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Apparently, at the international level, an implicit consensus is forming around Ukraine in favor of continuing the war at least in the medium term — on a horizon of up to two years. The negotiation process has effectively been put on pause: substantive decisions have been postponed, at least until autumn — the period of the U.S. congressional elections. At the same time, formal contacts between the parties are likely to continue, serving more to maintain the negotiation infrastructure than to achieve real agreements.
Ukraine is receiving resources to continue the war and does not demonstrate readiness to make concessions, while Moscow is likewise unwilling to abandon its ultimatums. The cancelled visit of the American delegation, consisting of U.S. President’s Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Donald Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, to Ukraine became a kind of “litmus test” of Trump’s decision: the United States is no longer willing to overexert itself or put pressure on Ukraine and Europe regarding the need to conclude a deal with Russia. The U.S. is profiting from the crisis occurring in other countries — we are talking about hundreds of billions of dollars through arms supplies and rising energy prices. Therefore, it sees no need to become excessively involved in resolving a war on another continent.
The European Union has moved toward institutionalizing long-term support for Ukraine. An agreement was reached to provide Kyiv with a €90 billion loan for 2026–2027, and the 20th package of sanctions against Russia was approved. In essence, this represents a complex political deal: on the one hand, the EU unlocked large-scale financing for Ukraine; on the other, to prevent blockage from Slovakia and Hungary, Kyiv de facto agreed to restore access to Russian oil transit via the Druzhba pipeline. At the same time, the 20th sanctions package itself turned out to be largely “watered down.” Against the backdrop of tensions in the Middle East, European countries are not ready to take steps that could sharply destabilize energy markets, as a result of which key restrictions — particularly a full ban on the transportation of Russian oil — were postponed, and the package includes a number of exceptions preserving the regime of “grey supplies.”
The possibility of launching the Nord Stream gas pipeline is also being discussed, in particular the option of supplying gas through the surviving branch. Given that in early 2026 the United States began a targeted adjustment of the sanctions regime against Russia, a paradoxical situation is forming: while sanctions pressure remains, part of the restrictions is de facto being softened, and Russian oil — both through infrastructure such as Druzhba and via tanker schemes — continues to reach European and global markets. As a result, Russia retains access to export revenues, which remain a key source of financing for the continuation of hostilities.
For Ukraine, the European Union’s €90 billion loan program (for 2026–2027), together with the approximately $60 billion in military aid promised by NATO countries, effectively covers the main critical military and financial needs for the next two years and forms a guaranteed support volume of over $150 billion, excluding additional resources from international financial institutions (such as the IMF and the World Bank) and individual states. Overall, a regime of long-term war is effectively being institutionalized in Ukraine, consolidating a governance model oriented toward prolonged confrontation. The Verkhovna Rada has once again extended martial law and mobilization for another 90 days — until August 2, 2026 (for the 19th time since the beginning of the full-scale war).
The main position of European countries reflects a cautious and pragmatically restrained approach to the Ukrainian issue. They do not expect military results from Ukraine and seek to minimize their own risks and obligations by postponing key decisions to a more distant future. Thus, Europe signals that NATO membership for Ukraine remains inaccessible for now. Under conditions of ongoing war, Ukraine also cannot count on joining the European Union. Moreover, the process of European integration will not be quick and will require significant time, as stated by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. He also suggested that Ukraine may likely have to accept territorial losses. Germany is now effectively becoming the key financial and military donor for Ukraine in Europe.
Germany and France have proposed granting Ukraine “symbolic” advantages of an intermediate status before EU accession, without voting rights and without access to the EU budget, instead of accelerated membership. However, the simplified version of membership would include the EU mutual defense clause. It is proposed that this clause could be made effectively applicable through a simple political statement. But in Ukraine, it is stated that only full membership in the EU is acceptable.
