О заключении Государственной службы Украины по вопросам этнополитике и свободы совести о принадлежности УПЦ к РПЦ: что не было учтено?
Анализ основан на заключении ГЭСС, Уставе УПЦ, практике Церкви в 2022-2025 годах и официальных заявлениях.
Analysis based on the conclusion of the DESS, the Statute of the UOC, the practice of the church in 2022-2025 and official statements.
Entry.
Today, our society is going through the greatest test in all the years of Ukraine's independence — a war that has affected almost every home, every family, every soul.
In the conditions of war, Ukrainian society naturally becomes more sensitive to anything that has even a hint of Russian origin or connections.
And when there is no quick victory, the internal conflict replaces the external one. In military psychology, it is known that a society experiencing trauma is looking for objects of projection of aggression — traitors, collaborators, "those who are guilty." The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) has become such a target: it is visible, does not have time to defend itself in the media, and has a complex history. The UOC is often identified with "Russian influence", and its historical or administrative ties with the ROC are interpreted as direct threat. Today, loud accusations are made against this Church, political labels are used, emotions generated by pain, anger and betrayal are unleashed.
Such a reaction is a consequence not only of Russian military aggression, but also of a deep psychological trauma of society, when the search for internal and external enemies seems to be a guarantee of security. But such an approach risks replacing critical thinking with reactions, and complex social and historical phenomena with simple labels.
It is at such moments that society needs not an emotional reaction, but a sober analysis of facts and cause-and-effect relationships. Many Ukrainian institutions — political, economic, religious — have ties with Russia, and not all of them automatically mean loyalty or cooperation with the aggressor.
War is always not only a battle at the front, but also a battle for justice, truth, and the preservation of one's own humanity. The most dangerous injuries are not only injuries to the body, but also wounds in the mind and in our ability to see a real, not an imaginary, threat.
That is why today, when there is a heated discussion around the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, it is important to go beyond labels and stereotypes, to carefully and honestly figure out where the truth is and where there is a convenient cliché.
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On July 8, 2025, the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) published an official conclusion on the alleged affiliation of the Kyiv Metropolis of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).
Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of the conclusion of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) regarding the affiliation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church with the Russian Orthodox Church, let us immediately pay attention to one fundamental detail.
Despite the widespread use of the name "UOC-MP" ("Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate") in the media and political discourse, the DESS has never used this wording in its official documents. The entire text refers only to the "Ukrainian Orthodox Church" (UOC) or the "Kyiv Metropolis of the UOC" (CM OF THE UOC).
This is no coincidence: from a legal point of view, there is no organization with the name "UOC-MP" in Ukraine. All official documents, state registers, court decisions relate specifically to the UOC.
Legal expertise differs from media and political rhetoric. An official state body cannot ignore the legal status — otherwise, the conclusion would be immediately appealed in court on the basis of a formal error. That is why the DESS, which interprets the status of the UOC as critically as possible, correctly avoids the label "Moscow Patriarchate", which does not exist in the legal field. This fact in itself is important for the critical perception of further analysis.
Why do the media and politicians constantly use the "UOC-MP"? This is a simplified media label that appeals to the idea of the "Moscow church" as a "fifth column". This makes it more convenient to explain complex church processes in simple black and white categories, mobilizing the audience. In the information space, the label "Moscow Patriarchate" is used as a universal marker of an "enemy", an "agent of influence", convenient for mobilizing patriotic loyalty, but...
- … this label has no legal force;
- … it does not work in state decisions and courts;
- … Even the strictest state bodies avoid it, because they understand that this is the way to instant defeat in any court or international instance.
That is, in fact, this is disinformation — because there is no such organization legally, and all decisions regarding religious structures are made in relation to the UOC, and not the "UOC-MP".
All this speaks of the gap between the real legal picture and the image that exists in the mass consciousness. People are systematically accustomed to simple "labels" — because it is easier for politics and the media than to explain a complex history, canonical path, real actions, changes, and the distinction between ordinary believers and the elite.
If we want to build a legal, democratic country, we must proceed not from propaganda clichés, but from real, proven legal concepts and facts. This is how trust is formed both within the country and in the international arena.
Now let's go directly to the analysis of the conclusion of the DESS.
