At the front, the main battles continue in the Donetsk direction. In Avdiivka, the Russians captured the settlement of Keramik, the settlement of Novokalynovo, and the settlement of Ocheretyno, settlement Arkhangelske. Russian troops also advanced northwest of the village. Ocheretyno and advance in the village of Novoaleksandrivka. To the south of the Russian Federation, we advanced near the settlement of Novopokrovsky. The assault on the village continues north of the city of Maryinka. Krasnogorivka. The situation has also worsened south of Chasiv Yar in the Bakhmut direction, which the Russian Armed Forces are trying to encircle. In the Vremevsky direction, Russian troops attacked the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Urozhayne - Staromayorskoye area of the Donetsk region, as well as in the village of Robotino and northwest of the village of Verbove, Zaporizhzhia region.
However, even though the tactical initiative is in the hands of the Russian Federation, Russian troops are not yet capable of achieving operational or, especially, strategic advantage.
The Russian Federation's current tactical successes in the area of Avdeevka are because Ukraine is forced to keep significant reserves on the Zaporizhzhia front and also in the north of Ukraine, partly sacrificing the Donbas, fearing a simultaneous attack from the north and south (in the area of Zaporizhzhia—Dnepropetrovsk and Kharkiv—Poltava).
There is a high probability that the Russians will go on the offensive on several fronts in mid-May (according to Ukrainian intelligence data in mid-May - early June). The Russian offensive could have taken place earlier not to give time to strengthen the Ukrainian positions due to the American aid that had begun to arrive.
Russian troops may be preparing a major offensive in the Zaporizhzhia direction, and also, over the next month, they may invade the Sumy region of Ukraine in the direction of the city of Okhtyrka, then the city of Poltava to bypass and encircle the city of Kharkiv. In this regard, some sources note the presence of evidence of mine clearance and the removal of Russian fortifications on the border, which indicates the preparation of such an operation. There is a possibility that the Russian Federation will seek to implement a project to create the so-called "buffer zone" (60-30 km deep) from its border in the northern regions of Ukraine, which we wrote about back in February 2023. Such large regional centers as Kharkiv and Sumy potentially fall into the "buffer zone."
There is an intensification of air strikes on Ukraine by the Russian Federation. In addition to the power industry, the following areas are subject to intense shelling: port infrastructure, ammunition depots, and logistics routes for the supply of weapons to Ukraine. This is due mainly to the beginning of a new batch of military aid from the latest US package ($61 billion).
In Ukraine, “arrivals” were recorded at warehouses with long-range Western Storm Shadow missiles (the coordinates of the hit are not specified), and government officials associate them with the "leaking" of information to the Russian intelligence services.
Ballistic missile strikes from Crimea are carried out on the city of Odesa almost daily, mainly because the Russian Federation wants to impede Ukrainian shipping. Since the Russian Federation withdrew from the grain deal (in July 2023), shipping in Ukrainian ports has practically restored to pre-war levels. At the same time, they transport not only grain but any other product that the Russian Federation cannot control.
On May 8, another missile attack on Ukraine's energy sector damaged heat and hydroelectric power stations. It caused blackouts in nine regions: Lviv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Kharkiv and Sumy, Dnipropetrovska, Donetsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Kyiv. The Burshtyn, Dobrotvorsk, and Ladyzhyn thermal power plants were damaged; their work is vital for the functioning of the entire energy system of Ukraine.
Since March 2024, the Russian Federation has already dealt several massive blows to the Ukrainian energy system, knocking out up to 7 GW of electricity generation capacity.
The strikes destroyed the Dnieper hydroelectric power station in Zaporizhzhia, the Kharkiv CHPP-5, the Centernergo Zmievska and Trypolska thermal power plants, and the DTEK Burshtynska and Ladyzhinska thermal power plants.
In April, Ukraine was forced to import 225 thousand MWh of electricity, the highest figure since the beginning of this year. Compared to March, the volume of commercial imports increased by a third.
Energy Minister German Galushchenko named the amount of damage caused to the energy system due to the latest attacks from the Russian Federation. Today, we are talking about over $1 billion (back in March, the Government estimated losses at $230 million). However, the attacks continue, and these losses will only grow.
The Russian Federation threatens Ukraine's allies to use nuclear weapons because some Western elites are raising the stakes in the war (increasing assistance to Ukraine, expanding the boundaries of the permissible use of new weapons against the Russian Federation, etc.). Thus, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, on behalf of President V. Putin, began preparations for conducting exercises with tactical nuclear weapons. After the Russian Federation, Belarus also launched nuclear exercises on its territory.
In addition, the increase in the degree of nuclear escalation can be associated with the inauguration of V. Putin on May 7 and the prevention of large-scale attacks by the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the territory of the Russian Federation (for example, on the Crimean Bridge) at this time.
