Confucian Roots of China’s Global Governance Initiative

China’s Global Governance Initiative (GGI) is a strategic diplomatic proposal put forward by Beijing and announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2025 during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit held in Tianjin, China, and dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the United Nations. The initiative is intended to reform the global governance system by increasing the representation of Global South countries in international institutions in order to create what the Chinese side declares to be a fairer, more democratic, and multipolar world order. The principal aim of the GGI is to strengthen the voice of the “Global South” and revise the operating rules of global institutions of multilateral cooperation such as the UN, the WTO, and the IMF.i Beijing justifies this by pointing to the faltering implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: a decade after its adoption, only about 35% of its 169 specific targets are on track, almost half are being implemented too slowly, and 18% have regressed.ii

The initiative is based on five principal commitments:

1. Commitment to the principle of sovereign equality: it advances the idea that all countries—regardless of wealth or size—have the right to participate in global governance and benefit from it on equal terms;

2. Adherence to the principles of the international rule of law: it insists on universal legal norms rather than their selective application, opposing the imposition of localized values (that is, values applicable only to a particular region) or unilateral sanctions. Here China finds a global partner in the West in the Vatican. On June 8 of this year, Pope Leo XIV stated in an address to the Spanish Parliament that escalating conflicts, deepening polarization, and widespread disregard for human rights had pushed the world into a “profound crisis.” Shortly afterward, speaking at a closed conference convened by Pope Leo XIV on the subject of war, Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández, head of the Vatican’s doctrinal office, said that governments increasingly invoke international law on the basis of political advantage (that is, considerations of expediency— I. P.) rather than universal principles. In Fernández’s view, this contradiction reflects political and economic interests rather than a consistent commitment to international law.iii

3. Practice of multilateralism: it focuses on decision-making through the United Nations and rejects confrontational bloc politics or exclusionary arrangementsiv.

4. Promotion of a people-centered approach: it places human well-being and sustainable development, rather than strategic rivalry, at the forefront.

5. Action orientation: it calls for tangible results and practical measures rather than symbolic rhetoric.v

In turn, these five principles rest on the key Confucian principle of Harmony (He), which the contemporary Communist Party of China (CPC) actively uses to justify state policy. Its essence is the pursuit of social concord and the avoidance of open conflict. This principle served as the foundation for the state doctrine of the “Harmonious Society” under China’s previous leader, Hu Jintao. The principle of Great Unity (Datong) is also actively employed as the Confucian ideal of universal peace and equality among peoples. Xi Jinping’s principal foreign-policy concept—the “Community with a Shared Future for Mankind”—is officially presented as a modern embodiment of the Datong ideal.

In the geostrategic context, the GGI serves as the systematizing core of China’s foreign-policy strategyvi and as a kind of comprehensive operating system for China’s other geostrategic proposals advanced earlier, in 2021–2023, complementing the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI).

The GGI specifically identifies several “governance-deficit areas” requiring urgent multilateral attention, including:

• The international financial architecture (reforms of the IMF and WTO);

• The climate-policy architecture;

• Artificial intelligence (AI) and cyberspace governance.

The initiative seeks to position China as a “rule-maker” rather than a “rule-taker” in international organizations, calling on leading powers to set an example in observing international law and promoting an inclusive multipolar world.

According to UN Secretary-General António Guterres, the global initiatives proposed by China are fully compatible with the UN Charter. In his view, they embody “full respect for multilateralism,” “full support for the UN as the central element of multilateral institutions, and a strong commitment to international cooperation and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.”vii

Many developing countries welcome China’s global initiatives as a constructive, “non-interventionist” partnership (that is, one that does not challenge the sovereign policies of nation-states), while Western powers view them as geopolitical instruments that alter the values of the post-bipolar era and threaten a global order based on the West’s military, ideological, cultural-value, and financial-economic hegemony.

The two current global superpowers—the United States and China—both have market economies, but fundamentally different political and social systems: systems of social values, social ethics, and social institutions. Whereas the Soviet social system was based on a philosophy, ideology, values, and economic theory developed quite literally “on the fly,” during the several decades preceding the establishment of Soviet statehood, contemporary China has effectively based its ideology on Confucian teaching and Confucian values adapted to the modern era, developed two and a half millennia ago and tested over two millennia as the foundation of social ethics and state ideology in China and Koreaviii. In the traditional Confucian system, profit and wages are important, but they are not the principal motivators of economic actors’ behavior. China’s economy has never been capitalist in the sense that profit and capital maximization have never been its principal driving force or the basis on which its principal economic actors make decisions.