A study conducted by the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) establishes the presence of signs of affiliation of the Kyiv Metropolis of the UOC with a foreign religious organization – the ROC (link to the DESS study). The conclusions are based on references to the Statute of the UOC (dated May 27, 2022), the Charter of Patriarch Alexy II of 1990, as well as the norm of Chapter X of the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church, which describes the status of the UOC as a self-governing part of the ROC. The DESS interprets these documents as continuing to regulate the legal and canonical status of the UOC. At the same time, the real actions of the UOC after the Council on 27.05.2022 indicate profound changes — both in the legal situation and in canonical practice.
1. Thus, the DESS believes that the updated Statute of the UOC has not severed ties with the ROC: «Adoption of a new version of the Charter (27.05.2022) ... did not lead to the rupture of the canonical connection between the UOC and the ROC. The status of the UOC as a structural unit of the Russian Orthodox Church...remains unchanged". The UOC allegedly has relations of a "part" with a "whole", and not two autocephalous Churches. Formulation of the DESS:
«The scope of the rights of "independence and independence" does not correspond to the autocephalous status... can be reduced by the ROC…». The wording of the DESS: "The UOC in relation to the ROC has an ecclesiastical-canonical connection of the part with the whole. The relations of the UOC with the Russian Orthodox Church are not relations between one independent (autocephalous) church and another independent autocephalous church. The UOC also does not have the status of an autonomous Church that would be recognized by other churches, and, therefore, from the point of view of ecclesiology and canon law, is a structural subdivision of the Russian Orthodox Church, which has separate rights of independent formation without its own canonical subjectivity.»
Canonical status in Ukrainian law:
Ukrainian legislation does not recognize the term "canonical connection" as a legal basis for restrictions. The law determines only Facts of subordination, obligations to comply with the decisions of the external center, participation in management, etc. (Article 5-1 of the Law No. 987-XII “On freedom of conscience and religious organizations”). The DESS ignores the fact that after 2022 the UOC acts virtually independently, and "Canonical subjectivity" is determined not by external recognition, but by the actual functioning of a religious organization. Lack of formal mechanisms of subordination:
Into Statute of the UOC after 27.05.2022 there are no provisions on "obligation to implement the decisions of the Russian Orthodox Church”, “Submission of candidates for approval”, “compulsory participation in cathedrals", i.e. no mechanisms "The relationship of the part with the whole”.
The UOC independently approved the new version of the Statute on 27.05.2022 without the approval of Moscow. The new Statute does not mention the "blessing of the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church", participation in its bodies, and the center of management of the UOC is determined in Kyiv. The UOC exercises independent management in all canonical, administrative and legal matters. The concept of "autocephaly" in canon law is not an absolute measure. The very fact that the scope of rights "may be reduced" is invalid if the UOC itself ceased to recognize these powers of the ROC, removing from the charter the reference to the ROC as a jurisdictional center (which happened on 27.05.2022). Century. 5-1 of the Law of Ukraine No. 987-XII "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" (the Law is supplemented by Article 5-1 according to the Law "On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Field of Activities of Religious Organizations" No. 3894-IX of 20.08.2024) contains a direct exception: if the governing bodies have officially refused to participate in the governing bodies of a foreign organization and this is confirmed by practice, the criterion of "affiliation" does not Applies. The head of the UOC, His Beatitude Metropolitan Onufriy, in a letter to the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience dated September 28, 2022 (No. 0838), emphasized that the UOC now has not only administrative independence (which existed before), but also full canonical independence. In accordance with Articles 7, 14, 16, 30 of the Law No. 987-XII, and Art. 35 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the issues of subordination of religious organizations are determined by the organization itself through the approved charter, and not by external conclusions or traditions.
2. According to the DESS, only the mention of participation in unity with other Churches "through the Russian Orthodox Church" has been removed from the Statute, but the fundamental clause has been preserved: "The Ukrainian Orthodox Church is independent and independent in its governance... in accordance with the Charter of Patriarch Alexy II of 1990". The DESS analyzes the Charter itself as a "constituent element" of the UOC charter – it formally grants the UOC independence in governance, but also states that the UOC is "united through our Russian Orthodox Church with the One Holy One... Universal Church". Experts interpret this as meaning that the UOC has received a broad but limited autonomous status under Moscow's jurisdiction.