Against the backdrop of the EU approving a €90 billion loan, internal political struggle in Ukraine is intensifying between anti-corruption structures and the presidential vertical for control over key financial flows and state institutions. In particular, the “Mindich case” has once again intensified in the public space. “Ukrainska Pravda” published new fragments of wiretaps organized by NABU and SAPO in the apartment of businessman Tymur Mindich, close to the Presidential Office, in which former First Assistant to the President Serhiy Shefir and National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov are mentioned. UP has announced the publication of new materials, which may also involve other representatives of the President’s inner circle, including Volodymyr Zelensky himself. However, no direct recordings with his voice have yet been presented. In this context, the current publications can be viewed as an element of pressure or bargaining in the struggle for redistribution of influence within the system of power. In the near future, the situation may develop in two directions: either personnel reshuffles and strengthening of anti-corruption bodies as a form of compromise, or a counterreaction from law enforcement agencies and the presidential vertical, leading to a transition of the conflict into a more intense phase.
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The European Union has approved the 20th package of sanctions against the Russian Federation and allocated a loan of 90 billion euros to Ukraine.
Last week, the European Union reached an agreement to provide Ukraine with a loan of 90 billion euros for the period 2026-2027 and to approve the 20th package of sanctions against the Russian Federation.
A loan for Ukraine in the amount of €90 billion for 2026-2027 was agreed back in December 2025, but remained blocked by the outgoing Hungarian government for a long time. Whereas the package of sanctions was blocked by Slovakia. The Druzhba oil pipeline was the key conflict between Ukraine and Hungary and Slovakia during this period, accounting for about 86-92% of Hungary's oil imports and almost all supplies to Slovakia. Oil supplies through the pipeline were stopped by Ukraine on January 27, 2026 - the day when the Russian Federation struck the Lviv region near the city of Brody, approximately in the area of the passage and branching of the oil pipeline branch.
It should be noted that the relations between the administration of Volodymyr Zelensky and the government of Viktor Orban during this period were brought to an extremely conflictual level. Hungary lifted its veto after the opposition won the election. The leader of the winning Tisza party, Peter Magyar, said that Budapest would not block the loan to Ukraine, while stressing that Hungary itself does not plan to participate in its financing.
In fact, a political deal was concluded between the EU and Ukraine: on the one hand, the European Union unblocked the loan for Ukraine, on the other hand, in order for Slovakia and Hungary not to block this decision, Ukraine de facto restored access to Russian oil supplies through Druzhba. At the same time, a package of EU sanctions was adopted, which these countries also did not block.
The 20th package of EU sanctions provides: measures against oil exports and the "shadow fleet", strengthening sanctions against the banking system of the Russian Federation and related structures in third countries, new trade restrictions, as well as steps against circumvention of sanctions through intermediary countries.
However, the decision to ban the transportation of Russian oil in full was not made. It has been postponed, and the sanctions package includes exceptions that make it possible to maintain the regime of "gray supplies" of Russian energy to the European market for some time.
As a result, the main content of the package was reduced to additional restrictions: measures were introduced against individual vessels and Russian icebreakers involved in circumventing sanctions, as well as restrictions on companies from third countries, including structures in Kyrgyzstan, China and a number of other jurisdictions. It is these targeted measures that are currently the main practical result of the 20th package of sanctions.
The European Union's €90 billion loan program, designed for 2026-2027, actually covers the main critical needs of Ukraine's budget for the next two years. At the same time, an important innovation was that the EU for the first time allowed to direct part of this assistance to pay salaries to the military: previously, external funding was used exclusively for civilian expenses, while Kyiv covered military costs from its own resources.
As NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said earlier, in 2026, the Alliance countries plan to provide Ukraine with about $60 billion in military assistance. Together with the EU loan program, this forms a guaranteed amount of support at the level of $150+ billion on the part of individual allied countries.
In general, in Ukraine, it is actually institutionalizing the regime of a long-term war, consolidating a management model focused on a long-term confrontation. The Verkhovna Rada has once again extended martial law and mobilization for another 90 days - until August 2, 2026 (for the 19th time since the beginning of a full-scale war)
The negotiation process to resolve the war in Ukraine has actually been paused.
