Analytical review of the week No. 148 of 13.02.2022.

ANALYTICAL REVIEW OF THE MAJOR DOMESTIC, FOREIGN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EVENTS OF THE WEEK

07.02.- 13.02.2022

 

CONTENT:

SUMMARY AND MAIN TRENDS.

DOMESTIC POLICY.

1. Results of the NSDC meeting. Sanctions against the Nash TV channel.

2. Another trial in the case of P. Poroshenko.

3. Searches in the City Council of Krivoy Rog.

4. NABU detained a deputy of the Kiev City Council from the “Servant of the People” Vladislav Trubitsyn on taking a bribe.

FOREIGN POLICY.

1. Continued whipping up of the information hysteria about the prospects for a "Russian invasion".

2. Emmanuel Macron 's visit to Russia and Ukraine.

3. Visits of the Foreign Ministers and the Ministry of Defense of Great Britain to Russia.

4. Meeting of advisers to the heads of state of the Normandy format.

ECONOMY.

1. Raising taxes for the IT sector , dismantling the welfare state and increasing defense spending .

2. Road construction costs in 2021

3. News from Naftogaz and the gas industry in general.

4. The shadow sector in Ukraine reaches 31% of GDP in less than 2021.

5. Relations of Ukraine with investors on the example of the sale of the Vinnitsa plant "Kristall" and the decision of the Norwegian company to stop the construction of wind farms in the Zaporozhye region.

SUMMARY AND MAIN TRENDS.

Summing up the results of the past week, we note that:

Firstly , this week, in the domestic policy of the country, the trend of "tightening the screws" has reappeared - the suppression and discrediting of the main political and economic opponents of the current government. In particular, the practice of closing opposition media resources without a corresponding court decision continued. At a meeting in Kharkiv, the National Security and Defense Council imposed sanctions for a period of 5 years against the NASH TV channel.

Secondly , at the local level, as part of the trend towards the administrative and economic strengthening of the president's power, in the struggle for control over V. Zelensky's hometown, employees of the State Bureau of Investigation conducted searches in the Krivoy Rog City Council and its executive committee.

Thirdly , the corruption case of the deputy of the Kyiv City Council from the "Servant of the People" V. Trubitsin continues the wave of discrediting the current government, which, apparently, is being dispersed by Western partners dissatisfied with the policies of V. Zelensky, as well as domestic political competitors.

Fourthly , this week the Western media and American politicians continued to whip up informational hysteria around the “probable Russian invasion of Ukraine”. The purpose of this massive information campaign is most likely to shift the focus of public opinion and diplomatic activity from the discussion of Russian demands for security guarantees in Europe to the discussion of the situation around Ukraine. The more the degree of information hysteria grows, the less trust there is in Russian-American relations.

Fifth , another trend that has continued this week is the absence of any prospects in all negotiation formats regarding a peaceful settlement in Donbas. The next meeting of advisers to the heads of state of the Normandy format did not bring any results. The continuation of the negotiating deadlock increases the likelihood of a military escalation in the region.

Sixthly , the current government plans to increase tax revenues from the IT sector by 2.5 times. Legislative grounds are being prepared for the abolition of solidarity pensions in the long term by removing the concept of “single social contribution” in the Tax Code. At the same time, the authorities are increasing defense spending by UAH 11.6 billion. in 2022. That is, three trends continue to be traced: total fiscalization in parallel with the refusal of the state from its social function and at the same time building up the military component in the confrontation with Russia.

DOMESTIC POLICY.

Briefly :

This week, in the country's domestic policy, the trend for "tightening the screws" has again appeared - the suppression and discrediting of the main political and economic opponents of the current government. In particular, the practice of closing opposition media resources without a corresponding court decision continued. At a meeting in Kharkiv, the National Security and Defense Council imposed sanctions for a period of 5 years against the NASH TV channel.

At the local level, as part of the trend towards the administrative and economic strengthening of the power of the president, in the struggle for control over the hometown of V. Zelensky, employees of the State Bureau of Investigation conducted searches in the Krivoy Rog City Council and its executive committee.

corruption case of the deputy of the Kyiv City Council from the "Servant of the People" V. Trubitsyn continues the wave of discrediting the current government, which, apparently, is being dispersed by Western partners dissatisfied with the policies of V. Zelensky, as well as domestic political competitors.

