At the front, Ukraine has transferred reserves to the Lyman and Kupyansk directions, where Russian troops are trying to launch an offensive. In the Zaporizhzhia region, Ukrainian troops continue offensive operations in the Melitopol and Berdyansk directions. The RF Armed Forces tried to counterattack the Vremievsky ledge. The advance of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is noted at two points of the southern front - under the village of Rabotino (Orikhiv direction, Zaporizhzhia region) and in the village of Urozhaine (Vremievsky ledge, Donetsk region).
There are also some successes of the Ukrainian troops on the southern flank of the Bakhmut direction, in total, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have already liberated 40 sq. km of territory. The Armed Forces of Ukraine also carry out raid and sabotage operations on the left bank of the Dnipro in the area of the Cossack Camps and other settlements to tie up the reserves of the Russian army in the south.
Periodic shelling of the Crimean Bridge continues. President of Ukraine V. Zelensky, in his address, actually took responsibility for the attack on the Crimean Bridge, which took place on Saturday, August 12. According to the statement Russian Federation, missiles of the S-200 complex, converted by Ukraine into a strike version, were shot down. There is no information about the damage to the bridge - the missiles were shot down over the sea - footage of the smoke masking of the bridge, which was turned on by the Russian Federation, circulated on the network. Later, CNN, citing SBU data, published footage of sea drone strikes on the Crimean Bridge.
Such attacks are more designed to inflict reputational damage on the Russian Federation, as well as, if possible, disrupt Russian logistical supply routes.
The Russian Federation plans to hold early "elections" in part of the occupied territories (Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions). So "early voting" will take place from August 31 to September 7. Whereas the main voting day in the Russian Federation is September 10th. This means that Moscow once again raises the stakes and demonstrates the rigidity of its position. Such a step on the part of the Russian Federation is a signal that they are not going to give up the occupied and annexed territories of Ukraine, even within the framework of some future agreements on a peaceful settlement.
The Ukrainian counter-offensive is not moving as fast as the Allies planned. As the Western press writes, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are suffering heavy losses, burning Western equipment and ammunition on the battlefield. Although a breakthrough by the Ukrainian army during the current campaign has not yet been ruled out. In the West, they are already beginning to think about the spring offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine next year. Since there will be more Western equipment and more qualified operators in Ukraine by spring, more Ukrainian military personnel will also be able to be trained in NATO countries by that time. That is, the allies expect that next year the Armed Forces of Ukraine will have better training than the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
In general, publications in the Western press regarding the lack of significant results of the Ukrainian counter-offensive, or even statements that Ukraine will have to make territorial concessions for the sake of EU and NATO membership, may indicate growing fatigue within the political systems of Ukraine's allies, associated with rising costs and domestic political crises in these countries. And also about the attempt to establish stable control throughout the war in Ukraine, especially on the eve of the difficult presidential elections in the United States and parliamentary elections in the UK and other European countries.
Prospects for peace talks. The war of attrition is already partially affecting the political position of the parties. Thus, the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine Oleksiy Danilov said that in the "peace formula" of President V. Zelensky, the basic principles cannot be changed, but the sequence of points can be changed.
This statement about the possibility of reviewing the procedure for implementing the points of the peace plan of V. Zelensky can be regarded as a compromise by Ukraine in the framework of the negotiation process, which intensified after consultations in Copenhagen (Denmark) and Jeddah (Saudi Arabia). In particular, this may mean that Ukraine is considering the possibility of starting a negotiation process without the liberation of all the occupied territories and freezing the conflict, to which the Ukrainian leadership categorically did not agree before. If such points as the withdrawal of Russian troops, the punishment of those responsible, and the payment of reparations, are brought to the very end, this will mean that their implementation is regarded as an unlikely scenario and more like a political declaration. Any truce agreements are likely to be implemented only in the first few points.
If we return to the consideration of the summit in Saudi Arabia (August 5-6), it was noteworthy that Ukraine did not openly demand the de-occupation of all territories. This, probably, was done to a greater extent to draw the countries of the Global South into the negotiation process. The appearance was created that Ukraine, allies, and countries of the Global South were determined to search for common ground, not disagreements, deliberately putting aside those issues on which there was no agreement initially.