"Olympic Truce". Chinese President Xi Jinping and French President Emmanuel Macron called for a truce in Ukraine and other global conflicts during the Olympic Games in Paris (from July 26 to August 11, 2024). If the idea of an “Olympic truce” is a synchronous position of the PRC and France, we should expect, on the one hand, pressure from Xi Jinping on V. Putin. And on the other hand, E. Macron is calling on the President of Ukraine to implement such a truce.
Initially, the "Olympic Truce" does not suit both sides (Ukraine and the Russian Federation). The Russian Federation believes that such a truce will give "breathing space" to US President D. Biden and other European elites during the election processes. Therefore, the Russian leadership insists that this truce include certain political agreements or concessions (for example, lifting some sanctions, refusing to admit Ukraine to NATO, etc.). What Western countries still need to be ready to do today. In addition, the decision on the "Olympic truce" would also be painful for the Russian Federation because the Russian team would not be allowed to participate in the Olympic Games in Paris.
For Ukraine, agreeing to the “Olympic Truce” will be even more difficult than for the Russian Federation. Since public opinion in Ukraine is more passionate and more determined to fight until victory than in the Russian Federation, it is about 40-50% on average.
Therefore, the "Olympic truce" could turn into a quiet diplomatic war, into severe pressure and confrontation, both along the Beijing-Moscow axis (thus, the PRC will have a reason to narrow cooperation with the Russian Federation, which the West demands) and along the Paris-Kyiv line. This may be enough reason for Paris to sabotage European assistance programs for Ukraine partially. Or even establish an "Olympic truce" as a condition for Ukrainian European integration.
All this is happening against the backdrop of preparations for the Global Peace Summit; it is already known that it will be held on June 15–16 in Switzerland. Switzerland invited more than 160 countries to the "peace summit." While considering V. Zelensky's "Peace Formula," Ukraine expects it will be possible to approve it as the only model for implementing peace agreements. The Swiss Foreign Ministry stated that the Russian Federation was not invited to the Global Peace Summit at this stage. Still, as the head of OP A. Ermak previously reported, Russia's participation in the second round of negotiations is possible when the already approved plan is handed over to it.
The joint Sino-French proposal for an "Olympic Truce," with the continuation of the Council of Heads of the UN General Assembly to return to the Istanbul version of the agreements, can significantly influence the mood and content of the Global Peace Summit. Instead of a benefit performance of the Ukrainian "peace formula," it can become a "concert" of different voices.
Ukraine and Western partners expect to involve as many countries of the Global South as possible. The PRC's position in this matter may be decisive. Among other things, the KRN can present an alternative, more detailed peace plan that will better suit both the Russian Federation and the countries of the Global South.
Some world elites believe that the Ukrainian "peace formula" is unrealizable because it describes the conditions for the Russian Federation's surrender and does not give V. Putin the opportunity to "save face."
The process of mobilization continues in Ukraine. To avoid fines, many citizens go to the military registration and enlistment offices to update their data, undergo a medical examination, and obtain a military ID. The Law Enforcement Committee of the Rada is preparing amendments for the second reading of the bill, which will increase fines for violating the law on mobilization. The upper threshold of fines is proposed to be increased to 25,500 and not to 22,500, as previously reported. The committee proposes to fine citizens for violating military registration rules of 17,000 to 25,500 hryvnia.
Let us remind you that the law on strengthening mobilization, which comes into force on May 18, requires men 18-60 to carry a military ID. Appearing on the street without a military ID will be a violation. Such a ticket is issued only after a medical examination at the territorial acquisition center. Those with a military ID that is still valid (the document is issued for five years) do not need to clarify the data if they have not changed. The Cabinet of Ministers is now developing an algorithm for clarifying data through an electronic account.
Regarding personnel rotations in the highest circles of power. Adopting an aid package to Ukraine ($61 billion) in the United States may cause significant personnel changes in the Government. In particular, this should improve control over the expenditure of funds. Also, personnel changes will ensure progress in Ukraine's accession to the EU and reduce costs (Government personnel may be reduced by 30%-50%).
Parliament decided to dismiss Alexander Kubrakov from the post of Deputy Prime Minister for the Reconstruction of Ukraine - Minister of Development of Communities, Territories and Infrastructure of Ukraine. Nikolai Solsky, Minister of Agrarian Policy of Ukraine, was also dismissed.
Ukraine has reached pre-war export levels. The Ministry of Economy stated that in April 2024. Ukraine exported a record volume of products. So last month, exports amounted to more than 13 million tons, exceeding the figures for February 2022. Thus, Ukraine reached pre-war export levels. In monetary terms, exports in April reached $3.3 billion. This is 1.3 million tons more than in March 2024. In February 2024, Ukraine exported a then-record 8 million tons of cargo via a temporary sea corridor. The temporary sea route, which Ukraine created with its partners after Russia's withdrawal from the Black Sea "grain deal," was used by 1,300 vessels. Ukrainian agricultural products are supplied to 40 countries even under such difficult conditions. The growth in export figures was also influenced by the opening of an alternative sea corridor in the summer of 2023, which allows Ukraine to export grain and metal, particularly grain and metal.
