Domestic policy
1. Vladimir Putin demanded that a new concept of Russia's migration policy be adopted in 2025.
On March 5, during an expanded board meeting of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin announced the need to adopt an updated concept of migration policy in 2025, as well as to study the possibility of switching to electronic authorization of migrants.
"As we agreed, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, together with other specialized services, needs to study the possibility of abandoning the paper migration card and switching to electronic authorization of immigrants. These and other innovations should be reflected in the updated concept of state migration policy, which needs to be adopted this year," the President of the Russian Federation noted.
This statement and Putin's order, in essence, is an approval of the initiative to introduce the so-called "migrant ID", submitted to the State Duma in December last year by deputies from the New People party. It is assumed that this electronic document will perform several functions: verify a person's identity, contain information about the date of his entry into the Russian Federation, the duration and place of stay in Russia, as well as all information about banking transactions. It is proposed to make "Migrant ID" mandatory for all foreign specialists arriving in Russia for the purpose of working. "Digital profiles are needed to control every step of migrants within the country - from their place of residence to money transfers," explained one of the authors of the initiative, the leader of the New People party, Alexey Nechayev, in December. Considering that "New People" is a project of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation to channel the sympathies of the moderate part of the liberal electorate into the mainstream of systemic policy, it is not surprising that the "migrant ID" initiative was initially submitted to the Duma and thrown into the media field precisely through them. This allowed us to test the reaction of Russian society and big business to the idea. Two months later, when it became clear that the initiative did not cause much rejection in society and business circles, Vladimir Putin publicly supported it, instructing the Ministry of Internal Affairs to develop appropriate changes to the regulatory framework.
All this is being done as part of the general course of the Russian government to tighten migration policy (primarily in relation to immigrants from Central Asian countries). In recent years, illegal migrants have been perceived by the Russian leadership as a source of potential problems for national security. The reasons for this are:
• The widespread use of radical Salafi Islamism among migrants and the ease of recruiting migrants to carry out terrorist attacks on Russian territory (examples include Crocus Hall, the shooting of more than 10 servicemen by two Tajik migrants at a training ground in the Bryansk region in 2023, etc.).
• The conflict potential of the dominance of migrants in large Russian cities and especially their compact residence in certain areas (the so-called ghettoization). In such cases, everyday conflicts with the local population often develop into interethnic conflicts with the involvement of ethnic organized criminal groups disguised as diasporas.
2. Demographic policy:
criticism of the birth rate KPI in assessing regional leaders.
Increasing the birth rate has become one of the priority areas of domestic policy in the Russian Federation in recent years. The reason for this is the low birth rate (1.4 with a required rate of 2.1 for reproduction), especially in the regions of Central Russia. As part of this policy, last year the Presidential Administration introduced the birth rate KPI as one of the criteria for assessing the work of governors.
Last week, criticism of the birth rate KPI principle, clearly initiated by the federal authorities, began to appear in the Russian information space, on resources associated with the Presidential Administration. Its essence is that instead of taking real measures to increase the birth rate in the regions entrusted to them, governors are intensively engaged in statistical manipulation to achieve target KPI.
A striking example here is the Vologda Region, where, on the initiative of Governor Georgy Filimonov, women in labor began to receive an increased one-time regional benefit. At the same time, registration in the region is not required to receive benefits. Thus, the authorities of the Vologda Region stimulate "birth tourism" from other regions in order to improve the birth rate statistics in their region. However, in reality, this does not correct the situation with the depopulation of the region, where the birth rate index is lower than the federal one and is at the level of 1.3.
At the same time, Governor Filimonov is gushing with populist statements that in the next 5 years the birth rate index in the Vologda Region will increase by 1.5 - 2 times. A similar situation with fraud in the issue of fulfilling the birth rate KPI is observed in other regions of the Russian Federation (especially in Central Russia).
In this regard, the appearance in regional and federal media, as well as pro-government Telegram channels of criticism of the fulfillment of the KPI by regional authorities signals that the Presidential Administration sees the problem and, in the foreseeable future, will develop new, more effective measures to support the birth rate. In addition, the Russian leadership plans to improve work in this area with local authorities, but how exactly is still unknown.
The reason that in recent years the Russian authorities have been so actively concerned about demographic problems is both the shortage of personnel, which clearly made itself felt in the Russian economy during the war, and the above-described threats associated with the continuation of mass labor migration from southern countries.