But in the future, if the Ukrainian counteroffensive does not lead to the expected result at the front, discussions in the West regarding further financing of Ukraine may intensify. There is a danger that US public opinion, in the event of a protracted war, may begin to express dissatisfaction with Ukraine's support. In particular, US President D. Biden asked the US Congress for an additional $23 billion for Ukraine. But there is no certainty that the Republican-controlled House of Representatives will provide the money.
These processes as a whole can cause pressure on Ukraine from the world community to soften its positions and resume negotiations with the Russian Federation. At the same time, the format of such negotiations, among other things, may provide for the abandonment of part of the territories occupied by the Russian Federation. The fact that the world community is also considering such an extremely unpleasant option for Ukraine can be evidenced by the statement of the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Alliance, Stian Jenssen. He admitted that Ukraine could become a NATO member in case of territorial concessions to the Russian Federation. Obviously, in this case, joining NATO is seen as compensation. But officially Ukraine is not satisfied with this option. Most likely, the world community is now looking for the best options to end the war. And the degree of forced compromises has not yet been finally approved by the Allies. To a large extent, this will depend on the results of the advancement of Ukrainian troops at the front.
Ukraine unilaterally tries to restore the functioning of the ports. After the Russian Federation withdrew from the "grain deal", it launched a strategy to destroy the main export routes for Ukrainian grain and now systematically strikes at the Ukrainian ports of Odesa, as well as on the Danube, near the border with Romania - a NATO member country. The Naval Forces of Ukraine have announced temporary corridors for merchant ships going to/from Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea. These routes will be primarily used to enable the exit of civilian ships that have been in the ports of Chernomorsk, Odessa, and Yuzhny since the beginning of the invasion. At the same time, it is reported that a military threat and a mine threat from the Russian Federation remain throughout all routes. Vessel owners/masters will be required to formally confirm readiness to navigate under current conditions. It is not yet clear whether owners and insurers will want to use these corridors and risk ships, cargo, and people.
For its part, Turkey intends to restart the "grain deal" in a more "expanded" format. On the eve of the visit of the President of the Russian Federation (expected in the last week of August), Ankara stepped up negotiations with Ukraine, the US, and EU countries on this issue.
The situation with the export of Ukrainian agricultural products. After the termination of the "grain deal", in July the volume of exports of agricultural products of Ukraine decreased by 31%.
Thus, according to the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food, in July the export of agricultural products amounted to 3.3 million tons, while in June this export was 4.8 tons.
The volume of export of grain abroad through seaports decreased the most (-41%), which amounted to 2.3 million tons in July (70% of the total volume of grain exports), which is the lowest figure since August 2022.
In June, the corresponding figure was 3.9 million tons (81% of the total volume ).
In theory, Ukraine could export up to 5 million tons per month by alternative routes. In particular, Ukraine could export up to 3 million tons through the ports of the Danube River, and up to 2 million tons by other types of land transport. But after the Russian Federation withdrew from the "grain deal" on July 17, it systematically strikes at the port infrastructure of Ukraine, including the ports of the Danube River, which makes this export virtually impossible.
The Ukrainian Grain Association predicts - 44 million tons of exports of grain and oilseeds in the 2023/2024 marketing year. This is an average of about 3.6 million tons per month.
But without a port infrastructure on the Danube River, Ukraine is unlikely to be able to cope with this year's food exports, having only the ability to export grain by rail and road across the western borders. Ukraine exported about 75% of its agricultural products through ports.
Since the EU is now restricting the import of Ukrainian agricultural products until September 15, it is likely to be extended. In this case, Ukraine's exports may further decline even more.
From the beginning of the functioning of the "grain deal" dated August 1, 2022. until the end of July 2023, Ukraine exported 68 million tons of agricultural products, of which about 51 million tons (75%) were exported through ports and only about 17 million were exported by other means of transport. In particular, railway - 11 million tons; automobile - 5.2 million tons; ferries - 0.79 million tons. According to our calculations, exports through ports should have brought Ukraine about $15 billion (total export profit in 2022 was $44 billion). And the functioning of the "grain deal" - up to 10 billion dollars. That is, Ukraine may lose almost a quarter of its export earnings.
