SITUATION IN UKRAINE: June 27 – July 3, 2024. | UKRAINIAN INSTITUTE OF POLITICS

The process of peace negotiations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine has publicly undergone specific changes but has not yet significantly moved from the "dead point." Recently, information has begun to spread in the media that the Office of the President of Ukraine has allegedly softened its position regarding the conditions for ending the war with the Russian Federation. In particular, government officials do not publicly insist on the complete withdrawal of Russian troops and the return of all territories within the 2013 borders. Another reason for this was the interview with the American newspaper Philadelphia Inquirer of the President of Ukraine, V. Zelensky. Thus, when asked what would constitute a real victory for Ukraine, the usual theses about the withdrawal of Russian troops from the country's entire territory were not voiced. Instead, V. Zelensky said that it is necessary to prevent the destruction of Ukraine and prevent a possible repetition of aggression, which should ensure Ukraine's accession to the European Union and NATO.

On the other hand, the head of the Office of the President A. Ermak commented in a slightly different way on the rumors spreading in the Western press that the team of the US Presidential candidate from the Republican Party, Donald Trump, is already negotiating with the Russian Federation about what part of Ukrainian territory they can take away to themselves. In particular, A. Ermak said that Ukraine would cooperate with any US administration and respect the choice of the American people, regardless of what it would be. However, Ukraine is not ready to compromise with Russia and give up any territory to end the war. "We are not ready to compromise on essential things and values - independence, freedom, democracy, territorial integrity, sovereignty," said the head of the OP.

The variability in the rhetoric of the Ukrainian leadership regarding the negotiations is associated with the following factors:

The OP is preparing to host the second Global Peace Summit (before the end of this year) and strives to involve as many undecided countries and countries of the Global South in the peace process as possible. Therefore, the OP states that it is not against the presence of the Russian Federation at this summit. The Ukrainian side even allows its participation in the Chinese peace summit with the Russian Federation.

The OP does not rule out a scenario in which Donald Trump becomes President of the United States after the elections (he promises to end the war in Ukraine quickly), so they partially adapt to the Republican rhetorical mainstream.

Recently, D. Trump's advisers presented him with a plan to end Russia's war in Ukraine. The plan essentially involves using blackmail to end the war: telling Ukraine that it will receive more American weapons only if it enters into peace negotiations with the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation will also be warned that any refusal to negotiate will increase American support for Ukraine. Ukraine's NATO membership will be delayed for an extended period. Ukraine will not need to cede its territory to the Russian Federation officially, but its return will not be considered soon. Ukraine will receive additional security guarantees, which means "arming it to the teeth." The Office of the President of Ukraine V. Zelensky rejected the proposals of the "peace plan" of D. Trump's advisers. It once again made it clear that they do not intend to abandon the implementation of V. Zelensky's "peace formula" (in fact, this implies the surrender of the Russian Federation).

It is worth considering that in your actions and statements to the OP, you are forced to focus on public opinion within the country. Even though war fatigue is growing in Ukrainian society, it is not yet ready to make specific concessions to the Russian Federation (for example, giving up part of its territories or joining NATO). The statement of the head of OP A. Ermak was likely directed to a greater extent at the internal Ukrainian political space.

In the future, if the situation really requires a freeze in the war, the Ukrainian leadership may resort to the following formulation: for Ukraine to liberate all its territories, the allies must provide more funding and the necessary amount of weapons. If this does not happen, the war will have to be stopped along the front line, meaning that the occupied territories will be liberated after an indefinite period.

There is a specific behind-the-scenes dialogue regarding the end of the war between the parties to the conflict. However, it remains unclear what principles the dialogue between Ukraine and the Russian Federation will be based on. The countries' positions on peace conditions are fundamentally different. Publicly, Ukraine, in essence, continues to insist on the implementation of the "peace formula" of President V. Zelensky.

In the Russian Federation, they put forward a counter-ultimatum from V. Putin about Ukraine's refusal at the international level from its five regions (Crimea, Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions).

It is also necessary to consider the interests and positions of the main geopolitical rivals—China and the United States. Considering all the parties' claims and demands, reaching a compromise in the Ukraine-Russia-West-PRC format will take a lot of work.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban arrived in Ukraine on June 2 (for the first time since the start of the war). The visit took place the day after Hungary assumed the presidency of the EU Council. V. Orban held talks with Ukraine's President Vladimir Zelensky and urged him to consider a ceasefire. He also said that Hungary is ready to take part in modernizing the Ukrainian economy and hopes to improve relations between Budapest and Kyiv.