Commentary:
The UOC does mention the Charter of 1990 in the new charter, but only as a historical source of granting an independent status. At the same time, the mention of "unity through the ROC" has been removed. This document is not a basis for legal subordination, especially after the independent renewal of the statute of the UOC.
The reference to the Charter ≠ the automatic adoption of all decisions of the Russian Orthodox Church.
- The charter is declarative in nature, it is not an agreement or an act of accession, which directly establishes subordination.
- The fact that she mentions the Decision of the Council of the Russian Orthodox Church in 1990 does not mean that these decisions become norms of direct effect for the UOC — and even more so not for its legal entity, the Cabinet of Ministers of the UOC.
In the modern statute of the UOC, only the phrase about granting "independence and independence" is preserved — without accepting obligations or formal subordination to the Russian Orthodox Church. The charter of 1990 is a historical document that cannot be the source of the current legal status if the other party (the UOC) publicly and practically no longer recognizes it as the basis of its structure.
3. From the side of facts, the DESS lists practical signs of connection: for example, the participation of individual bishops of the UOC in deciding on the replacement of the Primate of the Russian Orthodox Church, the inclusion of representatives of the UOC in the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, the receipt of chrismation by the Ukrainian Church (in particular, from the Moscow Patriarch), as well as the decision of the Moscow Synod on June 7, October 13, 2022 and May 2023 on the transition to direct subordination to the Moscow Patriarch of individual dioceses of the UOC (Crimea, Lugansk, Berdyansk)According to the DESS, the lack of reaction of the leadership of the UOC to these decisions means its actual unquestioning subordination.
Commentary:
The legal responsibility and "affiliation" of the church as an organization is not determined by the actions of individual hierarchs (especially in the occupied territories), but only by the official position and decisions of the governing bodies of the UOC. Most bishops, including Metropolitan Onufriy, did not participate in events or votes in the ROC after 2022, do not attend synodal or conciliar meetings of the ROC. According to Article 5-1 of the Law of Ukraine "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations", Signs of affiliation should be recorded in official documents or actions of governing bodies, and not at the level of actions of individuals. Statutory or canonical "inclusion" is a remnant of previous norms, which was actually suspended by the UOC in 2022. The lack of participation of the Metropolitan of Kyiv and the episcopate of the UOC in the meetings of the ROC, the termination of joint events and the adoption of independent decisions makes it impossible for the ROC to have a real influence on the management of the UOC. Article 5-1 of the Law of Ukraine "On Freedom of Conscience and religious organizations" contains a warning: if "the heads and/or authorized representatives of religious organizations have publicly stated orally or in writing their disagreement with the appointment to the governing bodies of the specified foreign religious organization" and take measures to terminate it, then this sign of affiliation does not apply. Metropolitan Onufriy did make such a public statementIn his letter to the DESS in 2022, in fact, stating that the UOC no longer considers itself a subject of the norms of the ROC.
The official position of the UOC (Council 2022, resolutions, statements) is to dissociate from the ROC, condemn the war, and refuse to participate in the governing bodies of the ROC. In 2022, the UOC decided on the possibility of self-production of holy myrrh, which is an attribute of autocephaly and a direct gesture of breaking with Moscow practice.
Decisions on the "transition" of individual dioceses to the direct subordination of the ROC were made by the ROC unilaterally, without the consent of the governing bodies of the UOC. This is an act of external interference during the war, which has no legal force for the UOC and cannot indicate the subordination of the entire UOC. The law determines that affiliation is established "in the presence of direct subordination" (Art. 5-1), and not only on the facts of the actions of a foreign structure without a reaction from the Ukrainian Church.
Silence does not constitute consent and cannot be interpreted as a sign of subordination. In the conditions of war and occupation, when any harsh official statement regarding this situation could endanger the clergy and laity of the UOC in the occupied territory, such a position is forced and tactical.
In general, there was no approval or implementation of the decisions of the Moscow Synod from the UOC. In the conditions of war, the UOC did not have real tools for responding in the occupied territories, and the lack of an official reaction is explained by security considerations, not "tacit consent".
