WHITE PAPER ON UKRAINE/RUSSIA

WHITE PAPER ON UKRAINE/RUSSIA

WHITE PAPER ON UKRAINE / RUSSIA

Prospects for the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: causes, sanctions and possible scenarios

Introduction

This “white paper” is the product of interdisciplinary collaboration by an independent and international assembly of “experts,” scholars and political actors, sponsored by the International Council for Diplomacy and Dialogue—USA and the European Council for Democracy Development. Their disciplinary focus ranges from sociology to political science to economics and the humanities. They work in universities, institutes, non-governmental organizations, and various advisory bodies. However, none are propagandists of any party or in the pay of any government; indeed, their vitae are available on request. They also have very different political beliefs, though they are united by a common rational and realistic approach to conflict resolution. The result of our joint efforts is a balanced and nuanced document based on verifiable data that deals with the causes, scenarios, and possible diplomatic initiatives that might contribute to furthering the cause of peace.

1.Causes: The Russian-Ukrainian conflict began due to a number of geopolitical, military and economic factors, and it is worth noting that the United States is withdrawing from multinational investigations led by the EU into determining responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities. This heightens the importance of our inquiry and our experts view the roots of this conflict in the following way:

  • Russian Imperialism based on the belief that territory of the former USSR constitutes its sphere of influence, its “historical territory

  • NATO expansion into Eastern Europe is seen by some experts as having increased xenophobic fears of Western incursion into the sphere of influence that the Russian Federation inherited from the USSR. Collective security arrangements-following World War II had clarified “red lines,” specified balances of power, and (no matter how imperfectly) provided stability and prevention of direct military confrontations. To provide the historical context for the present crisis, it is important to highlight the erosion of the e post-World War II security system.

  • The Warsaw Pact was dissolved, but NATO continues to exist.

  • In 2001, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

  • In response, in 2002 Russia withdrew from the START II Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty,

  • In 2007, the Russian Federation suspended its participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and withdrew from it in 2023.

  • In 2019, the United States announced its withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, concluded in 1987, and Russia followed by announcing its own withdrawal

  • In May 2020, President Donald Trump accused Russia of violating the Open Skies Treaty (OST) and ended American participation. Russia withdrew from the Treaty in 2021.

  • In 2023, Russian President V. Putin suspended Russia's participation in the START III Treaty, which was signed between Russia and the United States in 2010 in Prague.

  • Clashes over values associated with the West’s liberal universalism and Russia’s authoritarian illiberalism. Each sees the other as an existential threat: Russia is viewed as seeking to re-establish its Empire while the West is seen as seeking to exploit its “victory” in the Cold War to the detriment of Russia. Mitigating this distrust through “soft” diplomacy is of great importance.

  • Lack of uniform and binding human rights standards. Neither the US nor international organizations have been able to secure the rights of ethnic, national. and religious minorities, and members of the LGBT community in Russia. However, discrimination is also directed against Russian-speaking as well as Hungarian, Romanian, Polish, Bulgarian, and other minorities in the former Soviet republics, primarily in the Baltic countries and Ukraine. Forced “Ukrainization” of schools and the public sphere have not provoked protests from Western countries and international human rights organizations. This indifference was used by Russia to justify its aggression against Ukraine. Insistence on recognition of human rights standards on both sides is crucial for any new collective security system.

2.Victims: Following the revolutionary change of power in Ukraine in late February 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and supported separatist uprisings in Donbass. On February 24, 2022, Russia announced the start of the so-called “special military operation” against Ukraine, which turned into the largest and most destructive military conflict in Europe since the end of World War II. The human costs brought on by Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine have exceeded what either side could have expected. By the end of February 2025, 900,000 Russian troops and 500,000 Ukrainians have been killed or wounded. In addition, sexual assaults on Ukrainian women were frequent and thousands of children have been most likely deported or “evacuated” to Russia, or Russian occupied territories without their families’ consent. Again, providing signs of its shifting position on the war, the United States has also withdrawn from multinational investigation into alleged war crimes. Our experts consider it incumbent upon those rebuilding Ukraine to provide the war’s civilian victims with:

  • Free counseling and therapy
  • Support for women’s centers and clinics
  • Negotiation for the return of corpses for burial
  • Compensation for the families
  • Appropriate health care
  • Housing and jobs
  • Monitoring of these programs by international organizations

3.Realizing future ends depends on the efficacy of current strategies and tactics.

