Ukrainian President V. Zelensky presented the "Victory Plan" in the Verkhovna Rada. In general terms, the plan envisages strengthening Ukraine with its allies to such an extent that the Russian Federation would agree to negotiations on Ukrainian terms. According to V. Zelensky, the "Victory Plan" is a bridge for implementing the "Peace Formula" (which essentially implies the capitulation of the Russian Federation) and will not allow Ukraine to be forced into an unfair peace with the Russian Federation. If everything goes according to the "Victory Plan", the war can be ended by the end of next year.
Its main points include:
1. Geopolitical. Inviting (not joining) Ukraine to NATO now. According to the President, this will become "the foundation for establishing peace." Thus, Russia will suffer a geopolitical defeat if its partners show determination and show how they see Ukraine in the "security architecture" of Europe.
2. Strengthening Ukraine's defense (military). This clause includes continuing military operations on Russian territory and lifting restrictions on Western weapons strikes on its territory. In particular, this should harm Russian public opinion (Russian society should feel the consequences of the war itself). Strengthening Ukraine's air defense systems, shooting down Russian aircraft and missiles over Ukraine together with partners, creating a no-fly zone over western Ukraine together with Poland and Romania, providing partners with access to intelligence, expanding the use of Ukrainian missiles and drones, etc.
3. Deterrence (military). The clause provides for the deployment of a comprehensive non-nuclear deterrent package (long-range missile systems) on Ukraine's territory, which should protect against Russian aggression and limit its capabilities.
4. Economic. It develops and strengthens Ukraine's strategic economic potential and strengthens sanctions against the Russian Federation. It provides for an agreement between Ukraine and its allies on the joint exploitation of Ukrainian natural resources in exchange for support for the country in its restoration.
5. Concerning security, after the end of the war, the Ukrainian military can use its experience to strengthen the defense of NATO and Europe. The US contingent can be replaced by the Ukrainian military.
The first four points must be implemented during the war and are designed to end it. The fifth point is designed to ensure defense and will take place after the war.
As reported the day before by the Presidential Office, the plan has not been fully announced: the document's appendices (the second, third, and fourth points) will not be discussed publicly, since they concern the "mathematical military component" and contain secret appendices presented to Western allies (the USA, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, etc.).
The fact that the "Victory Plan" was presented publicly may indicate that its non-public promotion has failed. Now it is not so much a plan as a strategy, which, first of all, has political and informational goals. On the one hand, the President's team is radicalizing its public uncompromising position on ending the war with the Russian Federation, trying to stabilize the domestic situation in Ukraine (a message to society that there is no "betrayal"). On the other hand, this puts pressure on the allies in the information field (manipulating public opinion in these countries, where support for Ukraine remains high), shifting responsibility for possible negative consequences of the war onto them if Ukraine does not receive due support. In particular, V. Zelensky said: "The victory plan depends on the partners. I emphasize the partners, not Russia. We, Ukrainians, with our partners, must ensure that the war ends differently from what Putin wants. We must all force Russia to accept peace."
Following the President’s speech in Parliament, the main messages of the “Victory Plan” became publicly recorded, which complicates their possible adjustment in the future.
The main goal of the Ukrainian leadership at this stage is to involve Western allies in the war against the Russian Federation as much as possible, militarily and financially, while not allowing any agreements between the West and the Russian Federation behind Ukraine's back in the future. However, the meeting of partners in the Ramstein format, where V. Zelensky planned to present his "Victory Plan", was canceled due to the impossibility of the presence of US President J. Biden. Instead, a separate visit of J. Biden to Germany and his meeting with German Chancellor O. Scholz, French President E. Macron and British Prime Minister K. Starmer were announced. Probably, the meetings of the Ramstein group on Ukraine will no longer be held before the US elections. The Second Global Peace Summit was also postponed indefinitely since the organizers could not yet choose the right strategy for its implementation.
Thus, during his European visit, V. Zelensky sought to present the "Victory Plan" to Western partners individually. In general, the large tour of the President of Ukraine in Europe (immediately after the visit to the USA) was an attempt to minimize the negative information and political consequences of the postponement of the "Rammstein" meeting, as well as the Second Global Peace Summit.