The visit of the Hungarian Prime Minister to Ukraine mainly had two primary goals. Firstly, V. Orban tried to act as the principal negotiator between Ukraine, the Russian Federation, China, the EU, and US presidential candidate D. Trump (with whom V. Orban has good relations). The main idea that V. Orban came up with was a truce, which had been proposed by French President—Macron (in the form of the Olympic Truce). Secondly, V. Orban represented the country that would lead the EU in the next six months and expected concessions from Ukraine on the Hungarian-Ukrainian track.

The day before, Ukraine, to lift the Hungarian veto on the start of its negotiations on accession to the EU, announced that it would make concessions to Hungary on the issue of special rights of the Hungarian minority. Hungary put forward 11 demands to Ukraine, which Budapest directly connects with the prospects of Ukrainian European integration. Of the entire list of requirements, half relate to education in the Hungarian language, including using the Hungarian language at all stages of the educational process. Some demands relate to the political representation of national minorities, including guarantees of representation in parliament. Problematic are the points about the status of territories, for example, the proposal to recognize all settlements in Transcarpathia as "traditionally Hungarian," even those where Hungarians have not historically lived.

The Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation began to raise the topic of aggravation on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border and the border between Belarus and NATO countries. At the same time, threats were made to use nuclear weapons. In particular, in Belarus, they claim that there are 10 NATO battalion tactical groups totaling about 20 thousand people near the republic's border with the EU countries. Belarusian border guards are working in enhanced mode. Previously, Belarus stated that GUR special forces with heavy equipment had arrived at the border with Ukraine. In particular, fighters of the "Russian Volunteer Corps" appeared on the border with the Zhytomyr region, fighting on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Belarus says it can use nuclear weapons "if its independence is threatened." Press Secretary D. Peskov joined the Belarusian statement, saying this is "a problem not only of Minsk but also of Moscow." Last year, Russian tactical nuclear weapons were deployed on the territory of the Republic of Belarus. Only the President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin, can make a decision on its use.

With these statements, the Russian Federation and Belarus may pursue the following goals: to create an imaginary threat to NATO countries to force them to negotiate on Ukraine and to tie up Ukrainian reserves, which are lacking on the eastern front.

At the front, even though the Russian Federation continues to hold the military initiative, the situation is gradually beginning to level out, although it remains difficult for the Ukrainian troops. Attempts at counterattacks by Ukrainian troops resulted from the arrival of Western aid. The situation on the front line gradually shifts towards a new balance of power (and a new deadlock). Suppose the Russian Federation does not find and bring additional reserves into battle shortly. In that case, the situation at the front may stabilize, and neither side will have the military initiative.

In the Donetsk region, the direction to Pokrovskoye remains the most difficult for the Ukrainian Armed Forces after several breakthroughs; Russian troops are already just a few kilometers from the key Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka highway. The Russian Federation is striving to reach the southern outskirts of the settlement of New York in the Toretsk direction. The south part of the village is a large fortified area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which has been in the "gray zone" for several weeks.

Heavy fighting continues in the city of Krasnogorovka in the Kurakhovsky direction, where the Ukrainian Armed Forces troops are significantly depleted. Only the northern part of the city of Krasnogorovka remains under the complete control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and there are risks of its loss if the troops are not reinforced with reserves. Currently, the most combat-ready units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are directed to the north of the Kharkiv region. Thus, the Russian Federation has at least achieved its goal of withdrawing part of the Ukrainian reserves from the Donetsk region.

Fighting continues in the Bakhmut direction near Chasiv Yar; Russian troops have captured the Kanal microdistrict, which brings the possibility of losing the city itself closer.

Ukrainian troops are moving in some directions to local counterattacks near Terny and in the Serebryansky forest in the Limansky district of the Donetsk region.

The problematic situation at the front is causing a wave of criticism against the top military leadership of Ukraine, which, in turn, is causing personnel changes. President Volodymyr Zelensky dismissed Yuriy Sodol from his post as Joint Forces commander. Notably, MP from the Servant of the People M. Bezuglaya often criticized the general before, linking him with the head of OP A. Ermak. Criticism from M. Bezugla became a "black mark" for the military leadership and a harbinger of a possible imminent resignation, as happened with V. Zaluzhny.

