Abstract
The article examines the emergence of a new phase in relations between Ukraine and the European Union under the conditions of war, geopolitical restructuring, and institutional transformation inside the EU itself. The paper argues that Ukraine’s European trajectory can no longer be interpreted exclusively through the prism of values, identity, or normative convergence. Instead, European integration increasingly represents a question of institutional engineering, strategic bargaining, asymmetric interdependence, security governance, and geopolitical risk management.
Special attention is devoted to discussions surrounding a possible model of “associate membership” for Ukraine — an intermediate institutional format between the current Association Agreement and full EU accession. The article analyzes the opportunities and risks of such a model, including institutional participation, market access, financial architecture, security guarantees, and the danger of transforming temporary integration into a permanent peripheral status. The paper concludes that Ukraine should approach any interim status pragmatically: supporting deeper integration while insisting on legally guaranteed movement toward full membership.
Introduction
Ukraine’s relations with the European Union have entered a qualitatively new stage. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 fundamentally transformed the geopolitical architecture of Europe and accelerated processes that had previously evolved gradually and cautiously.
The decision of the European Council to grant Ukraine candidate status in June 2022 and formally open accession negotiations in June 2024 marked a historic political shift in EU policy toward Eastern Europe.[1] However, despite the political symbolism of these decisions, the practical implementation of Ukraine’s accession remains constrained by a range of structural factors.
Ukraine’s European trajectory today should not be understood solely as a civilizational or ideological process. Increasingly, it represents a complex negotiation over institutional participation, security responsibilities, budget redistribution, market integration, agricultural competition, migration management, industrial policy, and geopolitical stabilization.
From a realpolitik perspective, the central question is no longer whether Ukraine belongs to Europe politically. The key question is how the European Union can integrate a large, war-affected, militarily significant, and economically disruptive state without undermining its own institutional balance.
The debate surrounding possible “associate membership” or intermediate integration formats reflects precisely this dilemma.
Ukraine’s EU Accession: Strategic Legitimacy and Structural Constraints
The objective of Ukraine’s full membership in the European Union remains strategically valid and politically legitimate. The EU itself has repeatedly confirmed that “the future of Ukraine and its citizens lies within the European Union.”[2]
At the same time, political declarations must be measured against institutional realities.
Several structural constraints remain evident.
First, Ukraine remains a country at war. Although the EU has previously admitted divided or geopolitically vulnerable states, Ukraine’s case is unprecedented in scale, military intensity, and reconstruction requirements.
Second, the European Union itself is institutionally unprepared for the rapid accession of a country with Ukraine’s demographic size, agricultural capacity, industrial structure, and security significance. The accession of Ukraine would inevitably reshape the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), cohesion policy, budget allocations, and voting balances inside EU institutions.[3]
Third, enlargement remains constrained by unanimity among member states. Domestic political dynamics inside countries such as Hungary, Slovakia, France, and parts of Germany increasingly influence enlargement debates. Migration sensitivities, budgetary concerns, and fears of labor market disruption also shape the political environment.
Fourth, the transatlantic security architecture has become less predictable. The uncertainty surrounding long-term American commitments to European security after the return of Donald Trump to the White House has intensified debates about European strategic autonomy.[4]
As a result, the European Union is increasingly compelled to search for alternative formats of geopolitical integration that fall somewhere between partnership and full membership.
The Concept of Associate Membership
Against this background, discussions associated with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz regarding a possible “associate membership” format for Ukraine deserve serious analytical attention.
Although no fully developed institutional proposal currently exists, the concept may be interpreted as an attempt to create an intermediate status between the Association Agreement and full EU membership. Such a format could potentially include:
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participation in selected EU summits and ministerial meetings;
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structured access to EU institutions without voting rights;
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expanded integration into the single market;
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participation in European defense-industrial cooperation;
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privileged access to financial instruments and reconstruction mechanisms;
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gradual inclusion into elements of the EU security architecture.
The significance of the proposal lies not in its symbolic attractiveness, but in what it reveals about the transformation of the European Union itself.
The traditional enlargement architecture increasingly appears insufficient for the Ukrainian case. Ukraine is already functionally embedded in Europe’s security order. It plays a central role in the military balance on NATO’s eastern flank, European defense-industrial production, Black Sea security, energy transit, food security, and the geopolitical stabilization of Eastern Europe.
Yet institutionally and legally, Ukraine remains outside the EU’s decision-making core.