Zelensky's team is trying to convince key European allies - Germany, France, and Italy - to support Ukraine's accession to NATO and/or provide Ukraine with long-range weapons to strike Russian territory. There are also attempts to achieve the transfer of frozen Russian assets and speed up the process of Ukraine's accession to the EU. In addition, efforts are being made to convince the UK to be the first to permit Ukraine to strike Russian territory with long-range weapons (for example, with long-range modifications of the Shadow Storm, as was the case with the delivery of Challenger tanks and other weapons) and to support Ukraine's accession to NATO (to start the official process). However, the issue of Ukraine's accession to NATO remains highly problematic for Western allies due to Russia's position and unwillingness to expose themselves to the risk of escalating the conflict with a nuclear power.
Following V. Zelensky's grand tour, none of the points of the "Victory Plan" were officially supported by the White House or European allies (although there was no direct refusal to implement them). This situation may indicate that, most likely, the US Presidential Administration will postpone all key decisions on Ukraine until after the elections.
This could also mean that the US and Europe have not yet reached an agreement on who will support Ukraine financially and militarily and in what way. Biden’s visit to the Rammstein meeting could demonstrate the absence of these agreements, recording a crisis in the negotiations.
European officials have said they have given Ukraine $120 billion in aid since the war began, $40 billion of which is military aid. The U.S. (Republicans) say they have given at least $150 billion.
At present, the European elites are making it clear that they are not ready to fully finance the war in Ukraine. This is probably why Ukraine was approved to receive $35 billion (a loan taken against frozen Russian assets), rather than the $50 billion agreed upon by the G7 in June of this year. These funds are being allocated to Ukraine taking into account the risk that Europe could suffer losses in the amount of this amount if Russian assets are unfrozen under possible agreements with the Russian Federation.
All this could create a serious internal political crisis for V. Zelensky's team since it is happening against the backdrop of a difficult situation on the front, where the Russian Federation is actively advancing in the Donetsk direction and counterattacking in the Kursk region.
The Russian Federation will try to push Ukrainian troops out of the Kursk bridgehead as quickly as possible before the American elections to knock the trump card out of the hands of the Ukrainian leadership in negotiations with the new US Presidential Administration.
According to Ukrainian intelligence, the Russian command wants to send North Korean troops to the Kursk region, In the Russian army, a special battalion of up to 3,000 people is being formed on the basis of the 11th Air Assault Brigade.
North Korea is moving its troops to Ukraine to support Russia through the mutual defense agreement between Pyongyang and Moscow, which was signed in June 2024.
During his speech in Parliament, Ukrainian President V. Zelensky accused North Korea of joining the war against Ukraine. Informationally, this is also an additional attempt by the Ukrainian leadership to draw Western countries into military processes in Ukraine, since the DPRK's participation in the war could change the balance of power and lead to the defeat of Ukrainian troops in certain areas of the front, for example, in the Kursk region. Especially if the contingent of North Korean troops increases to 10-50 thousand people.
Iran and China were subjected to additional criticism from V. Zelensky. The inclusion of North Korea in the war in Ukraine could initiate the formation of an anti-Western coalition with the participation and deeper cooperation of these countries - the so-called Anti-NATO.
At present, the deployment of North Korean troops appears to be small in number. North Korea's strategy appears to be more focused on gaining tactical and technical expertise while avoiding large-scale interventions that could invite international condemnation or political retaliation. The DPRK's cautious strategy also aims to prevent the spread of foreign influence among its troops, as exposure to combat conditions in Russia or Ukraine could lead to increased ideological dissent after their troops return to North Korea.
However, the direct participation of North Korean soldiers in combat operations against Ukrainian troops could provide them with valuable experience in modern warfare tactics (for example, familiarization with advanced missile systems and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles). In addition, Russia could provide military assistance to North Korea, for example, in the creation of a nuclear submarine, which could significantly upset the military balance on the Korean Peninsula.
During the Russian counteroffensive in the Kursk region that began last week, Russian troops have recaptured more than 100 square kilometers. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have lost almost a quarter of the territory they captured in the Kursk region in August — at its peak, it was about 900 square kilometers, of which another 330 square kilometers were in the gray zone (according to DeepState). According to ISW, the fighting in the Kursk region covers an area of about 1,160 square kilometers.
