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The negotiation process to end the war in Ukraine remains limitedly effective and has so far yielded results only in matters of humanitarian exchanges between the parties. The trilateral format of the United States-Ukraine-Russia has not yet been resumed after its postponement due to the Middle East crisis: at this stage, bilateral contacts between Washington and Kiev and Washington with Moscow continue. It seems that the Russian Federation and the United States are exerting consolidated political pressure on Ukraine in order to force it to make a decision on the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the Donbass, which, in their opinion, remains the main "stumbling block" for the cessation of hostilities. In particular, Donald Trump regularly accuses Volodymyr Zelensky of prolonging the war and unwillingness to make concessions. put forward a new ultimatum providing for the withdrawal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the western part of the Donetsk region within 2 months; otherwise, Russia will continue to seize by force, but will put forward "other conditions" to stop hostilities. Raising the stakes of the Russian Federation in the negotiation process will mean an even more complicated exit from the war. In an effort to interrupt this negative agenda and demonstrate to allies Ukraine's readiness to stop the war, President Vladimir Zelensky raises the topic of the Easter truce.
The United States is preparing the ground for an exit from the conflict in the Middle East. U.S. President Donald Trump has announced that the war will be "over" within two to three weeks, even if the Strait of Hormuz, which is currently blockaded by Iran, remains closed. The U.S. is poised to wind down hostilities after the weakening of Iran's navy and missiles, shifting further responsibility for the region's security to allies in both Europe and the Middle East. The White House has also made it clear that it is interested in the Gulf states also compensating Washington for the costs of the Iranian campaign and paying for the service rendered to them. At the same time, the Gulf countries themselves demand that Trump continue the war with Iran "until the threat disappears."
At the same time, both the U.S. withdrawal from the war in Iran with an uncertain outcome and its protracted continuation carry significant reputational risks for Washington and, in general, increase the gap with allies.
Against the background of the spread of information that the United States is ready to stop the military campaign against Iran, the visit of the President of Ukraine V. Zelnsky to the Middle East took place. The political goal of this trip was also to integrate Ukraine into the new Middle East security configuration and prevent the Ukrainian topic from being pushed to the periphery of the American agenda because of the war with Iran.
Ukraine expects to gain access to additional resources from the Persian Gulf countries to continue the war and develop its own military-industrial complex - including financing, production sites and, possibly, access to scarce weapons, including air defense systems. This vector is becoming especially relevant against the backdrop of weakening Western assistance: US support is largely reduced to occasional paid arms supplies and intelligence sharing, while the European aid package of about 90 billion euros remains blocked for the time being. Kyiv is trying to gain a foothold as a supplier of protection, technology and military expertise for the Gulf countries, thereby competing not only with regional players, but also with European and American manufacturers of defense products.
Zelensky's visit to the Middle East was also a way to compensate for Washington's political distancing through direct work with its regional partners. This is a demonstration of Ukraine's increased capabilities, including to Donald Trump himself, actually leveling his theses that Kiev "has no cards", limiting the space for further political pressure.
The course of peace negotiations.
The trilateral format of negotiations between the United States, Ukraine and the Russian Federation has not yet been resumed after its postponement due to the Middle East crisis: at this stage, Washington's bilateral contacts with Kyiv and Washington with Moscow continue.
At the same time, one gets the impression that Russia and the United States are exerting coordinated political pressure on Ukraine, seeking a decision on the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Donbass, which, judging by Ukraine's statements, is considered in Washington as the main node of the current negotiation deadlock. In recent days, President of Ukraine V. Zelensky has made it clear that he sees pressure in this direction. that the Americans "want to end the war," but, in his opinion, "see only one way - to do it" - to force Ukraine to withdraw troops from the Donbass; separately, he added that Russia, according to him, gave Ukraine two months for such a step, after which "the conditions will be different." "A logical question, if their goal is only Donbass, this is my question to our American colleagues, then if they can seize Donbass, why do they say that they will go further, then there will be other conditions. That is, the issue is still not in the Donbass," Zelensky said.
The President said that Ukraine is ready for a ceasefire on Easter and for a mutual cessation of strikes on the energy sector, stressing: "We are ready for any compromises, except for compromises with our dignity and sovereignty." V. Zelensky claims that the negotiation process is still going on in a working, albeit slow, mode: after the postponement of the next round, the trilateral format of the United States-Ukraine-Russia has not yet been resumed.
