1. The process of peace negotiations: negotiations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation are scheduled for May 15, 2025 in Istanbul.
Expectations from this meeting remain uncertain, primarily due to the uncertainty of the composition of the participants at the highest level. However, as of May 14, it can be said with a high degree of certainty that at least three key delegations will take part in the negotiations: from the Russian Federation, a high-level delegation, but most likely without President Vladimir Putin; from Ukraine, a delegation led by President Volodymyr Zelensky; and from the United States of America, - Most likely, the Special Representative of the President of the United States for Ukraine Keith Kellogg and Negotiation Adviser Steve Witkoff will be present.
The presence of US President Donald Trump remains in question. He publicly stated: "I think Russia will agree to a 30-day truce" and "I am sure that Putin will also be there. I'm thinking about going — I'll go if I'm sure everything will work out." This formula is demonstratively conditional. "He (Putin) would like me to be there, and it's possible... I don't know if he'll be there if I'm not there. We will find out." Thus, Donald Trump deliberately maintains the intrigue, positioning himself as an external arbiter who controls the framework of negotiations, but does not bear formal responsibility for them. This position creates the effect of diplomatic pressure: if Vladimir Putin does not come, Moscow is to blame; if Vladimir Putin comes, this will already be perceived as an achievement of the United States.
In particular, the Russian Federation seeks to independently model the negotiation architecture and does not want to be drawn into the American scenario. Ukraine, in turn, counts on the United States as an ally, and not as a supranational coordinator of the process. financial and military support, rather than a distancing role as a third-party moderator.
At the same time, if Russian President V. Putin refuses to go to Istanbul and confines himself to sending a delegation, this will confirm that there are no fundamental agreements between the United States and the Russian Federation on the conclusion of peace yet, as evidenced by the presence of the leaders of the two countries at the talks. At the same time, Moscow is not ready to play according to the American scenario and considers the format premature or politically inconvenient. In this case, the meeting in Istanbul will not be the start of negotiations, but the continuation of diplomatic positional maneuvering with elements of pressure, PR and attempts to accuse each other of sabotage.
European partners, in particular France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Poland, have already expressed concern about their de facto marginalization from the negotiation format. Their leaders (Emmanuel Macron, President of the French Republic; Friedrich Merz, Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany; Keir Starmer, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom; Donald Tusk, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland) visited Kyiv on May 10 to publicly support the Ukrainian position and call for an unconditional 30-day ceasefire.
However, further developments went beyond European control, which de facto ousted them from the process. Now, in the event of a disruption of the summit of the heads of state – if, for example, Vladimir Putin does not come – European states can indirectly blame the United States for this "blunder", since it was the American side that took on the informal role of informal coordinator of the negotiations.
Against this background, on May 12, the European Commission confirmed that the EU is preparing the 17th package of sanctions against the Russian Federation, in case Moscow refuses to participate constructively in the negotiations. The new package includes the expansion of export restrictions, personal sanctions against the leadership of the corporations of the defense industry of the Russian Federation and the banking sector, as well as the legal blocking of bypass schemes through third countries , but also a political signal: Europe, despite diplomatic ousting from the negotiating framework, maintains an active sanctions position and is ready to play in the field of deterrence.
On May 12, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian said that "China's position remains consistent and clear - the cessation of hostilities and a return to negotiations are the only realistic way to resolve the Ukrainian crisis." This statement was made against the backdrop of a temporary lull in trade disputes between China and the United States and may interpreted as a soft factor of pressure on Moscow from a key strategic partner, which, despite the alliance, is not interested in further prolonging the conflict.
In general, against the backdrop of the clash of diplomatic interests, two fundamental narratives are emerging. The first is the Ukrainian-European one: this is a model of an unconditional truce, including a ceasefire before the start of any negotiations. This approach includes the rejection of Russian preconditions: unblocking agricultural exports, lifting sanctions against Rosselkhozbank, access to logistics, admission of Russian fertilizers to the international market, etc. The second is Russian: this is a model of unconditional negotiations, that is, readiness for dialogue without the cessation of hostilities. go in parallel with military pressure as part of the overall package of influence. Thus, the truce becomes a bargaining chip, not a starting point.
On the one hand, it publicly supports the idea of a truce, including through statements by European leaders. On the other hand, it actively promotes the idea of starting negotiations even against the backdrop of hostilities, focusing on political expediency rather than legal or humanitarian prerequisites , where the degree of pressure varies depending on the current diplomatic situation.
