Situation in Ukraine October 8–15, 2025

          U.S. Discusses Transfer of Tomahawk Missiles to Ukraine.

          The United States is considering the transfer of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine, though these discussions remain a tool of political leverage in negotiations between Washington and Moscow. President Donald Trump is currently focused not on the actual delivery of the missiles but on creating an atmosphere of threat to pressure the Kremlin into negotiations while reassuring U.S. allies that the situation is under control.

          On October 14, 2025, during a bilateral lunch with Argentine President Javier Milei, President Trump commented on an upcoming meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the potential transfer of new weaponry to Ukraine, including Tomahawk missiles. Trump expressed disappointment that Russian authorities show no desire to end the war and noted that the U.S. is exploring various options to support Ukraine.

          “We have an interesting meeting coming up. Look, I’m very disappointed because I had a very good relationship with Vladimir [Putin]. Probably still do. I don’t understand why he continues this war. This war has hurt him so badly. He’s entering his fourth year of a war that should’ve ended. He should’ve won this war in one week. Now he’s about to enter his fourth year. He’s lost maybe a million and a half soldiers, probably. Of course, in terms of the wounded—without legs, without arms, and all the things that happen in terrible wars. This is a horrific war. It’s the biggest event since World War II… 

          There are long lines for gasoline in Russia now. Who would’ve thought that would happen? Suddenly, his economy is starting to collapse. I’d like for things to go well for him. I had a very good relationship with Vladimir Putin. But he just doesn’t want to end this war. I think it’s really damaging his reputation… Biden should’ve never let this happen. This was a war that shouldn’t have happened. But it did. And it doesn’t make Russia look attractive. We’ll be talking about Ukraine, yes. I mean, the President [Zelenskyy] is coming on Friday. He wants weapons. He’d love to have Tomahawks. Everybody wants Tomahawks. And we have a lot of Tomahawks…” — Trump said.

          Over the weekend, Trump and Zelenskyy held two consecutive phone calls—an unprecedented frequency of communication between the leaders. A key topic was the potential transfer of Tomahawk missiles. Trump indicated he might use the sale of Tomahawks as leverage to pressure Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the war, emphasizing his intent to discuss this with Putin.

          “I could say, ‘Listen, if the war doesn’t get resolved, I might send them Tomahawks,’” Trump noted. “Tomahawks are a new step toward escalation,” he added. “Do they want Tomahawks aimed at them? I don’t think so… I think I could talk about this with Russia, honestly.”

          However, Trump acknowledged that such deliveries would represent “a new escalation, which he does not want,” and he informed Zelenskyy of this stance. He also suggested that U.S. weapons could be supplied through NATO member states before being transferred to Ukraine, though the specific mechanism for such a transfer remains unclear.

          Trump broadly stated that the U.S. is open to expanding arms supplies, provided it does not excessively deplete its own arsenals:

          “They need more weapons, and we’re looking at that possibility. We hope we can provide them. You know, our country needs weapons too. We can’t give away so many weapons that we’re left without—you never know what might happen,” he said.

          Zelenskyy confirmed that Trump has not yet made a final decision on the Tomahawk missiles but noted that, if approved, strikes with these missiles would target only military objectives.

          In the Kremlin, the likelihood of Tomahawk transfers to Ukraine is taken seriously, as evidenced by heightened Russian rhetoric warning against further U.S. involvement and hinting at potential nuclear escalation if Tomahawks are aimed at Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that such a move would jeopardize improving U.S.-Russia relations. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova threatened escalation, stating:

          This is a very serious escalatory step. The appearance of such systems, if it comes to that, would mean a significant, perhaps even qualitative, change in the situation. But it won’t affect our resolve to achieve our goals… I hope those pushing Washington toward such a decision fully understand the depth and severity of the consequences. We urge American leadership and military officials to approach this situation soberly, prudently, and responsibly.”

          Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko warned that supplying Tomahawks to Kyiv would escalate the situation to the brink of nuclear war:

          “Tomahawks won’t solve the problem. They will escalate the situation toward nuclear war,” Lukashenko said.