The day before, Bogdan Krotevich, the chief of staff of Azov, wrote to the State Bureau of Investigation against Y. Sodol, accusing him of various crimes, negligent treatment of personnel, and cooperation with the Russian Federation. It is assumed that Yu. Sodolya allowed significant losses among the troops and rearranged commanders who inherited respect among the soldiers. Critics also accused Yu. Sodol of failures in the zone of responsibility of the Khortitsa group, including Horlivka, Chasov Yar, and the Kharkiv region. Yu. Sodolya was fired under media pressure, which opened the door to future dismissals of military personnel or activists criticizing generals whose decisions they disapproved. In general, the resignation of Y. Sodol should reduce public dissatisfaction with the situation at the front, making him responsible for the failures.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, A. Syrsky, remains in his current position despite criticism from MP M. Bezugla. M. Bezugla, I believe that she is not allowed to visit the Ukrainian Armed Forces units in the forward zone under his command. Perhaps A. Syrsky uses criticism from M. Bezugla to protect military personnel from new dismissals, but the country's political leadership expressed dissatisfaction with the results of his work. The country's political leadership believes that they did everything possible for the military - they provided Western assistance, began the mobilization process (without demobilization, which insisted on general work), and demanded positive results from the military: at a minimum, stopping the Russian offensive, and in at best - to counterattacks in several directions. According to our information, such improvements at the front should occur before September 1, 2024, to create a favorable information background for the election campaign in the United States. Until this time, A. Syrsky's resignation is not planned. But if the situation at the front continues to deteriorate, A. Syrsky may be removed from his post.

The situation at the front is causing concern not only in the OP but also in the United States, where the presidential campaign is underway. Following the release of aid for Ukraine in the US Congress ($61 billion), the allies also believe they have done everything possible for Ukraine and expect positive changes on the front, or at least adequate protection of Ukrainian troops from Russian aggression.

The IMF Board of Directors completed the fourth review of the Extended Fund Facility for Ukraine (EFF) and decided to allocate about $2.2 billion to the country in budget support. The Fund also published an updated memorandum with Ukraine, the fulfillment of the terms of which will determine further assistance. In March 2023, the IMF approved $15.6 billion for Ukraine under a 48-month Extended Fund Facility. Ukraine has met 23/37 critical conditions, including reforms and legislative changes.

Three “beacons” were planned for the updated revision:

Develop a concept note for the "5-7-9" program - completed.
A sole review of HACS cases was completed with a delay.
Conducting a debt analysis and assessing the financial condition of heating and utilities enterprises has been postponed until the end of October.

The nearest “beacon” is the reboot of the BEB, which Ukraine was supposed to carry out by the end of June. On the evening of June 28, President V. Zelensky signed the law on rebooting the BEB, observing the deadline.

Ukraine has to complete the following tasks:

Develop a methodology for assessing tax benefits and their impact on the budget by the end of September.
Identify vital public companies affected by the war and prepare an overview of potential costs by the end of September.
Complete an external audit of the effectiveness of NABU with international experts and publish the report by the end of September.
With the help of the IMF, pre-war medium-term fiscal planning policies will be reviewed and compared with best practices by the end of October.
Develop a state ownership policy, dividend policy, and privatization strategy by the end of October.
Amend the Criminal Procedure Code to optimize the work of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office by the end of October.
Adopt changes to the Customs Code by the end of October.
Analyze district heating enterprises' debt and financial condition until the end of October.
Adopt a resolution to ensure the link between medium-term service life and capital costs by the end of December.
Continue transferring state-owned banks to the Ministry of Finance's management, avoiding their recapitalization at the expense of public funds.
Prepare a concept for bank rehabilitation in consultation with the IMF by the end of December.
Implement a methodology for assessing supervisory risks by the end of December.
Create a new court to consider administrative cases against government agencies by the end of December.

The memorandum Ukraine signed with the IMF stipulates an increase in gas and electricity tariffs, which should happen immediately after the end of the war.

The IMF's base case forecast for 2024 has been revised downwards to be expected in the range of 2.5–3.5% (from 3–4%), mainly due to the impact of attacks on energy infrastructure.

The growth forecast for 2025 was also revised slightly to 5.5% (from 6.5%).