South Korean social philosopher Uchang Kim points out that, unlike the self-confidence of individual consciousness (Descartes’s famous assertion “I think, therefore I am”), which seeks to master and subdue the external empirical world and constitutes the starting point of Cartesian and all modern Western Gnosticism, the Confucian worldview proceeds from the original sociality of the human being, ethically oriented toward seeking harmony and equilibrium with the surrounding worldix. Yet both types of rational subjectivity—Cartesian and Confucian—contain vectors of active pragmatic interest in the empirical world and the capacity to observe reality impartially from a universal perspective.

In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith virtually reiterates the principles of the Confucian worldview: in his teaching, human freedom is subordinated to the teleological principle of established harmony and the golden rule of morality and is impossible without personal responsibility for one’s own actions and their consequences. Ultimately, in Smith’s view, the individual is accountable to Providence, which serves as a transparent analogue of the Confucian Heavenx. However, neither Voltaire, Kant, Adam Smith, nor other Enlightenment intellectuals—including admirers of Confucius such as Leibniz and Benjamin Franklin—despite their enormous social authority, became, as Confucius did in the Far East, pillars of a new secular, rationalist ethical teaching that would encompass all of Western society vertically and horizontally and exert a decisive influence on the motivations both of the Western political, financial, intellectual, and cultural elite and of the broad masses of the population.

Mao restored the sovereignty and integrity of mainland China. This was achieved both through revolutionary intransigence and through criticism of Confucianism. Yet the Maoist period is a very short historical interval against the background of five thousand years of Chinese civilization. China’s modernization and economic recovery following the launch of Deng Xiaoping’s policy of “reform and opening up” are associated with a return to the Confucian tradition. Today China’s global “soft power” is embodied not in Marxist-Maoist institutions but in the worldwide network of Confucius Institutes. Confucian teaching is now actively used to promote the PRC’s “soft power” abroad.

In essence, secular Confucianism, as an ethical rather than mystical-religious teaching, plays the role of a civic, rationalist religion for contemporary China. By appealing to the traditional values, authorities, and rituals of Chinese civilization, it serves to consolidate China’s vast society and mobilize it to implement the political course of the CPC as the ruling party. At the same time, the CPC combines Marxist principles with traditional Confucian ideals, presenting itself as a collective junzi (“noble person”).

In the Confucian value system, the figure of the sage always stands above that of the warrior, and diplomatic, peaceful methods of settling disputes are always preferred to methods of force. Since normalizing relations with the USSR and the countries of Indochina in the early 1990s, China has not once participated in a full-scale war. By comparison, in the past decade alone the United States has participated in six wars and major military interventions (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Iran), as well as conducting counterterrorism operations in many other states.

In recent decades, Beijing has actively developed the conceptual and theoretical foundations of its diplomacy, drawing on traditional Chinese Confucian values of global harmony, humaneness, and global consensus based on common interests and a “shared future,” and reconceptualizing “all problems in the world” as “problems of the world”xi in its unity. Beijing’s diplomacy is distinguished by Confucian flexibility, a desire to avoid antagonisms, and a search for the golden mean. Unlike the didactic tones often present in communications by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the EU with developing countries, China, as an economic superpower, generally practices a “language of solidarity, compromise, and unity”xii. As the prominent American sociologist and Asian-studies scholar Gilbert Rozman has observed, the principal mental divide between the foreign-policy thinking characteristic of the United States (including the entire sequence of U.S. presidential administrations preceding Trump after the end of the Cold War) and that of the Confucian tradition lies in the fact that the former is “focused on polarization,” whereas the latter is focused “on building bridges”xiii.

A distinctive feature of Chinese diplomacy is its powerful traditional cultural background, formed through a synthesis of Confucian, Marxist “with Chinese characteristics,” modernization, and globalist values. In this context, the PRC’s “relational” diplomacy emphasizes the development of “human relationships” among state leaders and the harmonization of relations among states on the basis of Confucian wisdom, morality, and common sense. It attaches relatively less importance than Western diplomacy does to a world order based on the written norms of international treaties and public international law in general.

As a rising superpower, China effectively uses a network of institutional platforms for informal multilateral intergovernmental coordination of policy at the global level, above all in the financial and economic spheres. At the same time, unlike Moscow, Beijing acts very cautiously in accordance with Confucian principles. In particular, the Confucian doctrine of the “golden mean,” which prescribes avoiding extremes and seeking a reasonable balance of interests and a “shared future,” is successfully and effectively applied in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)—a multilateral development bank established in 2014 at the initiative of the PRC and headquartered in Beijing. None of the three principal forces represented among the Bank’s members (China, developed countries, and developing countries) holds a controlling stake in its authorized capital or a controlling share of votes on the Board of Directors, but all three hold a blocking stake (26–30% of the vote), ensuring the search for rational compromise and consensus when important governance decisions are made concerning the Bank’s projects.xiv This fundamentally distinguishes the AIIB from other multilateral development banks dominated either by economically developed donor countries (the IBRD, EBRD, ADB, etc.), by developing countries (the African Development Bank (AfDB), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), etc.), or by countries with hegemonic ambitions (as Russia was in the Eurasian Development Bank in 2006–2023).