1. Results of the NSDC meeting. Sanctions against the Nash TV channel.

Muraev , who is opposed to the authorities . Recall that at the end of January this year, the British Foreign Office announced that the Russian government plans to bring a pro-Russian leader to power in Ukraine and E. Muraeva was mentioned as a potential candidate 1. The Russian Foreign Ministry called it "disinformation" and accused NATO countries of escalating tensions around Ukraine. In fact, Western partners thus gave a signal to the Ukrainian leadership that repressive measures could be applied against Y. Muraev or his assets.

The companies against which the sanctions were imposed are NASHA Praha, OUR 24, OUR 365, as well as the company that directly owns all these companies and is located in Cyprus. In fact, this means a ban on the on-air broadcasting of the Nash TV channel. During the briefing 2, when asked about the reasons, NSDC Secretary A. Danilov replied that sanctions against the Nash TV channel are being introduced based on the submission of the SBU. The Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council did not voice any other reasons.

Thus, the government continues the trend of "tightening the screws" - the suppression and discrediting of the main political and economic opponents. In particular, the practice of closing media resources opposing the authorities without appropriate court decisions continues.

Probably, the closure of the NASH TV channel is the reaction of the President's team to the decline in ratings. Just like a year ago, when sanctions were imposed on the ZIK, NewsOne and 112 Ukraine TV channels, the authorities are experiencing an electoral crisis. At that time, this problem was partially solved with the help of the active use of the NSDC tool to form the image of a “strong hand”.

Another blow to the representatives of the "anti-Western" opposition is due to the fact that the latter do not enjoy the patronage of Western partners, unlike, for example, the leader of the "European Solidarity". In addition, V. Zelensky (mainly thanks to the team) continues to shift to the nationalist political segment and competes for the corresponding electorate with P. Poroshenko, whose ratings have actually already become equal to those of the incumbent President.

2. Another trial in the case of P. Poroshenko.

On February 11, the Kiev Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the previous instance on the measure of restraint for the fifth president of Ukraine, people's deputy from European Solidarity P. Poroshenko 3.

P. Poroshenko is suspected of participating in a scheme for supplying coal from uncontrolled territories. January 19 The Pechersky District Court of Kiev chose a measure of restraint for the ex-president - he was released on personal commitment. The politician's lawyers demanded that the measure of restraint be canceled altogether. For their part, the prosecutors demanded to change the measure of restraint from a personal obligation to arrest with the possibility of release on bail of UAH 1 billion. As a result, the court did not satisfy the demands of any of the parties and left the measure of restraint unchanged.

The reasons for choosing such a mild measure of restraint for P. Poroshenko were the fact that the ex-president had guarantees of immunity from Western partners and the fear of his supporters organizing mass riots. On the one hand, in the long term, P. Poroshenko remains dependent on law enforcement agencies, which now control his movements and contacts.

However, in the short term, this situation looks like a defeat Office of the President, as a light measure of restraint for the main domestic political opponent is perceived as a weakness. There is no real criminal prosecution, while fictitious P. Poroshenko converts into electoral points.

The results of recent sociological studies show that against the backdrop of a decrease in the ratings of V. Zelensky and the Servant of the People, there is a trend of growing support for P. Poroshenko and his European Solidarity party. According to various estimates, their ratings have grown from 4% to 6% since November 2021. At the same time, "European Solidarity" is confidently leading in the party rating with a margin of 5% -6%, and the gap between V. Zelensky and P. Poroshenko is already about 2%.

3. Searches in the City Council of Krivoy Rog.

On February 7, SBI officers conducted searches in the Krivoy Rog City Council and its executive committee. The production is being investigated under Part 2 of Art. 367 (official negligence resulting in serious consequences) of the Criminal Code. The sanction of the article provides for punishment in the form of imprisonment for up to 5 years. According to the investigation, it was established that as of April 1, 2021, the Krivoy Rog City Council concluded 82 land lease agreements with one of the enterprises. But supposedly officials of the City Council, in the interests of business, significantly underestimated the cost of land rent, as a result of which the company did not pay almost 700 million hryvnias to the budget 4.