          Moscow also responded to Trump’s threats through Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, whom Trump recently called a “stupid person” without directly naming him. Medvedev’s response was harsh, veiled with nuclear threats—a typical element of Russian informational escalation:

          “Trump said that if the Russian President doesn’t resolve the Ukrainian conflict, it will ‘end badly for him.’ Threatening for the hundred-and-first time, in short. If the ‘business-peacemaker’ is talking about Tomahawks, the phrase is wrong. Supplying these missiles could end badly for everyone. And first and foremost—for Trump himself. It’s been said a hundred times in a way even a stars-and-stripes guy can understand: it’s impossible to distinguish a nuclear-armed Tomahawk from a conventional one in flight. Their launch would be carried out not by Kyiv, but by the U.S. itself. Read: Trump. How would Russia respond? Exactly!” — Medvedev wrote on Telegram.

          The Kremlin appears to view any Tomahawk launch—regardless of location or payload—as a potential signal of a nuclear attack. Notably, Putin has avoided direct, sharp statements against Trump, suggesting Moscow is preserving room for diplomatic maneuvering and backchannel negotiations to ease sanctions.

          For Putin, maintaining the appearance of a rational actor open to dialogue, while projecting strength, is critical to avoid a direct confrontation with Trump, which could derail potential deals.

          The ongoing ritual of mutual intimidation between Washington and Moscow continues, with both sides relying on verbal signals and diplomatic maneuvers to avoid direct military steps. However, this approach risks further escalation, increasing distrust and tension.

          This rising tension benefits Ukraine. A Ukrainian delegation, including Head of the Presidential Office Andriy Yermak, Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, and Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko, is currently in Washington. President Zelenskyy is set to arrive on Friday. The potential supply of Tomahawk missiles is expected to be a central topic.

          Additionally, Ukraine aims to persuade Trump to impose trade tariffs on countries purchasing Russian energy, further weakening Moscow’s finances, and to pressure European partners to use frozen Russian assets to fund aid to Ukraine, arguing that much of this funding would support U.S. arms purchases.

          These initiatives could complicate future U.S.-Russia dialogue, especially if Trump uses Tomahawk supplies as leverage against the Kremlin. The outcome of Zelenskyy’s visit will clarify Ukraine’s progress on these issues.

          However, the U.S. clearly seeks to avoid deeper involvement in the war. Trump’s statements suggest he prefers a controlled, cost-effective role for the U.S., avoiding direct confrontation with Moscow. He has signaled a willingness to communicate with Putin, proposing a deal: either Moscow agrees to a ceasefire and negotiations, or Washington may escalate.

          In practice, the most likely scenario is a limited, tightly controlled transfer of Tomahawks to Ukraine—a symbolic package with specific targets, accompanied by diplomatic efforts to mitigate Russian retaliation. If supplied, these missiles could target key but limited number of Russian military assets, such as strategic aviation bases, fuel and ammunition depots, or symbolically significant sites like the Crimean Bridge, with a maximum of 10–15 priority targets.

          According to former Pentagon official and military analyst Mark Cancian, the U.S. has approximately 4,150 Tomahawk missiles, but availability for Ukraine would be highly limited. Of the 200 Tomahawks purchased since 2022, over 120 have been used, and the 2026 Pentagon budget requests funding for only 57 missiles. Stacie Pettyjohn, director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security, estimates a realistic transfer range of 20–50 missiles. The transfer of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine is unlikely to significantly impact the frontline situation. For that, Ukraine would need to achieve at least approximate parity with Russia, which launches several hundred missiles at Ukrainian territory monthly. Against this backdrop, even the transfer of dozens of Tomahawks would have more symbolic than operational significance, demonstrating political support but not substantially altering the balance of power in the air or on the frontline.

 

          Trump’s Middle East Breakthrough: Impact on Ukraine?

          President Trump achieved a cessation of hostilities in Gaza, with Israel and Hamas announcing an end to fighting on October 9, 2025, in Sharm el-Sheikh. The agreement included the release of all living Israeli hostages in exchange for 2,000 Palestinian prisoners, with Israel agreeing to withdraw troops to pre-agreed lines. Trump’s speech in the Israeli Knesset called for a shift from military operations to diplomacy, stating, “The time for victories through combat must give way to peace.” On October 13, Trump and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi led the signing of the “Trump Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity.” The ceasefire in Gaza not only bolstered President Trump's political capital but also opened prospects for international recognition as a leader who halted one of the Middle East's bloodiest conflicts. This creates a foundation for the U.S. administration to highlight its diplomatic “success” as a basis for potentially nominating Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. This year, he could not be considered for the award, as the 2025 prize covers events from the previous year, when Trump was not yet President. However, in the following year, when 2025’s diplomatic efforts are evaluated, his work in securing peace between Israel and Hamas could be a central argument for his nomination.