Some bishops of the UOC (33 hierarchs, October 2024) publicly condemned such decisions of the Russian Orthodox Church as anti-canonical, which directly contradicts the thesis of the DESS of "unconditional subordination". Original statement on Facebook (page of Archbishop Jonah Obukhovsky, vicar of the Kyiv diocese). Quote from this statement: "We, the bishops of the UOC, strongly condemn this decision [of the Russian Orthodox Church], which is anti-canonical, since church law regulates canonical relations between the Orthodox Churches...» This link is also given in the annexes to the official study of the DESS (Appendix 32).
4. The DESS also points to "Chapter X" of the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church (added in October 2022), where the Ukrainian Church gains "independence and autonomy in its administration with the rights of broad autonomy." The expert group argues that in fact this chapter "increased the dependence of the UOC on the ROC" (see paragraph 4.3 of the opinion). The conclusion of the DESS throughout the document contains a citation or retelling of these old norms and decisions (Gramota of 1990, decision of the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church in 1990, Chapter X, etc.) as evidence of long-term obedience. The wording of the DESS:
"The DESS did not find the documents of the UOC on the termination of the Chapter of the X... Therefore, its provisions are binding."
Commentary:
Chapter X of the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church is an internal document of a foreign structure (ROC), which has no legal force in Ukraine if it was not adopted by the UOC itself, which is not recorded. The UOC never ratified Chapter X after its appearance and did not participate in its development. Moreover, the UOC does not actually fulfill any of the provisions of Chapter X: it does not submit its statute to Moscow for approval, does not send delegates to the Councils, does not cook myrrh in Moscow, does not mention the Patriarch Ukrainian. each religious organization registered in Ukraine is an independent legal entity, and its internal structure is determined by the charter approved by its bodies, and not by external centers.
Key conclusion. The DESS relies on formal mentions (Charter of 1990, Chapter X of the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church).
The DESS states:
- Chapter X of the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church "Ukrainian Orthodox Church" directly contains provisions binding on the UOC, in particular:
- approval of the statute of the UOC by the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church;
- participation of the bishops of the UOC in the Councils and Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church;
- the obligation to remember the Patriarch of Moscow;
- receiving holy peace from Moscow;
- subordination to the Bishops' Court of the Russian Orthodox Church, etc.
The DESS believes that since the UOC did not officially renounce the Charter and did not amend the Statute regarding these points, Chapter X of the Statute of the ROC remains valid for the UOC.
Although the DESS formally refers to Chapter X of the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church as a source of subordination to the UOC, all available practice indicates otherwise.
In particular, the UOC independently adopts the Statute, does not participate in the governing bodies of the Russian Orthodox Church, does not mention the name of the Patriarch of Moscow and, most importantly, brews holy myrrh on its own, which is a sign of canonical maturity and ritual independence. These facts completely deny the assumption that the provisions of Chapter X of the Russian Orthodox Church are still binding on the UOC.
Links in the table.
Main argument of the DESS- Actual state after 2022 / counterargument
Letter of Patriarch Alexy II (1990) as a legal basis for connection with the Russian Orthodox Church: The charter is a canonical act of blessing, not a legal document. In the Statute of the UOC (2022), it is mentioned declaratively. [Text of the charter]
Chapter X of the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church operates automatically in the UOC: Chapter X is an internal document of the Russian Orthodox Church. The UOC did not approve its content, did not recognize it. [UOC Charter, 2022]
Commemoration of Patriarch Kirill: Most dioceses have stopped commemorations. [Council Resolution, 2022] [Address by Metropolitan Onufriy]
Receiving peace from Moscow: the UOC has been brewing holy myrrh on its own since 2022. [UOC publication][Address by Metropolitan Onufriy]
Participation in the synods of the Russian Orthodox Church: After 2022, the participation of bishops of the UOC in the governing bodies of the Russian Orthodox Church was not recorded. [DESS, pp. 18–19]. And some of the bishops of the UOC publicly condemned the actions of the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church
Lack of proclamation of autocephaly: the UOC actually acts as an autocephalous one. [Address by Metropolitan Onufriy]
The term "part-whole": the UOC has a governing center in Kyiv. [UOC Charter, 2022]
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Thus, the investigation of the DESS is based on certain legal and canonical arguments (formal provisions of the statute, norms of the Russian Orthodox Church, historical decisions of the Councils), but it has significant weaknesses.