3. Expansion of personnel programs to attract participants in the war in Ukraine to the regional level governments.
Last week, the Russian Federation summed up the results of the first year of the federal program "Time of Heroes", aimed at training high-level government managers from among the participants in the hostilities in Ukraine. The program started on March 1, 2024. Its first intake included 83 students. As of March 3, 2025, 27 of them were appointed to high government positions no lower than deputy governor in certain areas of work.
Overall, the program was recognized as successful by the Russian authorities. In December last year, Vladimir Putin publicly announced his intention to expand it to the regional level. As of early March 2025, more than half of the 89 subjects of the Russian Federation have launched their programs to select and train veterans of the war in Ukraine for appointment to government positions.
The policy of attracting veterans of the war in Ukraine to public administration is one of the key areas of activity of the domestic policy block of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation. It is seen not just as a "PR program", but as laying the foundation for long-term stability of the Russian state and society, as well as maintaining and improving governance at all levels of the vertical of power.
Participants in the hostilities are viewed by the Russian leadership as unconditionally loyal to the policies pursued by V. Putin, moderately proactive, conservative in their convictions and hostile to geopolitical compromises that are unfavorable to the Russian side, which certain representatives of the "systemic liberals" who have remained in the Russian government are still trying to promote. The Russian leadership also sees the participants of the federal program "Time of Heroes" and similar regional programs as the "reinforcement" of the vertical of power during the future transition of power from Vladimir Putin to any of his potential successors. While the backbone of combat veterans is being built "on the lower and middle floors" of the Russian vertical of power, at its very top, groups of influence associated with the security agencies and personally loyal to Vladimir Putin are gaining more and more weight. Thus, over the past year, the "apparatus weight" of the Russian presidential aide and Secretary of the State Council Alexei Dyumin has increased significantly. At the end of last year, the influence of V. Putin's cousin Anna Tsivileva, who was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense and previously oversaw issues of assistance to participants in the war in Ukraine, also increased significantly.
Foreign policy.
1. Continuing to establish Russian-American contacts.
On March 6, Vladimir Putin signed a decree appointing a new Russian ambassador to the United States. He is Alexander Darchiev, Director of the North Atlantic Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Previously, he headed the Russian delegation at the negotiations with the United States in Istanbul on the resumption of diplomatic representation. Immediately after these negotiations, the United States issued an agrément to Darchiev.
The resumption of full diplomatic contacts is one of the important topics in the emerging trend of normalizing relations between the United States and the Russian Federation. As Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova and Vladimir Putin's press secretary Dmitry Peskov have stated over the past two weeks, the Russian side intends to seek the return of diplomatic property seized by the American authorities in 2016-2018. If an agreement can be reached on this, in the foreseeable future (2-6 months) we can expect a mutual increase in the number of American diplomats in the Russian Federation and Russian diplomats in the United States.
The parties have already taken a number of preliminary steps for this. In particular, during the talks held in Istanbul, Washington and Moscow agreed to gradually lift restrictions on financial transactions for diplomatic missions, which had largely paralyzed their activities.
Restoring the normal operation of embassies and consulates between the United States and Russia is the first and necessary stage for further improvement of relations between the parties. After its completion, it will be possible to talk about more in-depth negotiations in a number of areas, including strategic stability (issues of nuclear deterrence), arms control, division of spheres of influence in the world and policy coordination in those issues where the parties have situational common interests.
2. Working out the issue of lifting anti-Russian sanctions as part of the process of normalizing relations.
On March 7, the head of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Alexander Shokhin, said that he had already discussed the issue of lifting anti-Russian sanctions with the head of the US Chamber of Commerce.
"We met with Robert Agee a couple of weeks ago, and he said he intended to prepare a "white paper". We supported some of the priorities that he named," Shokhin noted. "White paper" refers to a list of priority areas for lifting sanctions.
Thus, on March 3, Reuters, citing sources, reported that the White House was studying plans for the possible lifting of sanctions against Russia. The day before, the Financial Times published an article in which it claimed that secret negotiations were underway in Switzerland between "Putin's friend", German citizen Matthias Warnig, and representatives of American business on the resumption of the Nord Stream gas pipelines. And although the Russian Foreign Ministry publicly denied any negotiations on behalf of the Russian side on the resumption of work at Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2, no one in the West wrote that they were official.
The above indicates that, against the backdrop of the establishment of diplomatic contacts between the US and Russia over the past month and a half, the American authorities, as well as Western businesses, are actively preparing for the possible lifting of anti-Russian sanctions. The situation in this matter will greatly depend on the dynamics of the settlement in Ukraine. But if the processes proceed quickly, it is possible that the lifting of sanctions may begin in the next 6-12 months.