According to the IMF’s baseline scenario, they predict that Ukraine’s real GDP will return to the pre-war level no earlier than 2030 (in 2021, Ukraine’s GDP amounted to almost $200 billion, +3.4% of 2020).

Let us recall that Ukraine’s GDP growth in 2023 was 5.3% after a fall of 29% in 2022.

The IMF notes that inflation continues to surprise on the downward side recently, and the forecast for 2024 has been slightly reduced from 8.5% to 8%.

In 2025, inflation will be -7%

Ukraine's public debt at the end of 2023 amounted to 82.3% of the country's GDP; in 2024, it will be 97.3%; in 2025 - 97.7%

Public debt should return to 82% of GDP by 2028. And reach 65% of GDP by 2033.

The electricity shortage in Ukraine, provoked by the Russian Federation, will continue until 2026. On average, the energy deficit in 2024 will be about 10% (at peak hours - 30%), gradually decreasing throughout 2025. Damage to energy infrastructure is estimated at - US$1 billion

The downward revised scenario retains the assumption of more intense war until 2025. In this case, it is predicted that persistent electricity shortages will lead to a decline in production in 2025, which will lead to a further decline in GDP

In the most pessimistic scenario and intensification of hostilities, GDP at the end of 2024 could drop to -1.7%; in 2025, GDP will decrease by -1%

Inflation will be 10% in 2024 and 8.5% in 2025.

In this case, the public debt in 2024 will be will already amount to 104% of the country’s GDP, and in 2025 - 121.5%

The Fund's solvency indicators remain within the same ranges as in the previous review.

Under the baseline scenario, total Fund lending is expected to peak at 8.2% of GDP and 35.7% of gross reserves in 2024. The Fund's debt service will peak at 1.9% of GDP and 8.1% of gross reserves in 2024.

The realization of downside risks will lead to an increase in these ratios: outstanding loans to the Fund will peak at 9.1% of GDP in 2026 and 46% of gross reserves in 2024; The Fund's debt service will peak at 2.1% of GDP in 2025 and 10.4% of gross reserves in 2024.

The Ukrainian authorities have pledged to avoid the open issue of hryvnia to cover the state budget deficit.

Public opinion. According to research by the Razumkov Center, after the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the share of citizens who believe that events in the country are developing in the right direction increased from 20% in December 2021 to 51% in October 2022, reaching the highest levels of -60% in February 2023. Further, there is a gradual decrease. Now, 47% of Ukrainian citizens believe that events are going wrong. 33% think it is correct.

In general, trust in government institutions is decreasing. Respondents most often expressed trust in President V. Zelensky—54% (almost 38% do not trust). At the same time, the "personal" level of trust in V. Zelensky exceeds the "institutional" level of trust in the President of Ukraine (50%).

From January 2024 (69%), trust in V. Zelensky decreased by 15%, and distrust (24.5%) increased by 13.5%.

Trust in society's institutions. Most often, trust is expressed in the Armed Forces of Ukraine - 90%; volunteer organizations - 81%; volunteer battalions - 80%

The majority of respondents express distrust: the state apparatus (officials) - do not trust - 78.5%; political parties -77.5%; Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine -76%; courts (judicial system as a whole) -73%; To the Government of Ukraine - 73%.

Attitude towards holding national elections in Ukraine before the end of the war: 59% - have a negative attitude towards the idea of holding elections in Ukraine (presidential or parliamentary) before the end of the war (in September 2023 – 64%); 22% have a positive attitude (in September 2023 - 15%)

Support for holding elections before the end of the war remains at a low level but is already beginning to grow. It depends on the degree of trust in the current government. Thus, among those who trust the President of Ukraine, only 11.5% would support such elections, while among those who do not trust, 34%.

On the night of June 28, a debate took place in the United States between current President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump. The discussion lasted 90 minutes, of which about 5 minutes was devoted to the Ukrainian-Russian issue. However, the war in Ukraine remains one of the critical issues that most divides the candidates. The fundamental difference between the candidates’ positions on the issue of the war in Ukraine is that:

D. Trump proposes a strategy for ending the win. He believes that Ukraine's position is weak and that the United States is spending too much money on this, which it could not spend. D. Trump believes that he can end this war by putting pressure on V. Putin and V. Zelensky and forcing them to mutually compromise.