On May 7, V. Putin's inauguration took place in Moscow, and from that day, he officially took the post of President of the Russian Federation. Thus, V. Putin will be able to rule the country for the next six years, until 2030, and taking into account the amended Russian constitution, he will be able to run again and remain President until 2036. This signals to the outside world that V. Putin's current course will continue. In the coming years, the Russian Federation will be in a highly structured leadership-type state (Putin's governance model).
Due to the fact that the elections in the Russian Federation were uncompetitive, Western countries and Ukraine predominantly called them unfree and unfair. On April 18, during the regular session of PACE, it called on the member countries of the Council of Europe and the European Union "to recognize Vladimir Putin as illegitimate after the end of his current presidential term and to stop all contacts with him, except humanitarian contacts and contacts aimed at striving for peace." However, since PACE resolutions are only advisory, this document did not entail any official changes in relations with the Russian Federation.
The United States stated that it does not recognize the presidential elections in the Russian Federation as "free and fair," but V. Putin is the President of Russia and "acts in this role."
The European Union also did not refuse to recognize Vladimir Putin as the President of the Russian Federation since all member states could not reach a consensus on this issue. Representatives of six EU countries attended V. Putin's inauguration: Slovakia, Hungary, Cyprus, Greece, Malta and France.
EU Foreign Service spokesman Peter Stano said that diplomats from several EU countries participating in the Kremlin leader's inauguration do not question the EU's agreed-upon position on supporting Ukraine.
In Paris, they believe that the French ambassador's participation in the event does not mean that they recognize V. Putin's election as legitimate; it "only means that we have an embassy in Moscow."
Thus, Western countries only partially abandon political dialogue with the President of the Russian Federation.
After V. Putin finally takes office, his policy will be mainly aimed at continuing the war in Ukraine and a new escalation of conflicts. The pressure on Ukraine and Western allies will increase. In the future, there will be a change of government and the establishment of other balances within the Russian Federation (rebuilt under V. Putin). After the inauguration of V. Putin, the Russian government and the administration of the President of the Russian Federation resigned. On May 10, the State Duma of the Russian Federation will approve the candidacy of a new prime minister, and on May 13 - new ministers.
Combat map
The situation around Ukraine.
The process of peace negotiations.
"Olympic Truce". Chinese President Xi Jinping and French President Emmanuel Macron called for a truce in Ukraine and other global conflicts during the Olympic Games in Paris (from July 26 to August 11, 2024). If the idea of an “Olympic truce” is a synchronous position of the PRC and France, we should expect, on the one hand, pressure from Xi Jinping on V. Putin. And on the other hand, E. Macron is calling on the President of Ukraine to implement such a truce.
Initially, the "Olympic Truce" does not suit both sides (Ukraine and the Russian Federation). The Russian Federation believes that such a truce will give D. Biden and other European elites a "breath" during the election process. Therefore, the Russian leadership insists that this truce include certain political agreements or concessions (for example, lifting some sanctions, refusing to admit Ukraine to NATO, etc.). What Western countries still need to be ready to do today.
In parallel, the Russian Federation threatens nuclear weapons because some Western elites are raising the stakes (increasing assistance to Ukraine, expanding the boundaries of the permissible use of new weapons against the Russian Federation, etc.). Thus, the Russian Ministry of Defense reported that the General Staff, on behalf of President V. Putin, began preparations for conducting exercises with tactical nuclear weapons shortly. Despite the presence of military initiative in the hands of the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation has not achieved any significant advantage, mainly since it has not achieved a turning point in the war.
For Ukraine, agreeing to the "Olympic Truce" will be even more difficult than for the Russian Federation. Since public opinion in Ukraine is more passionate and more determined to fight until victory than in the Russian Federation, it is about 40-50% on average.
If, for example, we consider a survey by the Razumkov Center,
less than half of those surveyed favor continuing the war under any conditions - 42%, but only 23% favor negotiations.
62% are against negotiations, and 15% hide their opinion.
By this, citizens of Ukraine can be divided into three groups:
• dominant military passionaries - about 40-50%
• tired - about 20-30%,
• peacekeepers - 20-30%
According to the Levada Center, although 76% of Russians support the war in Ukraine, society's actual involvement is much lower. 46% are in favor of peace negotiations, and 40% are in favor of continuing the war.