Ukraine's budget expenditures in July were 44% covered by Western funding. This month, the filling of the state budget of the country amounted to UAH 324 billion. Of these, internal resources amounted to UAH 130.3 billion. External resources amounted to - 5.3 billion dollars or - 194 billion hryvnia. Budget expenditures in July amounted to 231.4 billion dollars. At the same time, in July, assistance from international donors amounted to 60% of all revenues, respectively, domestic revenues - 40%. Recall that in June the revenues of the state budget of Ukraine did not cover its expenses. Thus, budget expenditures in June amounted to UAH 264.7 billion. And the total budget revenue for the month amounted to $245 billion. Thus, $20 billion was already spent at the expense of the reserves of the previous months, when budget revenues covered its expenses. This was because foreign aid in June was significantly lower than it is now. Compared to June, international assistance increased by $2.3 billion (June - $3 billion or UAH 110 billion; May $3.25 billion or UAH 119 billion; April - $5.55 billion or UAH 203 billion .). Thus, since the beginning of 2023, the country's budget has already received about $28.3 billion. Thus, on average, since the beginning of the year, Ukraine has received about $4 billion per month. By the end of the year, Ukraine expects to receive more than $40 billion.
Ukraine spends a third of its budget on payments to the military. Since the beginning of the year, 520 billion hryvnias have been spent on the maintenance of the military from the general fund of the budget, that is, a third of all expenses during this time (1.64 trillion hryvnias). More than half of this amount goes to the Armed Forces of Ukraine: UAH 276.9 billion. spent on military equipment, weapons, ammunition, fuel, and food for the military. In particular, 40.8% of the total volume was spent on salaries with accruals.
The Office of the President seeks to strengthen its control over the deputies and continues to “cleanse” the ranks of the pro-government party from toxic and disloyal figures. So the "Servants of the People" expelled people's deputies A. Gunko and B. Torokhtiy from their parliamentary faction. A. Gunko was sent to a pre-trial detention center the day before on suspicion of taking a bribe of 85 thousand dollars. And B. Torokhtiy got into a scandal by going abroad and buying expensive property. Both refused to voluntarily resign the mandates of people's deputies. A series of corruption scandals that periodically enter the information field irritates society and lowers the morale of the army. Therefore, the government is very sensitive to public criticism and situations when individual members of its team or officials and parliamentarians create information crises and gain toxicity, which casts a shadow on the actions of the President's team as a whole. The "reprisal" against these deputies is indicative of other parliamentarians and officials. Recently, the "Servant of the People" has already lost 4 people's deputies. So earlier, Y. Aristov wrote a letter of resignation after an investigation by journalists about his vacation in the Maldives. Andrey Kholodov became the second deputy to resign his mandate from the Servants of the People. Against this background, Minister of Culture and Information Policy A. Tkachenko was dismissed earlier. Also, investigative actions are currently underway against dozens of other people's deputies. On the eve, searches were also carried out at the people's deputy - A. Dubinsky (an informal group of I. Kolomoisky ) in the case of illegal travel abroad. The figure of A. Dubinsky was already quite toxic, the deputy was expelled from the party more than two years ago, is under US sanctions, and rumors are spreading in the information space about his ties with the Russian Federation and I. Kolomoisky.
Draft Law No. 9610 on Amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine" on Certain Issues of Realizing the Rights and Freedoms of Persons Belonging to National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine has been submitted to the Verkhovna Rada.
The bill was introduced in connection with the conclusion of the Venice Commission, which proposed to bring the law into line with the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Regional Languages. Changes to the law on national minorities are rather a forced step for the authorities, otherwise, it may become an obstacle on the way to joining the EU
In particular, they proposed to bring the law into line with the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Regional Languages. Namely, the Venice Commission proposed to revise the provisions of other laws restricting the freedom to use minority languages and differential treatment of minority languages, in line with previous opinions of the Venice Commission. The Law "On Education", as well as the Law "On the State Language" affect the situation and the rights of national minorities. They were submitted to the Venice Commission for decision in 2017 and 2019, respectively. And the new Law on National Minorities (Communities) did not make any changes to the legislation on education and the state language. Thus, the previous recommendations of the Venice Commission in this area remain valid to the extent that they were not taken into account in subsequent special laws.