- And J. Biden proposes a continuation of the war. He claims that V. Putin is a war criminal with whom it is impossible to agree; he wants to seize all of Ukraine, and he is restoring his Empire. Moreover, V. Putin's ambitions threaten the US NATO allies in Europe.

Following the debate, most media outlets celebrated Donald Trump's victory. According to a CNN/SSRS poll, 67% thought that Donald Trump won, while only 33% named J. Biden the winner. Before the debate, 55% of voters expected Trump to perform better than Biden.

This situation increases the likelihood of replacing J. Biden with another Democratic candidate. According to the Western press, against the background of unsuccessful debates for Biden, Democratic Party sponsors "plunged into deep anxiety." Some are discussing possible ways to remove Biden from the election race and replace him with another candidate. But J. Biden's headquarters, despite the defeat in the debate, he said that he does not plan to change the candidate and that replacing J. Biden in the elections will lead to "chaos" and the victory of D. Trump. They claim that other potential candidates, including Kamala Harris, have less chance of winning than Biden.

In general, J. Biden's unsuccessful performance presented the Democratic Party with a difficult choice - to lead Biden to the elections or replace him with another candidate. However, at the moment, no candidates with a rating could compete with D. Trump. There is also the risk that the new candidate could take even fewer votes.

The debates of candidates for the post of US President were not the last; the next ones are expected on September 10 and October 2. It cannot be fully stated that the results of the debate will determine the elections. For example, in 2016, all the debates against D. Trump were won by H. Clinton, which did not prevent D. Trump from winning the election against her. But overall, J. Biden's chances of winning are decreasing; the latest national polls (New York Times/Siena College and Quinnipiac University) show that D. Trump is already ahead of J. Biden by 4%.

Combat map.

Internal situation in the country.

Economic situation.

The IMF Board of Directors completed the fourth review of the Extended Fund Facility for Ukraine (EFF) and decided to allocate about $2.2 billion to the country in budget support. The Fund also published an updated memorandum with Ukraine, the fulfillment of the terms of which will determine further assistance. In March 2023, the IMF approved $15.6 billion for Ukraine under a 48-month Extended Fund Facility. Ukraine has already met 23/37 critical conditions, including reforms and legislative changes.

Three “beacons” were planned for the updated revision:

• Develop a concept note for the 5-7-9 program - completed.

• The sole review of HACS cases was completed with a delay.

• Conduct a debt analysis and assess the financial condition of heating and utilities enterprises - postponed until the end of October.

Ukraine has to complete the following tasks:

• Develop a methodology for assessing tax benefits and their impact on the budget by the end of September.

• Identify key state-owned companies affected by the war and prepare an overview of potential costs by the end of September.

• Complete an external audit of the effectiveness of NABU with international experts and publish the report by the end of September.

• With the help of the IMF, review pre-war medium-term fiscal planning policies and compare them with best practices by the end of October.

• Develop a state ownership policy, dividend policy, and privatization strategy by the end of October.

• Amend the Criminal Procedure Code to optimize the work of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office by the end of October.

• Adopt changes to the Customs Code by the end of October.

• Analyze district heating enterprises' debt and financial condition by the end of October.

• Adopt a regulation to ensure the link between medium-term life and capital costs by the end of December.

• Continue to transfer state-owned banks to the management of the Ministry of Finance, avoiding their recapitalization with public funds.

• Prepare a concept for bank rehabilitation in consultation with the IMF by the end of December.

• Implement a methodology for assessing supervisory risks by the end of December.

• Create a new court to consider administrative cases against government agencies by the end of December.

The memorandum Ukraine signed with the IMF stipulates an increase in gas and electricity tariffs, which should happen immediately after the end of the war.

The IMF's base case forecast for 2024 has been revised downwards to be expected in the range of 2.5–3.5% (from 3–4%), mainly due to the impact of attacks on energy infrastructure.

The growth forecast for 2025 was also revised slightly to 5.5% (from 6.5%).

Let us recall that Ukraine’s GDP growth in 2023 was 5.3% after a fall of 29% in 2022.

The IMF notes that inflation continues to surprise on the downward side recently, and the forecast for 2024 has been slightly reduced from 8.5% to 8%.

In 2025, inflation will be -7%

Ukraine's public debt at the end of 2023 amounted to 82.3% of the country's GDP; in 2024, it will be 97.3%; in 2025 - 97.7%

Public debt should return to 82% of GDP by 2028. And reach 65% of GDP by 2033.