  • Current sanctions have not produced changes in the strategy or policy aims of the Russian Federation. Our experts believe that the United States and its allies have employed in an ineffective manner for the following reasons:

  • Current sanctions have expelled Russia from Western markets, but China, India, and other countries have stepped into the breach.
  •  Current sanctions have not blocked Russia's oil and gas exports on which its economy rests.
  • Current sanctions have not significantly weakened Russia's military potential: In 2022, 100 cruise missiles were produced and then used against Ukraine’s civilian facilities and infrastructure. Production of Shahed -136 UAVs has also increased sixfold compared to 2022. At the same time, according to Forbes estimates. As of January 2024, Russia produced about 115-130 strategic missiles plus 100-115 operational-tactical missiles
  • Current sanctions have increased Russian xenophobia by targeting all citizens. Their visas are being canceled; their cars abroad, registered in Russia, are being confiscated; and their bank accounts are being closed. They are also prohibited from exporting leather and fur products, cosmetics, semi-precious and precious stones, mobile phones, cameras and laptops
  • Current sanctions have actually helped solve one of the main problems of the Russian economy, namely ,capital flight abroad. In 2022 alone, $240 billion or 13% of GDP flowed out of the country. Today, capital outflow has been significantly reduced and Russian oligarchs have been returning their money to the Russian Federation.

  • Current sanctions have isolated Russia from the West. The main goal achieved by Western sanctions has been to reduce contacts, isolate and vice versa. Xenophobia has increased, Western values have lost popularity in Russia leading to more intense persecution of dissidents and blocks on resources.

4. Making Sanctions More Effective: Our experts suggest the following:

  • Focus on critical sectors of Russia’s war machine, especially technology, energy, and financial systems. Western countries should also tighten controls on technology exports, especially those that could be used for military purposes.
  • Prioritize oil and gas exports and at the same time work with European and Asian countries to reduce their dependence on Russian energy resources.
  • Prevent circumventing sanctions through third countries. China and the nations of the “global South” are proving useful to Russia in this regard. It is also necessary to strengthen controls on dual-use goods exported to Russia from these countries, as well as on cyber operations.
  • Close financial loopholes that allow Russian oligarchs and state-owned enterprises access to international capital markets, and also prevent the return of those assets to Russia. However, it is also important to make sure that these assets do not return to Russia.
  • Use sanctions in a more flexible manner: They should be imposed exclusively on Russian officials, their close associates, oligarchs and corporations, but not on ordinary Russians and the middle class. Focusing on the oligarchs will inevitably create tensions between them, but also between this elite and the majority of the country's population, which will weaken the regime.
  • Employ the “carrot and the stick:” Strengthening Russia's motivation to end military actions, and engage in serious negotiations, calls for effectively using the "carrot and stick" mechanism – employment of tough sanctions balanced with prospects for lifting them in the event of significant steps being taken towards peace.

5. Possible scenarios: Our experts have put forward the following:

  • Military conquest of territories is tacitly acknowledged, and the end of hostilities takes place without a formal peace agreement. Russia would either annex or take control over roughly 20% of Ukraine, including Crimea and Donbas, which would leave the region destabilized and Ukraine in fear of further incursions. This likely scenario would mirror the division of Cyprus.

  • Direct confrontation with NATO: That possibility is on the table, but there is an extremely low likelihood of this scenario taking shape. The European Union is speaking about creation of a continental army, but this will take time, and various members such as Hungary and Slovakia—along with right-wing political parties -- would probably create obstacles. This scenario would result in a regional and perhaps even a global confrontation that both Russia and Europe would prefer to avoid.

  • Nuclear attack is considered improbable by most of our experts given that the US has pulled back, Russia is in an advantageous military position, and Europe will have difficulty in formulating a common strategy. Yet, some experts do not rule it out, especially if Russia is faced with the loss of important territories or if it miscalculates the threat that a European nuclear arsenal might pose.

  • Russia widens the conflict: Political ambition often trumps realism: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were part of the Soviet Union [until 1991], and Putin has often expressed his desire to recreate the old empire and regain control over these states. However, this would stretch Russia’s already depleted resources even further by keeping its forces in the region and, since the Baltic states are NATO members, provoke NATO. This scenario is, therefore, unlikely and some see threats against the Baltics as mere propaganda rhetoric.