Firstly, it had a one-sided focus on the old norms and did not take into account that the new Statute of 27.05.2022 and the decision of the Council of 2022 in every possible way seek to separate the UOC from Moscow.
Secondly, many of the "signs" named by the DESS (mentions in documents, participation of individual hierarchs in the synods of the Russian Orthodox Church) are actually beyond the control of the Church or have become invalid, since the UOC independently abandoned the relevant practices.
Thirdly, from a legal point of view, there is no indisputable evidence of the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on the modern administration of the UOC – all decisions regarding the Primate and the structure are made within the UOC.
As a result, although the DESS found formal compliance with the criteria of affiliation, its interpretation does not take into account the self-governing decisions of the UOC itself and is therefore controversial. The conclusion of the DESS is largely based on formal features and requires additional legal and canonical justification, taking into account the real situation and position of the UOC.
Formally, the signs given in the study can only be interpreted as potential "affiliation" with the Russian Orthodox Church, however:
- public statements and managerial changes in the UOC after 2022 are not taken into account;
- the arguments are based mainly on the analysis of statutory documents, without analyzing current church practice;
- there is no convincing new evidence of the actual subordination of the Cabinet of Ministers of the UOC to Russian church structures.
Thus, from a legal point of view, the conclusion on the mandatory affiliation of the Cabinet of Ministers of the UOC with the ROC remains debatable and requires additional verified confirmations, taking into account the real situation and position of the UOC.
As a result:
1. A systematic review of the main counterarguments to the conclusion of the DESS regarding the "affiliation" of the UOC with the Russian Orthodox Church:
- The updated Statute of the UOC (2022) does not contain any mention of the Moscow Patriarchate, its structures, blessings, synods or councils. The center of governance is defined in Kyiv.
- The charter of 1990 is mentioned exclusively as a source of independence, and not legal subordination.
- Chapter X of the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church, referred to by the DESS, has never been adopted by the UOC. Its provisions have not been implemented and are not being implemented.
- Participation in the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church has been suspended, Metropolitan Onufriy does not appear in the governing bodies of the Russian Orthodox Church after 2022.
- The Law of Ukraine No. 987-XII requires signs of actual influence or control — not a single such sign has been recorded in the modern UOC.
2. The actual practice of the UOC after 24.02.2022
- Public reaction to the war: in the very first days of the invasion, Metropolitan Onufriy strongly condemned Russia's actions, calling the war fratricidal and criminal.
- Cathedral on May 27, 2022officially decided on the full canonical independence of the UOC.
- Termination of the mention of the name of Patriarch Kirill in the vast majority of dioceses.
- Own chrismation: the UOC began to independently produce holy myrrh — this is an attribute of canonical independence.
- Financial, humanitarian and spiritual assistance to the front: dozens of dioceses provide constant assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, chaplains of the UOC work in frontline brigades, monasteries accept refugees, buy cars, drones, and medicine.
Although the DESS in its conclusion interprets the UOC as supposedly part of the ROC, the Russian Orthodox Church itself not only does not consider the UOC "its structure", but actually supports the pressure campaign against it, absorbing the parishes of the UOC in the occupied territories, pretending "crocodile tears" about "persecution", which in fact provides it with a "justification" for the domestic audience for its actions in Ukraine.
Recall that on March 27, 2024, the Russian Orthodox Church officially approved the concept of the "Russian world". The order of the XXV World Russian People's Council "The Present and the Future of the Russian World" contains:
- an apology for a "special civilization", which includes Ukraine in the "Russian spiritual space";
- support for war as a "sacred struggle for truth";
- ideological justification of the forcible integration of neighbors into the Russian cultural code.
This document is a political and religious program of militarized Orthodoxy, completely incompatible with the evangelical tradition.
The reaction of the UOC: clear and public demarcation at the official level.
Unlike the Russian Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church:
- did not support the ideology of the "Russian world";
- publicly condemned the text of the "Order", emphasizing that it contains: "an apology for violence, justification for the violation of spiritual, moral and evangelical principles", "a threat to Ukrainian identity, sovereignty and territorial integrity".
- recognized that such ideas could not be supported by an organization claiming to be Christian.