At the current stage of the settlement of the war in Ukraine, it is becoming increasingly obvious that substantive decisions on the negotiations have been postponed at least until the fall, the period of elections to the US Congress. At the same time, formal contacts between the parties are likely to be maintained, performing the function of maintaining the negotiation infrastructure rather than reaching real agreements. Neither Ukraine nor Russia currently demonstrates readiness for principled compromises.
An indicative episode was the failed visit of the American delegation consisting of the Special Envoy of the President of the United States Steve Whitkoff and Jared Kushner to Ukraine. This breakdown can be seen as a signal: Washington does not intend to actively put pressure on Kyiv and European allies to accelerate the conclusion of an agreement with Russia at the moment. At the same time, this reflects the redistribution of US foreign policy priorities against the backdrop of involvement in the Middle East crisis.
Against this background, the position of the Ukrainian leadership remains tough. President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky actually questioned the long-term role of Donald Trump as a guarantor of a possible peace agreement: "For example, the United States says President Trump. President Trump will have another two and a half years, and what are we going to do then?" At the same time, he reiterated his refusal to accept Moscow's key demand - the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the Donbass: "They want us to leave the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Of course, strategically for us this is a loss... We're definitely getting weaker."
Zelensky also stressed that Ukraine takes into account the impact of the Middle East crisis on the priorities of the American administration: "The Americans are busy with something else - not the war here in Europe. Europe has fewer opportunities to influence Russia. But we have our own tasks." At the same time, Kiev continues to maintain constant contact with both Washington and European partners, hoping to keep attention to the Ukrainian agenda.
Separately, the President urged not to attach undue importance to the failed visit of Whitkoff and Kushner, noting: "It is not we who need it, but them," stressing the readiness to receive American representatives at any time.
Thus, at the current stage, a situation of a controlled pause is formed: the negotiation process is formally preserved, but in fact frozen, and the key players are concentrating on their own strategic tasks. Under these conditions, the likelihood of a quick conclusion to substantive agreements remains minimal, at least until the political balance in the United States changes.
Activation of the "Mindich case".
Against the backdrop of the approval by the European Union of a loan of 90 billion euros for Ukraine, the internal political struggle for control over the government and key institutions is escalating. On April 28, Ukrainska Pravda journalist Mykhailo Tkach published fragments of wiretapping organized by NABU and SAP in the apartment of businessman Timur Mindich, who is close to the Office of the President. The audio recordings themselves were not made public - only retellings of three conversations were voiced. These materials feature the former First Assistant to the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky Serhiy Shefir, a certain "Natalia" (probably associated with the construction in the cooperative "Dynasty"), Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Rustem Umerov, and also discussed issues related to the case of the ex-Deputy Prime Minister - ex-Minister of National Unity of Ukraine A. Chernyshov, construction in the cooperative "Dynasty" and possible influence on decisions in the defense sector. It follows from the content that the participants in the conversations discussed support for Chernyshov, expressed dissatisfaction with the actions of NABU, and also touched on the distribution of resources and interaction with government agencies.
After the publications, Rustem Umerov was summoned to a meeting of the parliamentary investigative commission, and Tkach himself announced new materials with the possible participation of President Volodymyr Zelensky himself, although they have not yet been published.
The very fact of leaking records is hardly accidental. Most likely, it occurs with the participation of the structures that kept these records. The media attribute this to the requirements of the EU in the context of a loan of 90 billion euros and the need to strengthen anti-corruption policy. However, the situation is probably more complicated. The main goal may be an attempt to change the internal balance of power – to weaken the influence of the president's entourage on key economic flows and law enforcement agencies.
The announced European reforms are aimed at strengthening the role of the anti-corruption vertical, reducing the influence of the Prosecutor General's Office, the Security Service of Ukraine and other institutions, as well as personnel changes in favor of figures supported by the EU and the anti-corruption environment. Similar processes may affect key sectors of the economy, primarily energy and the military-industrial complex. It is also possible that the leaks are related to the preparation of possible suspicions against representatives of the former leadership of the President's Office.