Russian businesses affiliated with the authorities, for their part, are trying to facilitate this process, offering the Americans deals on joint development of mineral resources (and not only) behind the scenes of negotiations.
3. Preparation for further negotiations on Ukraine and the position of the Russian side.
Negotiations between the American and Ukrainian delegations are scheduled for March 12 in Riyadh. As US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on March 10, their main task will be to determine the readiness of the Ukrainian leadership for a peaceful settlement. US President Donald Trump confirmed this, noting that the Ukrainian authorities have not yet demonstrated the necessary desire for peace, and, in his opinion, the next few days will show whether they will demonstrate this desire in principle.
Against this background, on March 10, the American news agency CNN reported that after the Ukrainian delegation, US representatives will meet with Russian negotiators in Riyadh. The Russian Foreign Ministry officially denied this information. Vladimir Putin's press secretary Dmitry Peskov also called it unreliable. However, as the US pressure on the Ukrainian side intensifies in order to force it to sit down at the negotiating table on realistic terms, as well as to continue US-Russian contacts, the Russian Federation is faced with the need to articulate more and more rigidly the fundamental conditions for a peaceful settlement. Recently, three such conditions have been voiced:
• Transfer of the Kherson, Zaporizhia, Lugansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine within their administrative borders to Russian control (this was stated by Sergey Lavrov, Dmitry Peskov, as well as the Russian Ambassador to London Andrei Kelin).
• Absence of peacekeepers from NATO countries in Ukraine following the settlement (this condition has been officially voiced by Sergey Lavrov on several occasions. Dmitry Peskov also spoke about this).
• Cancellation of discriminatory laws in Ukraine (Sergey Lavrov called them "racist"). In essence, this condition implies a change in the ruling regime in Ukraine and its ideology, being a paraphrase of the original demand of the Russian Federation for "denazification".
In addition, the Russian side does not abandon the demand to refuse to accept Ukraine into NATO, as well as the demand for "demilitarization" (qualitative and quantitative reduction of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other security forces of Ukraine). The above-described demands are what the Kremlin perceives not as a position for bargaining, but as something that should be part of any peace settlement unconditionally. This position is explained by the geopolitical interests of the Russian Federation. Moscow understands that any verbal or even written guarantees regarding the absence of Ukraine's admission to NATO, or its military development by the countries of the alliance, can be revised in a matter of weeks in the event of a change of power in the United States in 4 years, or even earlier, in the event of a deterioration in relations between the Trump administration and the Russian Federation. Therefore, the Russian leadership insists on a change of regime (the political and legal order established in 2014) in Kyiv, the abolition of laws that make up its ideological framework and a return to the possibility of representation in the power structures of conditionally "pro-Russian" or at least "neutralist" forces. Moscow sees this as a kind of "fuse" to prevent post-war Ukraine from returning to the state of an outpost of the West against the Russian Federation.
In the West, and especially in Ukraine, there is an underestimation of Russia's determination to insist on the demand to transfer four regions within their administrative borders under Moscow's control. It is believed that the Kremlin is bluffing and "raising the stakes" by putting it forward publicly. However, the Russian leadership itself takes this demand much more seriously and considers it critically important for itself.
This circumstance has both image-related (the annexation of the regions has already been publicly announced and written into the Constitution of the Russian Federation) and purely practical reasons. The second lies in the persistent conviction of the Russian leadership that the Russian Federation has an advantage on the battlefield, Ukraine's resources are steadily approaching exhaustion and, sooner or later, Russia will "take its own", whether as a result of the collapse of the Ukrainian Armed Forces front due to overexertion and exhaustion of resources, or as a result of the internal collapse of Ukrainian statehood and the surrender of the said territories by some new, more accommodating Kyiv leadership. Moscow is ready to wait several years to achieve these goals. The Russian authorities could accept compromises with a "freeze" of military actions along the contact line only if not just a neutral, but an openly loyal to Russia regime is established in Kyiv (in this case, the fundamental demand for territories would be, as it were, "exchanged" for indirect control over much larger and more strategically significant territories). But in the current conditions, such a scenario seems unlikely.
The Russian authorities are ready to "bargain" on issues of sanctions, economic cooperation, policy coordination with respect to individual regions (for example, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, or even Belarus), strategic stability and arms control.