For its part, the Kremlin confirms contacts with Washington, while the Russian position on the negotiations has been publicly voiced in recent days by Dmitry Peskov, press secretary of the President of the Russian Federation, and Yuri Ushakov, assistant to the President of the Russian Federation on foreign policy. In particular, Peskov emphasizes that Moscow expects to continue dialogue with the United States and wants to preserve the "spirit of Anchorage" in it. At the same time, the Kremlin makes it clear that they do not consider Ukrainian signals about the Easter truce as a full-fledged peace initiative: according to Peskov, "in Zelensky's statements that we read, we did not see any clearly formulated initiative regarding the Easter truce." Moreover, the Russian side is again shifting the focus from a temporary ceasefire to the fulfillment of Moscow's political and military conditions. "Zelensky must take responsibility and make an appropriate decision so that we come to peace, and not just a ceasefire." On April 1, the Kremlin actually confirmed the rigidity of the logic of its ultimatum: Dmitry Peskov said that V. Zelensky should have withdrawn troops "yesterday," and that it should not be about a truce, but about "peace."
The EU continues to try to overcome obstacles to the approval of a 90 billion loan to Ukraine.
On March 31, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas said during a visit to Kyiv that the EU cannot yet solve all the problems regarding the adoption of the 20th package of sanctions against Russia, as well as the allocation of an EU loan of 90 billion euros to Ukraine. As Kallas noted, "we have some obstacles on the way to the 20th sanctions package, as well as loan repayment. According to her, a decision may be made at the next meeting of the European Council. At the same time, the obstacles remain primarily political. Budapest will block the 20th package of EU sanctions against Russia, accusing Ukraine of allegedly deliberately not repairing the Druzhba oil pipeline. Hungary also refused to support the documents necessary to approve an EU loan of 90 billion euros for Ukraine.
At the same time, the European Commission has already approved a package of preparatory measures for the launch of this loan. The European Commission proposes to allocate 45 billion euros to Ukraine in 2026, of which 16.7 billion euros should go to budget support under the Ukraine Facility and Macro-Financial Assistance programs, and another 28.3 billion euros to the development of Ukraine's military-industrial potential and urgent defense procurement. Separately, the European Commission allowed Ukraine to apply exceptions to standard procedures for the procurement of defense products at the expense of these funds, primarily in terms of purchasing components for drones. Now this proposal must be approved by the EU Council, after which the European Commission will be able to move on to borrowing in financial markets and launching the first payments.
In Ukraine, the parliamentary crisis continues to deepen, which is increasingly affecting the manageability of the entire political system.
The ruling Servant of the People party has long been unable to ensure effective voting in Parliament on its own without situational support from other parliamentary factions and deputy groups. There are 228 people among the faction (as of March 2026). But the real number of votes is lower, the core is about 112-160 deputies.
The internal crisis of the Rada is fueled by several factors at once. The parliament is actually blocked by anti-corruption structures, the lack of informal additional payments for voting, as well as the unwillingness to take responsibility for toxic and unpopular decisions, primarily related to tax increases and other painful reforms. Against this background, the confrontation between three centers of influence in the Parliament is intensifying: the presidential circuit headed by Volodymyr Zelensky, parliamentary group associated with the head of the Servant of the People faction David Arakhamia and the new head of the Office of the President Kyrylo Budanov, as well as the so-called "Servant of the People" faction."anti-Zelensky coalition" (anti-corruption bloc + opposition), focused on external partners.
As a result, a multi-level conflict is formed within the government, in which each of the groups seeks not only to promote its own agenda, but also to block the strengthening of competitors, which leads to further destabilization of the work of the Parliament. The anti-corruption vertical is objectively interested in changing the Government and weakening the President's control over the executive branch as a whole, and the resignation of Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko is desirable for themas a figure more oriented towards V. Zelensky.
That is why in recent weeks there have been signs of a protracted blocking of the work of the Verkhovna Rada and a kind of parliamentary "strike", which already threatens the normal functioning of certain state institutions.
Nevertheless, despite signs of the collapse and degradation of the parliamentary majority, issues of a strategic and patriotic nature – including the extension of mobilization and martial law – are likely to be supported. On Wednesday, March 25, 2026, the situation in the Verkhovna Rada seemed to return to normal when the draft law No13155 on the exemption of residents of damaged housing from paying utilities and taxes for the period of restoration was adopted in the second reading. The head of the Servant of the People faction D. Arakhamia called this successful vote evidence that the Parliament is working, despite "some difficulties."
But the Cabinet of Ministers has not submitted the most problematic bills related to tax legislation, obligations in relations with the IMF and the implementation of the Ukraine Facility program to the Verkhovna Rada (they say that this was postponed to the beginning of April). Problems in relations between the Government and the Parliament remain.
On Thursday, March 26, the feeling that the parliamentary crisis has not disappeared has only increased. On March 26, 2026, the head of the Finance Committee of the Verkhovna Rada, Danylo Hetmantsev, made a harsh statement, warning of the risk of a "financial catastrophe" and loss of statehood due to a policy reminiscent of the events of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) of 1918.