Therefore, the "Olympic truce" could turn into a quiet diplomatic war, into severe pressure and confrontation, both along the Beijing-Moscow axis (thus, the PRC will have a reason to narrow cooperation with the Russian Federation, which the West demands) and along the Paris-Kyiv line.
This may be enough reason for Paris to partially sabotage European assistance programs for Ukraine or even establish an "Olympic truce" as a condition for Ukrainian European integration.
Against this background, preparations for the Global Peace Summit continue; it is already known that it will be held on June 15–16 in Switzerland. Ukraine expects that dozens of countries around the world will attend the summit, and in the process of considering V. Zelensky's "Peace Formula," it will be possible to approve it as the only model for the implementation of peace agreements. The Swiss Foreign Ministry stated that the Russian Federation was not invited to the Global Peace Summit at this stage. Still, as the head of OP A. Ermak previously reported, the participation of the Russian Federation in the second round of negotiations is possible when the already approved plan is handed over to it.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the West's support for Ukraine is sending a message to Vladimir Putin that ending the war requires a "sincere desire" on his part to negotiate peace by the basic principles of international law.
The joint Sino-French proposal for an "Olympic Truce," with the continuation of the Council of Heads of the UN General Assembly to return to the Istanbul version of the agreements, can significantly influence the mood and content of the Global Peace Summit. Instead of a benefit performance of the Ukrainian "peace formula," it can become a "concert" of different voices.
Ukraine and Western partners expect to involve as many countries of the Global South as possible. The PRC's position in this matter may be decisive. Among other things, the KRN can present an alternative, more detailed peace plan that will better suit both the Russian Federation and the countries of the Global South.
Some world elites believe that the Ukrainian "peace formula" is unrealizable because it describes the conditions for the Russian Federation's surrender and does not give V. Putin the opportunity to "save face."
Inauguration of V. Putin.
The inauguration of V. Putin took place in Moscow; on that day, he officially took the post of President of the Russian Federation. Thus, V. Putin will be able to rule the country for the next six years, until 2030, and taking into account the amended Russian constitution, he will be able to run again and remain President until 2036. This signals to the outside world that V. Putin's current course will continue. In the coming years, the Russian Federation will be in a highly structured leadership-type state (Putin's governance model).
Because the elections in the Russian Federation were uncompetitive, Western countries and Ukraine predominantly called them unfree and unfair. On April 18, during the regular session of PACE, it called on the member countries of the Council of Europe and the European Union "to recognize Vladimir Putin as illegitimate after the end of his current presidential term and to stop all contacts with him, except humanitarian contacts and contacts aimed at striving for peace." However, since PACE resolutions are only advisory, this document did not entail any official changes in relations with the Russian Federation.
The United States stated that it does not recognize the presidential elections in the Russian Federation as "free and fair," but V. Putin is the President of Russia and "acts in this role."
Six EU countries were present at V. Putin’s inauguration: Slovakia, Hungary, Cyprus, Greece, Malta and France.
EU Foreign Service spokesman Peter Stano said that diplomats from several EU countries participating in the Kremlin leader's inauguration do not question the EU's agreed-upon position on supporting Ukraine.
In Paris, they believe that the French ambassador's participation in the event does not mean that they recognize V. Putin's election as legitimate; it "only means that we have an embassy in Moscow."
Thus, Western countries do not entirely abandon political dialogue with the President of the Russian Federation.
After V. Putin finally takes office, his policy will be mainly aimed at continuing the war in Ukraine and a new escalation of conflicts. The pressure on Ukraine and Western allies will increase. In the future, there will be a change of government and the establishment of other balances within the Russian Federation (rebuilt under V. Putin). After the inauguration of V. Putin, the Russian government and the administration of the President of the Russian Federation resigned. On May 10, the State Duma of the Russian Federation will approve the candidacy of a new prime minister, and on May 13 - new ministers.
Internal situation in Ukraine.
Economic situation.
The Ministry of Economy stated that in April 2024, Ukraine exported a record volume of products. As reported by the First Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine—Minister of Economy of Ukraine Yulia Sviridenko, last month's exports amounted to more than 13 million tons, exceeding the February 2022 figures. Thus, Ukraine reached pre-war export levels. In monetary terms, exports in April reached $3.3 billion. This is 1.3 million tons more than in March 2024.
In February 2024, Ukraine exported a then-record 8 million tons of cargo via a temporary sea corridor. According to the head of the Ministry of Economy, the growth in export figures was also influenced by the opening of an alternative sea corridor in the summer of 2023, which allows Ukraine to export, particularly grain and metal.
The temporary sea route, which Ukraine created with its partners after Russia's withdrawal from the Black Sea "grain deal," was used by 1,300 vessels. Ukrainian agricultural products are supplied to 40 countries even under such difficult conditions.
Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovskaya, Andrey Timchenko
for the Ukrainian Institute of Politics