«The mentioned text contains an apology for violence, justification of violations of spiritual, moral and evangelical principles, whichposes a threat to the Ukrainian identity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.We believe that the ideas discussed above from the mentioned documentcannot be supported by a religious organization that claims to be called Christian.» -the UOC said in a statement.
This is the most rigid and theologically motivated separation from the "Russian world" of the Russian Orthodox Church made by any canonical structure. But for some reason, this fact was unfairly ignored in our media space.
Based on the logic of the DESS, the question arises. Why did the UOC not obey if the decisions of the Russian Orthodox Church are binding on it?!
The obvious answer is: because it remained a Church, not an appendage to imperial ideology. Unlike the Russian Orthodox Church, the UOC retained internal canonical responsibility for its flock:
- did not accept the politicization of faith, which is the main feature of the Russian Orthodox Church during the time of Russian President V. Putin;
- did not share the false sacralization of war, which is actually a betrayal of Christ's Sacrifice.
This is a rare example of ecclesiological resistance to political violence, while many other churches of Universal Orthodoxy are simply silent or distancing. The fact that it was the UOC that condemned the ideology of the "Russian world" adopted by the Russian Orthodox Church is the final proof that there is neither spiritual unity nor organic affiliation between them. The UOC remained the Church, the Russian Orthodox Church became an ideological tool of war. This is a fact that is well understood in the Kremlin.
That is why for Moscow, the modern UOC is no longer an "instrument of influence" in Ukraine, but a "rebellious structure" dangerous for Russian propaganda, which:
- She publicly condemned Russia's war against Ukraine from the first days of the invasion, clearly calling it a crime;
- It dissociated itself from the ideology of the "Russian world" and directly condemned the "Order" of the XXV World Russian People's Council, which promoted aggressive ideas of a "special civilizational space" adopted by the Russian Orthodox Church;
- It independently elects its leadership and makes key decisions — without coordination with Moscow or accountability to external centers.
- She stopped mentioning Patriarch Kirill in divine services (in most dioceses);
- He makes holy myrrh with his own hands, which is a sign of independence;
- She announced a course for complete independence in the canonical dimension.
- Conducts active humanitarian, social and spiritual support for the army of Ukraine and the civilian population — dozens of dioceses and monasteries help the Armed Forces of Ukraine, volunteers, and IDPs;
- She has publicly distanced herself from the political narratives of the Russian Orthodox Church and does not use official church rhetoric to justify the war.
Why does this matter for Ukraine?
- Millions of believers of the UOC are citizens of Ukraine, defenders, volunteers, and military families. Their loyalty and sense of belonging to the country is an important element of unity.
- Discrimination against the entire Church on formal grounds is a step that undermines trust in the state as legal, open and humane. Such decisions create a humanitarian vacuum that cannot be filled quickly and painlessly.
- A split within society is always in the hands of the aggressor. The Kremlin will only benefit from destabilization, a "witch hunt" and the loss of national unity.
And this is something that state bodies — in particular the DESS — must take into account before operating with stamps of legal labels.
Taking into account the above, I personally have an uncomfortable question: on what basis is the entire structure of the UOC marked in its State as an enemy, if the facts of its activities indicate otherwise?
It is especially necessary to emphasize:
It is overlooked that the UOC is, first of all, millions of people, rooted practices of solidarity, charity, ritual and moral support. Its exclusion or destruction automatically leaves a humanitarian vacuum that no one else can fill — neither the state, nor business, nor even other church projects.
The humanitarian field of war is a spiritual weapon, no less important than drones and artillery. The UOC is an institution that has mobilized tens of thousands of people for prayer, help, and service.
The beginning of a mass struggle against "internal enemies", including against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, did not in any way lead to an improvement in the situation at the front. On the contrary, these processes for some reason coincided in time with the transition from the offensive (successful liberation of Kharkiv region and the city of Kherson) to positional defense, and later with the loss of initiative, defense crises, and a decrease in the level of international assistance.
In short:
February-October 2022: The state does not initiate a large-scale campaign against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The humanitarian issue of the church is not the subject of harsh legislative or media attacks. During this period, the Armed Forces of Ukraine demonstrate the highest efficiency at the front: the defense of Kyiv and Kharkiv, the counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region, the liberation of Kherson. International, especially American, support remains stable and maximum: the Biden administration and the Democratic majority in the US Congress approve large-scale military aid packages.