In September 2021, the Minister of Internal Affairs D. Monastyrsky stated 5that the mayor of Krivoy Rog Konstantin Pavlov could have committed suicide against the backdrop of a large audit of the city budget, which, according to the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, showed serious abuses on the part of the authorities. In this case, the responsibility for violations could be borne by the person who signed the documents, namely, the mayor. At the same time, in September 2021, searches were carried out at the house of the acting mayor of Kryvyi Rih Yuriy Vilkul , as well as his son Alexander Vilkul . The case concerned the investigation into the death of the mayor of Kryvyi Rih, Konstantin Pavlov. It's obvious that the police are trying to incriminate the acting o . Mayor of Krivoy Rog Y. Vilkul , representatives of his team and, possibly, members of the family of K. Pavlov himself. At the same time, the possibility of possible pressure from other political forces and groups of influence (for example, local representatives of the Servant of the People) has not yet been considered.

Recall that after the death of Konstantin Pavlov, Yuriy Vilkul was elected by the majority of deputies as the secretary of the city council, which means - the acting mayor of the city until the next election. Oleksandr Kotlyar (from the Servant of the People party), who was supposed to take over the duties of the measure, resigned. In this way, V. Zelensky's team failed to take control of the president's hometown and the balance of power before the election of a new measure changed in favor of the opposition forces. Another loss in his hometown will greatly damage the reputation of V. Zelensky, and this cannot be allowed in the OP. As we wrote earlier, in the current situation, some form of pressure from the authorities on Y. Vilkul or representatives of his team is not ruled out.

4. NABU detained a deputy of the Kiev City Council from the “Servant of the People” Vladislav Trubitsyn on taking a bribe.

On February 9, NABU detectives detained a deputy of the Kyiv City Council from the Servant of the People Vladislav Trubitsyn at the time of extorting a bribe in the amount of 1.2 million hryvnias. The deputy promised to issue permits for street trading in different districts of Kiev. On that moment, V. Trubitsin managed to escape from the detectives. Now the suspicion to the deputy has been agreed, and he is in a temporary detention center. Five more defendants in the bribery case have been notified of suspicion 6. According to the director of NABU Artem Sytnik , at the moment, six suspicions have been agreed in relation to all the defendants in the case.

In connection with the incident, the head of the Servant of the People party, Elena Shulyak , began the procedure for convening an extraordinary conference of the Kiev city organization of the party to consider the incident and possible sanctions against V. Trubitsin 7. At the same time, it was stated that V. Trubitsin was the director of one of the utility companies.

Thus, in less than a month, the third case with a corruption component has appeared in the information field of the country, where deputies from the Servant of the People are involved. Regardless of the final outcome of these cases, they are already toxic to the authorities, damaging the reputation of both the President and the ruling party, gradually reinforcing their image of corrupt officials. Recall that earlier, when receiving a bribe, a deputy from the “Servant of the People” S. Kuzminykh was detained. A video of the consequences of the accident was also published with the participation of another deputy from the Servant of the People, A. Trukhin, who tried to leave the scene and offered to pay the police. In this context, the case of V. Trubitsin continues the general wave of discrediting the current government . For its part, the leadership of the ruling party takes prompt measures to distance itself as much as possible from the defendants in corruption cases, and if A. Trukhin was expelled from the party, then they try to “transfer” the corruption toxicity of V. Trubitsin to the mayor of Kiev V. Klitschko.

FOREIGN POLICY

Briefly:

This week, the Western media and American politicians continued to whip up informational hysteria around the “probable Russian invasion of Ukraine.” The purpose of this massive information campaign is most likely to shift the focus of public opinion and diplomatic activity from the discussion of Russian demands for security guarantees in Europe to the discussion of the situation around Ukraine. The more the degree of information hysteria grows, the less trust there is in Russian-American relations.

Another trend that has continued this week is the absence of any prospects in all negotiation formats regarding a peaceful settlement in Donbas. The next meeting of advisers to the heads of state of the Normandy format did not bring any results. The continuation of the negotiating deadlock increases the likelihood of a military escalation in the region.

1. Continued escalation of information hysteria regarding the prospects for a "Russian invasion".

On February 12, the German publication Bild published the news that employees of the US Embassy in Kiev were allegedly busy burning secret documents 8.