At this stage, Washington has already received a strategic concession from Ukraine – the signing and ratification of the Framework Agreement on Access to Ukrainian Subsoil. At the same time, the United States has not obtained a single practical step from Moscow. It is for this reason that the negotiation process remains asymmetrical and unbalanced: Washington exerts more influence on Kyiv than on Moscow, using Ukraine as a bargaining chip in a broader bargain.
Most likely, the meeting in Istanbul will take place, but it is unlikely that it will take place at the level of presidents. It is unlikely that Russian President Vladimir Putin will go to Istanbul to meet with President of Ukraine Vladimir Zelensky. A meeting is likely either at the level of delegations, or an unbalanced meeting, in which the Ukrainian President may appear at the talks, and the Russian President will not appear, instead of him he may be represented by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov or other Russian representatives.
2. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) is becoming one of the key points of discussion between the United States, Ukraine and the Russian Federation.
This follows from the latest statements by two high-ranking representatives of the administration of US President Donald Trump.
White House Special Representative for Ukraine Keith Kellogg, US Special Representative for Ukraine and Russia, in an interview with Fox News, actually confirmed the intention of the United States to gain control over the ZNPP as part of a future settlement. According to him, the United States is interested in "helping to operate the plant" and participate in its management in order to ensure energy supply to both parts of Ukraine - both controlled by Kyiv and temporarily occupied.
His position was clarified by Steve Whitkoff, another special representative of the White House, who said that the ZNPP is one of the "central and sensitive issues" of negotiations between Washington, Kyiv and Moscow. He stressed that the issue of managing the facility is being considered in conjunction with the future status of territories in southern Ukraine and with the energy security of the region.
Earlier, the media has already discussed information about the so-called "Trump plan", according to which the American side could take on guarantees for the safe operation of the ZNPP, while providing electricity to both the territories under the control of Kyiv and the zones under the control of the Russian Federation, as part of the mechanism of "de-escalation and synchronous functioning."
The US interest in the ZNPP is directly related to the previously signed Framework Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Subsoil Use between Ukraine and the United States.
The process of enrichment and processing of rare earth metals is extremely energy-intensive. This means that the long-term implementation of the subsoil agreement will require a significant increase in available capacity in the electric power sector. In this context, the Zaporizhzhia NPP is a critical asset capable of providing the industrial infrastructure for future mining and processing capacities in Ukraine.
The US interest in the ZNPP also logically fits into the broader context of their presence in the Ukrainian nuclear energy market. The American company Westinghouse Electric Company, which is one of the key suppliers of nuclear fuel for Ukrainian nuclear power plants, including the replacement of Russian fuel with alternative fuel, is already actively operating in Ukraine.
Thus, the United States already has experience in interacting with the Ukrainian nuclear sector and seeks to expand its presence, especially against the backdrop of Russia's potential loss of control over the ZNPP in the event of a negotiated compromise.
Nevertheless, the official position of the Russian Federation remains tough today. Moscow did not agree to the transfer of control over the ZNPP to a third party, including the United States, and in public statements has repeatedly stressed that the plant is located "on the territory of Russia" and under its jurisdiction, especially in the run-up to negotiations.
Thus, the ZNPP turns into an informal "nuclear argument" on the energy flank of the war, where:
- The United States is trying to build the topic of control into the overall framework of a peaceful settlement and energy stability;
- Ukraine may be ready for the technical or international administration of the plant, provided that it is de-occupied;
- Russia considers any talk about the transfer of the ZNPP as political pressure and a step towards revising the actual control.
Control over the ZNPP can become either a point of aggravation in the negotiations, or a trade element around which the terms of exchanges will be formed - for example, a ceasefire in exchange for a compromise supervisory mechanism for operation.
3. The President of Ukraine signed a law on the ratification of the agreement with the United States on subsoil - the document has entered into force.
On May 12, 2025, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed a law ratifying the agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the United States of America on the establishment of the Ukrainian-American Recovery Investment Fund. Earlier, on May 8, 2025, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine approved this bill. 338 people's deputies voted for its adoption.
The agreement provides for the creation of a Recovery Investment Fund, which includes the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) on the part of the United States, and a state agency operating within the Cabinet of Ministers on behalf of Ukraine. The fund will be registered in the state of Delaware (USA), and its operating account will be opened in Ukraine.
According to the terms of the agreement:
- Ukraine undertakes to transfer 50% of royalties and license fees from new mining permits to the fund;
- The United States can count military assistance provided to Ukraine as an investment contribution, but the agreement itself does not contain obligations to provide such assistance;
- The Fund will be exempt from taxation on the territory of Ukraine, and the terms of the agreement will take precedence over national legislation;
- Ukraine provides free conversion of hryvnia into dollars and unhindered withdrawal of funds abroad;
- All projects in the field of subsoil use are required to disclose information to the fund and cannot provide third parties with more favorable conditions than the fund.
