various “gray zones.” The formal existence of NABU and SAPO had at least forced political and business elites to act more cautiously. However, despite significant external investments in the creation and support of these institutions, there has been neither a major breakthrough in fighting corruption nor any systemic change in the status quo among the upper echelons of power in recent years. Since 2015, international partners have invested approximately $200–300 million in supporting NABU, SAPO, and the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC)—including equipment, training, digitalization, and ensuring their independence—while the EU alone contributed over €20 million. Over the same period, state funding for Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies amounted to roughly $300 million.
According to part of Ukraine’s political establishment, the anti-corruption framework has become a tool of domestic political struggle and a channel for Western influence over the Ukrainian elite. There have been numerous high-profile accusations, but hardly any real convictions of top officials.
Corruption remains one of the country’s main public concerns: almost 80% of the population and 76% of businesses name corruption as the second most serious problem after the war with Russia. According to March 2025 polls, distrust toward NABU, SAPO, and HACC reaches 70% among Ukrainians.
The removal of the so-called external “yoke” and legislative restrictions on the independence of NABU and SAPO reflect a shift toward centralized management of the anti-corruption system by the current government. This creates new risks in Ukraine’s dialogue with the EU and key donors, as the independence of the anti-corruption framework had been viewed as one of the most critical criteria for further support and Ukraine’s advancement toward European integration.
Brussels has so far indicated that support for Ukraine continues but remains tied to progress in transparency, judicial reforms, and democratic governance principles. Valdis Dombrovskis, EU Commissioner for Economy and Financial Affairs, stressed that further financial assistance to Ukraine would depend on restoring the independence of anti-corruption institutions. In his words:
“NABU and SAPO are crucial for Ukraine’s reform program and must operate independently to fight corruption and maintain public trust.”
After the signing of Law No. 12414, protests against the curtailment of NABU’s and SAPO’s powers took place in several Ukrainian cities, including Kyiv, Lviv, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Odesa, Rivne, and Poltava, where participants demanded that the law be vetoed. In the capital, hundreds—estimated between 500 and 1,000 people—gathered near the Ivan Franko Theater. These protests received public support from opposition leaders: Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko, representatives of Petro Poroshenko’s European Solidarity party, and members of the Holos faction, including MP Yaroslav Zheleznyak. These demonstrations marked the first large-scale anti-government citizen mobilization since the start of the war, giving the protests a distinctly political character and strengthening the influence of opposition forces in public discourse.
After meeting with law enforcement leadership, President Volodymyr Zelensky announced plans to submit a bill to the Verkhovna Rada aimed at strengthening the independence of anti-corruption agencies. He stated:
“There were many meetings with representatives of law enforcement agencies. They spoke in great detail. The Security Service of Ukraine, NABU, SAPO, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Agency on Corruption Prevention, the State Bureau of Investigations, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine. It was important for me that everyone expressed their arguments and their vision. We agreed that the heads of these institutions will jointly propose an action plan—concrete steps that can strengthen the rule of law in Ukraine.”
Apparently, under pressure from protests and criticism from both foreign partners and internal opposition, it has become especially important for the Presidential Office to demonstrate commitment to a pro-Western agenda and willingness to take certain conciliatory steps on the issue of anti-corruption agencies. However, it is possible that these initiatives will be limited and may not result in real expansion of independence or transfer of control, remaining more of a gesture of political flexibility.
— Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovska, Andrii Timchenko
for the Ukrainian Institute of Politics