The AIIB is one of the key financial and institutional instruments of the Belt and Road Initiative and of Beijing’s geostrategy for international development assistance. Despite its stated Asian orientation, in practice the Bank has a global membership: under Article 3 of the AIIB Articles of Agreement, all IBRD member states (currently 189) qualify as potential shareholdersxv. Membership therefore remains open to any interested sovereign states wishing to join the AIIB in the future. Between 2015 and 2025, the number of AIIB members rose from 57 to 111 approved members (including 106 full membersxvi and 5 prospective members), of which 53 are regional and 58 non-regional. They include 18 of the 27 EU member states (including Germany, France, and Italy), as well as the United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, Israel, Türkiye, Australia, and South Koreaxvii. Thus, created on the basis of the Bretton Woods system, the AIIB is now the world’s second-largest multilateral development bank after the World Bank in terms of member states. Together, AIIB members represent about 81% of the world’s population and 65% of global GDP. The AIIB is capitalized at $100 billion, while the global volume of project financing it has approved has reached $68 billion. The Bank consistently holds an AAA rating and preferred creditor status from global rating agenciesxviii.

The AIIB’s focus on economic growth through financing infrastructure development (especially under the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative)—as distinct from the principal mission of the U.S.- and Japan-controlled Asian Development Bank (ADB), which is to alleviate poverty and develop the public-goods sector—objectively challenges the development paradigms entrenched by multilateral development banks controlled by Western donors.xix In keeping with the tradition of financial institutions controlled by Western states, the ADB often imposes stringent conditions on its loans, including requirements concerning domestic policy reform and the protection of human rights. The AIIB generally takes a much more flexible and less directive approach, which is attractive to many developing economies.

Despite geoeconomic competition, the AIIB actively cooperates with the ADB, the World Bank, the IMF, the United States, and Japan, although the latter two declined to join the AIIB when it was established. Notably, the AIIB’s first agreements were cooperation arrangements with the ADB and the World Bank, with which it now co-finances many joint projects. The AIIB’s investment activity has prompted institutions such as the European Investment Bank to devote greater attention to their aid projects in the Indo-Pacific region and agree to co-financing arrangements with the AIIB for infrastructure projects such as the expansion of the metro network in Bangalore, India, with a total cost of $1.78 billionxx.

At the same time, the position of the AIIB’s management should not be directly equated with Beijing’s position. For example, in March 2022 the Bank announced the suspension of all activities in Russia and Belarus (even though the Bank’s credit exposure to those countries was minimal at the time), and to date the Russian-Ukrainian war has not significantly affected the AIIB’s operations.

The attempt to establish an Asian Monetary Fund under Japanese leadership in 1997 failed, in particular because of painful historical memories of Japanese military expansion—that is, serious concerns among East and Southeast Asian states about the restoration of Japanese imperial hegemony in their macroregion. China’s strategy and practice, by contrast, have traditionally relied, in contemporary terms, not on hard power but on soft and smart power, above all on Confucian ideational resources, and have so far proved effective and successful: the AIIB, as a key China-centric element of the international financial system, is increasingly acquiring a global role and independent significance.

In the foreseeable future, China is likely to attempt to restore its central role in the world of the Confucian tradition (Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and even Japan), spreading the values of Confucian civilization throughout the world through such projects and institutions of global leadership as the SCO, BRICS, the AIIB, Confucius Institutes, and others. Yet this will be an expansion of economic, financial, and “soft” power rather than military or direct political power. In many respects, the G20 development agenda—in which the voices of China and the newly industrialized countries are being heard ever more loudly—and the UN Sustainable Development Goals through 2030 coincide, so synergy can be expected in the course of their implementation.

Through its strategic infrastructure initiatives, such as the AIIB, the BRICS New Development Bank, and the Belt and Road Initiative, China seeks to achieve a level playing field with institutions dominated by the West. At the same time, China and India are actively competing for leadership among Global South countries, both invoking a “people-centered” approach in their development doctrines and development-assistance policiesxxi. Yet it “remains unclear whether the Global South regards any country as its leader”xxii, which, once again, is fully consistent with the Chinese concept of a multipolar world.

It is becoming increasingly evident that the global challenges of our time—such as preventing a global nuclear catastrophe, global warming, combating terrorism, crises and processes in the global financial system, the demographic crisis in most of the world’s economically developed countries, and deepening global contradictions in East-West and North-South relations—cannot be resolved through a universal solution to problems (challenges), but only through diverse responses to global economic, social, and financial problems and through the interactive diversification of international mechanisms, institutions, and approaches based on different cultural-civilizational systems of values.