In addition to the main agreement, the Ukrainian government confirmed the signing of two additional technical agreements with the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, the content of which was not disclosed.According to the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, the following were signed:
- Limited Partnership Agreement;
- an agreement on the establishment of a legal entity in the form of a Limited Liability Company, which will act as a general partner within the fund.
On the Ukrainian side, the documents were signed by Niko Gachechiladze, Director of the Agency for Support of Public-Private Partnerships under the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine.
Also, the Budget Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine approved amendments to the Budget Code necessary to launch the fund. Ukraine' s contribution to the fund is expected to amount to about UAH 3 billion within 5 years.
In the short term, the subsoil agreement plays to strengthen the position of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, strengthening his foreign policy image. However, in the absence of a real effect – in the form of deterring Russian aggression, obtaining clear security guarantees from the United States, and transparent implementation of the provisions of the subsoil agreement – this step may become the basis for a drop in public support in the future. Given the opacity of the agreement , it is difficult to assess its implications, especially in terms of future commitments. This increases distrust and forms the basis for speculation.
At the same time, society, which is tired of war, economic pressure and political uncertainty, perceives this deal as a forced but acceptable compromise. According to the KIIS study dated May 2, 2025, 47% of the surveyed citizens of Ukraine have rather positive expectations from the signing of the subsoil agreement, 22% have a negative attitude.
However, if the agreement with the United States does not lead to concrete results, such as de-escalation of hostilities, the provision of long-term security guarantees to Ukraine, or clear economic benefits, then in the strategic perspective (6-12 months) it may provoke a decrease in the President's trust rating.
4. Military operations.
As of May 14, 2025, the intensity of hostilities in eastern Ukraine remains high, with active offensive actions by Russian troops in several directions in the Donetsk region.
During the week (from May 7 to May 14, 2025), Russian troops captured about 50 more km² of Ukrainian territory and now control 112.757 km²
In the Kursk region, Ukraine still continues to control an insignificant part of it, about 17 km². And another 11 km² in the area of the city of Tetkino.
In the north of the Sumy region - 91 km² of Ukrainian territory are in the gray zone (Novenke, Basivka, Zhuravka, Veselovka). Russian troops are trying to approach the village of Lokne, near the Yunakievka - Sumy highway.
A difficult situation for the Armed Forces of Ukraine is developing on the front line between the city of Toretsk and the city of Myrnograd south of the city of Konstantinovka. Fighting is already underway in several places on the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka highway. Russian troops have significantly advanced south of Konstantinovka - near Oleksandropil, Romanivka, Nova Poltavka and Vodiane 2nd.
The most significant advances of Russian troops were recorded:
- in the area between Toretsk and Pokrovsk - in the areas of Sukha Balka and Kalynove;
- in the vicinity of Constantinople and Razliv, to the west of the city of Kurakhove.
- on the Donetsk-Zaporozhye highway, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are fighting for the settlement of Bogatyr. In the event of the loss of the settlement, it is likely that the pressure on the positions of the Ukrainian troops in the area of the village of Otradnoye will increase and the Russian offensive will resume in the western direction, along the upper reaches of the Volchya River, towards the villages of Yalta and Zaporozhye. According to the Ukrainian military, the goal of the Russian Federation in this sector of the front is to cover the southern flank of the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with the subsequent creation of a convenient bridgehead for advancing towards the Dnipropetrovsk region.
The situation for the Armed Forces of Ukraine is also deteriorating in the Lyman direction, Russian troops are trying to completely seize the dominant heights in the area of the village of Novoye, which could lead to a breakthrough of the front in Oskol. The capture of this area will allow the Russian Federation to cut off logistics on the Ukrainian bridgehead behind Oskol, and then it will be extremely difficult to hold both the city of Borovaya and the city of Kupyansk.
Compared to March 2025, April saw an increase in the intensity of hostilities and the advance of Russian troops.
According to the analytical resource Deep State, in April, Russian forces captured 175 km² of Ukrainian territory, which is more than in March (133 km²). These data do not take into account the advance in the Kursk region, where, according to the same sources, Ukraine lost about 50 km² more , which is almost twice as much as in April 2024, when there were no battles on the territory of the Russian Federation. However, the intensity of the offensive remains lower than in January 2025 (325 km²) and especially in November 2024 (730 km²).
Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovskaya, Andrey Timchenko
for the Ukrainian Institute of Politics
Maps of military operations.
Donetsk region.
Kursk region.