In addition, the authorities expect to smooth out the conflict with Hungary, where Ukraine is often accused of persecuting the Hungarian national minority. This gave rise to statements about the readiness to block Ukraine's accession to the EU, which caused a strong reaction in society.
This draft law No. 9610 introduces the ability to restrict the rights and freedoms of national minorities in the interests of state security and also changes the language policy. At the same time, clear regulation is introduced when exactly such restrictions are possible. The amendment of the first paragraph of part 6 of article 5 allows the restriction of the rights and freedoms of national minorities only "in the interests of national security, territorial integrity, and public order. for the prevention of disorder or crime, for public health, for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, if such restriction is necessary in a democratic society."
An important provision on methodology includes references to activities that are solely based on the main provisions of the Framework Convention of the Council of Europe for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Which, in turn, provides for a wide range of powers and rights of national minorities and creates opportunities for their application in Ukraine. Such amendments to the law on national minorities make it similar to the law “On the Fundamentals of the State Language Policy” (known as the “ Kivalov -Kolesnichenko law”), which The year 2018 was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.
In the definition of the very term national minorities, the word "traditionally" disappears (Article 1, paragraph 1). According to the current legislation, this is a group of non-ethnic Ukrainians who traditionally live on the territory of Ukraine. In the new wording, "a group of citizens of Ukraine, not ethnic Ukrainians, who live on the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders ... "Thus, all representatives of ethnic minorities are equalized in rights among themselves (for example, the Hungarian and Afghan national minorities, completely different in size ). Here the question arises whether the state can objectively differentiate the needs of such minorities.
Paragraph 2 of Article 10 is now set out in the following way: “Public events organized for persons belonging to national minorities (previously organized and conducted by persons belonging to national minorities) may be held in the languages of the respective national minorities (communities).” Thus, the circle of persons who can hold events for representatives of national minorities is expanding.
Paragraph 3 of Article 10 states that simultaneous or consecutive interpretation of accompaniment (entertainment) in the state language A cultural, artistic, entertainment, or entertainment event organized and conducted by persons belonging to a national minority (community) may be held in the language of the corresponding national minorities (communities), if the request for simultaneous or consecutive interpretation was not received earlier than 72 hours (in the primary edition 48 hours) before the start of the event. That is the time increases, which makes holding such events with translation into Ukrainian unlikely.
Publishing products published in the languages of national minorities (communities) at the expense of state and/or local budgets, as well as the activities of specialized bookstores, are not subject to the requirement of Article 26 of the Law of Ukraine "On Ensuring the Functioning of Ukrainian as the State Language". According to this, the distributor of publishing products is obliged to issue at least 50% of book publications in the state language. For the provision of emergency medical care, the language of the relevant national minority (community) may be used if it is understandable to the parties (previously it was acceptable).
The Cabinet of Ministers will determine the procedure for recognizing a settlement as one where national minorities "traditionally" live or constitute a "significant part of the population." There is no mention of a percentage. And only in settlements that will receive such a status, there will be language indulgences for national minorities. In particular, for communication with authorities and when using toponym. We can say that concessions for national minorities are introduced manually.
The norms of this law will not apply to the Russian language. The transitional provisions stipulate that language relief does not apply to the language of the aggressor state - even five years after the abolition of this status.
Representatives of Transcarpathian Hungarians, and public organizations such as "The Association of Hungarian Culture of Transcarpathia" and "The Democratic Union of Hungarians of Ukraine ("Democratic Union Ugrian Ukraine ") believe that the project does not restore the rights of national minorities guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine or previously enshrined in legislation. Despite certain steps and concessions on the part of the authorities, the new bill provides for legislative regulation, which has fewer rights and freedoms than it was before 2014.
Military situation
Combat action.
The situation in the Kharkiv region: In the Kupyansk direction, the RF Armed Forces continue their attempts to advance to the Oskol River. There were battles southeast of the village of Olshan and east of the village of Petropavlivka.