In other words, the Parliament is less and less able to vote on complex political and socially toxic decisions, but so far it retains the ability to make the most basic decisions for the functioning of the state and war.
Course of hostilities.
The Russian Federation is gradually increasing the pace of the offensive at the front and in a week (March 25 - April 1, 2026) captured another 44 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory; in total, Russian troops control 116,696 square kilometers, or 19.33% of the territory of Ukraine. The main efforts of the Russian Federation are still aimed at further capturing the Donetsk region.
In the Donetsk region, Russian troops intensified offensive operations, primarily in the area of the Pokrovsko-Myrnohrad agglomeration, in particular near Hryshyn. Attempts to break through the Ukrainian defenses in the areas of Vasylivka and Novooleksandrivka are also recorded, but so far these actions are local in nature and have not brought significant success.
In the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk direction, the Russian army captured Sviato-Pokrovske and Vasiukivka.
In the Zaporizhzhia direction , during this period, the advance of the Russian Federation in the Varvarovka area was noted, but the enemy's attack on Mala Tokmachka was repulsed.
In the Kharkiv direction, the advance of Russian forces in the Peschane area was recorded.
At the same time, in the Dnepropetrovsk direction, Ukrainian troops took control of the settlement of Berezovo.
Conflict in the Middle East.
On March 31, U.S. President Donald Trump said that Washington could end the war with Iran within two to three weeks, even if the Strait of Hormuz, which is currently blocked by Iran, remains closed. The United States may demand that its allies, especially the Gulf states and NATO, lead operations to reopen the strait.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said on Tuesday that the United States allegedly achieved "regime change" in Iran. This was confirmed by Trump himself. "We have had a regime change. Regime change was not part of my plans. I had one goal: they will not have nuclear weapons, and this goal has been achieved. They will not have nuclear weapons. But we're finishing the job, and I think it's going to take maybe two weeks, maybe a couple of days to finish what we started. But we want to destroy everything they have," Trump told reporters in the Oval Office.
Trump said that the issue of opening the Strait of Hormuz should be a problem for other countries (NATO and Gulf countries), stressing that it is up to them to ensure the security of this "critical waterway." Later, the president reiterated that the war would be "over" within two to three weeks: "Whatever happens in the strait, we will have nothing to do with it."
The US president added that the war could end earlier if an agreement is reached. On the American side, there are frequent statements that "productive" negotiations are underway with Iran, although officials in Tehran actually deny this, and there is no evidence of diplomatic progress.
Earlier, White House press secretary Caroline Leavitt actually made it clear that US President Donald Trump is probably interested in the Gulf countries also compensating for Washington's costs of the Iranian campaign. When asked by a journalist whether Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are ready to take on "the overwhelming part of the costs of the war," she said:
"I think the President would be very interested in such an idea. I'm not going to get ahead of myself, but I certainly know he has that idea, and I think you'll hear more from him." Such a signal looks like a reaction test through a spokesperson and can cause a negative response from allies.
There may be a growing perception in the region that the U.S. has actually escalated the Middle East with Iran without full coordination, and then seeks to distance itself by shifting both financial and security costs onto them. which provoked a large-scale response from Tehran on their territory and led to a serious regional crisis, causing significant economic costs to both the Gulf countries themselves and the countries importing Middle Eastern fuel. Iran's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz – through which about 20% of the world's oil exports pass – has created the threat of a massive energy crisis. First of all, this hits Europe and Asia, where the cost of energy resources is rising sharply and pressure on the economy is increasing. Secondary effects are already being observed: rising fuel prices, disruptions in logistics and even the cancellation of flights due to rising fuel prices. Oil prices fluctuate depending on Donald Trump's statements and are generally in the range of $100-110 per barrel, but in the event of further escalation, their growth is predicted to reach $200.
European Commissioner for Energy Dan Jorgensen has estimated the cost of the first 30 days of the conflict for the European Union: an increase in fossil fuel import costs of 14 billion euros, a 70% increase in natural gas prices and a 60% increase in oil prices. Even if an agreement on the Strait of Hormuz is reached tomorrow, He added, "We will not be able to return to normal life in the near future." According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), about 2,000 ships are stuck in the region; insurance premiums for hulls and cargo have risen by 300%. One vessel paid $2 million for the right to transit with Iran's permission.
The Iranian parliament passed a law fixing the toll for passage through the Strait of Hormuz , a measure that turns the strait from a military lever into a permanent economic instrument of pressure with all the ensuing consequences. In fact, this means that the strait is turning into a permanent source of income for Iran, which will affect economic and political relations in the region in the future.
The team of US President Donald Trump continues to grow split with European countries.