In the most pessimistic scenario and intensification of hostilities, GDP at the end of 2024 could drop to -1.7%; in 2025, GDP will decrease by -1%

Inflation will be 10% in 2024 and 8.5% in 2025.

In this case, the public debt in 2024 will be will already amount to 104% of the country’s GDP, and in 2025 - 121.5%

The Fund's solvency indicators remain within the same ranges as in the previous review.

The Ukrainian authorities have pledged to avoid the open issue of hryvnia to cover the state budget deficit.

Public opinion.

According to research by the Razumkov Center, after the start of the war in Ukraine, the share of citizens who believe that events in the country are developing in the right direction increased from 20% in December 2021 to 51% in October 2022, reaching the highest levels of -60% in February 2023, further observed gradual decline. Now, 47% of Ukrainian citizens believe that events in the country are developing in the wrong direction. 33% think it is correct.

From January 2024 (69%), trust in V. Zelensky decreased by 15%, and distrust (24.5%) increased by 13.5%.

Trust in society's institutions. Most often, trust is expressed in the Armed Forces of Ukraine - 90%; volunteer organizations - 81%; volunteer battalions - 80%

The majority of respondents express distrust: the state apparatus (officials) - do not trust - 78.5%; political parties -77.5%; Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine -76%; courts (judicial system as a whole) -73%; To the Government of Ukraine - 73%.

The situation around Ukraine.

Debate between US President J. Biden and ex-President D. Trump.

On the night of June 28, a debate took place in the United States between current President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump. The discussion lasted 90 minutes, of which about 5 minutes was devoted to the Ukrainian-Russian issue. However, the war in Ukraine remains one of the critical issues that most divides the candidates. The fundamental difference between the candidates’ positions on the issue of the war in Ukraine is that:

- D. Trump proposes a strategy for ending the win. He believes that Ukraine's position is weak and that the United States is spending too much money on this, which they could not spend. D. Trump thinks he can end this war by putting pressure on V. Putin and V. Zelensky and forcing them to compromise mutually.

- And J. Biden proposes a continuation of the war. He claims that V. Putin is a war criminal with whom it is impossible to come to an agreement; he wants to seize all of Ukraine, and he is restoring his Empire. Moreover, V. Putin's ambitions threaten the US NATO allies in Europe.

The main theses of the candidates regarding the war in Ukraine.

D. Trump proposes a strategy for ending the war - a strategy for exiting the war.

- this war that should never have started

- I will end this war between Putin and Zelensky even before taking office (being elected) - (by January 20, 2025);

- people were killed so stupidly and thoughtlessly

- with me, Putin would never have attacked Ukraine, and Hamas would have never attacked Israel

- Putin attacked because he was not afraid of Biden even after the shame in Afghanistan

- we spent more than 200 billion dollars on Ukraine. And we were not obliged to spend this money

- Zelensky is the best seller (each time $60 billion)

- Ukraine is not winning the war

- V. Putin’s demands are not acceptable (defensive thesis)

Biden - proposes continuation of the war.

- If Putin is not stopped, NATO countries will be under threat.

- Putin is a war criminal who wants to restore the Empire

- It was Trump who surrendered Ukraine, saying, "Do whatever you want with it," and "Kyiv will fall in 5 days," and Putin did it.

- We don't give money, but weapons.

The candidates will most likely discuss the war in Ukraine at the next debate, which will take place in the fall.

D. Trump will also propose a hazardous scenario for ending the war.

J. Biden will insist on the need to continue the war and maintain support for Ukraine until the Russian Federation suffers a military defeat at the front.

This situation increases the likelihood of replacing J. Biden with another Democratic candidate. According to the Western press, against the background of unsuccessful debates for Biden, Democratic Party sponsors "plunged into deep anxiety." Some are discussing possible ways to remove Biden from the election race and replace him with another candidate. But J. Biden's headquarters, despite the defeat in the debate, he said that he does not plan to change the candidate and that replacing J. Biden in the elections will lead to "chaos" and the victory of D. Trump. They claim that other potential candidates, including Kamala Harris, have less chance of winning than Biden.

Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovskaya, Andrey Timchenko

for the Ukrainian Institute of Politics

SITUATION IN UKRAINE: June 27 – July 3, 2024.

Research UIP

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