  • Other plausible options exist for Russia to apply pressure on Ukraine and the Baltic states: cyber-attacks, disinformation, and geo-political threats. These methods are less risky, and might provoke retaliation in kind, but would undoubtedly prove more effective in achieving Russia’s goals.

  • Division of spheres of influence: Division of spheres of influence or implementation of the so-called "New Yalta" or “Global Compromise”. This option has several possibilities for development, including:

  • Determining spheres of influence while isolating Russia from the West. This option can be seen as the basis for a global compromise. It is intended to prevent further escalation by achieving a new balance of power. In this case, Russia would have a sphere of influence, but would remain isolated from the West and would face Western security guarantees for what was left of Ukraine. In addition, it would continue to feel the pressure of major sanctions, which would remain in effect.

This option would lead to Russia being isolated from the West, but to a weakening of imperialist ambitions and the acceptance of a delineated sphere of influence. Meanwhile, Ukraine would be forced to surrender roughly 20% of its territory, face possible depopulation, and remain dependent on Western economic support to stay afloat, and receive security guarantees that it can only view with mistrust
 

  • Determining spheres of influence with Russia emerging from isolation. In this option Russia ends its isolation from the West by reaching an agreement with the United States that would include lifting sanctions, suspending military action, and recognizing new spheres of influence. Ukraine would be sidelined, and neutralized (without full security guarantees), NATO would be weakened and a new anti-European alliance would take shape. Russia would retain control over conquered territories and, in exchange, it would lower the costs of Russian energy and “share” Ukrainian earth minerals with the United States. With the Trump Administration in power, indeed, this is a realistic opportunity to achieve a formal peace–and yet a dangerous scenario.

Most of Ukraine would then come under the US sphere of influence, threatening its de facto sovereignty. However, the absence of a final peace agreement might create new imperialist temptations for Russia. It will also likely result in long-term instability reinforced by resentment from Ukrainian ultranationalists and possible de-legitimation of the government in a manner similar to the Weimar Republic following Germany’s defeat in World War I.

  •  This may entice Russia to violate the ceasefire with Ukraine and, acting on new divisions between the United States and Europe, intervene in Moldova and other Baltic states. Surrendering to such temptations will only increase with the weakening of NATO.
  • European acquiescence will likely aggravate the situation. The cynicism of “pragmatists” fatigued by the Russia-Ukraine war is being complimented by the pro-Russian and authoritarian proclivities of right-wing radical parties, such as “Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the “National Rally,” and illiberal nations such as France. Hungary and Slovakia. Such parties would demand that Europe endorse Trump’s tilt toward Russia, and even his anti-immigration views by rejecting Ukrainian refugees, in exchange for his administration’s defense of their battle against the institutional arrangements and political values of Europe’s democratic forces.
  • v)Europe refuses to accept "New Yalta". This scenario will lead Europe to attempt substituting itself for the United States. It will continue to finance Ukraine, alone if necessary, start its own program of military construction and rearmament, including nuclear weapons. Divisions between supporters of Russia, such as Hungary, and opponents will complicate matter. Continental rearmament will take time, enormous investment, and tensions with the United States will necessarily grow.
  • Europe cannot serve as a military or economic substitute for the United States. Europe will seek to guarantee Ukraine’s security, but without the drones, ammunition, and defense systems that the United States provided. That the European Union will be put under enormous strain is a foregone conclusion. It may consider taking a chance, and biding its time, in the hope that the United States undergoes regime change, or a change of policy in 2026 or 2028.

  • The parties to the conflict, especially Russia, have shown little interest in the US peace initiatives. Should this continue, the United States will likely withdraw from the peace process and perhaps even introduce additional sanctions against Russia, such as high duties for those countries that buy its oil and oil products. At the same time, the US will probably cut military assistance to Ukraine, or end it entirely, thus shifting the burden to Europe. Even should a deal emerge over the extraction of Ukrainian minerals, the US could decide to sell weapons to Ukraine for the money provided it by Europe. This could partially solve the problem Under such circumstances, however, the war will continue in accordance with scenarios 1-5.

  • As matters currently stand, “victory” over Russia, which Ukraine and the West seek, will require “boots on the ground.,” which can only increase the risks of an expanded war and perhaps even nuclear escalation. At the same time, the Russian peace plan implies the creation of a sanitary corridor from 4 Ukrainian regions, which is unacceptable for either Ukraine or NATO. Consequently, peace is possible only through well-considered and intelligent diplomatic pressure on both warring parties in order to force them to compromise.