19 countries called on their citizens to leave the territory of Ukraine 9. In particular, the call to leave the country was made by the authorities of Australia, Great Britain, Latvia, Israel, Canada, Greece, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Norway, the United States, as well as North Macedonia, Finland, Montenegro, Estonia, South Korea, Japan, Belgium, Germany and Lithuania. Representatives of the foreign ministries of these states called on their citizens to return from Ukraine due to the “serious and unpredictable” security situation. The day before, US President Joe Biden announced February 16 as the day of the likely start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. He named this date during negotiations with the leaders of Western countries, the EU and NATO.

However, almost simultaneously with the news about Biden, an article was published on the website of the Bloomberg agency , in which February 15 is called the start date of the invasion 10. Russia's actions allegedly could include a provocation in the Donbass or an attack on Kiev. Also on the topic of the invasion spoke the assistant to the President of the United States for national security Jake Sullivan . He expressed confidence that Russia could take aggressive steps towards Ukraine during the Beijing Olympics 11. At the same time, the presidential aide stressed that the United States does not claim that Russia has made a final decision on the use of force against Ukraine.

The above may indicate that the leadership of a number of Western states is whipping up information hysteria about the prospects for a “Russian invasion” in order to shift the focus from Russian demands for security guarantees to the issue of Ukraine . the ruling regime in a neighboring country and the desire to overthrow it, and not about Moscow's desire to revise the entire security architecture on the European continent, significantly limiting the military-political influence of the United States.

2. Emmanuel Macron 's visit to Russia and Ukraine.

On February 7, French President E. Macron paid an official visit to Moscow and met with Russian President V. Putin. During the visit, he stated that neither Russia nor Europe "want chaos and instability" during the pandemic 12. This visit can be considered a PR before the presidential elections in France. E. Macron sought to create for himself the image of a peacemaker and “conciliator” of Russia and Ukraine.

On February 8, the French president arrived in Kiev as part of an official visit to meet with President V. Zelensky 13. With the election approaching, now Emmanuel Macron found himself in a new reality. Although the incumbent remains the leader in the polls, his runoff victory is not guaranteed. To win, he must offer voters something new and compelling. And preferably - something that will knock out the trump cards from the hands of his opponents. And his key opponents are either pro-Russian or very pro-Russian.

E. Macron focused on the fact that he flew to V. Putin before visiting Ukraine. At a press conference in the Kremlin, the presidents of France and the Russian Federation stressed several times that after visiting Kiev , Macron should again call V. Putin in order to coordinate with him what he heard from his Ukrainian colleague. It is difficult to call the negotiations in Moscow successful for Macron , even though he tried to pass them off as a victory. The leaders spent about six hours behind closed doors, and after that they went to a press conference, which turned out to be more like a continuation of their dialogue and lasted more than an hour.

Macron , at a press conference in Moscow, publicly admitted that the draft law "on the transitional period", which regulates the legal procedure for the de-occupation of Donbass and Crimea, was withdrawn from parliament at the direction of V. Zelensky, since Bankova promised to do this within the framework of the "Norman" negotiations. The OP has officially denied this.

E. Macron even promised Ukraine 1.2 billion euros of assistance during his visit to Kiev on February 8 14. Negotiations between the French and Ukrainian presidents dragged on. They went to the press an hour later than planned. Because of this, the briefing was held in a shortened format - on one question to E. Macron and V. Zelensky from the Ukrainian and French press. V. Zelensky, opening the meeting, noted that this was the first visit of the French president to Kiev in 24 years, and said that the peace process in the East of Ukraine was at the center of the negotiations.

The Ukrainian President announced that he had reached several cooperation agreements with Macron . In addition to financial assistance, French companies will help Ukraine reform its defense sector, and the Ukrainian railway monopoly has bought new locomotives from France.

One of the agreements signed in Kiev during the visit of E. Macron provides for the supply of hundreds of French Alstom locomotives worth up to 900 million euros, the second - 370 units of special equipment for rescuers worth up to 300 million euros. Thus, even if the President of France did not achieve the main goal - to create the image of a peacemaker before the presidential elections, he at least defended the economic interests of some French enterprises, providing them with orders at the expense of Ukraine.

E. Macron summed up the results of his visit to Kiev as follows: “I realized that there would be neither deterioration nor escalation [of the conflict].” However, he still tried to credit himself with the role of a peacemaker, saying: "My goal was to stop the game, prevent escalation and open up new perspectives. I believe I have achieved this goal." This means that Ukraine refuses to move forward in the implementation of the political points of the Minsk agreements.