The aforementioned Russian demands are extremely difficult for the American side to fulfill. Both from a purely technical (it is unclear how to force the Ukrainian authorities to do this) and from an image perspective. Therefore, the "Ukrainian issue" remains the most complex in American-Russian relations and it will be much more difficult to agree on it than on all other contentious issues.
However, the Donald Trump administration has clearly not yet abandoned hopes of emerging from the Ukrainian conflict on a "positive note", ending it with some form of peace treaty, or at least a long-term truce. To this end, Washington is putting pressure on the Ukrainian authorities. The latter's intractable position has already caused the American leadership to establish contacts with representatives of the Ukrainian systemic opposition. Washington believes that the potential replacement of Volodymyr Zelensky by any of its representatives (be it Yulia Tymoshenko or Petro Poroshenko) could make Ukraine more accommodating in matters of peaceful settlement.
In Russian near-political circles, meanwhile, this point of view is more marginal. Although thoughts about Yulia Tymoshenko's "negotiability" are expressed by some pro-government Russian political scientists. In general, the "general line" of the Russian Federation on the issue of the desired configuration of power in Kyiv is not only and not so much the desire to remove Volodymyr Zelensky from the presidential post, but rather the desire to abolish the entire system of functioning of the political elites of Ukraine that took shape after 2014. Personalities in this matter play a secondary role for Moscow, while the vector of development and ideology of post-war Ukraine are of primary importance to it.
Military operations
1. Intensification of the displacement of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the Kursk region. Its political significance.
Last week, the Russian Armed Forces intensified fighting in the Sudzhansky direction in the Kursk region with the aim of driving the Ukrainian Armed Forces out of the region. First, Russian units crossed the border and attacked in the area of the settlement of Novenkoye in the Sumy region, then advanced westward in the direction of the Ukrainian border south of the city of Sudzha. Thus, Russian troops took under fire control the only route through which Ukrainian units in the Kursk region are supplied. This was followed by the intensification of offensive actions by the Russian Armed Forces along the entire perimeter of the Kursk bridgehead of the Ukrainian Armed Forces with the occupation of a number of settlements. As a result, by March 10, the Ukrainian bridgehead in the Kursk region had shrunk by about a third of its area as of the beginning of the month. There is reason to believe that the Russian command is determined to completely drive the Ukrainian Armed Forces out of the Kursk region within the next few weeks. From a political point of view, this is important for the Russian Federation, since earlier Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky publicly expressed his intention to exchange territories in the Kursk region for some Ukrainian territories occupied by the Russian Federation. By eliminating the Kursk bridgehead of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Russian side hopes to deprive Kyiv of this trump card in potential peace negotiations.
At the moment, we assess the likelihood of the Russian side's plan to oust the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the Kursk region as high.
Meanwhile, while the fighting in the Kursk region has intensified, in a number of other areas (Kherson, Zaporizhia, Pokrovskoe, Kupyansk) their intensity has recently decreased. There are several reasons for this:
1. The concentration of reserves of the parties for battles in the Kursk region due to their high political significance.
2. The exhaustion of the offensive potential of the Russian Armed Forces after several months of an intensive offensive in the Pokrovsk direction and the need to restore combat capability.
3. The Russian side's reluctance to "over-escalate" military actions against the backdrop of negotiations with the US (although the continuation of massive strikes on the Ukrainian energy sector speaks against this hypothesis).
4. Spring thaw due to a sharp warming.
Economy
The ruble exchange rate and its dependence on the dynamics of negotiations with the United States.
At the end of the week, the official exchange rate of the Russian ruble fell by 1%, to 89.1 rubles per 1 US dollar. This was preceded by a long period of strengthening, lasting several weeks, associated with positive news about the US-Russian negotiations and the expectation in business circles of improving relations between Washington and Moscow.
At the same time, the OPEC+ announcement of its intention to increase oil production from April lowered quotes on the oil market to below $70 per barrel of Brent, which in the long term may contribute to the weakening of the ruble.
The Russian budget for 2025 was drawn up taking into account the average annual ruble exchange rate at 96.5 rubles per dollar and the average annual export price of oil at $69.7 per barrel. Russian Urals oil is cheaper than Brent oil. Therefore, with the situational fall in oil prices on world markets, we should expect a weakening of the Russian ruble. At the same time, any positive news on the American-Russian negotiating track will contribute to its strengthening. Thus, we can conclude that the ruble exchange rate in the coming months may undergo quite significant fluctuations, with an average annual value approximately at the level set in the budget.