6. Furthering Peace: Experts highlight key concerns that participants might consider to facilitate negotiations and, ultimately, end hostilities:

  • Introduce a new system of collective security. Introduce guarantees for collective security that would satisfy all counties in the region. This would include Russia and perhaps even lead to facilitate the strengthening of civil liberties and human rights. In this vein, negotiations should not only deal with arms control, but adopting uniform standards for minority rights. Such negotiations could be launched under the auspices of the OSCE, the Council of Europe or another international organization.
  • Publicly recognize "red lines”: Russia perceives NATO expansion as a direct threat to its security. NATO must therefore commit not to expand eastward and also discuss the status of Crimea and Donbas. This compromise can become a starting point for negotiations.
  • Provide incentives for stability: Prospects for de-escalation would improve with the introduction of economic incentives as parts of the negotiations on collective security. and peace. In both cases, however, investment and aid will depend upon the participants’ willingness to begin negotiations without preconditions.
  • Include “indirect actors” in the negotiations: Successful negotiations require multilateral diplomatic efforts and input not only from the West, but China, India, and various countries from the Global South. As the United States and Europe pressure Ukraine, these other nations can help convince Russia of the need for negotiations. Bringing such indirect actors to the table, however, should occur only if they agree to exclude extraneous issues and the pursuit of interests external to those of the actual participants.
  • Call for “freezing” the conflict: Full resolution of tensions will probably take years, but a temporary cessation of hostilities is possible. This would involve freezing the conflict in a manner that would result in a situation similar to what exists on the Korean Peninsula and create the foundation for negotiations over a long-term peace settlement. However, employing this approach makes sense only if both sides suspend their preconditions for engaging in talks.
  • Seek democratic reform of the Russian Federation: Experts note that regime change in Russia or significant weakening of the current leadership, could create opportunities for negotiations. The West can facilitate this process by increasing economic and political pressure, as well as supporting public initiatives and political movements within Russia that advocate for peace. But this would require great delicacy: what might be seen as interfering with the politics of a sovereign state could provoke a robust response. The best way to avoid this is by abandoning sanctions that negatively impact everyday Russian citizens.

7. Discrete Prospects:

  • The USA: The old alliance between the United States and Europe is currently at a low point, and policies are in flux. It is necessary to begin by assuming: 1) “neo-isolationism” has led the United States to withdraw from numerous international agencies and treaties; 2) With its policy “America First!”, the United States is ready to “go it alone;” 3) “transactional” benefits will determine the policies of the Trump Administration as in “sharing” Ukrainian mineral rights; 4 ) presidential “unpredictability” is built into current American foreign policy that has shifted from support for Ukraine to Russia. Should circumstances change, it might well shift back again to Ukraine—especially should a Democratic administration take office. 
  • Tempering current policy choices by the USA might occur through creating new terms for rehabilitating the old Western alliance: 1) exchange reduction of tariffs for greater economic contributions to NATO; 2) cease interfering in the working of European democracy, through public support for illiberal forces on the right, on pain of turning the isolation of America into a self-fulfilling prophecy; 3) drive wedges between Russia’s “BRICS” allies (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South America); 4) negotiate a new nuclear deal with Iran, which also supports Russia.
  • Scenarios: The most important questions facing the Trump Administration involve the extent to which it will support Ukraine’s ultimate recovery and what position it will take on the “new Cold War” between the Western Alliance and BRICS. Its present policy of pressuring Ukraine to enter negotiations by threatening cuts in aid, or even its abolition, is being thwarted by Russia’s attempt to secure leverage through a new military offensive: there seems no general strategy designed to deal with this situation. Finally, how will it react, if Russia’s territorial demands are such that Ukraine cannot agree without abandoning its sovereignty
  • Europe: NATO and the EU must confront the same problem that plagued American foreign policy to Ukraine before Trump took office: aid to Ukraine is crucial for Europe’s geo-political security, but such financial support cannot go on forever. NATO and the EU will thus need to develop a strategy that does not rely on the United States as their military bulwark against Russia.