In Donbas: The RF Armed Forces are trying to advance in the Lyman direction. On Bakhmutsky, Maryinsky, Avdiivsky, and Ugledarsky clashes of lesser intensity are noted. In the districts of the cities of Bakhmut, Maryinka, and Avdiivka. The attacks of the RF Armed Forces were repulsed in the area of populated areas: in the Serebryansky forest and the settlement Bilogorivka in the Lugansk region.
In the Donetsk, region attacks were repelled - in the areas of the settlements of Spirne, Vesele, Kurdyumivka, in the vicinity of Klishchiivka and northeast of Druzhba, Zaitseve, west of Staromayorske, Novodanylivka, Bogdanivka, Ivanovske, Vesele, Pervomaiske, Orekhovo-Vasilevka, Severne.
The situation in the South: In Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Ukrainian forces continue offensive operations in Melitopol and Berdyansk. RF Armed Forces tried to counterattack on Vremievsky ledge.
Black Sea-Azov direction: without significant changes.
Combat map.
Internal situation.
Economic situation.
Ukraine's budget expenditures in July were 44% covered by Western funding. This month, the filling of the state budget of the country amounted to UAH 324 billion. Of these, internal resources amounted to UAH 130.3 billion. External resources amounted to - 5.3 billion dollars or - 194 billion hryvnia. Budget expenditures in July amounted to 231.4 billion dollars. At the same time, in July, assistance from international donors amounted to 60% of all revenues, respectively, domestic revenues - 40%. Recall that in June the revenues of the state budget of Ukraine did not cover its expenses. Thus, budget expenditures in June amounted to UAH 264.7 billion. And the total budget revenue for the month amounted to $245 billion. Thus, $20 billion was already spent at the expense of the reserves of the previous months, when budget revenues covered its expenses. This was because foreign aid in June was significantly lower than it is now. Compared to June, international assistance increased by $2.3 billion (June - $3 billion or UAH 110 billion; May $3.25 billion or UAH 119 billion; April - $5.55 billion or UAH 203 billion .). Thus, since the beginning of 2023, the country's budget has already received about $28.3 billion. Thus, on average, since the beginning of the year, Ukraine has received about $4 billion per month. By the end of the year, Ukraine expects to receive more than $40 billion.
Ukraine spends a third of its budget on payments to the military. Since the beginning of the year, 520 billion hryvnias have been spent on the maintenance of the military from the general fund of the budget, that is, a third of all expenses during this time (1.64 trillion hryvnias). More than half of this amount goes to the Armed Forces of Ukraine: UAH 276.9 billion was spent on military equipment, weapons, ammunition, fuel, and food for the military. In particular, 40.8% of the total volume was spent on salaries with accruals.
The situation with the export of Ukrainian agricultural products. After the termination of the "grain deal", in July the volume of exports of agricultural products of Ukraine decreased by 31%.
Thus, according to the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food, in July the export of agricultural products amounted to 3.3 million tons, while in June this export was 4.8 tons.
The volume of export of grain abroad through seaports decreased the most (-41%), which amounted to 2.3 million tons in July (70% of the total volume of grain exports), which is the lowest figure since August 2022.
In June, the corresponding figure was 3.9 million tons (81% of the total volume ).
In theory, Ukraine could export up to 5 million tons per month by alternative routes. In particular, Ukraine could export up to 3 million tons through the ports of the Danube River, and up to 2 million tons by other types of land transport. But after the Russian Federation withdrew from the "grain deal" on July 17, it systematically strikes at the port infrastructure of Ukraine, including the ports of the Danube River, which makes this export virtually impossible.
The Ukrainian Grain Association predicts - 44 million tons of exports of grain and oilseeds in the 2023/2024 marketing year. This is an average of about 3.6 million tons per month.
But without a port infrastructure on the Danube River, Ukraine is unlikely to be able to cope with this year's food exports, having only the ability to export grain by rail and road across the western borders. Ukraine exported about 75% of its agricultural products through ports.
Since the EU is now restricting the import of Ukrainian agricultural products until September 15, it is likely to be extended. In this case, Ukraine's exports may further decline even more.