In parallel, this may be linked to the broader context of war and the peace process. After the EU's decisions to allocate significant financial resources and the confirmation of large-scale military assistance from the West, Ukraine received a resource base for the next two years, which reduces incentives for concessions in the negotiation process. Moscow also does not demonstrate readiness for compromise, and a situation of protracted war is emerging. However, this scenario does not suit everyone. Against this background, leaks can be viewed as an instrument of pressure on the President and his team in order to weaken their positions and increase controllability, including for a possible reformatting of the negotiation process and relations with the United States. At the same time, direct evidence, including recordings with the participation of the President, has not yet been presented: in the public field there are only retellings and hints that can be considered as signals of pressure.
In the near future, the situation may develop in two directions. Either there will be personnel reshuffles and a strengthening of the role of anti-corruption structures as a form of compromise, or there will be a response from traditional law enforcement agencies and the presidential vertical, which will lead to the transition of the conflict to a more open phase.
Franco-German concept of Ukraine's interim status in the EU.
Germany and France offer Ukraine an interim status on the way to EU membership, which involves gradual integration without a full set of rights. This format is largely political and symbolic, making it possible to demonstrate support for Kyiv without immediate financial and institutional obligations. We are talking about models in which Ukraine will be able to participate in EU institutions, but without the right to vote and access to key financial instruments (in general, such a model can be considered).
In the German version, this is "associate membership" with participation in summits without influencing decisions; in French, it is the "integrated state" model, where access to mechanisms such as the Common Agrarian Policy and the Cohesion Policy is postponed until full accession. Both concepts are presented as an accelerated path to membership, which can be implemented by a political decision. At the same time, there is still no consensus within the EU on the accelerated integration of Ukraine.
Previously, the European Commission proposed a model of gradual membership, in which Ukraine would formally become part of the EU, but without access to key rights and funds with their subsequent gradual provision. However, most member states opposed this logic, fearing the inclusion of Ukraine in budgetary and institutional mechanisms without completing the full accession procedure. Against this background, the initiatives of Germany and France actually represent an alternative approach – institutional convergence without providing rights and resources.
Within the framework of the discussed interim status, the possibility of extending certain elements of the EU's mutual defense to Ukraine is also being considered. Formally, such obligations are not automatic and leave countries free to choose the form of participation, but the political risk of pressure remains, especially given Ukraine's financial dependence and the possible increase in threats on the eastern flank of the EU.
At the same time, such compromise formats are not supported in Ukraine. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy emphasizes that Ukraine does not consider membership options without full participation in decision-making, pointing out that the country "defends Europe not symbolically, but realistically," which, in his opinion, should be the basis for full membership.
Ukraine entered the top 7 countries with the highest defense spending.
According to new data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), global military spending reached $2887 billion in 2025, up 2.9% from 2024, but well below the 9.7% growth a year earlier. The slowdown is due to a decrease in US military spending to $954 billion (-7.5% by 2024) amid the lack of new military aid packages for Ukraine, which contrasts with the previous three years, when a total of $127 billion was approved.
At the same time, spending increased by 14% in Europe (to $864 billion) and by 8.1% in Asia and Oceania. Military spending remains highly concentrated, with the 15 largest countries accounting for $2,304 billion, or 80% of global spending. Twelve of them increased their budgets, with declines recorded only in the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel. The combined spending of the five leaders – the United States ($954 billion), China ($336 billion), Russia ($190 billion), Germany ($114 billion) and India ($92 billion) – reached $1,686 billion, or 58% of the global total, with the United States, China and Russia accounting for 51%.
Germany in 2025 came in 4th place in the world with $114 billion, increasing spending by 24% - this is the third consecutive year of double-digit growth. At 2.3% of GDP, Germany's military burden exceeded 2% for the first time since 1990, and Berlin plans to bring it to 3.5% of GDP by 2029. Over the past decade, the regional structure of spending has changed: America's share has decreased by 5.5 percentage points, while Europe's share has increased by 11 percentage points. In 2025, the Americas account for 37% of global spending, Europe for 30%, Asia and Oceania for 24%, the Middle East for 7.6%, and Africa for 2%.