Igor Piliaiev,

Doctor of Political Science, Professor

Kyiv

Notes

i Lee, G. S. (2025, September 08; UPD November 10). China’s Xi proposes GGI to reshape global governance: Will the world follow? Channel News Asia (CNA). https://www.channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/china-xi-jinping-global-governance-initiative-reform-un-sco-5334516

ii Xinhua News (2025, December 22). How China’s initiatives are charting a new path toward a better world. https://russian.news.cn/20251222/17de729a6aeb4282b57d33bbf2097e4b/c.html

iii Bondareva, K. (2026, June 29). Brussels softened its criticism of the Vatican regarding the EU’s double standards on the war. European Pravda. https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/rus/news/2026/06/29/7240636/

iv In world politics, exclusionary arrangements mean alliances, treaties, or institutional structures that deliberately restrict, marginalize, or isolate specific actors in international relations.

v Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. (2025, September 01). Concept Paper on the Global Governance Initiative. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/wjbxw/202509/t20250901_11699912.html ; Hu, W. (2025). The Global Governance Initiative: A Chinese Response to Questions of the Times. Foreign Affairs Journal, 41(4). https://www.unachina.org/en/article/1151

vi Liu Qing. (2025, November 11). The profound significance of the Global Governance Initiative. China’s Diplomacy in the New Era. https://en.chinadiplomacy.org.cn/2025-11/11/content_118170670.shtml

vii Xinhua. (2025, September 16). Global initiatives proposed by China totally compatible with UN Charter: UN chief. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202509/17/content_WS68ca16dfc6d00fa19f7a2838.html

viii Kistersky L., Marmazov V., & Piliaiev, I. (2021). Prospects for the East-West Civilizational Convergence: Confucian-Tradition Democracy in the Republic of Korea. Coretex CZ SE. https://jmonographs.donnu.edu.ua/article/view/12149

ix Kim, U. (2006) Confucianism, Democracy, and the Individual in Korean Modernization. In Y.-Sh. Chang, & S. H. Lee (Eds.). Transformations in Twentieth Century Korea (pp. 221–245). Routledge. P. 242.

x Smith, A. (2008 [1776]). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations: A Selected Edition. Ed. by K. Sutherland. Oxford Paperbacks. Reprint Edition.

xi Zhao, T. (2009). A Political Philosophy of World in terms of All-Under-Heaven (Tianxia). Diogenes, 221, 5–18.

xii Were, A. (2022, June 1). The Secrets of China’s Economic Statecraft in Africa. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2022/06/the-secrets-of-chinas-economic-statecraft-in-africa/

xiii Rozman, G. (2018, May 21). Synopsis of the 2018 Asan Plenum: “Illiberal International Order”. The Asan Forum. URL: http://www.theasanforum.org

xiv Piliaiev, I. (2025). Confucian Values in the Contemporary Geoeconomic Context. In: Carrillo-Pina, J., Sharov, O. (eds). The Geoeconomics of the International Monetary Order: Money and Power in the 21st Century (pp. 93–125). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-90851-4_4

xv Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Articles of Agreement. Done at Beijing, People’s Republic of China on June 29, 2015. https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/basic-documents/_download/articles-of-agreement/basic_document_english-bank_articles_of_agreement.pdf

xvi Two of the full members—Hong Kong and the Cook Islands—are non-sovereign territories that form part of the PRC and New Zealand, respectively.

xvii Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. (2026, May 29). Members and Prospective Members of the Bank. https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html

xviii AIIB. (2025). 2024 AIIB Annual Report and Financials. https://www.aiib.org/en/news-events/annual-report/2024/index.html

xix Piliaiev, I. (2025). The Potential of Asian Multilateral Development Banks for the Post-War Recovery of Ukraine’s Economy. Economy of Ukraine, 68(09): 22–36. https://doi.org/10.15407/economyukr.2025.09.022

xx Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. (2025, January 9). Bangalore Metro Rail Project. Project Summary Information. https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/details/2025/_download/India/AIIB-PSI-P000038-India-Bangalore-Metro-Rail-Project-Line-R6-Jan.-09-2025.pdf

xxi Dhingra S. (2023, September 8). The G20 spectacle and the domestic imperatives of Modi’s global ambitions. The Interpreter. Published Daily by the Lowy Institute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/g20-spectacle-domestic-imperatives-modi-s-global-ambitions

xxii Miller M. Ch. (2024, February 1). China and India Compete for Leadership of the Global South. The Council on Foreign Relations website. https://www.cfr.org/blog/china-and-india-compete-leadership-global-south