3. Visits of the Foreign Ministers and the Ministry of Defense of Great Britain to Russia.

10 and 11, the British Foreign and Defense Ministers paid official visits to Russia. British Foreign Minister L. Truss demanded to move Russian troops from the borders of Ukraine 15. Earlier, she said that none of the NATO countries undermine the security of Russia, since it is an exclusively defensive alliance 16.

Liz Truss wants to take the post of Prime Minister of Great Britain, which, at the moment, is occupied by Boris Johnson. Within the Conservative Party, the struggle has intensified, where both B. Johnson and L. Truss want to play the “Ukrainian card” for their own domestic political purposes.

It should be noted that France and Great Britain are pursuing diametrically opposed PR goals in the Ukrainian issue. While E. Macron is trying to play the role of a peacemaker, the leaders of the British Conservative Party, on the contrary, are whipping up information hysteria around the “Russian invasion”. Thus, the visit of L. Truss to Moscow and harsh rhetoric were her PR in the hope of becoming the next Prime Minister of Great Britain.

4. Meeting of advisers to the heads of state of the Normandy format.

On February 10, a meeting of advisers to the leaders of the Normandy Format countries took place in Berlin 17.

It lasted more than 9 hours, but the parties did not even agree on a joint statement. The meeting stated the impossibility of reaching an agreement.

According to the Russian side, Kiev does not want to implement the Minsk agreements, and the West does not want to put pressure on it to implement them. To a large extent, this assessment is correct. The Office of the President does see much more threats to itself in potential attempts to implement the Minsk agreements than in the continuation of the low-key conflict.

The foregoing once again states a complete deadlock in the negotiation process on the issue of a peaceful settlement in Donbass. This, in turn, increases the risks of military escalation.

ECONOMY.

Briefly:

The current government plans to increase tax revenues from the IT sector by 2.5 times. Legislative grounds are being prepared for the abolition of solidarity pensions in the long term by removing the concept of “single social contribution” in the Tax Code. At the same time, the authorities are increasing defense spending by UAH 11.6 billion. in 2022. That is, three trends continue to be traced: total fiscalization in parallel with the refusal of the state from its social function and at the same time building up the military component in the confrontation with Russia.

1. Raising taxes for the IT sector , dismantling the welfare state and increasing defense spending .

From February 8, a special legal regime " Diya.City ", developed for the development of the IT industry , begins to work in Ukraine 18. Its launch was presented by Natalia Denikeeva , head of the Diya.City project office .

The idea of electronic customs “ Diya.City ” was announced by President V. Zelensky on October 5, 2020 during the “ Diya Summit” 19. There is a special tax regime for resident companies. In particular, they will pay:

• Corporate taxes: optionally withholding tax of 9% or income tax of 18%;

• Payroll taxes: 5% personal income tax; from the amount of salary exceeding 240 thousand euros per year - 18% personal income tax. Military tax - 1.5%. The unified social contribution was kept at the level of 22% of the minimum wage;

• Incentives for "angel" investments: 0% on the income of individuals as dividends, subject to payment no more than once every 2 years. A tax rebate from personal income tax is also provided for the amount of investments in Ukrainian startups .

Back in 2020, the President thus expected to increase the share of IT in the country's GDP from 4% to 10% (up to 16.5 billion US dollars) 20. It is logical to assume that tax revenues to the budget from IT will increase by 2.5 times.

Also, on January 25, the “Voice” faction submitted bill No. 6548 with a proposal to remove all the wording related to the single social contribution 21. Thus, the legislative ground is being prepared for the abolition of solidarity pensions in the future. At the first stages, of course, contributions to the Pension Fund will continue, as conceived by the authors of the bill, but the path to the abolition of pensions will be legislatively simplified. The pension fund will be filled from the combined new tax, and in fact - the same personal income tax, but not ERUs. In the long term, solidarity pensions will be abolished.

On February 9, D. Getmantsev registered bill No. 7012-1, according to which it is planned to increase defense spending by UAH 11.6 billion.22

2. Road construction costs in 2021

On February 7, the Center for Economic Strategy released a report 23, according to which, in 2021, three times more funds from the state budget were spent on roads than planned 24.

On February 10, the “OUR PENIES” project published an investigation into an opaque tender for the repair of one of the sections of the Kiev bypass road, in which the American company Bechtel , involved in numerous corruption scandals around the world, was declared the winner 25.