          Against the backdrop of Trump’s Gaza success, some Ukrainian politicians increasingly suggest that this diplomatic breakthrough could hasten the end of the war in Eastern Europe within months. The logic is straightforward: Trump now has greater freedom to act, and his authority, bolstered by resolving the Middle East conflict, positions him as a global arbiter to mediate the war in Ukraine. However, sober analysis suggests that Trump has already achieved a goal that could secure his reputation as a potential Nobel nominee, provided no new escalation occurs. In this context, there is a risk that Ukraine may become a secondary priority for him. So far, Trump’s harsh rhetoric toward Russia has not led to significant changes in his practical Ukraine policy.

          Most likely, the U.S. President will continue efforts to restore peace in Ukraine. However, Trump’s approach will remain pragmatic, guided by the “America First” doctrine, where support for Ukraine is viewed primarily through the lens of U.S. interests rather than moral or ideological commitments. There is a strong chance that even limited successes could prompt Washington to declare “enough” and shift responsibility for Ukraine to Europe.

 

          Zelenskyy Strips Odesa Mayor of Citizenship and Position

          Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has stripped Odesa Mayor Gennadiy Trukhanov of his Ukrainian citizenship and position. According to Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), evidence has been obtained confirming Trukhanov's possession of Russian Federation citizenship, including an international passport issued in 2015. Following the publication of the relevant decree on the Presidential Office website, acting duties as head of the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Military Administration (RMA) have been temporarily assigned to Deputy Vladyslav Haivanchenko. The current head of the Dnipropetrovsk RMA, Serhiy Lysak, has been appointed as head of the newly established Odesa City Military Administration. Among the candidates for the position of head of the Odesa City Military Administration are Deputy Head of the RMA Oleksiy Khymchenko and Lysak himself, who attended a meeting with Zelenskyy and received personal thanks from the president for his work in the Dnipropetrovsk region.

          MP Oleksiy Honcharenko interpreted Trukhanov's dismissal as a political signal toward ending the war, stating that "the entire saga with Trukhanov is yet another proof that Zelenskyy is preparing for elections, and Odesa remains one of the key electoral bases for the president's re-election."

          Trukhanov, who held the position of Odesa mayor for 12 years, has not recognized the decision to dismiss him and stated that he continues to consider himself the acting mayor. He intends to appeal to U.S. authorities with a request to send an official inquiry to the Russian Federation regarding the presence or absence of his Russian citizenship, noting that Ukraine has no direct diplomatic relations with Russia.

          Trukhanov's dismissal is part of the Presidential Office's course toward centralizing power and subordinating local government bodies to the presidential vertical. Over the past few years, mayors of major cities, wielding significant authority and controlling substantial financial resources, have remained potential political competitors for the central authorities.

          Trukhanov's position weakened after the 2023 appointment of former Kyiv Prosecutor Oleg Kiper as head of the Odesa RMA—a politician close to the head of the Presidential Office, Andriy Yermak. Trukhanov's departure also coincided with the diminishing influence of the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR), Kyrylo Budanov, who had previously served as his informal patron. An additional factor was the spread of rumors about Trukhanov's contacts with Valery Zaluzhnyy, which were perceived in the Presidential Office as a manifestation of disloyalty.

 

          Military Operations

          The most intense combat operations in recent days have been recorded in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad, Kostiantynivka, and Lyman directions in Donetsk Oblast, as well as in Kupiansk (Kharkiv Oblast) and the southeastern part of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Although the overall pace of the Russian army's advance in October has slowed somewhat, the initiative on key frontline sectors remains with the Russian side. Over the week (October 8–15, 2025), Russian forces captured approximately 37 km² of Ukrainian territory and now control 115,077 km², representing a total of 19.04% of Ukraine's territory.

          In the Donetsk Region, Russian forces are advancing toward the southern outskirts of Kostiantynivka, expanding control in the areas of Bila Hora and Pleshchiivka on the eastern sector of the front.