End of 2022 – 2023: From the end of autumn 2022, the state campaign against the UOC begins: mass searches of churches by the Security Service of Ukraine, intensification of draft laws on restrictions and prohibitions of activities, a public campaign to isolate the church from the humanitarian field, conflicts around the Lavra and church property. At the same time, there is a slowdown at the front: Ukraine's active offensive actions are curtailed, the war is moving into a positional phase, Russia begins massive shelling of critical infrastructure. In the summer of 2023, the counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Zaporizhzhia direction, Rabotyne) does not bring the expected breakthrough, parity of forces is established at the front. During the same period, the United States is experiencing political difficulties in approving new aid packages, and Western support is becoming less predictable. At the beginning of 2023, a Republican majority comes to the US House of Representatives. In the fall of 2023, Republicans in Congress block new large aid packages for Ukraine for the first time. A multi-month delay in funding begins, which significantly affects the dynamics at the front — the Armed Forces of Ukraine are unable to restore offensive capabilities. Spring 2024: Biden's $61 billion package was adopted with a significant delay — by this time, a critical shortage of weapons had already affected the combat capability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
2024 – mid-2025. Law No. 3894-IX is in force, the UOC is being pushed out of the humanitarian space, legal and administrative actions are continuing to restrict its activities, conflicts around property and the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra continue. At the front, the situation becomes more complicated: Russia seizes the initiative, carries out an active offensive in the Donbas, and from the Kursk region goes on the offensive against the city of Sumy. The US presidential election will be won by Donald Trump. The Trump administration is heading for negotiations with Russia and a gradual curtailment of military aid to Ukraine, which increases uncertainty for Ukrainian defense and generally undermines the prospect of sustained support from the West.
On July 23, 2025, for the first time in history, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU, subordinate to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and not canonically recognized by the UOC) held a religious service in the Far Caves of the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra. This step was perceived by a significant part of the UOC clergy and laity as an act of pressure. Notably, from that very day, a wave of protests swept across the country — against the backdrop of high-profile decisions regarding NABU and SAPO. A photo of a mass rally near the Franko Theater in Kyiv was widely circulated online.
Of course, this parallel is not evidence of a direct cause-and-effect relationship, but perhaps it deserves attention. The policy of searching for an internal enemy did not have a strategic effect in the war and probably caused the loss of part of the country's moral resource.
In a historical context, it can be mentioned that during World War II, the Soviet government also radically changed religious policy. In September 1943, when the situation at the front was extremely difficult for the USSR, Joseph Stalin abruptly abandoned militant atheism and switched to supporting the Orthodox Church in order to raise the patriotic spirit and consolidate the rear.
So should the Ukrainian Orthodox Church really become an object of mass persecution or collective punishment? Such an approach is not only illogical and unfair, but also strategically disadvantageous for Ukraine itself.
The fight against betrayal or collaboration should be targeted, personified, and not collective. Even if there have been or remain isolated cases of cooperation with the enemy among the UOC, this requires an individual legal assessment.
The transformation of the entire Church into an object of a campaign of persecution is a strategically harmful precedent that undermines the reputation of the state as legal and pluralistic, worsens the dialogue with international partners, and creates grounds for manipulation by the Russian Federation.
The UOC is one of the largest owners of land, buildings, historical monuments and cultural heritage in Ukraine. Therefore, it should not be ruled out that everything that is reduced to security and ideological rhetoric ("agents of Moscow", "the hand of the Kremlin") in the real process is only a large-scale redistribution of church land, property, and shrines.
Ukrainian society is in a state of deep collective trauma due to full-scale aggression, daily losses and destruction. In such conditions , some patriotic groups, informed mostly from the media, do not delve into the legal subtleties — there is a request for a "simple solution": ban, expel and confiscate. This is a psychological reaction of societyNot a legal category. Unfortunately, this is used by some politicians. But if the state wants to maintain legal and moral trust, it must act in accordance with the law and the principle of objectivity, and not on the basis of emotions or simplifications.
Oksana Krasovska, expert analyst at the Ukrainian Institute of Politics