The main advance of Russian troops took place in the Korenevsky district, in the area of the settlements of Olgovka and Kremyanoye. The Ukrainian Armed Forces withdrew from the settlement of Zeleny Shlyakh, and fighting continued in the area of the settlement of Novoivanovka. DeepState also noted the reduction of the initially small section of the gray zone in the south of the Glushkovsky district in the area of the settlement of Vesyoloye, located on the border with Ukraine - from 50 to 36 square kilometers. Thus, the area of the captured territory in the Kursk region now amounts to about 660 square kilometers, and about 360 square kilometers remain in the gray zone.
On the Donetsk front, in the Pokrovsk direction, Russian troops captured three settlements in the area of the city of Mirnograd - Mykolayivka, Krasny Yar, and Krutyi Yar. Mykolayivka is the last settlement before the city of Mirnograd. The Russians are also advancing to the west of the settlement of Mikhailivka and have taken up positions at the Selidovsky reinforced concrete plant near the Korotchenko mine. The so-called Nivelsky salient is also under threat of collapse. The Russian Federation announced that the village of Ostrovske, which is closely adjacent to the eastern outskirts of the city of Kurakhovo, has been captured.
In the Toretsk direction, battles are underway for the city of Toretsk; Russian troops have already captured more than 50% of the city.
The situation near the town of Chasiv Yar is deteriorating. The Russian Federation crossed the "Seversky Donets - Donbas" channel to the south, where the Russian Federation captured the fork in the road leading to Chasiv Yar from the towns of Bakhmut and Konstantynivka, and to the north of the city (in the areas of the settlements of Kalynivka and Grigorivka).
In the Zaporizhzhia-Donetsk direction, the Russian Federation is advancing towards the settlement of Levadne in the Zaporizhzhia region, which is located to the west of the settlement of Velyka Novosilka and is also advancing towards the settlement of Novodarivka.
From the captured city of Vuhledar, Russian troops are developing an offensive towards the settlements of Bogoyavlenkf and Zolota Niva.
In the Zaporizhzhia direction, Russian attacks are intensifying in the village of Kamenske and the Rabotine area.
In the Kupyansk direction, from the village of Peschane, Russian troops have practically reached the Oskil River, thus dividing the Ukrainian group in this area into two parts - Kupyansk and Borovsk.
Another element of the crisis for the team of the President of Ukraine V. Zelensky is the alternative peace initiatives being prepared by China and Brazil, as well as the Friends of Peace platform, which unites supporters of a speedy end to the war in Ukraine. From October 22 to 24, the BRICS summit will be held in Kazan, where China may present its concept for ending the war in Ukraine. According to the Chinese side, 13 countries signed a communiqué based on a six-point peace plan proposed by the Chinese and Brazilian sides. In Ukraine, the Friends of Peace initiative is perceived mostly negatively. In particular, the Ukrainian authorities, like some Western elites, consider this an attempt to impose an end to the war along the current front line that is beneficial to the Russian Federation. Officially, Ukraine continues to insist on the return of all captured territories within the 1991 borders. The Chinese initiative implies stopping the war along the front line.
If China gains broad support for its peace proposals, this could ultimately alienate the countries of the Global South from Ukraine. In addition, the Friends of Peace initiative could eventually develop into an international peace conference, becoming an alternative to the Second Global Peace Summit organized by Ukraine and the West.
As noted earlier, the overall situation with peace talks will be adjusted depending on the results of the US elections. In particular, if it becomes clear that the Republican candidate, Donald Trump, is winning, then Ukraine will most likely hold the Second Global Peace Summit before the elections to present its developments to the new Trump administration. Otherwise, China will hold it after the US elections. However, if it becomes obvious that the Democratic candidate, Kamala Harris, may win the elections, then China will probably hold its event before the elections, and Ukraine will hold it after.
Given that the Second Global Peace Summit in the Ukrainian format has been postponed indefinitely, V. Zelensky's team is unofficially betting on Kamala Harris. At the same time, the peace process is increasingly divided into two opposing camps - the West (Ukraine, the United States, allies) and the East (China, Russia, countries of the Global South). But this process may slow down its polarization if D. Trump wins the US elections.
In Ukraine, raids by military commissars of the TCC are becoming widespread. In Ukraine, raids by military commissars of the TCC have become widespread. In almost all regions of the country, as well as in large cities (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Lviv, Odesa, etc.), military commissars conduct large-scale inspections in public places - in shopping centers, restaurants, concerts, markets, gas stations, etc. These actions have been criticized by public figures. Government officials explain what is happening by the fact that citizens have not updated their registration data en masse - about 6 million people. In addition, most of those who have updated their data have a reservation or the right to a deferment. However, the effect of the TCC raids is very low due to the corruption factor. Only 10-15% of those detained are mobilized.