This creates a structural mismatch between Ukraine’s geopolitical role and its formal institutional status.
Associate membership can therefore be interpreted as an attempt to manage this mismatch.
However, the proposal contains a profound ambiguity.
In one interpretation, associate membership may become a transitional bridge toward full accession.
In another interpretation, it may become a mechanism for long-term containment of Ukraine in a semi-integrated and semi-dependent peripheral position.
This distinction is strategically decisive.
Institutional Participation Without Full Membership
If Ukraine does not initially receive voting rights inside EU institutions, it must nevertheless insist on legally structured participation in the Union’s political process.
Participation should not be symbolic or ceremonial.
Ukraine should seek institutionalized involvement in discussions related to:
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sanctions policy;
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security and defense;
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reconstruction;
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energy security;
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Black Sea policy;
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migration;
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enlargement;
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defense-industrial cooperation;
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critical raw materials;
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digital governance.
Participation without voting rights can still be strategically meaningful if Ukraine receives:
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access to preparatory documents;
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inclusion in working groups;
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consultation rights;
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speaking rights;
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agenda-setting participation;
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permanent representation mechanisms.
Without procedural rights and institutional access, “associate membership” risks becoming politically decorative.
From the perspective of EU institutional evolution, such arrangements would not be unprecedented. The European Economic Area (EEA), the European Political Community (EPC), and differentiated integration mechanisms already demonstrate that the EU increasingly operates through multilayered forms of participation.[5]
Market Integration and the Risk of Asymmetric Absorption
One of the central risks of associate integration concerns the possibility of asymmetric economic absorption.
The European Union will naturally seek to protect its own agricultural producers, labor markets, industrial sectors, and budgetary interests. Ukraine, however, must simultaneously preserve its own industrial capacity, fiscal sovereignty, labor market stability, and economic resilience.
Ukraine’s integration into the EU single market must therefore proceed gradually and sector by sector.
Special attention will be required in areas such as:
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agriculture;
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transport;
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metallurgy;
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energy;
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digital services;
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military-industrial production;
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labor mobility;
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critical raw materials.
The danger lies in the possibility that Ukraine could be required to internalize EU regulations before acquiring the institutional capacity to shape those regulations.
This would produce a condition of asymmetric integration.
To minimize this risk, Ukraine will require:
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transitional periods;
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sectoral safeguards;
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negotiated exemptions;
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compensatory financial instruments;
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industrial protection mechanisms during reconstruction.
The experience of previous EU enlargements demonstrates that uneven integration can produce long-term structural dependency and regional economic imbalance.[6]
Financial Architecture and Reconstruction
No serious model of associate membership can function without a long-term financial architecture.
Ukraine’s reconstruction needs are already estimated by the World Bank, the European Commission, the United Nations, and the Government of Ukraine at more than $500 billion over the next decade.[7]
Consequently, political symbolism alone will be insufficient.
Any serious integration framework must include:
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macro-financial stabilization instruments;
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infrastructure financing;
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war-risk insurance;
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defense-industrial investment;
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energy resilience programs;
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transport corridors;
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digital transformation support;
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reconstruction guarantees.
The key test of any associate membership proposal is therefore straightforward:
Does it create actual resources, or merely political formats?
If integration produces obligations without financing, it will generate frustration inside Ukraine and skepticism within Ukrainian society.
For this reason, Ukraine should insist on a dedicated financial annex attached to any future interim arrangement.
Security Guarantees and the European Defense Dimension
Security remains the decisive dimension of any future EU–Ukraine relationship.
Associate membership without a security component would be strategically incomplete.
Since 2022, the European Union has already significantly expanded its security role through:
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the European Peace Facility (EPF);
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joint ammunition procurement initiatives;
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sanctions policy;
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defense-industrial coordination;
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military assistance missions;
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cyber cooperation;
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strategic autonomy debates.[8]
At the same time, the EU remains institutionally ambiguous regarding collective defense responsibilities.
Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union contains a mutual assistance clause, but its operational meaning remains politically flexible and institutionally underdeveloped.[9]
For Ukraine, ambiguity in security guarantees has historically produced catastrophic consequences.
Therefore, any future associate framework must translate political declarations into operational commitments.
Such commitments may include:
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accelerated arms supply mechanisms;
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joint defense-industrial production;
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intelligence-sharing protocols;
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cyber defense coordination;
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sanctions escalation triggers;
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air defense cooperation;
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ammunition contracts;
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operational consultations during crises.