          Geolocated footage and reports confirm advances near the village of Novopavlivka, with intensified fighting on the Pokrovsk direction, where Russian troops are attempting to consolidate positions in the western part of Pokrovsk, pushing deeper into the private residential sector. Russian forces have advanced to the railway line west of the city, likely aiming to reach the E50 highway—a critical logistical hub connecting the Donbas to central Ukraine.

          Additionally, Russian subunits have initiated an assault on Myrnohrad from the east.

          Advances by Russian troops are also confirmed in the vicinity of Shandryholove village north of Lyman.

          In the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Russian forces occupied Ternove and claimed capture of Oleksiivka (also referred to in some reports as a site of ongoing counterattacks by Ukrainian forces).

           In the Kharkiv Oblast, fighting continues for Kupiansk, with Russian forces exerting comprehensive pressure on Ukrainian positions. Ukrainian forces are conducting counterattacks, particularly near Radkivka, where three assaults were repelled on October 4. Local authorities have called for the evacuation of residents from settlements around Kupiansk due to deteriorating security, as Russian advances threaten key supply roads west of the town.

 

Map of Military Operations

Donetsk Oblast

Energy Infrastructure Attacks in Ukraine

          Russia continues its systematic destruction of energy infrastructure in Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, and Dnipro oblasts.

          On the evening of October 14, emergency power outages were imposed in Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, and parts of Kyiv oblasts, affecting hundreds of thousands of households and industrial consumers due to prior strikes. In Chernihiv Oblast, a strike on a fuel facility sparked a large-scale fire, while attacks on railway infrastructure in Kirovohrad Oblast halted multiple suburban trains. These outages, part of a broader pattern, left over 20,000 consumers without power in affected areas, with restoration efforts ongoing amid risks to energy workers.

          Since the start of 2025, there has been a clear escalation targeting gas infrastructure, beginning with large-scale attacks on natural gas extraction sites. On October 3 and 5, combined missile and drone assaults struck gas production facilities in Kharkiv and Poltava oblasts, including sites operated by Naftogaz and DTEK, causing critical damage and suspending operations at multiple plants. These strikes, described as the largest on gas production since the war began, involved over 35 missiles (many ballistic) and 60 drones on October 3 alone, injuring civilians and reducing output by up to 40% in affected areas. Compressor stations of the Gas Transmission System Operator (OGTSU) linked to production were heavily damaged, as was surface infrastructure at the Underground Gas Storage Operator (Ukrtransgaz), with recovery timelines unclear due to destroyed specialized equipment. Naftogaz reported over 100 strikes on its facilities in 2025 alone, accounting for half of all attacks since 2022, exacerbating Ukraine's preparations for the 2025-2026 heating season.

          From the beginning of 2025, Ukraine has endured 237 large-scale attacks on electricity generation facilities, with 140 in August-September alone, intensifying ahead of the heating season. Primary targets include overhead power lines (26%), Ukrenergo transmission system operators (33%), Ukrzaliznytsia railways (20%), and electricity/heat generation sites (20%). Substations of 330–750 kV operated by Ukrenergo in Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts account for nearly half of all strikes, overwhelming air defenses with drone swarms (e.g., 450 drones and 30 missiles on October 9). On September 8, Tripilska TPP (Centrerenergo) sustained major damage from 19 drones, causing widespread blackouts in Kyiv Oblast and disrupting supply to Kyiv, Cherkasy, and Zhytomyr regions. On October 3, Kramatorsk CHP was hit by an Iskander-M missile, igniting a massive fire at the transformer unit and causing outages in Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, Kostiantynivka, and Slovyansk, destabilizing Donbas's northern energy hub.

          The total direct physical damage to Ukraine's energy sector is now estimated at $20.51 billion as of December 31, 2024, per the World Bank's Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA4), excluding losses from the occupation of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and the Kakhovka Dam destruction. Russia has conducted numerous mass attacks, occupying generation facilities totaling 18 GW. In 2024, strikes damaged or destroyed 10 GW of electricity production capacity, with about 5 GW (50%) restored primarily via the Energy Support Fund and partner aid.

 

          Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovskaya, Andriy Tymchenko 

          Ukrainian Institute of Politics