Therefore, the mass raids of the TCC are probably more of an informational nature and are aimed at maintaining the loyalty of the warring and passionate part of society (they catch everyone, everyone will fight) given that the norms on demobilization have not yet been adopted. These actions are also aimed at Western partners, from whom the authorities expect increased support. In particular, Ukraine is demonstrating that it has taken all measures in its power to increase mobilization. In connection with the problems of replenishing the army, talk has again intensified about lowering the age of mobilization, which is currently 25 years. But the President himself is against this, which in this case is already an element of PR and an attempt to win the sympathies of another non-mobilized part of society.
Maps of military operations.
Kursk region.
October 15th.
October 5
Donetsk region.
Sociology.
According to the research data of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) from September 20 to October 3, 2024.
As of September 2024, the level of trust in President V. Zelensky is 59%, and distrust is 37%.
The greatest lack of trust in the President is in the eastern part of the country - 45%. In the west and south, this figure is 38%, in the center - 35%.
Overall, the trust indicator has remained virtually unchanged since May of this year. In February 2024, the level of trust in the President was 64% versus 35%.
Before the full-scale invasion in February, Ukrainians' trust in the President was at a record low - 37%, while 52% said they did not trust him. While in September 2019, 80% trusted V. Zelensky against 9%.
After the start of the great war in 2022, the level of trust in the President rose to a record 90% against 7% (in May 2022), and then this figure gradually declined.
Earlier, KIIS published results according to which 54% of Ukrainians believe that the West sincerely wants an acceptable outcome for Ukraine in ending the war, while 38%, on the contrary, believed that the West is tired of Ukraine and is pressuring for an unfair peace.
It is noted that those who believe that the West wants a just peace for Ukraine trust the President more – 69% of them trust him versus 29% who do not trust him.
Among those who think differently and those who found it difficult to answer this question, 50% and 47%, respectively, trust the President. 48% and 42% do not trust him.
If we combine the answers to both questions, we can obtain a matrix of perception of the current context.
At one pole there will be those who are desperate in the West and at the same time do not trust the President – there are currently 18% of them.
At the opposite pole are those who believe in the support of the West and trust the President – there are currently 37% of them.
Between them are people with intermediate positions, mainly this combination trusts the President-desperate in the West or vice versa. Such a matrix of perception is connected with other important views.
In the question of readiness for territorial concessions, those who are most ready for them are those who are skeptical of the West and critical of the President. Those who believe in the West and trust the President are more against them.
Unfortunately, KIIS does not provide the results of V. Zelensky’s electoral rating in the event of presidential elections.
We all understand perfectly well that the level of trust in the President does not correspond to the readiness of each individual to vote for him in the elections. Citizens can simultaneously trust many politicians and structures, but in the elections, they will vote for someone alone.
The majority of Ukrainians believe that nothing will change in the Government's activities after the recent personnel changes - 74%. 12% expect the Government's activities to improve, and 6% expect its activities to worsen.
Among those who trust V. Zelensky, the majority also believe that nothing will change in the activities of the Government after the latest changes - 64%
19% expect a certain improvement in the situation, while 5% expect a deterioration.
Among those who do not trust V. Zelensky, 88% believe that nothing will change in the government's activities, and only 7% believe that the activities will worsen. 3% - read that it will improve.
If after the full-scale invasion the attitude towards the Government of Ukraine, as well as other institutions of power, significantly improved, then subsequently the assessments began to decline, gradually returning to the pre-war negative level.
In May 2024, KIIS surveyed NDI, according to which only 14% of Ukrainians rated the Government's performance over the past year well. Another 34% rated the performance neither well nor badly, and 50% rated it badly.
In a situation where the option of elections is impossible due to the war (and unacceptable for the majority of the population), personnel changes in the Government (among other things) were supposed to "let off steam" of the growing discontent of society and bring "freshness" to perception. But as the results of the KIIS survey show, this plan of the authorities did not quite work.
Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovskaya, Andrey Timchenko
for the Ukrainian Institute of Politics