From the beginning of the functioning of the "grain deal" dated August 1, 2022. until the end of July 2023, Ukraine exported 68 million tons of agricultural products, of which about 51 million tons (75%) were exported through ports and only about 17 million were exported by other means of transport. In particular, railway - 11 million tons; automobile - 5.2 million tons; ferries - 0.79 million tons. According to our calculations, exports through ports should have brought Ukraine about $15 billion (total export profit in 2022 was $44 billion). And the functioning of the "grain deal" - up to 10 billion dollars. That is, Ukraine may lose almost a quarter of its export earnings.
The Office of the President seeks to strengthen its control over the deputies and continues to “cleanse” the ranks of the pro-government party from toxic and disloyal figures.
So the "Servants of the People" expelled people's deputies A. Gunko and B. Torokhtiy from their parliamentary faction. A. Gunko was sent to a pre-trial detention center the day before on suspicion of taking a bribe of 85 thousand dollars. And B.Torokhtiy got into a scandal by going abroad and buying expensive property. Both refused to voluntarily resign the mandates of people's deputies. A series of corruption scandals that periodically gets into the information field irritates society and lowers the morale of the army. Therefore, the government is very sensitive to public criticism and situations when individual members of its team or officials and parliamentarians create information crises and gain toxicity, which casts a shadow on the actions of the President's team as a whole. The "reprisal" against these deputies is indicative of other parliamentarians and officials. Recently, the "Servant of the People" has already lost 4 people's deputies. So earlier, Y. Aristov wrote a letter of resignation after an investigation by journalists about his vacation in the Maldives. Andrey Kholodov became the second deputy to resign his mandate from the Servants of the People. Against this background, Minister of Culture and Information Policy A. Tkachenko was dismissed earlier. Also, investigative actions are currently underway against dozens of other people's deputies. On the eve, searches were also carried out at the people's deputy - A. Dubinsky (an informal group of I. Kolomoisky) in the case of illegal travel abroad. The figure of A. Dubinsky was already quite toxic, the deputy was expelled from the party more than two years ago, is under US sanctions, and rumors are spreading in the information space about his ties with the Russian Federation and I. Kolomoisky.
A draft amendment to the law on national minorities has appeared in the Verkhovna Rada. Draft Law No. 9610 on Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine” on Certain Issues of Realizing the Rights and Freedoms of Persons Belonging to National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine”. Its authors were mainly "Servants of the People": Alexander Kornienko, Yevgenia Kravchuk, Sergei Babak, Nikita Poturaev and others.
Law No. 8224 on national minorities of Ukraine was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada in December 2022. And in June, the Venice Commission issued its opinion on this law. In particular, they proposed to bring the law into line with the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Regional Languages.
Namely, The Venice Commission proposed to revise the provisions of other laws restricting the freedom to use minority languages and differential treatment of minority languages, in line with previous opinions of the Venice Commission. The Law "On Education", as well as the Law "On the State Language" affect the situation and the rights of national minorities. They were submitted to the Venice Commission for decision in 2017 and 2019, respectively. And the new Law on National Minorities (Communities) did not make any changes to the legislation on education and the state language. Thus, the previous recommendations of the Venice Commission in this area remain valid to the extent that they have not been adequately taken into account in subsequent special laws.
The Venice Commission stressed the importance of the issue of discriminatory attitudes towards other minority languages that are not official EU languages - should be considered in this context. The Venice Commission has recommended: the abolition of provisions providing for differential treatment between indigenous languages, national minority languages that are official EU languages, and national minority languages that are not official EU languages, to the extent that the distinction between these languages has no objective and reasonable justification.
This draft law No. 9610 introduces the ability to restrict the rights and freedoms of national minorities in the interests of state security and also changes the language policy.
The change in the first paragraph of part 6 of Article 5 allows the restriction of the rights and freedoms of national minorities only in the interests of national security, territorial integrity, and public order. Thus, legislators plan to prevent riots or crimes. And also - to stimulate the protection of public health and the protection of the rights and freedoms of other people.
“ The rights, freedoms, and obligations of persons belonging to national minorities may be restricted by the law in the interests of national security, territorial integrity, and public order, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for public health, for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, if such restriction necessary in a democratic society,” reads the text of the document. Which body will determine such a need to restrict rights is not reported.