Tempering these developments is predicated on Europe developing an independent policy toward the Russia-Ukraine War; in addition to bringing Ukraine to the table, perhaps through using “the carrot and the stick,” NATO will need to decide on the ends that any given tactic are meant to serve or, to put it another way, what will be the status of Ukraine after cessation of hostilities. It might also accept increased financial responsibility for its defense, and favorable economic incentives for the United States, in exchange for continuing an (uncertain) alliance. Europe can also shift its gaze to the weaker nations that the United States is offending – Canada, Mexico, Panama—while striking its own deal with separate members of BRICS.

Scenarios: Everything hinges on the fundamental question: Can European security afford the dismemberment of Ukraine and successful Russian expansion? Is Ukraine the “red line” that its enemy dare not cross? If so then to what extent is Europe ready to provide the requisite economic and military assistance? Is it able to withstand the anti-democratic tendencies in its own ranks, emanating from right-wing extremist movements, and overcome divisions between its member states in order to participate in ending the war on its own terms?
 

Europe could attempt to build its own army, or nuclear arsenal though the former will take time (that Europe does not have), and face conflicts between member states, while the latter might raise prospects for an international conflagration. Finally, it can gamble by “treading water,” either doing nothing or a little bit of everything, while waiting for Republicans to suffer setbacks in the congressional elections of 2026 and if they lose the White House in 2028.

  • Russia: will not enter into negotiations, according to most of our experts, and instead – most likely –escalate the war if forced out of the Ukrainian regions it has occupied, such as Crimea. To admit defeat, or sue for peace, would probably presage the regime’s collapse – and, to forestall that, its leaders might resort to a general mobilization or even the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Tempering this reality could occur through regime change or President Putin’s death. Either could result in a sharp change in foreign policy, which has occurred more than once in Russian history. Russia might even return its occupied territories to Ukraine—other than Crimea. However, such drastic changes might also cause Russia to disintegrate. This would revive nationalist sentiments throughout the region, create economic instability, and inspire separatist movements throughout the former empire.

Scenarios: If the conflict is frozen, Russia will maintain control over part of Ukrainian territory, remain isolated from the West, even while economic sanctions will not remain in place. Maintaining the status quo might increase Russia’ s regional influence, but it will not lead to significant economic improvements or restoration of relations with the West. Victory over Ukraine, by contrast, will make it the hegemonic power in the region, and turn Ukraine into a client state. This may also feed greater imperialist ambitions, but Russia will need to expend significant resources in propping up a puppet regime and suppressing resistance. Moreover, sanctions will probably remain in place since Russia will appear an even greater threat. Russia’s triumph might also produce a renaissance of Western cooperation and leave it in the neo-isolationist position of the United States.

Whatever the war’s outcome, many experts agree, Russia will draw closer to its authoritarian, Eastern allies, especially China and India, including other members of BRICS and the SCO. It may also draw closer to the United States.This may soften the impact of Western sanctions, but Russia will then need to rely more on its own domestic resources to maintain its independence and sovereignty—thus resulting in economic stagnation, decline of living standards, and loss of any competitive edge in developing new technology.

Securing a multilateral alliance by turning to the East will, most likely, revive the prospect of a Western alliance. This will probably result in a “new” cold war and a multi-polar world that would threaten the West with the loss of its dominant role.

  • Ukraine: This imperiled nation will likely experience the continuation of hostilities with numerous temporary suspensions and breaks during periods of negotiation. Keeping this war in limbo projects deteriorating socio-economic conditions, depletion of military resources, and possible regional de-stabilization. Ongoing war might also produce mass protests, regime change, with a growing acceptance of with maximum concessions.

Ukraine could turn into a neutral state, or buffer zone between Russia and the West. This option assumes that Ukraine will not become part of NATO and the EU, but that it will receive security guarantees from the USA, France, Germany, and maybe China. In exchange for this, Kiev would probably be forced to make territorial concessions to Russia, recognizing the loss of Crimea and some parts of Donbas. Ukraine would retain its independence, but without restoration of its territorial integrity. Thus, it would remain in a state of political uncertainty and under the threat of further interference from Russia.

Should Ukraine survive the war, however, it will further integrate with the EU and NATO. This could strengthen its democracy as well as attract significant economic investment for post-war reconstruction. The West could then view Ukraine as a strategic bulwark against Russia. However, this scenario would generate significant resistance and further escalation – or re-escalation -- of the conflict by Russia.

Should the conflict remain frozen, however, Ukraine will lose territory, and face long-term instability, even as it simultaneously attempts to rebuild its economy and defensive capacities. It will thus continue to depend upon external assistance to maintain its sovereignty in the face of constant threats from Russia, and lack of a decisive peace agreement.