Thus, the construction and reconstruction of roads in Ukraine remains an area with many corruption risks, which are exacerbated by abundant funding from the budget.

3. News " Naftogaz " and the gas industry in general.

Fitch agency published its updated reassessment of the credit rating of NJSC Naftogaz , leaving the credit rating of the company itself at the level of “B-”, but in relation to the rating of Ukraine, the rating of NJSC Naftogaz is at the level of “B” - that is, the rating, which implies the risk of default in the long term 26.

On January 11, 2022, the Economic Court of the Lviv region satisfied the claim of Naftogaz against Lvovgaz sales LLC (included in the sphere of influence of D. Firtash ) (in case No. 914/2618/20 ) and decided to recover UAH 1.53 billion from the defendant in favor of the plaintiff . debt under a contract for the sale of natural gas 27.

On February 9, D. Getmantsev registered bill No. 7038 with a proposal to increase the rent for gas production 28. It is proposed to tie the rent for gas production to the price of its sale 29. The increase in gas prices in Europe led to an increase in the net profit of gas producers in Ukraine, arousing D. Getmantsev 's interest in increasing the rent for gas production.

It is proposed to leave the rent unchanged if the price of gas is up to $200 per thousand cubic meters. Further, the rate will increase by 10 percentage points for every $ 200 of the price. So, for old wells up to 5,000 meters deep, the rate will vary from 29% for prices of $200 to 69% for prices of $800 per thousand cubic meters. If the wells are deeper, the rent will vary from 14% for prices of $200 to 54% for prices of $800 per thousand cubic meters. For new wells up to 5000 m deep, they want to differentiate the rent in the same way as for old ones. For those whose depth exceeds 5,000 meters, the rate will increase from 6% to 46%.

4. The shadow sector in Ukraine reaches 31% of GDP in less than 2021.

On February 10, the Ministry of Economy published a note on the shadow economy of Ukraine for the three quarters of 2021 30. According to the document, the shadow sector in Ukraine reaches 31% of GDP in incomplete 2021 31. It was possible to reduce the share of the shadow economy significantly (from 44% to 30%) in the real estate industry, but it increased in the financial sector (by 3 percentage points).

On the example of a graph from the note of the Ministry of Economy on assessing the shadow economy, the idea is confirmed that the shadow economy “insures” the official economy during cataclysms - the time of active hostilities in the Donbass in 2014-2015, and then during the start of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 year.

It is important to understand that the very fact of the existence of the shadow economy is a reaction of society to the actions of the authorities within the framework of total fiscalization , as well as a general crisis of trust between society and the state, which, moreover, is gradually freed from its social functions.

5. Relations of Ukraine with investors on the example of the sale of the Vinnitsa plant "Kristall" and the decision of the Norwegian company to stop the construction of a wind farm in the Zaporozhye region.

On February 10, the State Property Fund announced the re-auction of the Vinnitsa plant "Kristall" 32after an unsuccessful auction on October 1, 2021 (no buyer was found). The company is engaged in the cutting of diamonds, making diamonds out of them. Investors are not ready to invest in a country at war, let alone pay the market price.

On February 8 , the Norwegian company Emergy announced the postponement of the construction of the wind farm " Zofia " in the Zaporozhye region 33. Firstly, due to delays in payment from Guaranteed Buyer SE. Secondly, because of the difficulties in attracting large-scale foreign direct investment into the Ukrainian renewable energy market (partly due to the geopolitical situation with Russia) . That is, not only is Ukraine unattractive to investors because of the confrontation with Russia, but also the SE “Guaranteed Buyer” delays payment for electricity. Thirdly, because of the current legislation, which obliges market participants to complete the construction of renewable energy production facilities by the end of 2022 (the company does not have time to complete the wind farm until the end of 2022). After the completion of the wind farm " Zofia " can attract more than 1 billion euros of foreign direct investment in Ukraine.

Thus, on the example of the suspension of the construction of the Zofia wind farm by the Norwegian company Emergy , we see that Ukraine seems to be doing everything possible to prevent foreign direct investment from coming into the country.

 

Edited by:

Ruslan Bortnik,

Daniil Bogatyrev .

Authors:

Daniil Bogatyrev,

Oksana Krasovskaya,

Andrey Timchenko.