Supplementing Article 3 with a new part 4, obliging the state to take measures to achieve full and genuine equality between the national minorities and the ethnic majority. In particular, in the spheres of economic, social, political, and cultural life.
After paragraph 3, add a new paragraph 4 with the following content:
« 4. Establish that the provisions of parts two, three, eleven
Article 10 of this Law shall not apply to the state (official) language of a state recognized by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as an aggressor state or an occupying state, from the moment of the relevant recognition by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and within five years from the date of the adoption by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of a decision to cancel such status ".
In addition to Article 13, a new paragraph 5 refers to state support for languages of national minorities that are threatened with extinction. Such languages include the Crimean Tatar, Karaite, and Krymchatsky languages.
In the definition of the very term national minorities, the word "traditionally" disappears (Article 1, paragraph 1). According to the current legislation, this is a group of non-ethnic Ukrainians who traditionally live on the territory of Ukraine. In the new wording, "a group of citizens of Ukraine, not ethnic Ukrainians, who live on the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders ... "Thus, all representatives of ethnic minorities are equalized in rights among themselves (for example, the Hungarian and Afghan national minorities, completely different in size ). Here the question arises whether the state can objectively differentiate the needs of such minorities.
Paragraph 2 of Article 10 is now set out in the following way: “Public events organized for persons belonging to national minorities (previously organized and conducted by persons belonging to national minorities) may be held in the languages of the respective national minorities (communities).” Thus, the circle of persons who can hold events for representatives of national minorities is expanding.
Paragraph 3 of Article 10 states that simultaneous or consecutive interpretation of accompaniment (entertainment) in the state language A cultural, artistic, entertainment, or entertainment event organized and conducted by persons belonging to a national minority (community) may be held in the language of the corresponding national minorities (communities), if the request for simultaneous or consecutive interpretation was not received earlier than 72 hours (in the primary edition 48 hours) before the start of the event. That is the time increases, which makes holding such events with translation into Ukrainian unlikely.
Publishing products published in the languages of national minorities (communities) at the expense of state and/or local budgets are not subject to the requirement of paragraph one of part four of Article 26 of the Law of Ukraine "On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language". According to this, the distributor of publishing products is obliged to issue in the state language at least 50% of all titles of book publications issued by him during the corresponding calendar year.
The activities of specialized bookstores established to implement the rights of national minorities (communities) are not covered by the requirements of the first paragraph of the fifth part of Article 26 of the Law of Ukraine "On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language". According to this, in a book distribution institution, there must be at least 50% of book publications in the state language.
For the provision of emergency medical care, the language of the relevant national minority (community) may be used if it is understandable to the parties (previously it was acceptable).
The Cabinet of Ministers will determine the procedure for recognizing a settlement as one where national minorities "traditionally" live or constitute a "significant part of the population." There is no mention of a percentage. And only in settlements that will receive such a status, there will be language indulgences for national minorities. In particular, for communication with authorities and when using toponym. We can say that concessions for national minorities are introduced manually.
The norms of this law will not apply to the Russian language. The transitional provisions stipulate that language relief does not apply to the language of the aggressor state - even five years after the abolition of this status.
An important provision on methodology includes references to activities that are solely based on the main provisions of the Framework Convention of the Council of Europe for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Which, in turn, provides for a wide range of powers and rights of national minorities and creates opportunities for their application in Ukraine. Such changes to the law on national minorities make it similar to the law "On the Fundamentals of State Language Policy" (known as the " Kivalov -Kolesnichenko law"), which the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional in 2018.
Representatives of Transcarpathian Hungarians, and public organizations such as "The Association of Hungarian Culture of Transcarpathia" and "The Democratic Union of Hungarians of Ukraine ("Democratic Union Ugrian Ukraine ") believe that the project does not restore the rights of national minorities guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine or previously enshrined in legislation. Despite certain steps and concessions on the part of the authorities, the new bill provides for legislative regulation, which has fewer rights and freedoms than it was before 2014.
The situation around Ukraine.
Peace negotiations.