8.Strategic Options:

The geo-political future of Russia and Ukraine depends on how the conflict between them is resolved. The reluctance to make a real compromise involving the conquered and claimed territories, the risk of nuclear escalation, and a tough confrontation with the West, coupled with the failure to achieve a clear military, is having disastrous effects on both nations. But that is especially the case with Ukraine whose infrastructure has been destroyed, sovereignty compromised, and citizenry shattered by bombing. Excepting the unpredictable consequences of military defeat or domestic implosion, by contrast, Russia will likely keep its leading position on the world stage, albeit to a more or less limited extent. According to a number of our experts, in fact, Russia will sooner or later return to the European economy and the European political scene.

A “global compromise” might be undertaken, but this would call for territorial deals, participation in military blocs, security guarantees, and advocacy for the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine and the rest of the region. Sanctions may also become subject to compromise and perhaps even their abolition. A strategy of this sort would make it possible for Russia to “sell” peace to its citizens, and proclaim “Russia’s victory in the war against the collective West.” That is not as superficial as it sounds: “saving face” is crucial for any authoritarian regime in which the national interest is identified with that of the leader. However, neither Russia nor Ukraine are ready for a global compromise today, because it contradicts their peace plans. Therefore, for now this option can be considered hypothetical, requiring serious lobbying efforts from the mediators.

The current conflict is the result of mutual mistrust, contested ideological narratives, failure to adapt to a changing world, and, most importantly, underestimation of the potential for sustained armed conflict. Russia underestimated Ukraine’s military and diplomatic potential, the West’s readiness to give up its lucrative relations with Russia, including cheap energy supplies, and its willingness to provide multi-billion-dollar aid packages to Kiev in order to advance its geopolitical interests and protect democratic values. Moscow also underestimated the will of the Ukrainian people to resist. Meanwhile, the West underestimated Russia’s reaction to NATO's advance to the East, its self-sufficiency, its resolve to reclaim its former glory, its readiness to sacrifice citizens and resources, and its willingness to sever lucrative economic ties with the West – all in the name of security and territorial ambitions.

Western sanctions have proven to be practically ineffective. They have failed to undermine the Russian economy, failed to undermine the Russian defense industry, and have not caused mass anti-government protests. If the West expects sanctions to be more effective, it needs to focus on coordinating them better and focusing them on sectors that are critical to Russia’s military capacity, solving problems connected with of circumventing them through third countries, and abandoning non-selective sanctions against both Russian citizens and the Russian-speaking population in the countries of the anti-Russian bloc.

9. Basics of Strategy:

Debates over strategy will continue, but our experts believe that dealing with certain core issues are preconditions for any sustainable cessation of hostilities. These include:

  • Acknowledging that the Western alliance might collapse: That is a real possibility given the “transactional” and neo-isolationist policies of the new U.S. Administration. President Donald Trump’s foreign policy is based on unpredictability, lack of transparency, impatience, and transactional hopes: he wants to achieve success at breakneck speed. President Vladimir Putin’s stubbornness in making a deal could fuel Trump’s impatience, leading him to push even harder on both sides, with potentially unpredictable consequences ranging from incremental moves toward Russia, to forcing Ukraine to give up more territory, to escalating the conflict.
  • Negotiating a new collective security arrangement that can speak to Russian and Ukrainian concerns over sovereignty as well as the rights of minorities living in the region. But that cannot occur should “war fatigue” triumph based on ignorance of what is at stake and the complexities in bringing about peace. In some European countries and the US, far-right and left-wing forces with ever greater governmental influence are advocating an end to Ukrainian aid and normalization of relations with Russia. Western support for Ukraine remains critical to its sovereignty and territorial integrity, however, no less than its ability to serve as a democratic bulwark and deterrent to further aggressive moves by Russia.
  • Creating a new system of collective security in Europe. This will call for strengthening (while refashioning) NATO, unifying the continent’s defensive capacities, fostering further interconnectivity between members, and prioritizing a military, nuclear, or cyber tools in response to the new direction of American foreign policy. Shaping the geo-political future, however, will depend not only on the outcome of the Ukrainian conflict, but ultimate result of internal ideological-political dynamics within the Western democracies, and their decisions in dealing with the BRICS alliance.
  • Designing a new global compromise in which parties to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the countries supporting them, can agree on a new systemic arrangement that considers the interests of all concerned parties and the rights of minorities. In this scenario, Ukraine will probably play the role of a neutral buffer, or continue to integrate with the West, but either possibility implies dependence on Western assurances with respect to its sovereignty. Russia will undoubtedly retain at least 20% of Ukraine, call for its own security assurances from NATO, demand the lifting of sanctions, and some help in reconstructing its conquered territories. The realism of such a scenario depends largely on the policies of the new American administration. It is important to understand that the Global Compromise will imply a new world order built on a new system of collective security encompassing the United States, Europe and the BRICS countries.