The countries of the second part of the top 15 show the highest growth rates: Spain increased spending by 50%, Poland - by 23%, Italy and Ukraine - by 20%. Ukraine, with an indicator of $84 billion, ranks 7th in the world, its share is 2.9% of global spending, and the military burden reaches about 40% of GDP - this is the highest level in the world. For comparison, in Russia this figure is about 7.5% of GDP. Since 2016, Ukraine's military spending has increased by 1501% (from 3.7% of GDP).
In general, SIPRI data show a slowdown in global spending growth with a shift in the center of military activity from the United States to Europe and Asia. The war in Ukraine remains a key factor in redistributing the burden on European economies, consolidating the transition to a long-term model of increasing military budgets. Europe is showing outstripping growth, largely due to Germany, which is becoming a key financial and military donor for Ukraine.
Ukraine, in turn, finds itself in a state of long-term external military and financial binding. The country has actually become systemically dependent on external arms supplies and defense financing, which is reflected in the dynamics of expenditures and their share in GDP. As a result, a model is being formed in which military consumption is supported from the outside, and the domestic economy is increasingly focused on servicing this system, increasing dependence on the political decisions of external partners.
Hostilities.
Russia is trying to intensify offensive operations along the entire front line, but the pace of advance remains limited. Over the past week, Russian troops have seized about 25 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory and currently control 116,830 thousand square kilometers (19.35%).
Kharkiv region. Russian forces have increased activity in the border areas, in particular in the Velyky Burlutsk direction. An advance north of Kupyansk is also recorded - in the Synkivka area. At the same time, the situation around Kupyansk remains unstable: earlier the Armed Forces of Ukraine managed to partially push back Russian troops and disrupt their logistics, but the Russian presence in the area remains.
Donetsk region. The most intense hostilities continue in the area of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, where Russian troops have made tactical advances. At the same time, the so-called "bag" in the area of Svitle north of Myrnohrad has been reduced, which has partially reduced the risk of encirclement of Ukrainian units.
Lyman direction. There are battles in the area of the village of Ozernoye. The village is partially located in the "gray zone", while the main part of the territory remains under the control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Sumy region. Intensification of hostilities is recorded in the border area - near the village of Taratutine (Krasnopillia direction). Fighting is taking place on the eastern outskirts of the settlement, which indicates attempts to expand the pressure zone in this sector.
Ukraine is strengthening the defense in depth in the northern direction. The head of the engineering troops of the Command of the Support Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Vasyl Sirotenko, said that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have begun to create a continuous line of defense from the Kyiv reservoir to Sumy. At the same time, Chernihiv, most of the Chernihiv region and a significant part of the Sumy region actually remain behind this line.
Middle East crisis: The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz becomes the main barrier to the deal between the United States and Iran.
The situation in the Middle East is entering a phase of negotiation deadlock, where the issue of the U.S. naval blockade of Iran is becoming a key knot of contradictions. The talks have actually come to a basic divergence of positions: Tehran demands the lifting of the blockade as a precondition for any further steps, while Washington insists on concluding a full-fledged deal before it is lifted. Iran proposes a step-by-step settlement scheme: at the first stage - the cessation of the war and guarantees of non-aggression against Iran and Lebanon, at the second - discussion of the regime for the functioning of the Strait of Hormuz, and only at the third stage - a return to the nuclear deal. It is also proposed to extend the truce for a long period in the absence of final agreements. The parties proceed from different logics: Iran proposes to first reduce the level of conflict and only then move on to key issues, while the United States demands that strategic issues be resolved in advance.
In the future, several scenarios for the development of the situation are possible. The United States may agree to a partial lifting of the blockade in exchange for limited steps on the part of Iran, which will allow negotiations to continue, but without guarantees of the result and with the strengthening of Tehran's position. Alternatively, Washington can maintain the blockade, counting on economic pressure, but its effectiveness remains controversial due to the possible circumvention of restrictions and external support for Iran, while the risks of escalation up to strikes on American forces in the region remain. Finally, the resumption of hostilities as an instrument of pressure is not ruled out, despite the previous limitations of this scenario – the difficulty of inflicting a decisive defeat on Iran, high costs and the factor of the upcoming elections in the United States.
Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovskaya
for the Ukrainian Institute of Politics
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