The war of attrition is already partially affecting the political position of the parties. Thus, the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine Oleksiy Danilov said that in the "peace formula" of President V. Zelensky, the basic principles cannot be changed, but the sequence of points can be changed.
This statement about the possibility of reviewing the procedure for implementing the points of the peace plan of V. Zelensky can be regarded as a compromise by Ukraine in the framework of the negotiation process, which intensified after consultations in Copenhagen (Denmark) and Jeddah (Saudi Arabia). In particular, this may mean that Ukraine is considering the possibility of starting a negotiation process without the liberation of all the occupied territories and freezing the conflict, to which the Ukrainian leadership categorically did not agree before. If such points as the withdrawal of Russian troops, the punishment of those responsible, and the payment of reparations, are brought to the very end, this will mean that their implementation is regarded as an unlikely scenario and more like a political declaration. Any truce agreements are likely to be implemented only in the first few points.
If we return to the consideration of the summit in Saudi Arabia (August 5-6), it was noteworthy that Ukraine did not openly demand the de-occupation of all territories. This, probably, was done to a greater extent to draw the countries of the Global South into the negotiation process. Similarly, on the other hand, the countries of the Global South (Asia, Africa, and Latin America) recognize the value of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine to influence its position.
The appearance was created that Ukraine, allies, and countries of the Global South were determined to search for common ground, not disagreements, deliberately putting aside those issues on which there was no agreement initially.
In the future, if the Ukrainian counteroffensive does not lead to the expected result at the front, discussions in the West regarding further support for Ukraine may intensify.
There is a danger that US public opinion, in the event of a protracted war, may begin to express dissatisfaction with Ukraine's support.
In particular, US President D. Biden asked the US Congress for an additional $23 billion for arms and assistance to Ukraine. But it's not yet certain whether the GOP-controlled House of Representatives will provide the money. Ukrainian Ambassador to the US Oksana Markarova told the Huffington Post that not everyone in Ukraine is confident in US support and that it will always be provided. U.S. lawmakers are now questioning aid to Ukraine " more sharply than ever, " she said.
In this regard, a very difficult political season is expected in Ukraine. These processes can cause pressure on Ukraine from the world community to soften its positions and resume negotiations with the Russian Federation.
At the same time, the format of such negotiations, among other things, may provide for the abandonment of part of the territories occupied by the Russian Federation.
The fact that the world community is also considering such an extremely unpleasant option for Ukraine can be evidenced by the statement of the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Alliance, Stian Jenssen. He admitted that Ukraine could become a NATO member in case of territorial concessions to the Russian Federation. Obviously, in this case, joining NATO is seen as compensation. But officially Ukraine is not satisfied with this option.
Most likely, the world community is now looking for the best options to end the war. And the degree of forced compromises has not yet been finally approved by the Allies. To a large extent, this will depend on the results of the advancement of Ukrainian troops at the front.
Prospects for a counteroffensive and Western aid.
The Ukrainian counter-offensive is not moving as fast as the Allies planned. The Armed Forces of Ukraine are suffering heavy losses (more than 150,000 Ukrainian servicemen were killed or wounded, according to New York Times) burning Western equipment and ammunition on the battlefield. Although a breakthrough by the Ukrainian army during the current campaign has not yet been ruled out. In the West, they are already beginning to think about the spring offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine next year. Since there will be more Western equipment and more skilled operators in Ukraine by spring, more Ukrainian military personnel will be able to train in NATO countries by then. That is, the allies expect that next year the Armed Forces of Ukraine will have better training than the Russians.
As a result of the slow progress of the Ukrainian counter-offensive, rumors about the need for negotiations to end the war are starting to grow. A very difficult political season is expected in Ukraine, because pressure may be exerted on the country in this regard. As stated, Foreign Minister Dmitry Kuleba said that he believes that a large number of difficult international summits are ahead, at which the Ukrainian side needs "the quantitative and qualitative presence of the whole world, and not just our traditional friends from Europe and North America." "This does not sound from officials, but these voices (with calls to start negotiations) are getting louder. We will do everything within the framework of international law and criminal law to ensure that these voices fade away," D. Kuleba said.
Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovskaya, Andrey Timchenko
for the Ukrainian Institute of Politics