10: Concluding Thoughts:

Flaws in the architecture of the unipolar world of the 1990s have led to the absence of instruments capable of preventing conflicts such as that taking place between Russia and Ukraine. The future may well portend the destruction of the old and the creation of a new world order. The strength of the European security arrangement that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet bloc is being tested right now in Ukraine’s resistance against Russia’s invasion of its territory and imperialist attack on its sovereignty. It will need new strategies to deal with the uncertainties and vagaries of American foreign policy.

Ending the impasse calls for serious diplomatic efforts by third countries – Western countries, on which Ukraine depends economically, politically and militarily, as well as China, which has increasing influence on Russia. The efforts of NGOs can also play an important role. The most available option is freezing the conflict, which preserves the risks of resuming and even escalating the war, but creates opportunities for future peace negotiations and perhaps even global compromise that would produce a new system of collective security to replace the old post-war treaties and agreements that have lost their relevance. Military and political factors, human rights and national interests, will remain decisive in bringing that about.

As things currently stand, prospects for ending the Russian-Ukrainian conflict remain slim, since both the Ukrainian and Russian peace plans do not include compromise and mutual concessions. None of the existing options for ending the conflict will either terminate existing tensions or restore the status quo ante. The need for a new global security architecture, a new world order, is almost self-evident. However, all principal participants in the conflict resist that conclusion. They remain captive to outmoded ideological narratives, which is precisely the reason why a new network capable of providing independent experts peace initiatives is necessary.

Signatories:

Dr. David Abraham (USA), Professor Emeritus School of Law: University of Miami; Ms. Haneen Alawawadeh; (The Hague), UN/Global Human Rights Defense; Mr. Ruslan Bortnik (Ukraine), Director of the Ukrainian Institute of Politics; Dr. Stephen Eric Bronner, Director of the International Council for Diplomacy and Dialogue; Dr. Jean Yves Camus (France). President of the Observatory of Political Radicalism/ Fondation Jean-Jaurès, Researcher in the Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques; Dr. Lawrence Davidson (USA), Professor Emeritus of History at West Chester University; Dr. Attila Demkó (Hungary), Head of the Centre for Geopolitics at Mathias Corvinus Collegium; Dr. John Ehrenberg (USA), Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Long Island University; Dr.Valery Engel, President of the European Council for Democracy Development; Dr. Michael Forman (USA): Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Washington: Tacoma; Dr. Sophia Howlett (USA) President of the School for International Training; Dr. Kurt Jacobsen (USA): Research Associate: Program on International Politics, Economics, and Security; Department of Political Science, University of Chicago; Dr. James Jennings (USA), President of Conscience International; Dr. Christian Kaunert (Ireland) Professor of International Security at Dublin City University; Director of the Jean Monnet Network on EU Counter-Terrorism; Dr. Mario Kessler (Germany), Senior Fellow am Leibniz-Zentrum für historische Forschung, Professor of European History: University of Potsdam; Mr. Igor Kotler, (USA) President of the Museum of Human Rights, Freedom, and Tolerance; Dr. Michael Macdonald (USA), Frederick L. Schuman Professor of International Relations: Williams College; Dr. Adam Muller (Canada), Director of the Peace and Conflict Studies, Program/University of Manitoba; Mr. Gaston Ocampo (Portugal): Secretary General of the Institute for the Promotion of Latin America and the Caribbean; Dr. Uwe Optenhögel (Germany): Vice-President of the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS); Ms. Marina Peneuva (Switzerland): European Center for Democracy Development; Dr. Manfred Steger, Professor and Chair of Spociology, University of Hawa’ii-Manoa; Dr. Sergej Tolstov, (Ukraine), Head of the Department of Transatlantic Studies, Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine; Mr. Thierry Valle (France) Director of CAP pour la Liberté de Conscience