Ukraine should not be integrated merely as a recipient of European protection.
It should be integrated as one of the pillars of the emerging European security architecture.
Ukraine now possesses one of the most experienced armies in Europe, advanced battlefield innovation capacity, significant drone warfare expertise, and a rapidly evolving defense-industrial sector.
These factors fundamentally alter Ukraine’s strategic value for Europe.
The Strategic Trap of Permanent Interim Status
One of the greatest dangers associated with associate membership lies in the possibility that it becomes permanent.
A comfortable waiting room remains a waiting room.
Ukraine must therefore insist on a legally and politically clear formula:
Associate membership cannot become an alternative to accession.
It can only function as a transitional stage toward accession.
This requires:
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review mechanisms;
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measurable benchmarks;
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accession-linked criteria;
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institutional monitoring;
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defined transition procedures;
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political guarantees against indefinite postponement.
Without such safeguards, associate membership may evolve into a “golden cage” — a semi-integrated status that institutionalizes dependency while avoiding full political inclusion.
From a geopolitical perspective, this would generate long-term instability rather than sustainable integration.
Ukraine’s Bargaining Leverage
Ukraine does not enter negotiations with the European Union as a passive object of geopolitical management.
Ukraine brings strategic assets to Europe.
These include:
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military experience;
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strategic depth;
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agricultural capacity;
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energy infrastructure;
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critical transit geography;
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digital governance innovation;
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defense-industrial production;
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Black Sea security capabilities.
Moreover, Europe will continue paying the costs of Ukrainian insecurity regardless of institutional status.
If Ukraine remains unstable or insufficiently integrated, the EU will still face:
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migration pressures;
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security risks;
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reconstruction burdens;
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energy instability;
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military vulnerability on the eastern flank.
From a strategic cost-benefit perspective, integration may ultimately prove less expensive than non-integration.
Ukraine should therefore negotiate not only from the position of gratitude, but also from the position of strategic value.
This does not imply arrogance.
It implies realism.
Conclusion
The European Union is entering a new historical phase.
It can no longer remain solely a regulatory market and post-historical peace project designed for an era of geopolitical comfort.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has transformed Europe into a strategic actor operating under conditions of military competition, industrial mobilization, and geopolitical fragmentation.
Ukraine is simultaneously the catalyst and the test case for this transformation.
For Ukraine, European integration must also cease being viewed as a symbolic ceremony of recognition.
It is a hard institutional negotiation.
A negotiation about:
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power;
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markets;
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money;
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security;
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sovereignty;
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institutional participation;
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strategic risk distribution.
Ukraine should therefore approach any proposal of associate membership pragmatically.
Yes — to associate membership as an interim geopolitical instrument.
No — to associate membership as a substitute for full accession.
Yes — to deeper institutional participation.
No — to symbolic inclusion without influence.
Yes — to market integration.
No — to asymmetric economic absorption.
Yes — to European security guarantees.
No — to another architecture of strategic ambiguity.
Strategic patience may be necessary.
But strategic passivity would be fatal.
Ruslan Bortnik, UIP
References
[1] European Council. “European Council conclusions on Ukraine, enlargement and reforms.” Brussels, 14–15 December 2023.
[2] European Commission. “Opinion on Ukraine’s application for membership of the European Union.” COM(2022) 407 final, 17 June 2022.
[3] Darvas, Zsolt et al. “The EU’s Enlargement Challenge: Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans.” Bruegel Policy Brief, 2024.
[4] Biscop, Sven. “European Strategic Autonomy: Bringing NATO Back In.” Egmont Institute, 2024.
[5] Lavenex, Sandra. “Differentiated Integration and the European Neighbourhood Policy.” Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 16, No. 6.
[6] Grabbe, Heather. The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization Through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe. Palgrave Macmillan.
[7] World Bank, European Commission, United Nations, Government of Ukraine. “Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA4).” February 2025.
[8] European External Action Service. “European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine).” Official documentation, 2024–2025.
[9] Treaty on European Union, Article 42(7), consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European Union.
[10] European Commission. “Ukraine Facility Regulation.” Regulation (EU) 2024/792.
[11] European Parliament Research Service. “Ukraine’s path to EU membership: political, legal and institutional challenges.” 2025.
[12] European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). “The Geopolitics of EU Enlargement after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine.” Policy Brief, 2024.