Spain, France and Italy closed their airspace to American aircraft. Spain was the first to formalize this demarche: on March 30, Defense Minister Margarita Robles confirmed the closure of Spanish airspace to American military aircraft involved in the war with Iran, as well as the refusal to use joint bases with military cargo bound for Israel, after which Donald Trump publicly lashed out at Paris, saying that France was "extremely unhelpful" and that the United States would "remember." Finally, on March 31, it became known that Italy had banned the United States from using the Sigonella base in Sicily, when American bombers were already being sent there, and the request for permission, according to the Italian press, was sent after their departure. European partners loyal to Washington demonstrate their unwillingness to automatically get involved in an American war with Iran.
The situation served as a pretext for Washington to question the implementation of Article 5 of the NATO Charter. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said the issue of Article 5 "is a decision of the President." "You don't have a real alliance," Hegseth added, "if there are countries that are not ready to support you when you need them." Thus, American support is actually linked to the preventive and unconditional participation of allies in US operations. We are talking about a situation in which US military operations (for example, in Iran) can be initiated without coordination within NATO, without full consultations and prior notification of allies. However, political and military solidarity is subsequently expected from them, under the threat of revising the security guarantees themselves.
Washington's key costs in a war with Iran may ultimately be not so much resource as reputational. Faith in the dominance of the U.S. military is undermined, especially in the wake of the recent ostentatiously successful operation in Venezuela, which, on the contrary, reinforced expectations of unconditional U.S. military superiority. At the same time, trust in Washington's ability to make consistent and strategically calibrated decisions, as well as to implement its own policy in practice, is declining. Allies' faith in the ability of the United States to build stable alliances and alliances is also significantly undermined, which together forms the effect of the gradual erosion of American leadership in the world.
Visit of the President of Ukraine to the Middle East.
On March 27–30, 2026, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy paid a visit to the countries of the Persian Gulf. In particular, he visited Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Jordan. He also negotiated further cooperation with Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman. The visit took place against the backdrop of the spread of information that US President Donald Trump is ready to stop the military campaign against Iran, even if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed.
Following the visit, Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that he considers his trip to the countries of the Middle East successful and noted that a number of agreements on cooperation in the field of security have been concluded or are under discussion. Zelensky announced the achievement of "historic" agreements in the field of security with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. According to him, Ukraine also cooperates with Jordan and Kuwait, and two other countries, Bahrain and Oman , have also expressed interest.
In terms of content, the visit was devoted primarily to military-technical and energy cooperation against the backdrop of the war between the United States and Israel with Iran. Kiev offered the countries of the region Ukrainian experience in countering Iranian drones, discussed cooperation in the field of air defense and defense technologies, and also counted on reciprocal support in terms of financial investments, energy, fuel and defense supplies. The agreements and discussions on diesel fuel, energy support and possible military-technical cooperation figured most substantively.
The real political goal of the trip was to integrate Ukraine into the new Middle East security configuration and prevent the Ukrainian topic from being pushed to the periphery of the American agenda due to the war with Iran. Zelensky's visit to the Middle East was also an attempt to compensate for Washington's political distancing through direct work with US regional partners. Kyiv seeks to show that Ukraine is a supplier of sought-after military expertise, primarily in the fight against Iranian Shahed. This is especially important against the backdrop of statements by Donald Trump, who said that the United States does not need Ukrainian assistance in the field of drone defense, stressing that America itself understands this topic best of all. For Kyiv, cooperation with Middle Eastern countries is especially important against the backdrop of the American aid crisis, as such interaction can provide another, more independent source of funding. Ukraine offers technologies for combating air targets, vast combat experience and trained specialists, and in return expects to gain access to additional resources to continue the war: money, production sites and, possibly, access to scarce types of weapons and the development of its own military-industrial complex.
By promoting its technologies to the Middle Eastern markets, Ukraine is actually competing not only with regional players, but also with major European and American manufacturers of defense products. In particular, the director of the German concern Rheinmetall, Armin Papperger, in an interview with The Atlantic journalist Simon Schuster, said about Ukrainian drones: "It's just a Lego game. What innovations does Ukraine have? They don't have any technological breakthrough," and also added: "These are Ukrainian housewives. They have 3D printers in their kitchens, and they make parts for drones. This is not an innovation." In response, on March 30, 2026, during a conversation with journalists, Volodymyr Zelensky reacted sharply to these words, saying: "If every Ukrainian housewife can really produce drones, then every Ukrainian housewife can be the CEO of Rheinmetall». Thus, Zelensky made it clear that Kyiv perceives such statements not as a private remark, but as a reflection of the broader irritation of Western defense corporations with the strengthening of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex and its entry into the zone of direct competition.
Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovskaya
for the Ukrainian Institute of Politics
